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

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The Modern Teachers' Series

EDITED BY WILLIAM C. BAGLEY

A SOCIOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

The Modern Teachers' Series

WILLIAM C. BAGLEY, *Editor*

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A SOCIOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

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BY

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New York
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1928

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Set up and electrotyped. Published February, 1928.

Norwood Press
J. S. Cushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co.
Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.

PREFACE

THE distinguishing feature of this book is its sociological point of view. Its premises are derived from *social* psychology. The facts of mental interdependence — facts that, to be recognized, have only to be attentively observed — make it obvious that the individualistic psychology now so generally in vogue is one sided and misleading. So also, therefore, is the philosophy of life and society that is inferred from it.

To the establishment of the sociological point of view the first nine chapters of the book are devoted. The basic idea is the tendency of human minds to learn from one another, through a sort of semipassive mentation that results naturally from the social process. This *is* education in the broadest sense of the word; and from it result human nature and social organization, which are but two aspects of the same thing. From it results, also, social evolution, since whatever item of fact is discovered by any individual soon becomes the common property of all. Thus the cognitive capital by which men live accumulates from age to age.

The aim and content of formal education must be the same, therefore, as the aim and content of the social process; and the method too, so far as possible. The sociological attack upon the old problems of aim, content, and method gives us conclusions somewhat different from those just now in fashion, especially as mental interdependence, passive learning, and mass mentation are stressed in the premises.

The central idea of the book is the "telic" function of education. Whatever is put into the school process of to-day comes out in the social process of to-morrow. Within limits, education is the guiding factor in social change. Therefore the educators are running not merely the schools, but, in the long run, the world itself. The control of the collective life is passing from the soldiers, diplomats, politicians, and ecclesiastics to the scientists, scholars, and educators.

The part of the book subsequent to Chapter IX is devoted to the applications of these general principles. Chapters X, XI, and XII are type studies of the telic effects that education can have upon the institutions of society. Chapters XIII to XVII, inclusive, elaborate the telic influences of certain curricular subjects. Next (Chapters XVIII to XXII) comes the problem of social classes, including the questions of leadership in a democratic society, and how the masses can be induced to follow those most competent to lead them wisely. Here the argument takes definite issue with the theories now in fashion, maintaining the normality of passive mentation, especially in the duller masses, and advocating for them a memoriter, regimental type of pedagogy quite out of harmony with the current cults. In Chapters XXIII, XXIV, and XXV the order-progress dilemma is attacked; for which, of course, there never can be a final solution. Every age will doubtless lean too heavily on one foot or the other; but the position is here maintained that it is progress to the neglect of order which our *Zeitgeist* overappreciates. The last two chapters are devoted to topics that could not be omitted.

This book is presented to the educational public with apologies for the shortcomings that must inevitably char-

acterize such a work, but with the hope, nevertheless, that it may contribute something constructive to our contemporaneous thinking about education, and thus, indirectly toward the betterment of life.

Ross L. Finney.

University of Minnesota,
January, 1928.

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

In the following chapters, Dr. Finney presents an interpretation of educational aims and values differing at some important points from the tenets and teachings now generally accepted as guiding principles in American schools. His book will be welcomed, I am sure, by all teachers and other students of education who are open-minded in their attitude and keen to view their professional problems in the light of every reasonable hypothesis.

Against a substantial background comprising the facts, principles, and postulates of sociology, Dr. Finney projects the possibilities and limitations of education. Even those of us who are not sociologists will readily agree, not only that the materials of education are social in their origin and that the process of education is itself very largely a social process, but also that the aims and purposes of education must be expressed primarily in terms of social values and social ideals. Values and ideals are in the province of philosophy rather than in the field of exact science. Both the philosopher with a sociological bent and the sociologist with a philosophical flair should be in a position to give us real help. When we find agreements in the two types of guidance we may be fairly confident of our ground; when we find radical disagreement we may well hesitate to take a dogmatic or a doctrinaire attitude on either side. But both sides, surely, we should know and ponder.

Fortunately our author makes it a pleasant task for one to become acquainted with his side of the question. The reader will be impressed with the vigor and terseness of Dr. Finney's writing, and by the striking, epigrammatic phrases in which he so frequently compresses a thought of far-reaching significance. "Our little once," for example, packs into three words a tremendous meaning, — and a meaning fraught with momentous responsibilities for education. And yet, as he says, "It is better to be right than to be original," and it is certainly better to be clear and lucid than merely to be eloquent. Here there is no "darkening of counsel by words without knowledge." If anyone prominent in present-day educational writing is at once insistent upon and felicitous in calling a spade a spade it is the author of this book. Most heartily do we commend him and his work to our readers.

William C. Bagley.

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A SOCIOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

CHAPTER I

A BRIEF FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

On the first page of his *Pragmatism,* William James quotes the following from Chesterton's *Heretics:*

> There are some people, and I am one of them, who think that the most practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think for a landlady considering a lodger it is important to know his income, but it is still more important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy it is important to know the enemy's numbers, but it is still more important to know the enemy's philosophy. We think the question is not whether the theory of the cosmos affects matters; but whether in the long run anything else affects them. . . .

"I think with Mr. Chesterton in this matter," adds Professor James, than whom no person has contributed more toward the scientizing of our modern beliefs about human nature and man's relationships in the universe. It is in some such spirit as this that the present work is undertaken. Ours is an age of science. The inductive technique of objective research dominates the work of the intellect; and an amazing array of new knowledge is forthcoming as a result. And precisely for that reason there is more rather than less call for the work of the philosopher. To show that this is true,

and of sociology and education in particular, is the task of this initial chapter.

But before we can proceed it is necessary to arrive at a clear understanding as to what we mean by philosophy. In academic circles, the word usually suggests metaphysics; to which the typical reaction nowadays is that "philosophy bakes no bread." This attitude may or may not be justified, depending upon whether the work of the particular metaphysician is really constructive or not. Doubtless, it is a waste of time and energy to thresh over old straw. But because the only metaphysical creeds in sight, namely, the old ones, have become more or less incredible, is poor justification for snap judgment to the effect that we have no use for metaphysics at all. On the contrary, the chaos of circumstance and the conflict of will in which we so frequently find ourselves are often due to metaphysical maladjustment, subconsciously held, albeit. For example, that enormous waste of energy, miscarriage of morals, and obstruction to intellectual progress involved in our contemporaneous squabble over fundamentalism could all be obviated by clarification in the public thought of one or two metaphysical concepts. Still, with philosophy, in the sense of metaphysics, we are not here concerned, however useful a function it may still have to perform.

In circles devoted to science and scientific research, the word philosophy carries another meaning; and it is this meaning which is chiefly responsible for throwing philosophy into the shadows of an ill repute. The word is often used for a priori reasoning about problems, to the solution of which inductive methods might be applied instead. Philosophy in this sense of the word deserves all the disapproval and

contempt it draws, of course. But this is no excuse for becoming logically entangled in the *word* philosophy to the extent of blinding oneself to the value of really fruitful intellectual work just because there seems to be no other label for such work than this same *word* philosophy.

But what, now, is that sort of intellectual work which is really fruitful but for which we seem to have no better name than the word philosophy? It is that *careful, critical, systematic work of the intellect in the formulation of beliefs, with the aim of making them represent the highest degree of probability, in face of the fact that adequate data are not obtainable for strictly demonstrable conclusions.* It will be observed that this is a statement of method and technique rather than a delimitation of problem phenomena. It is for such work that this chapter is a brief; and it is to such work that this whole book will be devoted.

The felt need which this word philosophy has been commandeered to satisfy is one that arises from an ambiguity in the term scientific. Sometimes the word science is stretched to cover any inquiry whatsoever, provided only that the methods of procedure be systematic, even though that inquiry may be expected from the outset to result only in what Karl Pearson[1] calls beliefs with but slight balance of probability. Usually, however, the word connotes the sort of end results that he calls knowledge, as well as the technical procedure by which that knowledge is achieved. Devotees of science, in their ardor to promote the prestige of their deity, are wont — and wisely so, as a rule — to select problems for the solution of which there is a prospect of demonstrable conclusions, eschewing such problems as promise

[1] *The Grammar of Science*, p. 59.

slight prospect of that sort. But such eclecticism leaves large fields uncultivated. The cultivation of these neglected fields is what remains, therefore, to those who, because of the element of conjecture that must remain in whatever conclusions they are able to reach, are modestly willing, even in an age when science is exclusively in fashion, to call themselves philosophers. Their claim to recognition and respect lies, however, in the obvious fact that even the provisional findings of careful, critical, systematic work upon such problems are preferable to the obviously false beliefs that would otherwise prevail unchallenged. Half a loaf is better than no bread!

We are blinded to the vast extent of the fields in which our knowledge is not yet scientific by the dazzling brightness of what science has actually achieved during the past few decades; just as the bright lights of a motor car that one meets in the night divert one's attention from the illimitable darkness round about. As a matter of fact, most of the practical problems of life are still left in the gray shadows of partial conjecture, despite the amazing growth of scientific knowledge in many fields. The moral, cultural, and vocational nurture of our children, the conduct of our business and family affairs, the budgeting of our expenses, the management of our friendships and other personal relations, all issues in politics, morals, and religion, the selection of life's dominating interests, and most of the other practical problems of everyday life are still in the twilight of common sense, empirical insight, and shrewd guesswork. The general policies of society are selected on much the same basis of incertitude. Problems relating to immigration, taxation, tariff, crime, transportation, monopolies, constitutional

amendments, international treaties, and what not, are examples. More or less factual material is always available, to be sure, but seldom enough to provide for an air-tight diagnosis and treatment of the case. The practical task of the intellect is, therefore, to reduce the element of conjecture to the minimum; but that minimum is almost never zero.

The need for a term to cover that sort of inquiry which is not strictly scientific is suggested by Karl Pearson in that excursion of his into the field of epistemology and logic which he has called *A Grammar of Science*. Presenting his fourth canon of legitimate inference, in the second chapter, he says:

> While it is reasonable in the minor actions of life, where rapidity of decision is important, to infer on slight evidence and believe on small balances of probability, it is opposed to the true interests of society to take as a permanent standard of conduct a belief based on inadequate testimony.

But it is a fact that the large concerns of social life, no less than the minor actions of individual behavior, force upon us innumerable situations in which "decision is needful but the probability is not so overwhelming as to amount to knowledge." In such cases, to be sure, the beliefs upon which we are forced to act should be regarded as tentative, rather than as "permanent standards of conduct." To formulate such tentative beliefs, and do it in such a way as to make them at least not inconsistent with what actual knowledge we do possess, is a very important and useful sort of intellectual work, therefore, even though the certitude of its conclusions be somewhat less than scientific.

The need for tentative solutions where finality is as yet impossible arises out of the very nature of life itself.

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος was a very fascinating metaphysical postulate; but the practical fact is that *Im Anfang war der That.* In the evolution of life action *preceded* thought; and there is a sense in which it will always have to do so, even in human life. "Life lies deeper than logic." Driven by the needs of life, we are constrained to do just something. Whether we know what is the best thing to be done or not, something we are bound to do in any case. If existence would refrain from imposing upon us the necessity for action in advance of full and complete knowledge of the problems involved, we should have no need for guesswork. But the needs of darkened life can never wait for daylight. Problems of individual and social life can almost never wait for certitude. Some sort of a decision just has to be made, and the program carried forward. For example, there are the problems of curriculum making in education and criminal treatment in applied sociology. We do have a very considerable accumulation of objective data bearing on these problems; but the most careful scientists would themselves be the very last to claim that such data are adequate to strictly scientific solutions. Nor are they likely to be in the near future, no matter how diligently research is directed upon them. Nevertheless, society is under the practical necessity of going forward with some program or other in each of these cases. The alternatives are never, as the devotees of science so often act as if they supposed, between tentative and demonstrable conclusions. In actual social practice, the alternatives are the tentative though carefully scrutinized findings of what is here denominated philosophy, and the obviously false beliefs of the popular mythologies. The public can never wait for strictly scientific solutions, but is

compelled by the very nature of life itself to proceed upon the basis of tentative conclusions. Such is ever the tyranny of human circumstance. Always it has been so in the past; and it will continue to be so as long as human knowledge remains incomplete. If philosophical method means the most careful search for the most probable guess, there will always remain good work for the philosopher.

This need for working postulates accounts for that great mass of popular beliefs which constitute such an important part of our social heritage. When no solutions are at hand for the problems of nature and of life, then men, children, and savages proceed to fabricate imaginary solutions. And, moreover, they boldly proceed to live thereby. They have to! Thus it came to pass that our ancestors guessed, and then acted accordingly. Afterward they remembered their guesses and, if they had worked fairly well, believed in them. Thus beliefs accumulated in all fields of human activity. Not critically scrutinized, they often contained only "a core of truth in things erroneous"; but often that core of truth represented sufficient pragmatic validity to keep the beliefs afloat for centuries. Naturally each generation inherited the accumulated beliefs of the past; and fortunately so, for the most part, since the alternative would have been utter intellectual darkness. A half light is better than no vision; besides, light is something that has to evolve, like the coral. As a result of this process of accumulation and transmission, even we moderns, like all our forbears, live in a medium of inherited popular beliefs covering every conceivable problem and phenomenon of our life and environment. This gratuitous heritage of beliefs purports to explain all cosmic, racial, and social origins; to account for almost all natural

and social phenomena; to justify our customs, moral codes, and institutions. We have beliefs that provoke hostility or inspire hospitality toward proposed social changes; beliefs that generate either optimism or pessimism toward life, society, and the future; beliefs that make us love or hate our fellow-men for no good reason; beliefs for the defense of which we would die imagining ourselves martyrs to a holy cause. About everything, little or great, trivial or important, objective or subjective, natural or social, we have our generally prevalent beliefs, our body of popular mythology, even in this age of science. Indeed, in the fields of psychology, anthropology, economics, political science, sociology, history, law, education, ethics, philosophy, art, and religion, much of what we pass out as academically accredited information has a rather limited core of scientifically determined findings. These great bodies of academic teachings have all been more or less carefully winnowed, to be sure; but much of their content is still capable of improvement by research and re-synthesis.

If such popular beliefs are to be included among what William James called views of the universe — as unquestionably they must — then he was not far from right in contending that in the long run nothing else bakes any bread. For these beliefs are to the social process what its channel is to a river; they determine its course. To be sure, customs and institutions gradually produce beliefs about themselves, much as rivers dig their own channels; but at any given stage of social evolution the beliefs then in existence determine the social forms and processes of the present and the immediate future. If customs or institutions are to be reformed it is first necessary to dig for them new channels of popular

belief. Secure the prevalence of new beliefs, and new programs of collective behavior will result; indeed, not otherwise can social changes be originated — except by sheer coercion. Its prevalent beliefs are, therefore, among the most important possessions of any society, since they cause the programs of social behavior to be this instead of that.

If the popular beliefs contain a large element of error, public discomfort, distress, or disaster will result. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that civilization be constantly at work upon the enterprise of purging its current beliefs.

And this need is far greater in dynamic periods of change, like the present, than it is in static times, for the simple reason that new conditions vacate traditional explanations. The old theories explained the old phenomena, and furnished a *modus vivendi* for the old régime. But when the old phenomena have ceased to exist, and the old régime has passed away, beliefs that once had life become but spectral ghosts. The new death-rate, for example, has removed the need for a high birth-rate, making it a menace instead of a necessity as it used to be; so the old beliefs about birth control do not fit the new situation. The rise of democracy has imposed entirely new aims upon secondary education, so that the curriculum which was inherited from the secondary schools of the European aristocracy is a wasteful misfit; and yet our transition to an appropriate philosophy of objectives remains painfully slow and discouraging. And such cases could be multiplied almost without limit. In static times the old beliefs suffice; but in changing times the new conditions antiquate the old beliefs and require them to

be shaken through the sieve of criticism, and life thought out *de novo*.

But in our day there is a second reason for this need, and that is the enormous accumulation of new scientific knowledge. New data have vacated many of our old beliefs and rendered them untenable; as a result our systems will have to be rebuilt in such a way as to incorporate the new knowledge instead. The discoveries of Darwin and others, for example, have undermined many of our old religious beliefs; and religious leaders are confronted with the problem of reconstructing theology to harmonize therewith. Similarly, the discoveries of Pasteur have undermined many of our old beliefs about disease; and our medical men have been busying themselves ever since with the task of working out for us a new body of beliefs about the care of health. And this is true in every field of life. Science has invented so many improvements that it looks as if philosophy would have to redesign and reconstruct the whole intellectual machinery of life. Adam Smith rationalized the old domestic system just as it was passing out; and his a priori ratiocination fits the modern corporations, with their interlocking directorates and international connections, as buster kilts would fit a football star. Besides, there is the new statistical method of fact finding! In politics we are not so sure as we used to be that *vox populi vox dei est* when it comes to tariff schedules, the income tax, and railroad regulation. Besides, there are the I.Q.'s, and the distribution curves. In religion there are the new and complicated human relationships to be idealized; and besides, there are the Trinil and the Heidelberg skulls! As for life's fundamental valuations, how can we modern city dwellers take our philosophies

of life from the rural Puritans of the eighteenth century? And besides, there are movies, the radio, and the automobile! New conditions and new knowledge have set us at sixes and sevens; and at sixes and sevens we are doomed to remain until we are able to achieve a new synthesis of thought.

And in no phase of modern life is the need for a new philosophy more obtrusive than in our changing education. To minds sufficiently abstracted from the educational process itself so that they can consider its aims objectively, the conflict and confusion are oppressive in the extreme. With one hand we are stupidly clinging to traditional subjects that have outlived their usefulness, while with the other we grope blindly after new curricular fads. We exalt pedagogical method at the expense of subject matter, because we are uncertain as to the value of what we are teaching and the aims we wish to achieve. Such issues are hopeless, of course, until we establish a philosophy of objectives. The policies that democracy would impose upon our schools are at antipodal variance with the policies that business would impose; and we have no ultimate concepts by which to solve the dilemma. Most educators are, indeed, so close to the details as to be quite unaware that there is such a dilemma. We hear a great deal of talk about teaching children to think independently; and just as much talk at the same time about the considerable percentage of children who are hopelessly incapable of thinking. And nobody comes forward with a theory of democratic education into which both of these concepts will fit harmoniously. In our liberal arts colleges all sorts of traditional absurdities, futile freaks, and random lunges are being perpetrated because of our fragmentary and scattered notions as to what

such colleges are for; and as a rule the very premises are lacking from which cogent thinking might proceed. In short, out of a confusion of premises — subconsciously held for the most part — there arises a chaos of policy. And this lamentable situation obtains in a critical period of social change when clear principles and sound policies in education are our only hope for the success of democracy, not to say for the permanence of civilization. A new philosophy is therefore our deepest need in education, as it is in all phases of our modern life.

For such a new philosophy of education, the time is fully ripe. It would seem that the course of social movements is analogous to the integration of neural coördinations. When a new situation presents itself, a great variety of random movements occur, from among which some one finally emerges as satisfactory, through the mediation of more or less overt attention, and is adopted as the basis of the new coördination. In social readjustments a similar series occurs in the behavior of the social mind.[1] For some time the new situation is met by crude experiments. Eventually, however, there occurs the crystallization of a new theory in the minds of group leaders, corresponding to the work of conscious attention. This new theory furnishes the new principle around which a new program of social behavior can be integrated. And that is exactly the point at which we find ourselves in education. An utterly new and radically different situation, so far as education is concerned, has been created by scientific, industrial, and democratic developments. For a century we have been making a great variety

[1] Throughout this book the term social mind will be used to mean that body of mental contents which is held in common by members of the group, and through the use of which group action is made possible. No metaphysical implications are intended.

of more or less random movements — like a white rat in a maze — in our attempt to effect a suitable readjustment. But to date we have found no guiding principle; and of that lack we are now keenly aware. As H. G. Wells expresses it in *Joan and Peter*, "What are the schools up to, anyhow?" The need above all other needs is a clear and valid concept of the new aims of education in this new social situation. Then things would crystallize, and a new educational co-ordination might be expected to result at once. Sincere and serious attempts at a re-synthesis of educational philosophy should be regarded, therefore, as the natural product of the present situation. And the same is true in other fields as well.

Now this work of providing the present age with guiding theories of the highest pragmatic validity in the new situations, involves two distinct and radically different kinds of intellectual labor. The aim of the one is to uncover new facts; the aim of the other is *to reorganize our prevailing beliefs in such a way as to incorporate those new facts.* The one is research; the other is resynthesis. Old beliefs, like old machines, have to be taken apart and put together again, new parts being put in the place of those that are worn out or antiquated. This work is not research. Research differs from this kind of work as the invention of new contrivances for automobiles — the dry clutch, the vacuum feed, the Bendix drive — differs from the redesigning of the old models so as to include the new contrivances. And the more of such inventions there are, the more of such redesigning there must follow. Similarly, the more the findings of research in the various fields of science, the greater becomes the need of piecing those findings together into a new *modus*

vivendi for practical affairs. Research is increasing rather than decreasing the need for philosophical work. This cannot be too emphatically nor too insistently asserted. The more science we have, the more we need philosophy — and especially in progressive times like these. Far from being a symptom of intellectual stagnation, philosophical work is the indispensable prerequisite to a successful realignment. If philosophers work with viable minds, they deserve their full measure of appreciation.

And yet it often happens that those scientists who are the most diligent in piling up new work in front of the philosopher are the very persons who seem most bent on driving him away from it. They exhort him, forsooth, to turn scientist himself! But new facts do not replace just automatically old illusions in our systems of belief. Research is not resynthesis; and the one is as necessary as the other. Between these two kinds of workers there is no occasion for any negative appreciation. Indeed, inventors ought to rejoice to see their inventions installed; for otherwise, invention itself would soon come to a standstill. In this world of division of labor, there is scant excuse for even the head to say to the hand: What need have I for thee? Such an attitude is akin to fanaticism.

There is still another need for philosophical work, and one that arises out of the very nature of scientific research itself, namely, to scrutinize and rectify the assumptions involved in the procedure of research. For all scientific work is unavoidably shot through and through with assumptions. In mathematics these assumptions are overtly recognized as axioms. In the fields of the new humanities this element requires very special attention, because the assumptions

are so very likely to escape the investigator's notice. The reason is that in education, sociology, and related disciplines, the scientific investigator is working in an atmosphere of popular beliefs and professional cults which leak into his procedure through every crack in his logic. Beliefs naïvely derived from this surrounding medium of the social mind — sometimes from the mental stock of *hoi polloi,* sometimes from the traditional dogmas of his own profession — are thus inadvertently introduced as assumptions. Nothing is more usual than for accredited scholars to "float upon the social currents without even attempting to become aware of them." The result is that they very often advance opinions as the findings of science which are "so obviously those of their race, country, and social class that one can only smile at their naïveté." Since this is so it ill behooves the votaries of educational and social science to strut too proudly, or call their peers such nasty names as "fundamentalists," "temperamental traditionalists," and the like.[1]

The most competent scientific workers are, of course, the most careful to scrutinize their assumptions. But in the social sciences, for the reasons just mentioned, the ordinary precautions of sound logic are not enough; the system of surrounding beliefs needs to be renovated *in toto.* Accordingly the scientist must himself turn philosopher from time to time, if he is to be a careful scientist. And the more keenly aware he is of this necessity, the more he will appreciate the work of those who are seriously endeavoring to purify the air around him. But not infrequently it happens instead that those scientific workers who are the most intolerant of philosophy are the very ones who are the most

[1] See *American Journal of Sociology,* July, 1926, p. 134. Cf. Chapter XXI of this book.

likely to corrode their product with the acid of these unobserved assumptions. Inasmuch, therefore, as we have taken in hand to present a brief for the work of the philosopher, it might not be amiss to indicate some of the joints in scientific procedure at which such leaks are the most likely to occur.

In the first place, delimitation of the field in which research problems are selected is often predetermined by the blind spots and predilections of the investigators. Thus a prevailing fashion in pedagogical interests may suggest a study of the technique of language instruction, while no one may think to inquire into the sociological objectives of such instruction. Again, considerable interest may prevail in the effort to standardize achievement tests in history; while it may occur to no one to inquire what percentage of the graduates of the American high school have ever heard of Horace Mann. Or a series of discussions about college administration may completely omit any consideration of the ultimate objectives of college education in a democracy — a question whose answer might cancel out some of the administrative problems under discussion as quite irrelevant to any worth-while objectives. In such cases, the assumption roots down into a whole system of educational philosophy, and settles in advance the question of the relative importance of possible problems. And finally, the ambition to be strictly scientific may result in ruling out a whole field of phenomena. The behaviorists, for example, renounce all those phenomena which can be reached only by introspection, thus backing out of the field of psychology proper into the fields of neurology and physiology. It seems probable that the development of psychology has actually been retarded as a result.

Again, the method of procedure may be predetermined by a philosophical assumption. For example, it has been quite customary of late years to seek solutions by tabulating a consensus of opinions. The assumption seems to be taken from the popular theory underlying universal franchise, that the people think for themselves, and that the majority is likely to be right. A large number of high school teachers are asked, for instance, what are the reasons for teaching English literature; or a large number of college professors are interrogated as to the functions of a liberal arts college; or a large number of uncultured persons are invited to list those items of supposed culture for which they feel a conscious need. The findings constitute nothing more valuable, of course, than a cross section of some prevailing popular or professional belief, usually traditional; they throw no new light whatever on the validity of that belief. A consensus of worthless opinions is a worthless consensus of opinion; and there is no magic in statistics that can give it worth. This method would hardly be used in medical science to ascertain the cause of cancer!

One of the most subtile blunders by which the corporals of statistical research contrive to make their strut ridiculous is the inadvertent formulation of the units they are counting. Statistical research involves two intellectual processes, as distinct and different as red and green, the second of which is the statistical procedure. The natural scientist has only to *perceive* his units; but the mental or social scientist has to *conceive* his, and that is a different and far more difficult assignment. It requires an analytic-synthetic work of the intellect, involving some creative imagination. It can be nothing else, therefore, than that very "arm-chair

philosophy" which the quantitativist so piously despises. And if his units are unreal or irrelevant his work is only a retreat into unreality — a busy pottering over an easy, though fashionable, routine with which he is familiar.

Suppose, for example, that the research problem is to evaluate statistically the social contacts of children. A score card for such a purpose might concern itself with the cultural equipment of the child's home; in which case the books in the home might be counted, and the phonograph records as well. But suppose no distinction were made between the Alger books and the works of Dickens, Hugo, or Conrad; or between a jazz dance and the Ninth Symphony. Then two homes of very different cultural levels might score the same if the counting happened to come out alike. In such a case the objectivist has deceived himself by inadvertently pushing his subjective intuitions of value back into the units involved in his score card; after which a mountain of statistics would be a mountain of illusion, because the premise is fallacious.

In almost all campaigns against incertitude there is some sector of the front that is occupied by the undisciplined recruits of conjecture, for the obvious reason that the seasoned regulars of scientific induction are too few to man the entire line of attack. This is especially true of the mental and the social sciences. In other words, there are many problems for which the solutions must be partly philosophical in the very nature of the case; this is because adequate data for strictly scientific solutions are not available at any price. In such cases there is a strong temptation to assume, because the visible data are all in, that there are no invisible data still outstanding. Those who used to attribute social phenomena

to geographical causes almost exclusively were guilty of this kind of a mistake. It has been customary for half a century to argue a direct, causal connection between the decline of crime and the decline of severity toward the close of the eighteenth century; but the present increase of crime concomitant to sentimental leniency tends to raise the suspicion that something important must have been omitted from the the data. The finality with which psychiatrists and psychoanalysts are often wont to dogmatize their diagnoses sometimes suggests this fallacy. An unfashionable skeptic is naturally at a disadvantage in such a case, since the facts for rebuttal are never to be had. One is here reminded of Hamlet's weird suspicion: "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy." For, after all, the mark of a real scientist is in the rigor and frankness with which he keeps himself and his clients undeceived as to the element of speculative guesswork still lurking in his conclusions; and to this end the scientist himself must often turn philosopher — or else employ one.

Again, the *application* of strictly inductive findings may be vitiated by assumptions derived directly from the popular mythologies. Men who are first-class scientists in their own fields sometimes participate in the popular philosophy with the naïveté of *hoi polloi*. And, from these popular and untenable philosophies, scientists often infer the application of their findings to educational and social policy — however inductively and soundly those findings themselves may have been derived. This charge may too often be preferred against our mental measurers and our students of heredity. Their conscious science is good, but the philosophy which leaks in upon them unawares is often bad enough. Take,

as an example, the policy that just now obtains, from the elementary school to the college, of sorting and segregating pupils relative to the findings of the mental tests. Here the syllogism runs as follows: major premise, social organization and self-realization depend upon persons functioning *differently* in society; minor premise, their different potential capacities for such different functions are ascertainable; conclusion, schooling should cater to those differences of capacity and prospective function. Now it is only with respect to the minor premise of this syllogism that the science of the mental testers has a chance to function. However, it is really the major premise, rather than the minor, that is actually responsible for the conclusion. But the major premise is not derived from science at all, but from the popular sociological mythology; and, as a matter of fact, is less than a half truth at best. Besides it is introduced into the procedure with utter naïveté, without the slightest critical scrutiny, and, indeed, almost unconsciously. Likewise, the hereditarians, such as Stoddard, Grant, and Wiggam, commit a similar mistake. They disingenuously ladle out of the popular anthropological mythology the familiar assumption that the innate capacities of races differ proportionately to their cultures. This assumption most decidedly is not biologically sound; much less is it scientific. It is an utterly unproved inference from the Nordic conceit, with probably little, and possible no, foundation in reality. Unconsciously diluted with this popular assumption, their writings only contribute the apparent sanction of science to a popular prejudice that is both unscientific and dangerous. They thus make themselves the king kleagles of an intellectual Ku Klux Klan. The popular reaction is very

different in the two cases. The mental measurers are encountering a mass of intuitive protest because our own children are their obvious victims; whereas the hereditarians are enjoying an immense vogue because their fulminations flatter our conceits of race and class. But the harm they are both doing is proportionate to the logical blunder they are committing.

Perhaps most of the inadvertent, and hence usually fallacious, philosophizing upon the part of scientists may be described in terms of deductive versus inductive reasoning. It is an inviolable principle of psychology and logic that deductive and inductive procedure are inseparable in the reasoning process. Generalizations are bound to be drawn upon for the interpretation of particulars. In their sometimes almost fanatical devotion to induction, scientists too often relieve themselves of a sense of guilt by thrusting their heads into the sand. Or, to change the metaphor, they unconsciously draw their generalizations out of the pie of popular mythology, and then cry: "What a brave inductive boy am I!" Some of the most usual theoretical assumptions by which scientific investigators are thus liable to be ambushed unawares have been set forth above. These are some of the ways in which the scientific juggler is prone to deceive himself as well as his audience by drawing out of his hat a philosophical rabbit which he had permitted the *Zeitgeist* to drop into it when his back was turned.

And since these things are so it follows that there can scarcely be a more productive piece of intellectual work than to drag all such generalizations out into the light of recent scientific knowledge and philosophize them systematically. For scientific workers in the field of sociology or

education to assume that they can always do that for themselves is a bit presumptuous, to say the least. The mass of popular beliefs which are liable to smuggle themselves into scientific procedure as sheer assumptions is so great that, in a world of division of labor, the task of scrutinizing them is quite properly a profession in itself.

Under the general head of false assumptions inadvertently introduced, we have reserved one until the last because of its unique importance in educational theory. It is the assumption that *normative* problems are just as amenable to inductive technique as any other problems are. Curiously enough, this assumption is now seldom encountered among psychologists and sociologists who aspire to be scientific. They are more inclined, indeed, to swing to the other horn of the dilemma, and abjure the problem of evaluation altogether because of its subjective nature. How obvious it is, indeed, that concepts of value must always be provisional so long as there remains in human life the possibility of future invention and experiment. They are therefore leery of any attempt to define either the needs of human nature or the functions of institutions. And not only do they abjure the problem themselves, but also of philosophical solutions they most scornfully will have none. But educators are far less circumspect, as a rule. Instead, many of them openly avow the necessity of attacking the problem of educational values by strictly objective methods.

It is refreshing, however, to find one of the younger promoters [1] of educational science making this distinction with almost startling clarity. In discussing the limitations of

[1] See Professor George S. Counts, in the *Twenty-sixth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, Part II, p. 90. The quotations are from a summary of this article read by Professor Counts before the American Sociological Society at St. Louis in 1926.

scientific technique he distinctly declares that "the fundamental goals of education cannot be determined by scientific method." In explaining the reason for this statement he sharply distinguishes normative from other problems. "Education has to do with welfare," he says, "and when one approaches the question of welfare one seems to pass outside the confines of objective science. Scientific method can give no satisfying and conclusive answers to these questions of comparative values. It is only," he adds, "when the purposes or goals of education are determined that the field is cleared for the work of educational science. The fundamental goals of education . . . are the product of a process of evaluation which, while dependent on the results of science, cannot be identified with those results. . . . The selection of goals must reflect the advancement and the refinement of knowledge, as it must reflect all experience;" but "we cannot hope that science can give us an effective educational philosophy."

The usual result of studies which aim to solve this problem of ultimate objectives scientifically is, accordingly, to beg the whole question and to set forth a cross section of the prevailing popular opinion as if it were a really objective solution of the problem. Suppose, for example, that one undertakes to solve such a problem as the educational needs of prospective farmers by the methods of inductive research. Presumably the procedure would be that of job analysis. But then the investigator would have to select his farmers; whereupon there enters into the procedure, either implicitly or else overtly, a *normative* assumption that simply cannot be justified inductively. For, presumably, the pupils are to be trained for *good* farming. But

how is the criterion of good farming to be inductively established? Not by analyzing the jobs, either of a random sampling — for that would lead to accepting the average as the norm — nor of a select group — for such selection would amount to a begging of the question. And reliance upon scientific procedure is even more hopeless if the ambitious educator aspires to prepare rural children for a new type of rural life and agriculture better than the world has ever known before, and so create the same. By what conceivable technique of science could the blue-prints of such an ideal agriculture ever be designed? But that is exactly what the educator is under bonds to do; and not only for agriculture, but for every other process of our changing, problematical civilization — which is the central thesis of this book.

We come out, therefore, to a rather startling conclusion, namely, that the most important responsibility of education — that of guiding civilization forward into better things — is one that cannot be performed by educational science at all, but is the special task of educational philosophy. For real educational progress, at least so far as ultimate objectives are concerned, is strictly a product of the creative imagination. It depends upon postulates that, in the very nature of the case, cannot be verified by available facts, since they propose experiments that never have been tried before. Real educational progress can only be verified, therefore, in the sequel. Great educational advances are accordingly brought forth either by the intuitive insights of the *Zeitgeist*, like the junior high school and the junior college, or else by the intuitive genius of some great man, such as Bishop Grundtvig. He, a century before any such

thing existed anywhere, conceived a system of popular education for his native country, Denmark, which, being put into actual practice by a national act of faith, has since made over modern Denmark into the most admirable rural civilization in the world. But Grundtvig did not proceed by strictly scientific methods — most fortunately! His, instead, was the work of sheer creative genius.

But the present brief for that labor of the intellect which is other than scientific has not penetrated even yet to the heart of the matter. For the problem phenomena of science are definitely delimited by the technique and grammar of science itself. As Professor Charles Horton Cooley has pointed out in an essay[1] of characteristic penetration, there is an essential *difference* between material facts and mental-social facts. In the one field the problem phenomena are objective entities *in space.* These are amenable to measurements upon which all normal observers can agree. In the other field, the problem phenomena are subjective entities *in thought and feeling.* They are known directly in and by the self and are apprehended in others by what Cooley calls sympathetic dramatization, which "enables us to understand others by sharing (or duplicating) their states of mind." These phenomena are amenable to *dramatization,* but not to measurement. The objective measurements of the behaviorists may render more definite some of the least subtle symbols of the subjective life; but these symbols, however definite, remain *meaningless* except as they are interpreted by sympathetic intuition. Statistical treatment reveals just as much in the case of a human organism as in the case of a clock or an automobile;

[1] See *American Journal of Sociology,* July, 1926.

but no more. The mental-social phenomena, which the objective and measurable behavior means, remain knowable only through subjective intuition and sympathetic dramatization.

There really should have been another chapter in Pearson's *Grammar of Science.* For that book is, after all, a treatise in epistemology. However, it ignores one half of its own field: it treats only of the problem of objective knowledge. But there is also subjective knowledge — our inner awareness of the values of our own experiences; and that is as much a problem for epistemology as objective perception is. Now it is this inner awareness of values which constitutes the essential substance of mental and social realities. The phenomena of the sociologist are bound to display a normative aspect, however religiously the sociologist may aspire to blind himself to the fact. And the grammar of the knowledge-getting process in this subjective field, had it been written into Pearson's book, would have been a very different sort of grammar than that of objective science: for science deals with material realities only.

To be sure, subjective feelings are bodied forth in objective behavior; and of such behavior there can be a science. But that science will add nothing to our knowledge of the mind unless the objective behavior studied actually does parallel, represent, and symbolize something subjective. The real question is: How do we know what the behavior *means?* We know that only by subjective intuition or sympathetic dramatization — the kind of knowledge that is *not* amenable to scientific technique. Tone is not color; neither is time space!

If the study of concomitant behavior is logically careless

about this parallelism, then its conclusions are likely to be worthless. But even if such study is careful, it is the intuition of concomitance, not the measurement of concomitants, which constitutes the vital link in the process of acquiring mental-social knowledge. And this link is almost always overlooked by the devotees of objective science. If behavior is studied without reference to the subjective feeling which it represents, then such study adds nothing to our knowledge of psychology. To insist, by inference from a false analogy, upon applying to the non-spacial phenomena of the mind the same technique of knowledge-getting that is applied to the spacial phenomena of quantitive matter and motion is simply to abandon the field; which is exactly what the behaviorists are doing. They themselves admit as much, and boast of it indeed, by that overt denial of consciousness in which the leaders of that cult indulge — a position as consistent as it is absurd. Also there is danger of sociology being pushed into a like position of absurdity by the cult of objective research. In the strictest sense of the word science, psychology, and sociology are not sciences at all, nor ever can be. Indeed, it is conceivable that the cult of science may become an actual obstacle to knowledge here. For fundamental agreements in the mental-social field will be accumulated chiefly by the insights of introspective genius; and the principal tools of such research will continue to be logic, philosophy, and the fine arts.

For philosophy, after all, is quite as much akin to art as it is to science — and quite as worthy as either one of its relatives! Like art, it is a product of the creative imagination. The history of philosophy as taught in colleges and schools is often dry and sterile because the teacher fails to dis-

cern its real affinities. The great historic systems — vitally functional as they may have been in their day — are often spoiled for the student by his attempt to believe them in terms of modern concepts. Very often it is not their permanent validity, but the beauty of their symmetry and the marvel of their intuitions that make them interesting. Plato's system is as delightful and amazing a work of art as Wagner's "Tanhauser," Goethe's "Faust," or the Cathedral of Notre Dame. And every such system's claim to greatness inheres in the cogency and fruitfulness with which its maker's imagination has created a new and workable way of life. Therefore, in the intuitions of the imagination lies philosophy's kinship, to art on the one hand and to science on the other. And this is the vital spark in all progress. The imagination, if it be fortunate and creative, is a diamond that shines by its own fire. Without it, art is nothing but sterile imitation; without it, philosophy produces only epigones; without it, science laboriously proves what is already known or else potters technologically with insignificant trifles. For even in research, it is not the mere grubbing of facts, but the conception of a new and significant hypothesis, that breathes life into the clay. And the history of education, in so far as it is anything more than a record of mere social pressure upon the school, is the history of great imaginations of the Grundtvig sort. And so will it ever be!

CHAPTER II

ORIGIN AND CONTENT OF THE SOCIAL HERITAGE

No novelist can begin at the real beginning of his story. He always finds himself compelled to relate some things that happened before the curtain rises. Otherwise, some incidents are unexplained. It is the same with the philosopher. The usual technique of the fiction writer is to go back, after the start has been made, and take care of the necessary preliminaries. That method is open also to the more ponderous art of speculation; but it has its disadvantages. The alternative is to begin before the beginning; in which case the reader is left wondering, through several chapters, what it is all to be about. The remedy for this defect is to tell him in advance, and beseech him to labor patiently through the preliminary chapters. That will be the present method.

In a philosophy of education the first major problem is that of aim. What is the ultimate aim of education? But, before that chapter can be poured, the forms will have to be constructed. For aims are always relative. The school is an institution in human society; and its functions have to be stated in terms of that society conceived in its totality. For education, obviously, serves a need of man; but what the needs of man really are can be inferred only from a study of his activities as carried on in organized society. At least, so it seems to a sociologist! And hence our preliminary

necessity is to sketch an outline picture of man as his social activities reveal him. Indeed, the necessity lies rather deeper than that; for man is not only revealed, but also made, by his social setting. As Professor Cooley[1] puts it, self and society are but two aspects of the same thing. It is only, therefore, by an adequate conception of society, and the individual's causal relations in it, that we can achieve any adequate notion of those inherent needs of man which education aims to satisfy. Two chapters will accordingly be devoted to this preliminary task.[2] And by that means we shall hope to establish a new, and hitherto neglected, standpoint in educational theory; namely, the sociological.

In all philosophizing about human needs and institutions, it is of the utmost importance to distinguish sharply between biological and social evolution. For in all that telic labor of the intellect aiming toward improvement of the human lot, it is chiefly social, rather than biological, evolution with which we have to do. In the biological progress the vital factor is *mutation;* and that is something quite beyond control. The causes of mutations are as yet a mystery to science. Plant and animal breeders can do no more than watch for desirable mutations, and artificially select them for survival. Produce them at will they absolutely cannot do! Only the Creator can do that. Even scientific eugenics claims to do no more than weed out the human undesirables. It is doubtful whether mental culture improves the quality of brains our offspring are born with, even after many generations. We shall do well, therefore, to think of biological evolution as rising by terraces, rather than by a gradual

[1] *Social Organization*, Chapters I and II.

[2] On the subject matter of these two chapters, *cf.* Charles A. Ellwood, *The Psychology of Human Society.*

incline; and of our ancestors for many generations as on the same terrace with ourselves. According to the best authorities — though contrary to the popular belief — our forbears of the historic period probably had as good brains, and as much innate capacity of mind, as we. Henry Fairfield Osborn [1] makes a similar claim for our even more remote predecessors. Since the time of the Greeks and Romans — and before, indeed, — human evolution seems to have been mostly social rather than biological; it has consisted in the improvement not so much of the cognitive organ, as of the cognitive contents which that organ has gradually accumulated. Anthropologists would have us believe that the cerebral filing cabinet of even prehistoric man was magnificently provided with empty space, and that the progress of civilization has been merely filling, without enlarging, it.

It was precisely that enormous latent potentiality of the human brain [so long ago!] that rendered social evolution possible — and, indeed, inevitable. That brain set itself at work upon the problem of how to satisfy the needs of *Homo sapiens*, and social progress was the result. Our oldest relics of man's intellectual achievements are his stone tools and weapons. And also his works of art! There is something almost awe-inspiring about those amazingly lifelike mural drawings of extinct animals in the cave at Altamira and those curiously carved javelins from even earlier human cultures. Considering its antecedents, was not the first wheel as great a stroke of inventive genius in its time as the steam engine or the radio? For one invention led to another, each having its prerequisite antecedents. Thus, bit by bit, through the slow lapse of the centuries, the social heritage

[1] *Men of the Old Stone Age*, p. 272.

has accumulated. The mental heritage of the race is the product of the racial learning process. We are the grateful heirs of all the ages.

The exigencies of our argument suggest some elaboration of the phenomenon of cumulative racial learning; to which end a few illustrations will prove helpful. The technique of so simple and commonplace a thing as making bread harks back through a long series of inventions and discoveries to the very dawn of human life upon the planet. Modern methods in milling, recent improvements in baking, the method of lightening dough, the original devices for cooking, the first cracking of the kernels, the domestication of wheat, the initial discovery of the plant, are among the steps in the long series. Meat getting has had an evolution quite as interesting. It is a far cry from our modern ranches, feeding pens, packing plants, storage, transportation, and marketing facilities, back to the naked, barely human savage, sallying forth into the forest in the precarious hope of making some chance killing — with great risk of being himself the killed! Our modern inventions are none of them so wholly modern as they seem. Among the prerequisites of the airplane were the mathematical discoveries of Euclid and Pythagoras, who in turn built upon the foundations inherited from Crete, Egypt, Phœnicia, and Babylonia. The wheel is so old that the mind of modern man runneth not to the contrary, although reckoned in terms of social evolution it is a relatively late invention. The steam locomotive is but a recent assembling of ancient elements. The harnessing of steam is recent; but the taming of fire, by which the steam is produced, was the achievement of naked savages in the long-forgotten past. To whom shall we give the more credit for the steel rail,

Bessemer or Tubal Cain? Almost all the plants and animals of modern agriculture have been in use throughout the historic period, while many of the materials used in modern manufacture go back to a vanishing past. But in their day these earlier contributions were quite as epoch making as those of our own.

Similarly, all our institutions and cultures have evolved; and there is no intellectual exercise more enlightening than to trace that historic evolution in the various social fields. Political scientists, for example, find the genesis of our Constitution in Colonial and English precedents, which in turn they trace back to their origins in the Roman Empire and in primitive Teutonic life. Much factual material has been brought together recently to throw light on the origin of the state in the conflicts of early tribal society. Professor Ely [1] specifies an industrial stage, a handicraft stage, an agricultural stage, a pastoral stage, and a hunting-fishing stage in the evolution of industrial society. Other writers make different divisions. To understand our own school system we trace its evolution back step by step through modern and mediæval Europe, to ancient Greece and Rome; and then infer its prehistoric origin from the practices of primitive peoples now living. Westermarck has written the history of the human family, and corrected our notions about its primitive forms. Every moral code has a history: our own has derived contributions from pioneer conditions, from Puritanism, from chivalry, from ancient Roman law, and from the still more ancient Hebrew ethics, which in turn were rooted in the code of Hammurabi, and thence back to prehistoric times. In the long, slow sifting of the ages those forms of

[1] *Evolution of Industrial Society.*

conduct which society has decided are harmful, have come to be socially disapproved, while those that are adjudged harmless or helpful have come to be approved. Even the Christian religion has evolved; and the study of its evolution takes us back not only to the Jahveh cult of ancient Israel, but to the religions of Egypt and Babylonia, with prehistoric savagery in the ultimate background. Science has a history of the utmost fascination, surpassed in interest, if at all, only by the history of art: for the relics of primitive art carry us back to an even remoter past. And so it is in all fields. Little by little the race has learned; and the findings of racial experience have been transmitted and accumulated. Thus do we now possess that vast, mental heritage by the use of which we conduct our social life on the present high level of civilization.

So much for the evolution of the social heritage. We may now proceed to an analysis of its contents. This we may undertake from two separate points of view, yielding different categories in each case. We may consider the social heritage as a vast body of intellectual resources which may be qualitatively assorted. Or we may classify the same mental capital as to the objectives of its use. The latter classification gives us the objective structures, or, in other words, the institutions, of society, since the objectives of our social life give rise to certain more or less settled programs of collective behavior. It will serve to clarify our thinking if we set these two classifications forth, with some explanation of the terms employed. Because of their contribution in clarifying our thinking these lists will be referred to again and again throughout this book.

The intellectual resources of the social life:

1. The Means of Communication
2. The Techniques of Industry
3. The Techniques of Amusement
4. The Sciences
5. The Fine Arts
6. The Popular Beliefs
7. The Prevailing Ideals
8. The "Folkways"
9. The "Mores"

The *means of communication* include facial expression, gesture, language, the arts of writing and printing, the fine arts considered as means of expressing feeling, and all mechanical devices and social arrangements for communicating at a distance, besides those repositories by which we leave records for subsequent generations. That these are all resources of the collective intellect, a little exercise of the imagination will make clear enough, especially if one considers what would become of the physical things used in communication if the minds of all of us were suddenly to revert to savagery or idiocy.

By the *techinques of industry* is meant the knowledge of how to perform the processes in all branches of economic production. And that includes not only the manual and mental skills, but the applications of the arts and sciences, as well as the industrial organizations of various sorts. In order for the imagination to grasp these mental entities clearly, it is only necessary to contrast the techniques of different times and places: of wheat harvesting in the Mississippi and Nile valleys; of shoemaking now and a century

ago. The industrial development of the last century has been a development of technique. What elicits our attention is the machines, plants, and other material equipment; but the living soul of all these things is the new technique, which exists nowhere, of course, except in men's minds. How much learning is involved in this technique the reader will help himself to imagine if he will fancy himself learning and mastering, as to speed, the correct fingering of a typewriter, or the series of motions by which a man can husk one hundred twenty bushels of corn in a day instead of only fifty, or any other sample of the million and one processes of semiskilled, or even unskilled, labor. Or let him imagine some ignorant, unskilled laborer doing one's work for a single day!

Every society accumulates its *techniques of amusement*, including games, sports, and quasi-ceremonial amusements. The athletic games of the early Greeks, the gladiatorial shows of the ancient Romans, and the tournaments of mediæval times are good examples. Anthropologists describe the games they find in use among savage peoples, and also certain ceremonial dances and pageants which have a recreational as well as a religious function. Among ourselves the list of such resources is a very long one: the great athletic sports, including baseball, football, boxing, and others; the field sports, such as hunting, fishing, and touring; indoor amusements, such as card playing and dancing; the assembly hall entertainments, including the cinema, the theater, and concerts; sociable gatherings, like dinner parties, picnics, and conventions; besides many other recreations that will occur to the reader. These are all the products of social evolution and part of the cognitive capital

of the race, as evidenced by the fact that one has to learn them in order to participate in them.

The *sciences* and the *fine arts* need no definition, and their mental nature is too obvious to require discussion. As for the popularly current *beliefs*, enough was said about them in the previous chapter to make their quantity, significance, and evolutionary origin apparent.

Wants and *ideals* represent the affective, as distinguished from the cognitive, aspect of the mental and social life. The most basic wants are those which constitute the standard of living. In civilized societies, the different social levels are characterized by different sets of habituated wants, while in primitive societies, the cultural offerings limit the people to the most elemental wants. Human beings are constantly discovering new means of satisfying the old, fundamental needs; hence, the accumulation of wants is equivalent to the advance of civilization. Acquired wants organize themselves into systems; and persons are distinguished by their systems of wants — as are entire societies. Such systems of wants are thought of as ideals; the word implying that an individual — or a society — proudly identifies itself with its ideal. The kind of experiences and achievements which a person — or a society — has come to regard as satisfying, worthy, and dignified is that person's — or society's — ideal. The ideal of the New England Puritans was ascetic and religious; that of the ancient Romans was militaristic and imperial; that of the Athenians was æsthetic. The prevailing ideals of a people are among their most important mental possessions, because they determine the level of that people's civilization, and its upward or downward trend.

Whoever is familiar with the literature of sociology will have encountered the term "folkways." [1] It means those habituated and customary behavior patterns that lie mostly outside the radius of focal attention, but constitute, for that very reason, the substructures of our institutions. Examples are: ringing the door bell or knocking before entering another's house, tipping the porter in a sleeping car, removing one's hat in an indoor audience if one is a man — not, if one is a woman, — covering up house windows with several layers of hangings, and a million other similar items. We are hardly conscious of our own "folkways," but the "folkways" of other peoples intrude themselves insistently upon the traveler's notice. In Korea, we are told by travelers, the people wear cage-like contraptions, made of rattan, in the place of summer underwear, and heat their living rooms with an under-the-floor flue from the kitchen fire; in a wealthy home in Japan Poultney Bigelow says he shivered over a brazier filled with a few glowing coals, and squatted on the floor at his meals. That the "folkways" are a mental capital of very considerable quantity indeed is indicated by the difficulty that immigrants encounter in learning ours, the acquisition seldom being complete until the second or even the third generation.

The "mores" constitute another massive section of the normally unnoticed social heritage. They too are habituated and customary behavior patterns common to all members of the group; but they differ from the "folkways" in having a moral significance — though this distinction is not always easy to maintain consistently. The "mores" are the deeply habituated social practices by any breech of which

[1] See W. G. Sumner's monumental work, *The Folkways*.

the moral sensibilities of the community would be shocked. Almost every conceivable situation of moral import is provided for in the "mores"; so that we know what is supposed to be right or wrong under almost every circumstance that could possibly arise. It used to be supposed that we knew right from wrong intuitively; and there are still those who hold to that naïve delusion. But it is now a commonplace of psychology that there are no innate ideas; from which it follows that the "mores" have to be learned by each new member of the social group. The illusion of innate ideas arises from the fact that we learn the "mores" so incidentally, and usually so young, that the learning process is little noticed and soon forgotten. Besides, the "mores" of a group are so generally accepted that there is nothing in sight with which they can be contrasted; hence they appear to be as much a part of the constitution of things as the weather or the stars. Only by traveling in other countries, where other moral rules obtain, do people become overtly aware of their own. Thus, in Japan, Mr. Bigelow relates, he was offered the attendance of a maid servant to assist him with his bath. However, in changing periods like our own, when the "mores" are in flux, we do become vaguely aware of them as a sort of spiritual conflict between the older and the younger generations. But normally the "mores" elude attention, just because they are so commonplace and usual; but they are none the less significant on that account. As a matter of fact they are, with the "folkways," the absolute indispensables of social life, constituting as they do the framework of the social institutions.

We now come to our analysis of the social heritage from the standpoint of the functional purposes of those collective

activity-programs through which our knowledge is applied to the satisfaction of human needs. Such an analysis gives us a list of

The institutions of society:

1. The Family
2. The Local Community
3. The State
4. The Industries
5. The Church
6. The School
7. The Press
8. The Standard of Living
9. The Customary Recreations
10. The Health-preserving Activities
11. Miscellaneous

Psychologically conceived, an institution is a habit, or a system of habits, participated in by the social group. It is a frequently repeated, and hence thoroughly familiar, program of social behavior, having certain fundamental satisfactions as its objective. An institution is a functional organization of social habits that we have just denominated the "mores" and the "folkways." Consider, by way of illustration, that most basic of all institutions, the family. Its framework consists of the following "folkways" and "mores" among others: that a ceremony is preliminary to the married status; that husband and wife share the same apartments; that each must remain constant to the other; that the wife takes the husband's name; that the wife does the housework while the husband earns the living; that parents are to exercise authority over and assume responsi-

bility for their children; that the wife and children have legal rights in the father's property; that the aged, if indigent, are cared for by their children; and so forth and so forth. These habits of thought, feeling, and action *are* the family. And similarly with all the other social structures. Each consists of a thoroughly habituated program of social behavior in which all members of the group are so well rehearsed that the program goes off according to expectation year after year, decade after decade, generation after generation. So deeply fixed, indeed, are many of the customs out of which the institutions are constructed that they become codified in formal law. Thus habit is the fly wheel of the social machinery.

Some of the institutions listed above — the family, the state, the industries, the church, the school — require no explanatory comments; some of them do. The term community is here used to mean the local group of closely associated neighbors. It is not usually thought of as an institution; but Cooley's [1] doctrine of the primary groups makes clear the fact that it really is one of the fundamental social structures. The standard of living — that is, the economic wants to which a group has become habituated — may quite properly be thought of as an institution, because of the elements of imitation, habit, and custom involved in it. Thus the standard of living of an Indian tribe in the woods, or of negro croppers in Alabama, or of farmers in west China, is as much an institution with them as is their religion or their industrial organization. Likewise, the customary recreations of all sorts, and the health-preserving activities, have become so elaborate and so thoroughly established in

[1] *Social Organization*, Chapter III.

modern civilized society that they too are worthy to be thought of as institutions. The doctors, no less than the clergymen and the educators, are operating an institution. To give the doctors' institution a name ("therapeuton," for example) would make it seem as real an institution as the church or the school. For the eleventh item, miscellaneous, the apology is that, in the present philosophy of education, the primary necessity is to see that the institutions *are,* and that they are the objectives of education. It is a secondary matter to see *what* they are to the last finality of analysis. The important achievement for our present purpose is to conceive consistently sociological rubrics of analysis.

We now have before us the objective structures of society and the intellectual resources by which they are operated. The word structures, as applied to the institutions of society, is a metaphor that is intended to express the element of habit, or custom, and therefore of social fixity involved in them. Since the institutions are more or less established programs of social activities by which the common needs of human nature are satisfied, they involve a vast amount of *similar* behavior upon the part of all participants — a very vast amount indeed. There is no exercise more useful, especially to a social theorist or curriculum maker, than to drag these normally unnoticed similarities of behavior — of all good fathers, of all good citizens, of all good neighbors, of all good school patrons, and so forth — out into the light of deliberate observation, and invoice their quantity and compute their value. Only by such an exercise can the indispensability of social homogeneity be appreciated. Also, such behavior is fixed, orderly, and very much the same from time to time. It has to be. Otherwise we should have

social chaos, instead of orderly social institutions. So important is such social orderliness that elaborate means of social control, including coercion of recalcitrants, has been elaborated by society. All these facts are implied in the term social organization. But just because these phenomena of social organization are so commonplace and usual, they are but little noticed; and from this failure to observe the usual and commonplace do many fallacies arise. Certain subsequent chapters on social stability and control will have it as their function to correct such fallacies.

Another aspect of the social heritage that is often overlooked — and that accordingly needs especial emphasis, because of the fallacies, particularly pedagogical, that lurk in it — is oversight of the fact that the social heritage is essentially an accumulation of *cognitive* entities. This is obviously the case with the means of communication and the techniques of industry, at least upon a little reflection. So it is also with the sciences and popular beliefs; they are bodies of real or supposed *knowledge*. It takes a little more exercise of deliberate attention to prevent the cognitive character of the "mores" and the "folkways" from escaping notice; but cognitive they obviously are. We have to *know* (by learning) whether to ring the door bell or to walk right in, whether to wear one's hat in the house or to remove it, whether the most honored guest or the hostess should be served first at dinner, and so on. These commonplace, usual, and generally prevalent items of custom are all facts of knowledge. If, when in Rome, we are to do as the Romans do, we must first *know* what the Romans do.

And from the cognitive nature of the "mores" and "folkways," it follows that the framework of the institutions is

all built of *cognitive* material. The social substructures are composed of beliefs, practices, and valuations known to all of us alike by reason of their having once been learned by each of us.

But it is with respect to the prevalent ideals, the emotionalized prejudices implicit in the "mores" and beliefs, and the affective appreciations of the fine arts that we are most prone to overlook the cognitive frameworks. However, no student of psychology should make such a mistake; for does not psychology make it clear that feeling is a phase *of* experience, of which experience cognition is the basis; that it is always *about* something cognitive that we have feelings? There cannot be a smile without a face! We feel as we do about certain acts (*e.g.*, arson or graft), or about certain things (*e.g.*, dangerous animals or microbes), because of their *known* factual results. We appreciate certain things (*e.g.*, Da Vinci's "Mona Lisa" or Browning's "Rabbi Ben Ezra") partly, at least, because we have been made aware of the *fact* that it runs in the cultural fashions to appreciate them. We detest Bolshevism and "the unspeakable Turk," and approve of Washington and "liberty" for much the same reasons. This knowing what is in the cult is as definitely cognitive an experience as it is to know what tigers and tubercular bacilli will do. We often have strong feelings of like or dislike because of associations in experience, sometimes of the nature that we used to call subconscious. The ability of the psychoanalyst to dispel an emotional complex by rendering our *knowledge* of such associations overt is evidence that even they have a cognitive taproot. A careful scrutiny of the learning of attitudes, prejudices, appreciations, ideals, and the like will reveal the

fact that it consists at bottom in establishing these so-usually unnoticed cognitive bonds.

It is the difference in *cognitive* resources that constitutes the real difference between societies. Appreciations and detestations are probably about as numerous and vigorous in one type or stage of society as in another; the difference is in *what* is appreciated or detested. The institutions differ qualitatively according to the cognitive capital used in their operation. Where the belief prevails that women are inferior, and that birth control is "against nature," there a somewhat different type of family life exists than where the belief prevails that men and women are equal and that birth control is an obligation of enlightened responsibility. The essential difference between a savage and a civilized society is in the quantity and validity of the cognitive capital used in the social processes. The institutions all exist among savages; but some of them are very rudimentary, while most of them function with tragic inadequacy, because the stock of cognitive material by which they are operated is so meager. Suppose, for example, that an epidemic of smallpox breaks out in two societies, one savage, the other civilized. In each case a preëstablished program of health-preserving activities will be set in operation; but in the one case that program will be inferred from a body of erroneous superstitions, whereas in the other it will be inferred from a body of accurate scientific knowledge — and with very different results! Or suppose each of these two societies to be obstructed in its activities by the proximity of a large river. The savages will use crude rafts and flimsy boats to overcome the obstacle; whereas the civilized people will employ steel bridges, steamships, telegraphs, and telephones, each

involving the use of a vast amount of accurate scientific knowledge from which has been derived an elaborate industrial technique. A primitive society possesses each of the eight sorts of intellectual resources; but how elementary, indeed, some of them are! They do not know how to communicate, except by the simplest means and a sparse vocabulary; they do not know how to produce goods in great variety and quantity; they have no science at all, and almost nothing worthy of the name of art; their wants are few; their ideals are instinctive and rudimentary; their "mores" and their "folkways" are crude and unelaborated. In short, they *know* but little; and that is the very reason they are savages. Civilization is nothing more nor less than an accumulation of cognitive capital so very vast that a formal teaching institution is necessary in order to make possible the acquisition of that cognitive capital by each rising generation.

The reader will readily anticipate the bearing of all this upon the theory of educational aims, contents, and methods. The type of life that individuals enjoy depends upon the social heritage in which they live. But this social heritage is passed from each generation to the next by education, in the broadest sense of that word. In societies where the cognitive capital is meager, that education may be informal; but where it is rich and complex, there must be a system of schools, more or less elaborate. Education is therefore the reproductive process of the social life; by it the social heritage is reproduced into each rising generation. Thus each succeeding generation enriches its life by the accumulated wealth of all the centuries. How intimately the life and very personality itself of individuals depend upon the social heritage that is built into them by education will be our next consideration.

CHAPTER III

THE SOCIAL NATURE OF THE MENTAL LIFE[1]

"It will all have to be done over," was the comment of a competent critic upon the system of one of the greatest philosophers of modern times. And the same remark applies to the economic, political, ethical, and educational theories that prevailed in the popular mind and that determined the public policies of western civilization throughout the nineteenth century. They were excessively individualistic. They overstressed the independence of human units; and underrated their interdependence. Pragmatically, these theories have sown the dragon's teeth; for most of the disquieting conflicts of the present crisis are their quite natural harvest. But the recent developments of social psychology and sociological theory are bringing their untenability to light. The central fallacy involved in all of them is that of *attributing to mental and social phenomena an importance in life proportionate only to their obtrusiveness in attention.* This fallacy pervades the whole social philosophy of the nineteenth century; and vitiates it all. On account of it the current educational theory, along with all the others, has gone wrong at almost every important fork of the road, and especially with respect to

[1] To Charles Horton Cooley acknowledgment is made for the point of view set forth in this chapter — while absolving that illustrious sociologist of responsibility for all inferences which may seem to him unwarranted. The social psychology of this chapter, together with the implications suggested in its first paragraph, the present writer has outlined briefly in *The Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. X, No. 4.

pedagogical methods. It will all have to be done over in the light of our new insight into the mental interdependence of persons. And the sooner our intellectual leaders set themselves to the task, the better it will be for western democracy in particular and for modern civilization in general.

The trouble is that the unconscious, or, perhaps more accurately, the unnoticed, contents of the mind have been overlooked in all our modern theories. For the learned content of the mind is like an iceberg, nine tenths of which hangs out of sight below the surface of the sea. Attention is only a small part of the psychic apparatus; and only an infinitesimal part of the mind's content is at the focus of attention at any given time. Fact after fact comes under its focus and is learned, but it is then relegated to the dark pigeon holes of memory where the spotlight of attention seldom finds it. With the passing years this learned material accumulates to an unimaginable mass. Naturally it fades in vividness of recollection, the greater part of it into semi-consciousness at most, much of it into the unconsciousness. But this apperceptive mass, most of which is almost never lifted above the limen of consciousness, functions as habituated assumption, premises, and stereotypes, influencing our behavior at every moment and in wholly unsuspected ways. And just as ocean travelers are apt to ignore in their imaginations the invisible part of the iceberg, marveling at its visible part only, so all our popular theories are built as if that visible part of the mind were its total content. By ignoring the invisible part, which is of at least equal importance, we have been led into all sorts of erroneous conclusions.

These unnoticed contents of the social mind constitute the framework of all the social structures. Perhaps a more enlightening figure would be that they constitute the substructures of all our social institutions. Any fallacious misapprehension of the mind's subliminal contents will therefore skew all our social theories out of plumb. The "mores" and the "folkways," for example, are a part of the social mind — of the unconscious social mind, indeed — since for the most part they elude attention in the manner just described. But they constitute the framework of the institutions, as we have seen. The same is largely true of the prevailing ideals and beliefs. But we are forever attributing to this mass of learned material a functional importance proportionate only to its obtrusiveness in attention, which is almost zero. Hence we are often treating our institutions as if they stood up on flimsy stilts or floated on foundations of thin air. If social theory in general and educational theory in particular are to be put on a sound basis of social psychology, this mistake must be corrected. To this end it is necessary to look somewhat more deeply than is usual into the normally unnoticed contents of the social mind. In order to establish this sounder point of view, seven principles of social psychology will be expounded in this chapter, as follows:

I. *Social entities are mental entities.*
II. *The social process is a product of the learning process.*
III. *The learning process is usually a social process.*
IV. *Much learning is normally passive.*
V. *Personality is a product of the learning process.*
VI. *Self and society are two phases of the same thing.*
VII. *There is a basic sameness of all personalities in the same social environment.*

The technique is merely to stain familiar phenomena with a tincture of deliberate and conscious attention, so as to render their structure visible. For everywhere in social theory the problem is to escape the fallacy mentioned just above. Social phenomena are invisible not because they are too minute for the naked eye, but because they are so commonplace and familiar as to elude attention. It requires but the work of deliberate social introspection to detect them. The sociologist gets many of his data merely by noticing what is in plain sight if only folks would take the pains to notice it. A voluntary effort of attention is to him what a microscope is to a bacteriologist.

I

First of all, it needs to be clearly recognized that the social life is a mental life. *The social entities are mental entities.* This is the A-B-C of sociology. The close relationship in which human beings exist is of a different sort than that of a pile of stones, or of a cluster of plants, or even of a herd of animals. The stones of a pile just lie together; the plants of a cluster react upon each other unconsciously; the animals of a herd influence each other more or less consciously, but quite instinctively; whereas the mental interaction of human beings involves an intricate interplay of minds and a complicated system of cognitive materials. Human relations are unique in this respect; but their unique nature has drawn far less than adequate recognition in recent educational and other theory.

Men live their lives together by the use of their store of knowledge; and without the use of that knowledge the social process cannot go forward at all. This fact must be put

under the sociological microscope. Suppose the social program in hand is to prevent the spread of yellow fever, to construct a state highway, to maintain a municipal orchestra, to light a city, to stabilize the national credit, or what not. Obviously, knowledge will have to be used. The same is true of the simplest, most commonplace social program imaginable. Consider, for example, the quantity of knowledge that must first have been used by the long lines of producers involved before a family can have stewed prunes, buttered toast, and coffee for breakfast. Imagine an isolated village in which every person had, through some miraculous catastrophe, suddenly become a victim of complete and absolute amnesia; everything human would come to a dead standstill. Such a village could not even carry forward as orderly a program as a colony of brutes; for brutes have instincts, whereas men, deprived of memory, have nothing left. The social process is, therefore, a mental process. One looks out of his window and sees the social process going on; but what he sees is only an objective phantasmagoria; the real social process is subjective and invisible. There is a certain fascinating validity, after all, in Plato's quaint intuition that the visible world is only an illusive appearance; reality residing in a world of invisible ideas, which the visible illusions only duplicate and body forth. Of the social life at least there is a very real sense in which Plato was profoundly right about it.

This subjectivity of the social life should be most evident in the case of the spiritual elements of culture. Philosophy and theology are bodies of beliefs and ideals that can, of course, have no other than a mental existence. Christian programs of religious behavior obtain in England, and

Mohammedan in Arabia, because in those countries, respectively, they are thought. Government also is a mental entity. It does not consist in capitols, the steel machinery of war, the bronze insignia of civil authority, nor even in the books of law. It consists of a body of ideas, habits, and ideals that we hold in common. The difference between democracy and monarchy is a difference in habits of independence or docility, in feelings about personal liberty, in mental attitudes toward authority, and in civic arrangements that are similarly understood by all of those who use them. Science, art, literature, and institutions are all constructed out of "thought-stuff," and have no other living form. To be sure, these psychic entities have accumulated their corresponding "psychophysical phenomena." Science suggests laboratories, museums, and the machines and devices by which science is applied. Art connotes pictures, stone sculpture, imposing galleries, and other such like furniture and freight. Literature we associate with wood pulp, printing presses, and fireproof buildings. But all these physical things are only the body; and the body without the spirit is dead. If, in our minds, there were no knowledge, the apparatus would be nothing functional. If we feel no appreciation, art is not. If books convey no thoughts, they are but blocks of synthetic lumber. Without appropriate mental activities, the buildings of a school and those of a prison are as similar as two adjacent hills — and as meaningless.

So would all the material things that civilization uses be dead and meaningless without the mental contents of civilization. Suppose that we should all awaken to-morrow morning with the minds of Hottentots. Who would turn

on the gas and prepare breakfast? What curious things the pictures would appear. How ludicrously the telephone bell would alarm us — except that who would ring us up? Our clothes would fail utterly of their usual adjustment. We should peer curiously into the windows of Science Hall and the Library. Laboratories and our books would await us with tragic futility. No whistles would blow. The shops would not be opened; though they might be broken into and rummaged with barbaric curiosity. The street cars and the mail trains would stand still. The buildings of our cities would fall down piecemeal into débris. Eventually, we should all perish. And meantime, though we swarmed about as numerous as before, our civilization would be as dead as the Assyrian civilization buried in the mounds of Khorsabad and Aqurquf. For material things are but the garments of civilization; the living thing itself is the learned contents of the civilized mind.

From all of which, it ought to be apparent that all the social structures are really mental entities. The standard of living is a matter of acquired and thoroughly habituated wants. The state is a body of ideas, habits, and ideals. Schools are maintained with great difficulty among certain groups in the United States — the Russian-Germans of the Dakotas, for example, or the French of Louisiana — because of the traditional contents of their minds. Prosperous and fortunate business men are usually very anxious to prevent the spread of radical propaganda lest it undermine the economic institutions in which they find themselves entrenched. Our health-preserving institutions would work better if every citizen had actually looked at live bacteria through a microscope. And so on. The institutions exist

nowhere except in our minds. True, they are bodied forth in the psychophysical paraphernalia of the social life; and these objective things naturally stimulate our sensory attention. But, as we have seen, these physical things would be meaningless and dead except for the unobtrusive contents of our minds. Indeed, they would never have come into existence at all; as any child can understand if he will only think about the Indians.

It has already been observed that the institutions are spoken of as the objective structures of society. They are objective only in the sense that they exist outside the mind of any one observer. They would remain if he passed out; because they exist in the minds of his associates. They exist, in other words, because the mind stuff of which they are built is *common* property, in the sense of being an apprehension of objective reality that is similar to all. The social mind is the common mind; and out of it the social structures are constructed. By the use of the common contents of our minds the collective processes are carried on; and otherwise they cannot be! With respect to the "mores" and the "folkways" there must be a mental homogeneity upon the part of the people which is all but absolute; for otherwise no social structures can exist, nor any social processes proceed. The same is only less true of the prevailing ideals and beliefs. And if the social process is to be highly civilized, the arts and sciences must be a widely prevalent possession also. The efficiency of institutions and the effectiveness of the social process are approximately proportionate to social homogeneity; that is, to the like-mindedness of individuals — a principle from the oversight of which have resulted many danger-

ous aberrations of educational theory, as we shall see in due course.

II

That *the social process is a product of the learning process* is so obvious a corollary of the principle just expounded that it hardly needs discussion. Social entities are mental entities; mental entities are learned entities; therefore social entities are learned entities. The minor premise of this syllogism is simply the well-known principle of modern psychology that there are no such things as innate ideas; and, in human behavior, very few inherited reflexes. From which it follows that the social process is a product of the learning process.

This principle only requires to be stained with a tincture of voluntary attention to make it clearly visible to the naked eye. It is merely one of those perfectly obvious facts which have been neglected in theory because they are normally so unobtrusive in attention. Therefore, consider the learning achievements of a child by the end of the second year. Much as ever has he learned the elemental decencies. The "folkways" of behavior in public gatherings he has not learned as yet. Barely has he learned how to transfer food from his plate or his cup to his mouth; as for procuring or preparing food he has learned absolutely nothing. If his body were to grow to adult size, without any further growth of his mental stock-in-trade, he could not participate in the social process at all. If the learning process were to stop at the age of six, or even at eight or ten, his participation would remain strictly limited to the simpler social processes. If at the age of two or three he were captured and reared by a

tribe of savage Indians,—as in the story in the old McGuffey's Reader — he would by the age of twenty have learned neither the knowledge, the habits, nor the wants of civilized society, and would prefer, therefore, to remain in savagery. As a result of the learning process he would have adopted the tribe that had adopted him, having learned to participate in their institutions only. And exactly the same principle Americans see illustrated daily in the behavior of their immigrants who have not been as yet assimilated. They do not participate easily in American institutions because they have not learned them. And we have the same experience ourselves when we visit another than our own of the three great churches, Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish; or when, if city bred, we try to adjust ourselves to a strictly rural community or, if country bred, we have our first experiences in a great city. Everything has to be learned.

The learning process is therefore the reproductive function of society. Only by learning is the social heritage transmitted from one generation to the next; so that each new generation can build, like the coral polyp, on what all their forbears have contributed. Herein lies the continuity of institutions; by this means the intellectual capital accumulates from age to age. The school is the germ plasm of the higher civilization. Teachers are, therefore, in charge of social selection at the source of origins for each new generation; they can even introduce at will mutations of their own invention. Hence the telic function of education.

And the ultimate purpose of all this learning is to afford each new quota of candidates an opportunity to enter into real humanity through participation in the social process. For, as will be clarified in later paragraphs of this chapter,

and again in Chapter IV, it is only by participating in the social process that we acquire our personalities. An individual in isolation could never become truly human ; because he could learn nothing of the wherewithal of human living. Self-realization is achieved only through taking part in the institutions of society, and in utilizing, to that end, the mental resources of the race. Social participation is, therefore, the aim and purpose of the learning process.

III

The third principle from the field of social psychology to demand our consideration is that *the learning process is a social process.* As we have seen, the occasions and the motives for almost all learning are social. The life of human beings is essentially a social life, and almost all our activities are collective. Almost everything we do, accordingly, except the purely vegetative physiological functions, is done *with, to, for,* or *on account of* somebody. If the reader will follow his own activities for a single day he will realize how true this is. Since it is axiomatic that we learn in order to do, it follows that we learn most naturally by doing. And since almost all human activities are social, it also follows that the social process itself is the most natural of all teaching processes, and that learning occurs most easily in social participation. And this natural, spontaneous type of learning held its monopoly as long as mankind remained in the ignorant bliss of savagery. But civilization — unfortunately for some of the current pedagogical theories — has made life hard for the learner! It involves the use of a cognitive capital so vast, complex, and difficult to learn — and, withal, so necessary to know *in advance* of trying to use

it — that this natural, spontaneous type of learning has had to be supplemented by the formal, forced, and artificial learning of the schools. Out of this fundamental necessity of civilization arises, accordingly, the central problem of pedagogy, namely, that of rendering artificial learning as natural as possible. Obviously, however, it never can be wholly so; and only inefficiency and forfeiture of results arise from imagining that it can.

The sources of almost all our learning are social also. It is from other people, through sheer social suggestion, that we absorb almost our entire stock of knowledge. One is said to get ideas by social suggestion when he takes them from other people without critical resistance. Much of the content of the mind has been derived in that way. The percentage of one's information which he acquires by original inferences from his own observations, is very small indeed; the percentage from which the element of social suggestion is wholly absent is almost negligible. And this is really fortunate; for it is only by the method of suggestion that the accumulated knowledge of the race could possibly be reproduced in each of us. It has taken the race an unimaginably long time to accumulate its mental capital; and it would take the new individual as long if he could not learn by suggestion. The power of the individual mind to draw new inferences independently is very much less than our conceit would like to suppose; thinking is very much more a collective enterprise than it pleases us to admit.

As a matter of fact, it is only the animals that think for themselves, literally speaking. As for human beings, almost all of our ideas are "gleaned from fields by others sown." And precisely herein lies the incalculable mental superiority

of the human as contrasted with the brute intellect. At the disposal of each normal human being is the entire intellectual capital of the race; what he cannot carry in his own brain he can get the benefit of by employing experts. Thinking is thus a collective process; and the intellectual strength of each is in his utilization of the racial capital. The mental grandeur of man is not an individual, but a collective, grandeur. The textbooks in psychology almost entirely ignore this fundamentally important consideration in setting forth the difference between the brute and the human intellect. To discover new facts and add them to the sum total of human knowledge is indeed a noble achievement of the mind, and worthy of the highest appreciation in educational theory and practice. But it is so noble and great a thing that it does not happen very often; and then only when the premises are given in the extant stock of knowledge. Moreover, when the premises are thus given, the discovery or invention is pretty sure to force itself almost simultaneously, as a sort of inevitable inference, into several minds. Professor W. F. Ogburn [1] has published a list of one hundred forty-eight inventions and discoveries of which this is true, his list including practically all of the most important intellectual achievements of recent centuries. And as for the ordinary practical judgments of everyday life, they consist of nothing more dignified than merely referring the situations given in experience to stereotypes that were originally derived from social suggestion and are now on file in the apperceptive mass. Our much vaunted independence of thought is for the most part a merely flattering illusion!

[1] See *Social Change*, pp. 90 ff.

IV

We seem to have use in our pedagogical vocabulary for a new term, namely, *passive mentation*. The term social suggestion has been familiar for some time. It indicates the source of ideas. But when the mind accepts ideas uncritically from social sources the learning process is relatively passive, as compared with original perception and conceptual thinking. And the fact has been too little observed and reckoned with in theory, especially in pedagogical theory, that the contents of our minds is derived very largely from social sources through a process of relatively passive mentation. If the learning process is a social process, it follows that the learning process is just to that degree a passive process. The normality of this passive mentation is very urgently in need of recognition; it will force radical revisions upon all our theories, not only pedagogical, but ethical, political, and social. Right here is one of the most important departures of the present educational philosophy from that now currently in vogue; and the principles set forth in this part of this chapter will therefore occur again and again throughout the book, and lead us again and again to quite unorthodox conclusions. On account of the iceberg fallacy, Dewey and his followers fall short of recognizing the degree to which mentation is passive and thought a mere mass action. The act of original inference draws the attention of theorists like a bright light; and hence the unobtrusive process of passive learning through suggestion eludes their attention. Besides, the former flatters our sense of individual importance. Accordingly the latter gets but little recognition. Most of the educational theories now enjoying

prestige are inferred from this fallacy. As a consequence they will all have to be done over.

The surpassing importance of passive mentation may be further inferred from the enormous quantity of material that is acquired from social sources in this way. The young mind is as absorbent as blotting paper. The ideas of other people exert an insistent pressure even upon adults unless we are already possessed of ideas with which they seem to conflict. As a young child's mind is so meagerly equipped as yet with knowledge, it can offer no such resistance. Accordingly it absorbs whatever cognitive material happens to be extant in its social environment. The proverbial persistency with which young children ask questions is significant in this connection, as it indicates the avidity with which they absorb the mental substance of their associates' minds. Even the objects of nature are very different things to children from what they are to animals; because to animals things are merely what their senses apprehend, whereas to children they are that, plus what their associates name them and explain them to be for. This is a very important difference indeed! Almost everything that children learn is learned from other people; so much so that they would remain in a state of practical idiocy if they were deprived of all opportunity to learn from social sources. All elementary education, almost all secondary education, and much of college education, are but systematically organized processes of social suggestion, by which the accumulated knowledge of the race is imparted to growing, but relatively passive, minds.

The quantity of this shadowy, back-lying mass of socially acquired knowledge is almost beyond the grasp of the

imagination. There are all the commonplace facts of daily life: the difference between iron and wood, what buttons are for, the fact that birds really do have ears, what cheese is made of, and a million and one other comparable items as indispensable as they seem trifling. There are the innumerable explanations that run current: how the sun gets back from the west to the east, what causes the spread of measles, how the human species originated, why it is right to punish criminals, how business depressions are to be accounted for, and so forth, almost *ad infinitum*. And all these items of information we passively absorb from other people; as we do also our religious beliefs, together with our moral standards and ideals. Each one of us has received even what scientific information he possesses from other persons; and most of it without verification or even criticism; also the technique of his trade or profession; not to mention the innumerable tips and pointers as to how one should behave under the circumstances which social life presents in such a limitless variety. In fact, the cognitive mass which we have stored away in the dark recesses of our unconscious memories is nothing short of the total intellectual resources of the race; the total product of the racial learning — or rather, such portion of it as any particular individual has opportunity to acquire and capacity to retain.

This principle of passive learning has a most important bearing on the vexed problem of individual differences. It is in active mentation that individual differences are most conspicuous; in passive mentation they tend to disappear. There are very many things that the dull can echo and imitate about as well as the bright. Passive mentation makes it possible for persons of low and high I.Q.'s to *behave*

similarly under circumstances where the behavior required is such as to be directed by rote learning and imitation. And this is fortunate; since the overwhelming majority of the ordinary situations of life require that kind of behavior. There are some things — relatively much fewer in number than we are wont to suppose — that are done by *select* persons of the best brains; there are other things that are done by *all* of us, and very much alike. And these latter are very, very numerous indeed; as anyone is bound to conclude who will consider the institutions in which we all participate similarly, and the beliefs, ideals, "mores," and "folkways" which such participation requires us to know in common. In these common programs function, as we have seen, most of the unnoticed contents of our minds — the submerged nine tenths. In the vast majority of life's situations, whether we learn by rote or by reason does not matter much, the important thing is that what we have learned enables us to behave homogeneously with our associates. Social homogeneity would be hopelessly impossible if it depended upon learning actively instead of passively. The social ideal, indeed, involves similar utilization, however imitative and by rote, of the cultural resources. In all the institutions, except industry, similar participation by all citizens is desirable, irrespective of their intellectual differences. And this is possible to a high degree, due, fortunately, to that passive mentation in which intellectual differences tend to disappear, at least functionally. Due to the iceberg fallacy, this fact is too often overlooked by the mental-measurements people when it comes to the application of their findings in educational and social policies.

V

Our fifth major principle is that *the individual personality is itself a product of the learning process.* Two reproductive processes are required to procreate a human being: the physical and the mental. And it is through the learning process that the mental substance by which the race lives is reproduced into the personality of each new individual. The mind of the new-born babe is a clean slate; little by little he writes on it the accumulated products of racial learning. If a child were to grow up in complete isolation, so that he had no opportunity to learn anything from social sources, he would be no better than a brute or an idiot. This statement always arouses protest, because it conflicts with those blind and fallacious assumptions that run current just because we so naïvely ignore the subliminal contents of the mind. But nothing could be more indubitably true to one whose imagination succeeds in grasping the data involved. To such, it is obvious that only as the candidate's cerebral cortex is stored through the learning process with the mental capital of the race, does the human animal become a man. He thereby acquires ability to participate in the social life and take his part in the various institutions of which civilization is composed. Only thus can he achieve a worthful, satisfying existence; and that only in proportion *as* he does. One's characteristic traits depend upon the quantity and quality of the mental capital that he has opportunity and ability to acquire. If his personality is enriched with the wealth of a rich social mind, he becomes a rich, well-rounded personality. But if one's learning apparatus is offered no grist except mythology, superstition, a clumsy industrial

technique, and the "folkways" of mere rudimentary institutions, his personality will suffer the consequent hallucinations, fears, risks, deprivations, and deformities. The difference between a savage and a civilized personality can be fully accounted for by the differing quantities of learned material that each has had *opportunity* to acquire, without going into the question of innate capacity to learn or to infer acutely. In short, we put content into the form of selfhood only as we share the content of an elaborate social wealth by learning it. Thus each acquires the mental wherewithal to meet his innate needs; and without such acquisition personality is a vacuum, and freedom a meaningless abstraction. Self realization is achieved only by learning the social heritage; and the richer the offering of the social heritage, the larger the possibility of the personality.

VI

Sixth, *self and society are but two aspects of the same thing,* to use Professor Cooley's epigram. Or, as another[1] phrases it: "Personality is the subjective aspect of culture." This principle has been generally overlooked in the research and theory of our times, because the social content of the human personality is stored in the basement of the mind, where the theorist does not think to look for it. But it is none the less important on that account. This principle would seem to explain why the attempts of psychologists to discover the original nature of man have proved more or less a wild goose chase. The biological standpoint was the wrong approach. In this quest, they have dug at the

[1] Ellsworth Faris in *Publications of the American Sociological Society* (the *Yearbook*), Vol. XIX, p. 44.

roots of man's inherited reflexes until they have proved that *Homo sapiens* is peculiar in having none—or almost none! Instincts, in the strict sense of inherited reaction patterns, have been defined practically out of existence, so far as man is concerned. And what few remain, if any, explain nothing. The sucking and kicking instincts in babies do not adequately account for the presence in all civilized societies of so many suckers and kickers. The study of instincts has the suspicious appearance of having reached a *reductio ad absurdum*, of having degenerated into a fruitless quibble in the field of lexicography. It looks as if the psychologist had reached the end of his rope, so far as the original nature of man is concerned. It is time, therefore, to take seriously this principle of equating subjective personality with objective culture, and turn from nerves, muscles, and glands to the processes, structures, and accumulated resources of society — a point of attack upon the problem which has been strangely overlooked. If man would see himself, and learn the color and contour of his original nature, he must look into the mirror of his own objective culture. The inquiry will have to be shifted from the biological to the cultural man, a change of venue taken from psychology to sociology. And this change of venue will have important bearings upon educational theory.

It is not at all strange that intelligence quotients, temperaments, and the apparently inborn affinities for special interests, should have figured so largely in our thought about personality; they are so obtrusive in attention! But in the very nature of the case obtrusive in attention is precisely what this objective-subjective content of personality is not. One's own attention is naturally absorbed at any given

moment with the material just under the spotlight of the learning process. But that vast mass of social capital out of which one's personality is made, although it once passed bit by bit under the spotlight while it was being learned, has since been shifted into the background of consciousness, and there ignored, except when it is called into the penumbra by association. Even then it is often pale, schematic, and quite unobtrusive, its source entirely forgotten. Thus, although the quantity of mind stuff that has been socially inherited is almost infinite as compared with what attention is lighting up at the moment, nevertheless, that bit which attention does happen to be lighting up bulks very large indeed in all our theories about the mental and the social life; while the vast mass of learned material tends to be ignored in all our theorizing about it. Out of sight is out of mind! But if we could only realize the quantity of that social capital which we have learned, and how absolutely it comprises the woof, if not the warp, of our personalities, our beliefs and assumptions would undergo a rectification of the most revolutionary sort. Of both the individual mind and the social mind, nine tenths of the contents hang below the surface of attention; and hence we fail to observe its magnitude and importance.

VII

And similarly, of our own minds and those of our associates. They too, in their submerged nine-tenths, are practically identical. Living and learning together as we do in the same social *milieu* we naturally absorb the contents of our several minds from the same social heritage. Since the material of the learning process is a common property, the personalities that result from learning it must necessarily

overlap and blend. We are all communists perforce, so far as the intellectual capital of the race is concerned. Although we are physically as separate as the spokes of a wheel, mentally we are as one as the hub. In our unconscious minds we are all members one of another, in a very literal sense; inasmuch as the substance of which they are made is almost identical. The differences between our mental equipments interest the observer; but the likenesses attract no notice. Hence, we overlook the common stock.

But this common stock is very, very large indeed. For persons reared in a similar environment, say that of Englishmen, this common mental property is enormous, despite the differences of class or the peculiarities of individual experiences. Any reader who has not yet grasped the full significance of the terms "mores" and "folkways" will hardly get the point of this paragraph; these terms stand for such an enormously long list of little items of knowledge: that one should turn to the right in passing another; that certain topics are taboo in mixed groups; where to put the stamp on a letter; how to ring a door bell; et cetera, *ad infinitum*. The popular beliefs and mythologies were mentioned in the last chapter, as was the fact that we almost all participate in them. Their immense mass was indicated, too. The techniques of industry are shared by those of the same trade; and the rules of the industrial game are known by all of us. The ordinary facts of nature, and the rudiments of the arts and sciences — an interminable list — are common possessions, as is also the vocabulary by the use of which we communicate. The more we try to display this common property in detail before our imaginations, the more we realize how immense is the mass which binds us all together

in a common intellectual plasm. Professor Cooley's epigram, that "the idea of a separate and independent ego is an illusion," is one of the most significant insights of the century. When apprehended in its full significance and carried out to its applications, it will force radical revolutions in all fields of human thought, including education.

This equivalence of self and society, this interpenetration of personalities on the mental side, accounts for that perennial and inevitable dualism which one encounters in all phases of life and theory. As a physical organism, and as a sentient center of feeling, each person is a separate and independent entity. As participants in the social process and in the mental substance out of which our personalities are made, we are interdependent, fused, and inseparable. And for this dilemma of independence *versus* interdependence, there is seldom any balanced solution in sight. Are we creatures of heredity or of social environment? Is each of us, indeed, the captain of his own soul; or a victim of "the fell clutch of circumstance?" Is civilization to be built on the foundation of liberty or of authority? Does each spirit have direct access to God; or must the church intervene? Are discoveries and inventions the product of the age or of the man? Does reform depend upon improving individual persons, or upon improved social reorganization? Shall we drill children memoriter, or adopt the cult of problem solving? Always the tendency is to stand either on one foot or the other; which is as awkward a posture as it is illogical.

It is on the perennial conflict between these two tendencies that Bernard Shaw has built the masterful artistry of *Saint Joan*. But at the very climax of the drama he makes Joan exclaim: "By what judgment can I judge if not my

own?" Thus she commits herself to one horn of the dilemma! The established order burned her; but who can condemn it for ridding itself of an innovator who seemed so dangerous, as Joan must have? There are ninety-nine iconoclasts and dangerous cranks for every saint or genius; and against this pestilential brood, society must protect itself on pain of dissolution. And who but posterity can possibly recognize the sent-of-God? For stark innovations there can be no norms, in the very nature of the case. And so the world seems forever condemned to crucify its saviors. Joan's appeal to her own individual reason, heroic as it is naïve, naturally makes a tremendous hit with any twentieth century audience in almost any city west of Suez; for it voices the obsession of a civilization drunk with the new wine of an excessive individualism.

But on the other hand, if we moderns do succeed in pushing the pendulum back again, how shall we then escape the clutch of blind and selfish tyrannies? Neither horn is the solution of this dilemma. It is in the leadership of the wise and good, if we can only devise some means of building for them an institutionalized pedestal of popular prestige, and setting them upon it. And at present the school is the most promising agency for such an undertaking.

The educational implications of the present chapter are doubtless much less obvious than those of the last — and chiefly because they are less usual and orthodox. In the last chapter it was indicated that *what* we teach depends upon the contents of our social heritage. But *how* we are to teach depends upon the nature of the human mind — the problem to which this chapter is devoted. If each mind works independently, then we must teach by such a method

as to cultivate independence of thought. But if nature has decreed that the mental life is a mass life and a collective process, involving much passive mentation and blind followership, then, obviously, the problem of method is a very different one indeed. Educational psychology has too much ignored the collective nature of the mental life, the interdependence of human thought, and the normality of passive mentation, with the result that educational theory is desperately in need of the new point of view that can be imparted by such a *social* psychology as that outlined in the foregoing pages. The inferences to be derived from the principles here set forth will appear from time to time as we proceed, and especially in the latter portion of the book.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES[1]

ONLY the details of this problem can be solved by inductive research; the large and inclusive concepts must first be determined by deductive reasoning. For the educational institution in an autocratic society like that of Henry the Eighth or Frederick the Great will have very different objectives than will the public school system of a modern republic. And what the major aims of education are in each case will be deduced from the dominating ideals of the society in which the school is a part. Before we can proceed, therefore, to a formulation of educational objectives in our kind of a society we must first formulate the ideals and dominating purposes of that society itself. In other words, a philosophy of life for our modern world is prerequisite to a philosophy of education.

By a philosophy of life, as distinguished from philosophy in its more inclusive sense, we mean an answer to the problem of human values. What are the really satisfying interests, experiences, and achievements of life; and why are they so? What is the game that is most worth the candle? What sort of an organism is *Homo sapiens;* and how can his innate biological needs best be provided for? What, in short, is the ultimate aim of life? And the problem of human

[1] The fundamental principles of social evaluation, which is the basic problem of this chapter, the writer has expounded more fully in *Social Forces*, December, 1927.

values includes the problem of educational values, as the whole includes the part. The latter is inferred from the former. And so also, by the way, are the ultimate aims of morality, of religion, of government, or of any other human activity or institution whatsoever. A philosophy of education, like a philosophy of religion, or of ethics, or of politics, or of any other social phenomenon, must begin, therefore, with a philosophy of life.

There is a sort of mournful presumption, a suggestion of tragic futility, in the proposal of this question; for it is the unsolved problem of the ages. It appears in the sacred literatures that have come down to us from the remote and shadowy past; for therein we find the cosmologies and liturgies, the prayers and incantations of early civilization, whereby men sought to understand the universe, so as to escape, if might be, the pains that menaced them, and extort from life its fullest joy. The grim and silent architectural ruins of the ancient world, whether ziggurat, temple, or sphinx, testify to the same tragic quest; for each reveals a once prevalent philosophy of life. So do almost all relics of historic art. From the gruesome pictures and doleful statuary of the Middle Ages, for example, one infers the shadow of superstitious resignation under which the spontaneous joys of life were blighted. And formal philsophy, no less than art, is a record of men's attempts to unravel the mystery of existence. Hence Eucken entitles his history of philosophy, "The Problem of Human Life." Every great philosopher from Plato to Hegel, every great poet from Homer to Browning, every great prophet from Isaiah to Tolstoi, has impressed himself upon the imagination and memory of mankind by the seriousness and insight with

which he has attacked this age-old problem. The intellectural tourist into the realms of bygone cultures is everywhere fascinated by the ruins of ancient solutions, curious and awe inspiring in their amazing mixture of cogent thought and wierd fancy. But the problem recurs from age to age, and forever challenges to new solutions.

And never with more insistent urgency than in our own day — nor, indeed, with more bitter irony. For do we not flatter ourselves that the greatest achievements of all history are the achievements of our own age? We boast that our phenomenal inventions have revolutionized all human relationships and modified the very face of nature. Progress was never more rampant! And yet, as Rauschenbusch so wittily suggests, our wives are no happier on oriental rugs than our grandmothers were on rag carpets. Or, as Eucken with more dignity asserts, our creations have become our masters, so that we ourselves are but parts of the civilization machine. For modern life, despite the brilliancy of its scientific and industrial achievements, is more and more painfully failing to satisfy the deepest cravings of the human spirit. Notwithstanding all the complexity and splendor of our present civilization there has seldom been a time in history when a larger proportion of lives were distraught with nervous haste, conflicting purposes, aimlessness approaching despair, restless discontentment, resentful anger at injuries real or imagined, and haunting fear of impending disaster. And scarcely ever in all history has civilized man been more depressed and pessimistic with regard to the future than since the World War, to such perverted uses have we put our inventions and achievements.

And meantime, while our supposed progress is thus bitterly disappointing us, the old landmarks of faith and appraisal have faded out of view behind us; so that we moderns are quite lost upon a new and chartless sea. The revolutionary changes of the past century and a half have torn away our old customs and creeds, exploded our old faiths and valuations, and surrounded us with so much that is new and unappraised that we are perhaps more bewildered by the maze of life than any generation that has ever gone before us. What we appear to require above everything else is a new world-view, a new insight into the essential values of existence. The deepest need of our times is the solution anew, for man in his new environment, of the age-old problem of human life. And no new or cogent theory of education can take its logical departure except from some such new solution. For, as we have seen, a philosophy of life is prerequisite to a philosophy of education. Presumptuous as the enterprise may seem, it must, accordingly, be undertaken here; and to it the greater portion of the present chapter will have to be devoted.

The very concept of value itself carries some implications that need first of all to be clearly discerned. It implies, to begin with, some sentient organism *to* which things or experiences have value. In other words, it implies organic needs, in the satisfaction of which the organism experiences pleasure and the promotion of life, or in the deprivation of which it experiences pain and the thwarting of life. Human value has a fundamental relation not only to survival but to the affective aspects of our experience. The joy of life is a biological desideratum. It is doubtless good biology as well as good psychology, therefore, for William James [1] to write,

[1] *Talks to Teachers*, pp. 234 ff.

"Wherever a process of life communicates an eagerness to him who lives it, there the life becomes genuinely significant. Sometimes the eagerness is more knit up with motor activities, sometimes with the perceptions, sometimes with the imagination, and sometimes with reflective thought. But, wherever it is found, there is the zest, the tingle, the excitement of reality; and there is 'importance' in the only real and positive sense in which importance anywhere can be." Or, in other words, here is the ultimate value. Let us assert, therefore, that to act at the prompting of all our fundamental needs, — to live life to the full, to drink life's cup to its very depths, to "rise satisfied from the feast of life," — that is the biological urge, the just demand, the ultimate aim of human life. As James approves Stevenson in saying, "To miss the joy is to miss all." A philosophy of life must take its departure, therefore, from the needs of the human organism. Its fundamental, axiomatic assumption is that the real needs of the individual human unit are a sort of natural right, imposing inviolable obligations upon society and the very cosmos itself.

Such, at least, is the spirit of the present age. For, old as is the problem of values, our age approaches it in a new faith. It is the dominant and characteristic temper of our times to erect the welfare and consequent happiness of individual persons into an ultimate criterion. And let us assert that this temper, if coöperatively and spiritually conceived, is the bedrock of that new civilization whose foundations are just now in the making. The institutions were made for man, not man for the institutions. Pursuant to this faith, modern democracy is a revolt against the idea that the masses may be subordinated to the status of mere means;

and its central ideal is that every individual has a right to be treated as an end in himself. Modernism has faith that society can, and therefore must, be reorganized around these principles. The cult of progress is the religion of modernism; and progress is interpreted in terms of human welfare. Thus, the ideals of modern occidental civilization fully enfranchise the individual human unit. And this is an ideal that is new in history. It is modernism's unique contribution to social evolution. The concept and ideal of self realization for every person is the keynote of the new civilization, the symphonic theme of the new social order.

Two parenthetical paragraphs must detain us before we can proceed to a frontal attack upon the major problem before us. First, it must seem somewhat inconsistent, after what was said in the last chapter, to swing now to the opposite horn of the dilemma, and set up the individual as the criterion of social value. But the inconsistency is only an illusion, and arises from the fact that that dualism to which reference was made penetrates the very bone and marrow of the personality itself. As common participants in the mental *means* of existence, we are fused and inseparable. As experiencing the *ends* of existence, we are separate and isolated. It is only as separate physical organisms that we are sentient, and capable of experiencing pleasure and pain. The joy of life is private property in the sense that it can be felt only in the subjective center of individual experience. There is and can be no other good than the good of individuals. Social welfare is a metaphor, and can have no other meaning than the greatest good of the greatest number. If modern individualism means our determination to achieve the welfare and happiness of as many individuals as possible, then

there can be no such thing as carrying individualism to extremes. The truth is that modern individualism is excessive only in the sense of being misconceived as to the means of compassing its ends. For happiness is a co-operative enterprise; and it can be achieved by no other arrangement. Every-fellow-for-himself means the destruction of all in the end. Exploitation is the greatest of all mistakes, because it exploits none so mercilessly in the end as the exploiters themselves. The laissez faire theory was the supreme intellectual blunder of the nineteenth century. As to the *means* of life we are as united as a hub; as to its *ends*, as separate as the spokes. Not until we understand this dual fact shall we be in a position to lay the foundations of a real and successful democracy. The escape from destructive individualism is not in abandoning the doctrine of individual self-realization, but in organizing collectively the means of achieving it.

If there be those who crave to split the hairs of a fruitless metaphysical quibble, here is an excellent occasion. For human life is social, and therefore necessarily coöperative; notwithstanding the fact that each individual is a separate physical organism and as ultimate an ontological entity as can be conceived. Indeed, there is such a mutuality about all life, and such an interdependence among all entities, that we encounter a certain absurdity in ascribing independence to any person, organism, or entity whatsoever. Everything in the universe is at the same time both end and means. In the web of existence all separate entities are interdependent. Hence one is in for a puzzling dilemma whether he locates value within any unitary entity or outside of it; whether he ascribes ontological reality to values or to processes; whether

he adopts ends or means as his point of first departure. This seems to be the basis of the inevitable dualisms of metaphysics, ethics, and sociology. They arise, however, from the parallax of the individual point of view. Explanation is a need of conscious, sentient beings only; naturally, therefore, they post themselves at the center of it. Granted then, an arbitrary dogmatism in thus positing the biological self and its innate needs as the zero point for thinking. If there be those who boast the point of view of the vacant, interstellar spaces, let them laugh at our absurdity. As human beings here upon this little planet we find ourselves compelled to think our way as best we can across the maze of life. To that end we must look out on life through such eyes as nature has given us, even if metaphysical problems do sometimes present themselves to us in double images.

But to resume our major problem. We have posited the fundamental needs of *Homo sapiens* as the criterion of value. The next question is: How shall we determine what those needs are? To answer this question we have to begin with a sort of biological axiom, to the effect that the needs of an organism are revealed in its activities. Its biological needs are satisfied through its behavior. At least so it seems to those who are unwilling to just abandon the problem of values altogether. In the mechanistic philosophy of those science worshipers who profess to crave no insights except such as are obtainable by their technique, all such terms as needs, desires, values, purposes, and functions are of course anathema; and consistently so, from their limited point of view. But it is precisely because evaluation is not a problem for science that philosophy insists upon attacking it, and that in its own terminology. And, granting that value is a con-

ceivable idea at all, then it does follow as a sort of axiom that the function of activities is the satisfaction of organic needs. The aim of behavior is survival; and in the struggle for existence, behavior that has no survival value gets ruthlessly eliminated — with rare exceptions. The characteristic activities of an organism point inward, therefore, to the innate needs which it is their function to satisfy. And this, in general, must be true of mankind as well as of the lower orders. The fundamental needs of man are to be found through a study of human activities.

But the study of human activities with the aim of cataloguing the organic needs which they satisfy is an incomparably more complicated problem than a corresponding study of the lower orders. For while most animal behavior is instinctive, most human behavior is not. Instead of being simple, fixed and definite, it is, accordingly, complex and almost infinitely variable. Nevertheless, to date, its study has been approached by way of the same underlying assumption as has the study of animal behavior; namely, that the "original" is the *normal.* On the basis of this assumption the "original," that is, the real, nature of man has been sought in his instincts; but with the only result of showing that man differs from other organisms in having almost none, in the strictest interpretation of the term.[1] Almost all human

[1] See Floyd Allport's *Social Psychology*, Chapter III. However, the present writer by no means consents to the explanation of human behavior there set forth. In the first place, the analysis is too simple. Instead of six prepotent reflexes there may well be sixty (though six is a relief from Freudianism!). The result is explanations that are too far fetched — cleanliness, from the rejection reflexes, for example. One is tempted to explain social parasitism in terms of that clutching reflex by which an infant holds on to a broom stick. In the second place it seems like sheer verbalism to assert that "habit and instinct are clearly reciprocal in explanatory value," so that what is ascribed to learning must be denied any innate rootage. The chick may have to learn to pick up kernels of wheat, but why does it never learn to bury them as a dog does a bone? We seem to have innate predestinations to learn this instead of that. It is the old question of why grass from the same pasture makes wool on the sheep and bristles on the pigs. There is nothing in the behaviorist formulæ to explain that. And finally, our escape once made from this vicious dilemma, and the possibility admitted of

behavior turns out to be learned behavior; and the few inherited reflexes that remain throw little or no light on the real nature and inherent needs of man. What, for example, does it signify that a week-old infant will hold on to a broom stick and be lifted clear of all support? The quest for man's "original" nature has reached this reduction to absurdity because its underlying assumption was derived from a false analogy. For man differs from the lower forms in being educable, and capable of social evolution without any accompanying biological evolution. Hence the analogy breaks down. It is almost exactly the same assumption, by the way, that causes our fundamentalist friends to turn away with such disgust from what they call the monkey theory. They resent the suggestion that the original is the normal. Scientists escape any such feeling of disgust toward the so-called monkey theory precisely because they withdraw from that assumption so far as man's pithecan ancestry is concerned; but they hold to it so far as this "original nature" assumption is concerned. Their positions are hardly consistent. For what good reason is there, indeed, to assume that the acorn reveals any more than the oak, or that the cave house is any more "natural" than the modern mansion, or that the instinctive vocalization of an infant or a savage is any more fundamentally human than a finished opera? Certainly it is at least as reasonable to suppose that the real nature of man is revealed by his achievements; or even, as Browning suggested, by his aspirations.

We venture, therefore, to break with orthodoxy, to depart from the whole procedure of the psychologists, and to make

many innate drives, there remains no other way to invoice "the original nature of men" than the method suggested in the present chapter. Compare the present writer's articles in *The Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. X, No. 4, and *Social Forces* for December, 1927.

our attack upon this problem from an entirely different point of view, namely, the sociological. From the roots of the instincts we lift our eyes to the foliage of culture. We turn from nerves, muscles, and glands to the processes, structures, and accumulated heritage of society. In our quest for the real nature and basic needs of the species we deliberately substitute the fundamental assumption that the biological man is to be discovered in the cultural man.

And we take the precaution, moreover, of looking our assumption carefully in the teeth before closing the trade. The assumption upon which we are to proceed is that *all culture is implicit in the germ plasm.* This assumption is at least as tenable as the one that we are trading off. It runs through all modern biology, psychology, and philosophy, if we but take the pains to notice it. It is implied in the concept of the survival value of human behavior, and in all the ramifications of that concept. It gives rise to Eucken's thesis that the pendulums of history swing back and forth to man's fundamental needs; and to Ross's admission that there are limits beyond which social control cannot successfully go. It is implied in the philosophical doctrine of pragmatism — that all beliefs and practices are to be tested by their ability to meet the needs of human nature. And the biological needs of man that will be satisfied by new scientific discoveries and artistic creations are the *raison d'être* for all such endeavor.

Our assumption — that all culture is implicit in the germ plasm — merely implies that the enormous fore-brain of our species is the physiological basis of our innate needs; and of course that fore-brain is given in the germ plasm. *Homo sapiens* is an organism with some eight or ten billion neurones.

And such an organism he has continued consistently to be, without appreciable mutation we are told, for many thousands of years. And having such a nature as all these neurones predetermine, he craves, and in the end creates, the elements of culture to satisfy his needs: languages and industrial techniques, philosophies, mythologies, and great national ideals, the sciences and the fine arts, and all the institutions of a complex civilization. This is the difference between human nature and dog nature; and the difference is all in the germ plasm! And just as the only way of finding out what is in the embryo of the acorn is by studying the mature oak, so the only way of ascertaining the "original" nature of man is by studying his developed culture.

We have been frightened away from this procedure hitherto because of the seemingly hopeless complexity and contradiction of human culture. Our minds crave something simple; and a sort of bogus simplicity we succeed in selling ourselves in the terminology of reflexes, S–R equations, and synapses. Objective culture, on the other hand, is anything but simple; and as it is in plain sight there is no chance to fool ourselves about it. The activities and acquired wants of the human species vary from person to person, from class to class, from age to age, and from race to race. Wants that prevail quite generally among the upper classes of society seem to be quite absent among the lower. The prevailing wants of nineteenth century New Englanders, seventeenth century Puritans, and thirteenth century Englishmen were very different; although all of them represent the same racial stock. And the wants of cultured Americans, southern Negro croppers, Mexican peons, Chinese coolies, and Hopi Indians are so different that nothing seems more hopeless

than to discover any method for bringing order out of such confusion, simplicity out of such complexity.

The physiological explanation of this diversity is in the plasticity of the human nervous system. Man is educable. He can acquire ideas, habits, wants, prejudices, and apperceptive systems. Almost all human behavior, as we have seen, is learned behavior, involving acquired changes in the synapses; even those behavior patterns that have the feel and reputation of being innate. From this fact it follows that, within certain limits imposed by hereditary mechanisms, almost any other program might have been learned, instead of the one that actually was learned. This is why such an amazing variety of behavior programs is possible on the part of persons or peoples with such essentially similar organisms and hereditary traits. Different behavior programs, different culture systems, have been invented and learned in the attempt to satisfy the same innate needs of human nature. Thus a nervous system with subjective potentialities and drives the same generation after generation, may be passed along in the germ plasm, but give rise, nevertheless, to objective culture systems that are very different. But from this stability of the germ plasm it may be inferred that *universal* forms of human behavior, if we can but discover such underneath the bewildering, deceptive, and contradictory behavior patterns of the various culture systems, will point to the constant and stable needs of the human species. That the universal is innate is but another form of the assumption upon which we are deliberately setting forth.

To bring order out of complexity, the first enterprise of the scientist is classification. At first mention, this seems impossible; but it is not so impossible as it seems. As a

matter of fact a classification of cultural activities lies ready at our hand; all we have to do is to reach out and take it. It has been made for us by the collective intuition of common sense; just as formal grammar had but to label the syntactic forms of ordinary speech. A list of the universal institutions is a classification of man's cultural activities. The basic institutions — the family, the state, the church, the school, and industry — are recognized by everybody. Social scientists could agree on a more extended list, no doubt; but the principle of classification, not the finality of the rubrics, is the important consideration for our present purposes. It is only necessary to recognize the fact that certain institutions, or types of organized activities, are universal. A given institution, education for example, may vary from people to people and from age to age. It may be very rudimentary and undifferentiated in primitive society, and very elaborate in civilized society; but with a similar objective in every case. As a matter of fact, the functions of institutions are what differentiate them from one another, and give each of them its self-identity from people to people and from age to age. And their functions, or objectives, correspond to the human needs they satisfy. A list of universal institutions is therefore a classification of human activities on the basis of the universal needs of the species. Their universality constitutes the evidence that the needs the institutions satisfy are organic and fundamental. Everywhere and always men take to these sorts of activities, just as ducks take to water. The drives behind them — the needs they have been evolved to satisfy — must therefore be innate. The universal institutions reveal the contents of the human germ plasm.

From this principle it is but a short step to a very simple and practical formula for the guidance of individual life. *The needs of individual life are to be satisfied through participation in the institutions of society.* This is a perfectly obvious inference from the fact that self and society are but two aspects of the same thing — that the objective culture has been evolved through the cumulative efforts of the race to satisfy its own organic needs. The way of individual life, therefore, is in utilizing the products of social evolution. Self realization is achieved through social participation.

A general principle like this naturally requires specifications and qualifications. The first step in this direction is a list of the institutions, since it is necessary to know what the institutions are in which one should participate. Here the reader is asked to accept, provisionally, the list already presented. Due apology is hereby offered for its artificial simplification and for its lack of completeness and finality. The only claim is that these rubrics are helpful in thinking our way along toward a practical solution of the problem of how to live. They are as follows:

The institutions of society:

1. The Family
2. The Local Community
3. The State
4. The Industries
5. The Church
6. The School
7. The Press
8. The Standard of Living
9. The Customary Recreations

10. The Health-preserving Activities
11. Miscellaneous

The second step in the same direction is in adding, by way of qualification, the doctrine of the balanced ration. Social participation must be balanced participation. None of the great institutionalized activities may be neglected; for if any of them are, one's life is fractional, and some of its needs remain unsatisfied. Each activity must be pursued in such a manner and degree as not to interfere with participation in other important activities. One should not become so absorbed in industry that he neglects his family, his community, or his state; nor so obsessed with his religion that he underestimates the school, the recreations, or the health-preserving activities; nor so enslaved by a standard of living that he fails to utilize the other institutionalized satisfactions of the collective life. It is the old Greek principle of nothing in excess. The restlessness, the vague unhappiness, and the obvious miscarriage of life that we observe about us are largely explained on the principle of the unbalanced ration — some minor matter grossly overdone, while other important matters are neglected. This tragedy is forced upon some persons by the maladjustments of the social order in which their lots by chance of birth are cast; others stumble into it through the influence of their own misconceived ideals; while others are driven to it by the whips and stings of an outrageous personal fortune. The problem of life turns out to be the problem of balancing the ration of interests, needs, and satisfactions offered one in the social process of which his own life is but a part. The problem of society turns out to be that of offering to each individual an adequate social opportunity for a balanced satisfaction of all the innate needs of life.

And this brings us to the third and most difficult step in our attempt to furnish specifications. For human life is collective, and happiness is a coöperative enterprise. The ultimate problem is to find or create the right kind of a social environment in which to live. So far as the directing of one's individual career may be concerned the practical problem is to adjust oneself as well as possible to the kind of institutions among which one's lot may happen to be cast. But for philosophers and social leaders there is always the larger problem of trying to determine the institutional forms that *ought* to be offered to individuals as their opportunity for living. For no given social order can be accepted as ideal — "the hypnotism of the present reality" to the contrary notwithstanding. Each institution has presented itself historically in almost innumerable forms and relationships; and it is the task of the social philosopher to determine, if he can, which forms and relationships are the best. Society evolves; and it is the responsibility of social engineers to guide social evolution, so far as possible, toward desirable goals. A society thus guided would be called a *telic* society; and it is the aspiration of social science to furnish the knowledge whereby society can be rendered telic. We confront, accordingly, the problem of social evaluation. By what procedure and technique can we determine the blue-prints of the better world that ought to be in the future? How shall we decide whether a given form of the family, or the state, or religion, or what not, is best suited to the innate needs of man; and what constitutes a well-balanced social ration?

Before we proceed to the answer of this question, however, — an answer, be it conceded, that can only be provisional

and fractional at best — we must first introduce a subsidiary consideration. We must notice the qualitative differences between different forms of the same institutions. With respect to precisely what do they differ from place to place and from age to age? The answer to this question must be sought in the intellectual resources of the race. For convenience we insert our list again:

The intellectual resources of the social life:

1. The Means of Communication
2. The Techniques of Industry
3. The Techinques of Amusement
4. The Sciences
5. The Fine Arts
6. The Popular Beliefs
7. The Prevailing Ideals
8. The "Folkways"
9. The "Mores"

Now, the form and effectiveness of any given society's institutions depend upon the quantity and factual validity of the cognitive capital used in the operation of those institutions. The institutions are the nouns, the intellectual resources the adjectives, of the social life. Each society has an industrial institution; but the industrial institutions of different societies differ widely on account of the different industrial techniques employed in them. The utilization of much new scientific knowledge in modern industry renders this institution radically different from that of a century ago. The democratic ideal — that every human being has an inherent right to happiness and self-realization — has changed not only the state, but the family, the church, the

school, industry, and every other institution. In a later chapter an effort will be made to show how the utilization of more science and art will transform the family. The church is passing through a transition that is due, in part at least, to the recent increment of new scientific knowledge. Institutions change their features and values when the intellectual resources change. The same institutions exist in savage as in civilized societies; their difference being in the intellectual resources extant. The institutions are as constant as the germ plasm; the intellectual resources as plastic as the human nervous system. The problem of social evaluation turns out, therefore, to be that of evaluating the intellectual resources with respect to which institutions vary.

We return, therefore, to the question of how such valuation can be accomplished. It is a problem for historical research, involving a comparative study of racial experiences. Many forms of family life, for example, have been experimented with; so that it ought to be possible by comparative study to determine approximately, at least, which forms have worked the best. Many kinds of government have been tried; by analysis and comparison, trends ought to be discoverable, useful elements analyzed out, and bad features discarded. Various forms of industrial organization have been given the pragmatic test; from the results of racial experience we ought to know by now whether industrial exploitation, for example, works well or badly in the end. And so with each of the items in the two lists above. To each the pragmatic test of racial experimentation must be applied. Thus norms can be approximated.

In some cases the appraisal of social practices is a simple matter, inasmuch as their consequences are promptly

apparent. This is particularly true of scientific discoveries and technical inventions. In other cases the ultimate consequences are quite obscure and long delayed, so that the problem of evaluation is extremely complicated. Such is the case with those great dominating ideals by which different civilizations are characterized. For such phenomena a more elaborate conceptual technique of appraisal is necessary, involving the historical perspective. A custom, ideal, or institution may be judged to work well in the long run if it succeeds in perpetuating itself over long-extended periods, and at the same time facilitates the functioning of sister elements in the system of which it is a part. It may be said to work badly when, Sampson-like, it tends to pull down the social structure in ruins upon itself. But — be it clearly understood, — man, not the social process, is the ultimate criterion implied — a fact quite blindly overlooked by some. The biological needs of *Homo sapiens* are the principles that predetermine social harmonies. The chromosome determiners of the human germ plasm are the final predeterminers of what is for the social good. No other assumption can extricate one from the vicious logical circle in which contemporaneous philosophers too frequently maroon themselves and their disciples. Rudolf Eucken is therefore sound in his impressive contention that the needs of man assert themselves in the historic process; so that in the long run only those culture elements can survive which meet those basic needs, while culture elements that counter the needs of man tend to eliminate themselves through reform, revolution, or the disintegration of the society that harbors them.

In this way we shall gradually develop something approaching the nature of an objective, quasi-scientific philos-

ophy of life; and we are in a position to make a very useful beginning now, if we will set ourselves about it. Racial experience will be our laboratory, and history in the broadest sense of our source of data. We shall observe the pendulum swinging back and forth between Bohemian and Puritan "mores." There are first artists, and then iconoclasts, and then artists again. Now the soldier has his day, and then the priest; after him the savant, and anon the captain of industry. In one age the architect builds pyramids, in another colosseums, in another cathedrals, and in another skyscrapers. Every now and again some civilization has gone off on this tangent or that, and arrived at Avernus as a result. Thus the very fluctuations and aberrations of social phenomena constitute their instructiveness; for variables imply norms. To statistical treatment these data are not strictly amenable, to be sure; but to something analogous they are. Norms and trends can, by this technique, be approximately charted; ethics and normative sociology may thus be made to approach the status of an objective science.

But only approach! And not merely because the phenomena are relatively intangible and hard to measure, but because the data must always remain insufficient, and their subjective *meaning* problematical. So long as there remain any dominant potentialities in human nature, and any latent possibilities of social invention and evolution, such a discipline must always fall short of saying the last word. For life is always an adventure into uncharted fields of human experience where man has never been before. By studying the past experience of the race we can learn what not to try again, and which ventures have proved most promising. But there will always remain new ventures, the outcome of

which no man can fully foresee. Hence there will always be scope for prophets and idealists in the realm of ethics and social aspiration. There will always be more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in any man's philosophy, however objective and near-scientific he may succeed in making it. However, a provisional solution has its uses; and that is always the philosopher's assignment. Such tentative conclusions as the present writer has arrived at will be found implicit in the subsequent chapters of this book.

So much for our philosophy of life. We are now ready to deduce from it a theory of educational objectives. The ultimate aim of education is, of course, the self-realization of all persons. But, as we have seen, self-realization is to be achieved through a balanced participation in all the institutions of society. The immediate aim of education is, therefore, to prepare young people for effective participation in those institutions. *The institutions of society are the objectives of education.* It follows as a corollary that the curriculum must be composed of the intellectual resources used in operating those institutions. All of which is equivalent to the principle of parallelism, which will be expounded with some of its implications in the following chapter.

It is interesting to note parenthetically in passing that we have here a statement of educational objectives that is consistently sociological. In his *Educational Values* Professor Bagley has set forth certain objectives of education that are strictly psychological. In the *Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education* is a list of educational objectives, adapted from Spencer, which has been almost universally employed in pedagogical theorizing throughout the United States. But while this list is of great practical utility it falls

short with sociologists, who naturally crave a list of educational objectives as consistently sociological as Bagley's are consistently psychological. But consistently sociological this list from the *Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education* is not. Health, recreation, vocation, and morality are conceived from the individual rather than the social standpoint. "Socio-civic" blankets the whole social field but leaves it quite unanalyzed. In this term we have intimated a felt want for objectives that are really social but the term offers us only "the great, big, blooming, buzzing Confusion" of William James's facile rhetoric. But the list of social institutions satisfies the sociologist's demand for rubrics that are consistent with his own point of view. The school — if it knows its business — is getting young people ready to play their parts in the teamwork of the various institutions. All of them! Not merely in the industrial institution; nor in the state; but in all the institutions of society: the family, the community, the standard of living, the health preserving, the recreational, and the rest. And this simple sociological formula irons out many tantalizing wrinkles in educational theory and practice. The old puzzle, for example, about practical versus cultural education resolves itself into a meaningless jugglery of words. It would be a net gain if the word cultural were to drop out of our pedagogical vocabularies entirely, as traditional, ambiguous, and misleading. We might then have some chance of seeing clearly that all education worthy of the name has the very practical objective of preparing young people to take their parts efficiently in all the institutions of our highly cultured society.

But still our formula lacks an important qualification — a very important qualification indeed. As it stands it implies

a static society in which the institutions do not change from generation to generation, and in which social progress is impossible. But human beings do not live in that kind of a society. Institutions do evolve; and the collective intellect is constantly at work upon the enterprise of making this a better world in which to live. To be exact, therefore, the objectives of education are not merely the institutions as they are, but as they are becoming. And not merely, either, as they are likely to be, but as they *ought* to be. It is not enough that the educational program anticipate the social order of the future; it must anticipate what ought to be; and thereby help create it. This is the *telic* function of education. This function must be obvious from the principles of social psychology and social organization set forth in Chapter III; it will be expounded at length in Chapter VI. Indeed, the telic function of education is the dominant note of this whole philosophy. The major purpose of this book is to convince educators that their most important responsibility, by all odds, is that of determining what the institutional forms and relationships of the future ought to be, so as to build their educational programs accordingly; and that their most important duty is, therefore, to qualify as sociological philosophers.

CHAPTER V

THE PRINCIPLE OF SOCIAL PARALLELISM

THERE is always a striking parallelism between any given civilization and the educational system that functions in it. To make this clear is one of the chief services of the history of education.[1] Nothing will serve better than this principle to introduce the argument of the present chapter.

The educational programs of savage groups, as contrasted with those of civilized societies, furnish one of the best possible illustrations of this principle. In the educational system of a savage society there are no schools whatever. This statement sounds like a paradox, until one remembers that in any society, even the most civilized, there is going on constantly a great deal of the kind of education that we shall call informal. That is, the children learn by observation and imitation, through participation in the social process itself. In this way, each rising generation learns the mother tongue, the simpler techniques of industry, the moral standards, and the general customs of the group into which its members have been born. Now in a savage society there is no other kind of education. There are no schools, as in civilized societies, since there is nothing to be learned that cannot be learned informally. Schools are not needed, because the cognitive material used in the social process is so meager that formal education is not necessary to impart it. But wherever the

[1] Consult any of the standard texts: Monroe's, Graves', Cubberley's, *et al.*

social process becomes complex, involving the use of a considerable accumulation of mental capital, there we observe the emergence of a formal school system. There has to be; otherwise the knowledge required to operate the institutions would not come into the possession of the young people. Much superficial sentimentality about what schools are for would be dispelled by keeping this contrast clearly in mind. Civilized societies have schools precisely for the purpose of teaching the facts which constitute civilization. Knowledge, and lots of it: that is the essential difference between savagery and civilization. To teach facts, and lots of them: that is the essential function of the school. Everything else is incidental.

And in civilized societies the curriculum normally corresponds to the culture. In ancient Sparta, for example, the social process was almost exclusively a military process, at least for the free Spartan citizens. Hence there evolved in Sparta a system of training, partly formal, partly informal, designed to make soldiers out of all the boys. They were taken from their mothers at the age of seven or eight, and transferred to the barracks, where they grew up in the atmosphere of soldiering and were taught the attitudes and skills of soldiers. Athens, on the other hand, made use of the fine arts and the rudimentary sciences to a unique degree. Through the wonderful inventions of her great galaxy of first-class geniuses she accumulated a very rich capital in these fields. And the school program corresponded. Boys were taught the fine arts and the elements of the sciences. Moreover, the school actually encouraged original invention upon the part of the children. One of the most significant school exercises recorded in history is that of the Athenian

boy improvising music expressive of the sentiments of the poetry he had learned. That could hardly have happened anywhere in the ancient world outside of Athens; it could hardly have failed to happen there. It was as natural and inevitable as commercial arithmetic in American schools! For a civilization is bound to produce school exercises corresponding to its own dominating interests.

China presents a striking contrast. Here was a civilization with its face set toward the past. All techniques, all codes, all customs, all beliefs, had been formulated in the long ago, and set down in the ancient classics. Change was taboo. As a result China, for many centuries, did not progress, as we Westerners pride ourselves in doing. Western nations have taken their turns at spasms of temporary progress. But China solved the problem that no western civilization has ever solved, — namely, that of stability and permanence. And to her system of static culture her education corresponded. The student was saturated in the ancient lore. The method was strictly memoriter. Originality was rigorously discouraged; an intellectual echo was regarded as the acme of academic excellence. And, after a long period of such schooling, a ruthlessly competitive system of public examinations selected those most completely saturated in the ancient lore to become the civil and religious functionaries of society. Naturally, their administration of society was an overt application of the ancient beliefs, customs, codes, and techniques. It was by this parallelism that China conserved her static culture. And, if we Westerners are ever to solve the problem of that social disintegration and decline which has thus far overtaken in turn each and every one of our great societies — except those now in their prime — we

might do well at least to study seriously the Chinese system of education. Possibly it may contain some features worthy of adapting to our own needs. Moreover, it is interesting to conjecture what may happen to China now that she has abandoned that ancient system, and wagered her life, as it were, that she too can progress.

Illustrations of the parallelism under discussion could be enumerated almost without limit: the three-class social system of the Middle Ages — clergy, knights, and peasants — with its separate program of training for each class; the militaristic régime of Prussia between 1870 and 1914, with its peculiar educational features; the simple rural life of the American frontier, with its meager three "R's" curriculum; the austerely religious education of the ancient Hebrews or the modern Puritans; and so on almost indefinitely.

But it is equally significant that social change forces corresponding changes upon the schools. In Greece the degenerate, individualistic sophistry following the Periclean age gave rise to a tribe of teachers who advertised that they would teach young men "to take either side of any question and make the worser seem the better reason." When Rome expanded from a provincial republic to a cosmopolitan empire, she "unconsciously realized" her need for a more elaborate schooling, and so she imported Greek savants and established universities on the Greek model. When, later, Roman life decayed, scarcely anything survived in her school program but rhetoric. Having nothing much to say, the pupils gave their attention to saying it elaborately. From which it may perhaps be a hasty generalization to surmise that much attention to the forms of expression is an evidence either of curricular maladjustment or of social decadence.

The Renaissance produced new types of schools; and the Protestant Revolt gave rise to a new theory of education. The rise of modern democracy has produced a social need absolutely new in history, namely, for universal literacy; and as a result we have a state system of universal education in every modern republic. And the Industrial Revolution, including the social changes it has caused, is revolutionizing education completely.

Now, for this correspondence between education and civilization the reasons are obvious enough to the student of social psychology. Education is the reproductive process of society, as we have seen. It reproduces the social heritage into the individual; and so imparts to him the substance out of which his personality is made. By thus transmitting the mental capital of each generation to the next, education furnishes the foundation upon which each new generation is built. It conserves the social heritage by reproducing it into the minds of each new quota of the racial progeny. It keeps the social process going by keeping extant the mental substances thereof. Were it not for the learning process, the social heritage would perish. Indeed, it would never have accumulated at all. Without education each new generation of human animals would have to begin again at the bottom of the ladder of social evolution. But the learning process keeps the accumulated material extant, so that the institutions of civilized society can be operated on the civilized level by each new phalanx of the phylonic procession. Hence the parallelism between education and civilization. There really is no other substance out of which education, in any vital sense of the word, can be made, except the mental capital on which the civilization in which it functions is doing business.

And, what is more important, no civilization can continue except as the social heritage by the use of which it operates is transmitted from generation to generation; and no society can achieve and maintain a higher level of culture except as the richer mental wherewithal of that higher culture is rendered current among the people by an educational program that parallels it. There can be no permanent social progress without a corresponding educational progress.

To be sure, there are times, and ours is one of them, when this principle of parallelism can be maintained in the face of contemporaneous school practices only by distinguishing sharply between education and schooling. When the school program is made up of irrelevant and extraneous material — a dead hang-over from a by-gone age — then schooling ceases to be *education*, and degenerates into nothing better than mere "education." But, if we would really educate our young people, we must furnish them with schooling that really does parallel the civilization in which they are to live. And unless the schooling does parallel that civilization, it will not perpetuate it.

But this problem of paralleling the school with the real world outside the school is complicated in our time by the rapidity and extent to which that world itself is changing. For ours is a time of social readjustment out of all comparison with any previous period of which we have recorded history. So much so that we are completely bewildered and confused. The movement has been so fast that our minds have failed to keep up with it. We do not so much as realize how unprecedented and revolutionary are the changes that are actually occurring. These changes in the objective civilization have rendered the old sort of schooling obsolete; but what that

new sort of schooling is which will be required to parallel the new civilization, is far from manifest as yet. We have scarcely thought about it in such a relationship as this. Like the ancient Romans, we "unconsciously realize" our need for an expanded schooling; but, what the cause, meaning, and goal of that expansion are to be, we have not so much as principles by which we can decide. Nor shall we have until we achieve some adequate mental grasp of the movement itself. How can we parallel the new civilization when we have as yet no clear notions of what that new civilization is likely to become? There is not the slightest chance for cogent thinking about our present educational problems until we first have clearly before us the blue prints of that new social order which is taking shape before our eyes. And this is true not only of education but of all the other major problems of modern life as well.

Men react differently to the assertion that greater changes are occurring now than ever before in history. With respect to the visible changes, such as inventions, population growth, and multiplication of activities, almost everybody is inclined to boast. But these visible changes operate as social causes, producing deeper and less obvious changes in the organization of society. Some are disposed to view these changes with anxiety, and would like to return to "normalcy," even if by repressive measures. Others are wholly converted to the cult of progress, and burn incense to all the gods of change. But there are few who realize how deeply the visible changes, functioning as causes, are penetrating into all the invisible depths of our social order, altering all the relationships of human life. Hence those who boast most glibly about the visible changes on the surface of things are

often the very ones who are most blind to the revolutionary changes that are going on in the invisible depths of our social life. Moreover, by a sort of optical illusion, the curve of progress for the past century and a half is projected back at the same incline over the previous four thousand years, magnifying the slight progress of that long period into a sort of mirage. Due to these oversights and illusions we fail to perceive the true nature of the present age; so much so that a sort of mild and derisive resentment is often aroused by the suggestion that our own age is more changeful and problematical than any previous age has ever been. But it is; and scarcely anything is more important than for our leaders of thought and policy to perceive the magnitude and revolutionary nature of the changes through which we are passing.

The incline of a mountain road is sometimes deceiving. One's engine labors along in low gear on a grade that does not look at all steep to the driver. Occasionally one looks ahead at a stretch, apparently down-grade; but is surprised, when he reaches it, that his motor is still pulling rather heavily. It is somewhat the same with the changes of the times in which we are living. Their pitch and altitude are not perceptible to us who are living through them. In order to detect them in their true proportions it is necessary to resort to some device or other that will give us adequate perspective. This we can accomplish by comparing the changes of our own times with those of another. From the comparison we can draw enlightenment. That other change, which occurred in prehistoric times, we can stand away from and observe objectively, and by so doing realize its magnitude. Then, by a little reasoning, we can infer that the change through which we ourselves are passing must be equally great. In

this way we shall be able to understand why it is that the motor is heating. For the fact is that neither the educational, nor any other, problem of modern life can be understood at all except by considering it as a phase of that great epochal readjustment through which the world is passing.

Social evolution may be arbitrarily divided into three periods. For our present purposes, we may assert that human culture shows three terraces: the terrace of savagery, the terrace of civilization, and the terrace upon which we are just arriving, which we may call the terrace of the new super-civilization. On the first of these levels, man earned his living by hunting and fishing. He accepted his geographical environment as he found it, and tried to take out of it what he needed; but he made no effort to modify it. On the second level he earned his living by agriculture and the handicrafts. He undertook to modify his geographical environment and cause it to contain the things he most needed. This he did primarily by domesticating plants and animals, and, secondarily, by making the tools and equipment that he needed to take care of them and of the goods that accrued from their care. The fundamental cause, therefore, that lifted man from the level of savagery to the level of civilization was the domestication of plants and animals. The change came about very slowly in most societies; in some societies animals were domesticated without domesticating plants; in others plants, without animals; but wherever the change became completed, so that the society depended for its living upon agriculture and the handicrafts instead of upon hunting and fishing, that society had thereby risen from savagery to civilization.

For the domestication of plants and animals operated as a

cause and affected every phase and activity, every institution and ideal of the social life. It increased the quantity of population that could be maintained upon any given area of land, for obvious reasons. It resulted in a new kind of dwelling. As a rule hunting savages live in flimsy, movable shelters; but once a people have settled down upon the land to live by tilling it, they usually build houses of wood and stone. The change increased the quantity of personal property per capita. Hunters usually accumulated but little in the way of capital goods; agriculture and the handicrafts are far more favorable to such production and accumulation. This accumulation gave rise to barter, exchange, and commerce on a much larger scale than was possible among savage hunters. Larger population, more substantial houses, and commerce: these taken together meant the growth of villages and cities. Among a strictly savage people, depending exclusively upon hunting and fishing, only the smallest villages are found. Cities have never developed except among people that earn their living by agriculture and the handicrafts. And this new type of society gave rise in turn to new functions, and therefore to new forms, of government; tribes and chieftains give place to kingdoms and eventually to empires.

Slavery began with agriculture. There was nothing for hunting peoples to do with their prisoners of war except to torture and eventually dispose of them — the adult males, at any rate. But not so with farmers; they soon discovered that they could compel their prisoners of war to do their work for them. The change to agriculture had its effects upon the institution of property also. It gave rise to the institution of private property in land. Hunting people

made a tribal claim to certain areas, but seldom individual claims. But when an individual had cleared a piece of wild land, and arranged for its protection from wild cattle, it became necessary for him to assert a personal claim to it that had to be recognized and guaranteed by the group. Family life was also affected; for agricultural life is more conducive to the segregation of a pair and their children in a house by themselves, apart from their kindred, than is a hunting or a nomadic life. Besides, the growth of private property made the family a functional economic unit to a far greater degree than it had ever been before, and tended to exalt the status of men as the producers and defenders of property. But probably the most important cause for the artificial subordination of women under the agriculture-handicraft régime was the rise of slavery. Since wives were often procured in much the same way that slaves were, the tendency was to reduce wives to a status somewhat akin to slavery. These were important causes of the change from the metronymic to the patronymic type of family; and that tended to reduce women to the position of quasi-slavery, which has more or less characterized all civilized societies during the historic period.

Even the moral code and religion were altered, for reasons that will appear to the reader's imagination. And finally, recorded history began only after people had made the transition under discussion. The reason is that in a savage society there were no facilities for preserving records. Only relics remained; from which only the conditions, but not the events, of life could be deciphered. But with the rise of permanent kinds of buildings, including temples and libraries, there were safe repositories for the preservation of records.

This is why the historic civilizations of Europe and Asia always have a vague prehistory abounding in legends of their emergence from a previous status of hunters. This is why practically all the civilized peoples of the historic period have been agriculturists and handicraftsmen. Thus the cause which, more than any other, lifted man from the prehistoric to the historic level of culture was the domestication of plants and animals. That was what re-made the shadowy world primæval!

Within the last century and a half mankind has domesticated — so to speak — steam, electricity, bacteria, and the chemical affinities; and that is destined to cause modifications in our mode of life quite as far reaching and momentous as those the former domestication caused. Before the Industrial Revolution man did almost all his work with muscle power — the muscles of men or animals. That was the only power available — except that he used the wind for part of his water transportation, and water power for grinding wheat. But now he has harnessed the power of coal, petroleum, and electricity. For doing his work he has now made an entirely new adjustment to the resources of nature, quite as revolutionary as that of causing the plants and animals which he wanted to grow where he wanted them. And this new adjustment to the resources of nature is destined to modify every phase and activity, every institution and ideal, of his social life no less radically in the long run than did that earlier readjustment. Why should it not be expected to do so?

It has already increased the quantity of population that can be maintained upon any small, congested area, or upon the earth as a whole, by introducing science into agriculture,

and steam and electricity into the distribution of food to the distant places where it is needed. It has given rise to new kinds of building materials, and piled up dwellings twenty and more stories high. It has revolutionized trade and transportation. Hence the modern urbanization of society. Cities of a million were rare before the nineteenth century; now there are scores of them, and more than half the people live in good-sized towns. The new commerce, communication, and density of population have changed the functions and therefore the forms of government. They have made democracies possible on a larger scale than was ever possible before; and created a new need for a new form of international organization.

The new industry has led to the abolition of slavery — slaves being too motiveless and too unskilled to be profitable under the new régime — and it has created a new type of relationship between employer and employees: the corporation on the one hand, the great labor organizations on the other. As for the institution of private property: the greatly increased quantity per capita of personal property is one of the reasons why the distribution of wealth is so anxious a problem; and there are already indications that the private ownership of land and capital may prove as ill adapted to the new régime as public ownership would have been in the old.

Family life has been very deeply affected. The work that women used to do at home has gone to the factories and offices, and there been supplemented by many new kinds of work that women can do. The women have naturally followed the work; and the wages they receive make them economically independent of the family. Hence a new status

for women; and therefore a new type of family life. The same industrial causes have postponed the age of marriage, and are among the reasons for the new code of sexual morality with which the modern world is experimenting; all of which have their effects upon the family as an institution.

Our moral code is being modified. Rebating, for example, has been added to the things prohibited; and there are new regulations for the use of vehicles on the roads and streets. The sex code is in flux. The old right of the owner to control his own investment, and the old right of freedom of contract, are both up for debate because their application produces entirely different effects under the new régime than under the old. Even religion is changing, due to the new scientific knowledge of life and nature, and to the "scourge of prosperity" which the new resources have generated. And finally, the new technique has so changed war that it is no longer a sort of grand sport, but has become nothing less than an instrument for the destruction of civilization and the race itself.

In short, the changes of the past century and a half are producing a totally new social order. Nothing comparable to the present transition has ever occurred before since the domestication of plants and animals and the great social readjustment caused thereby. There is to be a new applied-science, machinofacture, democratic, coöperative super-civilization, as superior to the civilization of the past five thousand years as that was superior to the naked savagery of the primæval world. The curtain is rising on a new stage setting that would seem as strange to the men of Washington's day — or Cromwell's, or Cæsar's, or Solomon's, or Hammurabi's — as theirs would have seemed to the Hot-

tentots, the Ojibways, the Crô-Magnons, and the others of the prehistoric part of the human drama. A new world is emerging in which the social structures will be of a different shape, the social resources of a different scope and calibre, than any thing that history records. It is a new deal — in fact a different game with different cards; and we who are now alive are privileged to witness its beginning, however blind most of us may be to its implications for ourselves and our posterity.

And for a new age, a new school! The principle of parallelism is already asserting itself, indeed; blindly, and awkwardly, to be sure, and with no adequate appreciation of causes even upon the part of educational leaders, but with an irresistible urge that is almost cosmic, none the less. No such educational development is recorded in all history as that which has occurred within the past century, and especially within the last generation. At the close of the eighteenth century there was no system of public education, in anything like the modern sense of the word, anywhere in the world outside of Prussia and New England, and even there only a meager elementary schooling was provided. Elsewhere illiteracy among the masses was the rule rather than the exception as it is now, while secondary education was an exclusive privilege of the aristocracy. The ideal of secondary education, open freely to the middle class, and theoretically at least to the laboring classes, also, was never dreamed of till near the close of the nineteenth century. On the contrary, it was a sort of political axiom, until about a century ago, that the masses ought to be kept contented in their ignorance. The notions of universal education as they now prevail are, therefore, absolutely revolutionary.

The school has changed as much in recent decades as has the technique of industry. During the twenty-five-year period between 1890 and 1915 the investment in school plant and the annual expenditure for schooling were each quadrupled. Current annual expenditures for higher education were multiplied by ten. (Allowance for the shrinkage of the dollar during this period discounts these expansions only about one-third.) High school enrollment was multiplied by five; and the increase still continues with no sign of abatement. Communities everywhere are put to it to provide high school facilities for the constantly growing enrollment. The curriculum is changing as much as the enrollment is expanding. The elementary curriculum has been enriched; and the high school program of to-day resembles that of a generation ago about as an automobile resembles an old-fashioned carriage. As for higher education, it has spread out like a fan. The schools of the old professions have become far more scientific and technical; while several new professions have been provided for. The phenomenal influx of students has raised the question of how to limit the enrollment. Truly, we are rapidly developing a new education.

It is extremely interesting to consider what the principle of parallelism implies. Consider some of the intellectual resources out of which the new order is to be constructed. The new industrial technique is raising many kinds of work to a near-professional level, for which technical schools are demanded. In a western city recently, a convention of laundrymen memorialized the state university to establish a school of laundering. The local papers seized the occasion to make a huge joke of it in the headlines. But laundering

involves as much applied science as does chicken raising, and the state universities recognize that in their curricula. Really, the joke was on the newspapers and the public, inasmuch as all sorts of work are applying science, asserting their near-professional status, and demanding schools. Which implies a new system of vocational education for the new régime, of which we have scarcely conceived so much as the main outlines. Science and its applications are penetrating every phase of life. Unless well stocked with science, the social mind cannot operate the new régime. May fortune follow the writer who can say that with sufficient emphasis to make it penetrate! And art is scarcely less requisite to a high level of civilization, as a later chapter will feebly undertake to show. Nor can the new régime be operated with the beliefs of the old régime. They will wreck it, instead. Our new and complicated relationships have got to be scientized, so far as possible, and rephilosophized completely; and the product of this mental labor must be made to permeate the social mind; otherwise it will not function. As for the ideals by which we live, they too must be thought out *de novo,* and built into an adequate and effective new system of moral education.

One arrives at the same conclusion if he analyzes the new situation from the standpoint of the social structures. Family life, as will be later shown, will have to utilize science, art, and philosophy if it is to perform its functions adequately in the new order. The state will require the utilization, and hence the popular appreciation of, the services of experts in all lines, especially in the social sciences; and such an appreciation is inevitably proportionate only to the enlightenment of the social mind with respect to the

fields of the several experts. The industries, as we have just remarked, are being transformed into systems of applied science. Besides, the new industrial organization requires the application of as much social science to operate it with equity and reason as the technique itself requires natural science. The church cannot be operated with any contribution to social welfare by the ever diminishing percentage of persons who enjoy no participation in the new knowledge. If the schools are to be controlled by the public, the public must possess at least the outlines of a sound philosophy of education. A civilized standard of living involves the utilization of science and the fine arts. And the health-preserving activities will break down entirely unless the people are enlightened as to the rudiments of the sciences involved. The knowledge required to operate the old agriculture-handicraft régime was as nothing compared with the knowledge that will be required to operate the new applied-science super-civilization into which we are coming. Besides, the new régime is to be democratic, whereas the old was autocratic; which means that the knowledge involved in the operation of the new order must be a universal possession of all the people.

Obviously, the end of our new educational development is by no means yet in sight. The new age will demand a new system of schools as different from the schools of the historic centuries as the new systems of communication and transportation are different from the old. The educational development of the past half century indicates that we "unconsciously realize" in part at least our new need for a new education. But we are as yet only half way up the hill. It goes without saying, after the discussion in this and pre-

ceding chapters, that it is the economic and social changes which are causing the schools to change. But the schools have by no means kept pace, notwithstanding their phenomenal development; much less have they anticipated the needs of the new social order when it shall have come to its maturity. If we can continue the same rate of educational expansion and development for a century or so longer we shall perhaps arrive. To the men of a century ago, the schools we now maintain would have seemed utterly impossible and absurdly out of the question. Nevertheless, here they stand! And a century hence our posterity must have schools as much more elaborate than ours of to-day as ours of to-day are more elaborate than the schools our forefathers attended a hundred years ago. To the majority of persons now living such a prophecy seems quite unnecessary and impossible. But necessary such a system of schools supremely is — and therefore possible! For the new machinofacture, applied-science, democratic, coöperative supercivilization into which we are coming can neither be perpetuated nor even successfully operated without a corresponding educational system. Indeed, the new order will not materialize except as the new schools materialize along with it; otherwise maladjustment and failure of function will intervene instead. "Civilization is a race between education and catastrophe," just as Mr. H. G. Wells has said. The great unfinished task of our times is to complete what we have so gloriously begun, namely, an educational equipment adequate to the new social order into which the world is so blindly struggling to come without miscarriage. For, of the new order, a school to parallel it is the absolutely vital organ.

By this fundamental principle of parallelism, the monstrous deformities of our present school program are revealed in their ludicrous absurdity. They are of three sorts. The first is the traditional hang-overs from the old régime. This intellectual pabulum of the Middle Ages introduces chaos and unreason into our modern schools, imposes an enormous burden of waste upon the taxpayer, and prevents our rising generation from getting a real and rational education. The second is the freaks of ill-considered innovations and the random lunges of irrational experiments; manual training, Spanish, and student self-government are good illustrations. They lack philosophy! And, third, there are the gaping omissions or neglects; such as art, philosophy, the social studies, and vocational training. The concept of parallelism is the guiding principle by which we shall find our way out of this bewildering confusion. And from the general principle to specific details we shall think our way by reference to the social structures and the intellectual resources of civilization. Such will be our line of procedure in the subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER VI

THE TELIC FUNCTION OF EDUCATION

The social entities are mental entities, as we have seen, and the product of the learning process. And since education is the reproductive process of the social mind, it is possible for education to predetermine the social structures and activities of the future more or less at will. Put this instead of that into the learning process of to-day, and this instead of that will come out of the social process of to-morrow. Usually the learning process of to-day has been inadvertently predetermined by the social process of yesterday; but it can be deliberately predetermined, in part at least, by the conscious will of educational statesmen. Since the school program is the germ plasm of the body social, it follows that mutations can be introduced into the social process by the volition of those who direct the schools. Education may function as an important guiding factor in social evolution, especially in periods of critical transition like the present — not absolutely, to be sure, but to a degree that has never been sufficiently capitalized by an aspiring society. And that throws a new and enlarged responsibility upon educators, to which it is high time that they awake. Potentially, the school is the steering gear of a democratic society. If society is to be engineered on the basis of ascertained knowledge and general enlightenment, instead of on the basis of superstition, sentiment, and personal ambition, the

scholars and educators must proceed to take their place at the wheel. It is the business of teachers to run not merely the school, but the world; and the world will never be truly civilized until they assume that responsibility. Such is the *telic* function of education; to expound that function is the purpose of the present chapter.

To express this responsibility more clearly and impressively we may contrast two technical terms from the literature of sociology. It is customary to distinguish between *genetic* and *telic* societies. As the derivation of these terms suggests, a genetic society is pushed forward from its beginnings, whereas a telic society is self-directed toward preconceived ends. A genetic society is on the trial and error basis; out of many random reactions it falls upon chance coördinations, the most successful of which crystallize into social habits. A telic society is on a rational basis; it selects its ends and the means of attaining them through constructive imagination as the result of past experience, and then engineers itself deliberately toward those ends.

Societies have never yet been telic except to a negligible degree. For the most part the historic societies have merely patched up their present emergencies and so muddled through to the next. Hence the awful miscarriage of human welfare and wastage of human life. The social evolution of genetic societies is tragically prodigal of all human values. A thousand years count for little or nothing; nor does the misery of the millions who are sacrificed in the slow, wasteful process. If static, a genetic society, like China, frequently pays the Malthusian penalties of famine and pestilence during thousands of years; but if dynamic, like Greece, its brilliant promises flicker out into a long twilight of deferred

hopes. Again and again it has transpired that millions of human beings have shuffled miserably across the darkened stage of some century to which a preceding generation had looked forward with highly animated hopes. Decadent Greece was a sad sequel to the age of Pericles, and the Dark Ages to the reign of Augustus. The Thirty Years' War and its reactionary peace treaty with the subsequent consequences thereof were a sickening dénouement to the Renaissance and Humanism. That most glorious of all centuries, the nineteenth, which Marvin calls the Century of Hope, has been followed by the most destructive war in history, and has left a heritage of social and economic problems that fill the most thoughtful minds with deep concern. Will society never become telic?

The very idea of a telic society is a new thing under the sun, except in the minds of a few rare seers like Plato and Erasmus. So far as we know, Plato was the first to see the possibility. In an age when all Greece, under the infatuation of its *Zeitgeist,* was optimistic, he foresaw the dangers implicit in sophistry and the other individualistic tendencies of his day. It was with passionate eagerness to save Athens that he drafted his educational program. But it was never given a trial. From time to time throughout the centuries educational philosophers have sounded similar notes. But the rise of sociological philosophy, in connection with the scientific movement of our times, has brought the idea of a telic society to the front as never before. It is indeed an ambitious conception, this idea of blue-printing the outlines of a truly worthful society for the future and then piloting social evolution deliberately and intelligently toward that goal. There are those who regard such an ambition as

ludicrously impossible. Yet this is the supreme aspiration of social science, which assumes that social realities, like physical realities, are amenable to research, and subject increasingly to the authority and direction of the human mind. And to this enterprise social scientists and educators must resolutely set their wills.

The telic function of education implies the appraisal of present trends in social evolution. For there are, as in any age, certain trends that are not promising; and we should try to redirect them through our educational program. It involves a deliberate, conscious comparison between the institutions of the future, as they are likely to become if present trends are left to themselves, and as they ought to become in the interest of human happiness and welfare. For if the educators of to-day can blue-print the institutions of to-morrow approximately as they ought to be, it is possible for them, within limits of course, to pour the developing minds of to-day into molds that will fit them into the mosaics of such worthy institutions.

To illustrate: We know enough about the family to conjecture safely that some of its present trends are not desirable. If our education leaves these trends unchallenged in the minds of young people, they will probably continue. But if our education sets up in the minds of young people, especially of girls, a skeptical attitude toward the unqualified desirability of women entering the gainful occupations in such large percentages, a more intelligent appreciation of the social service involved in the conduct of a fine home, and some knowledge of how the sciences and the fine arts can be applied to housekeeping and the nurture of children, there is every reason to expect that such education would bear fruit

in the form of a better family life in the future. Again, there are conditions and trends in our industrial activities which any intelligent student of society must deplore. If these trends and conditions dictate a corresponding school policy, as they tend to do, their evils will be augmented thereby. But if school instruction reveals these trends and their undesirable character, renders vocational efficiency a universal equipment, creates more wholesome attitudes toward both poverty and luxury, cultivates tastes that make possible a common participation in culture by all classes, stimulates an intelligent belief in coöperation between labor and capital, and sets up a popular desire for social policies designed to equalize opportunities, such an education might modify, not to say correct, the most untoward features of our economic institutions.

But the problem of evaluating interests and appraising trends is very greatly complicated in our day by the transitional character of the times in which we live. Social evolution has thrown us upon a terrace where precedents are often lacking. The scientific discoveries, the technical inventions, and the new democratic ideals of the past century have produced a world so different from the past that many of the old analogies do not apply. Inferences from old slogans, ideals, and principles that might have been sound inferences a century ago are unsound and misleading to-day, because of changed conditions. Therefore if we are to make sound judgments as to the good and evil in present trends, and so bring order out of confusion, and real progress out of change, we must make allowances in our calculations for the new variables that now complicate the problem. Many of the social policies of contemporaneous life — economic,

political, and educational — are conducting us toward the ditch because the thinking underlying them ignores this source of fallacies. This danger can be reduced only by a clear apprehension of the truth that an entirely new and different social order is rapidly coming into existence.

It is interesting, and not without profit, to conjecture where the present trends are leading us. What kind of a world is this to be into which we and our posterity are coming? The prospect stimulates the imagination more than any epic that was ever written. It is usual to talk about our new and spectacular mechanical equipments, such as great ships, engines, rolling stock, bridges, tunnels, canals, ingenious and ponderous machines, skyscrapers, wireless telegraphy, and the like. But it is well to remember that these are means and not ends; that they do not make a supercivilization, but only make it possible. The real thing is the services and satisfactions which these spectacular devices render to mankind. The important question is whether these things will help us to live more richly and abundantly.

It certainly looks as if the answer to this question ought to be in the affirmative. The wherewithal for a satisfying life seems to be at hand as never before. It would seem as if there ought to be material goods of all sorts in abundance. The application of science to the creation of power and to the techniques of industry is increasing the per-worker production of industry so phenomenally as to hold out that hope. It ought to be possible to produce good houses and good furnishings, roads and conveyances, public buildings and utilities, along with all the other material necessities for a comfortable life, in adequate supply for all. It would look

as if there ought to be sufficient margin of reserve for the liberal cultivation of the refining arts. As for health, the achievements of medical science and the prospects of surplus wealth suggest that we ought to be as safe from bacteria under the new régime as we were from predatory wild animals under the régime just passing out. And the new means of communication promise the universal dissemination of all extant knowledge and culture, and the possibility of concerted action throughout the whole world.

The ideals of democracy would seem to suggest the achievement of a freedom and equality of opportunity such as the world has never dreamed of before. Applied to childhood, these ideals promise an educational system adapted to bringing out the talents of each child, and to approximating that unique adjustment of each personality to its environment which is necessary for true self-realization. Applied to women, the new democratic ideal means a freer, finer type of family life, an enlarged access to culture, and a new economic independence. Applied to government, it means impartial justice for all. Applied to industry, it means self-expression in work, an adequate standard of living for all, access to leisure and culture, and some measure of self-direction.

But while all this seems possible in so far as it depends upon the easy and rapid conversion of raw materials into consumable goods in large quantities, there are other considerations which throw the shadows of doubt upon the picture. Are we sufficiently in control of human nature and social organization? What use would most of us make of self-direction if we had it? Some children would show no individual aptitude for anything but idleness and mischief.

Some women would use their new status and resources merely to indulge in rivalrous luxuries and the neglect of family life. Some citizens would turn liberty into graft. Some workers would see nothing in industrial democracy but a chance for shirking, sabotage, and agitation. Some might regard personal liberty as license to indulge in vice in defiance of the law. And there might be enough of this sort to render liberty a doubtful asset and democracy a disappointment. Also, there is the further question as to whether the use of the fine arts and wholesome outdoor sports for purposes of recreation are what the people would want. Those are the things they ought to want, to be sure; but, to date, there is scant evidence that they are aware of the fact. What many of them seem to want is jazz, burlesque shows, and the vices. If leisure and surplus wealth are to mean these baser things chiefly, they would mean in the end, of course, the collapse of the fundamental institutions and the impoverishment of the intellectual resources. If the new régime is actually to bring forth what it possibly might bring forth, there will have to be a reëducation of the wants of a large fraction of the population. Is this in prospect?

History[1] teaches that all periods of transition are necessarily problematical and critical; and the more we scrutinize details the more we see that it cannot be otherwise with ours. For there is scarcely an ideal or institution of society but is either in obvious flux, or at least seriously called into question. Divorce and the new status of women imperil the family. The old theology is dead, at least among the educated; and the church is a babel of conflicting tongues. As for the

[1] See Paul Monroe, *Textbook in the History of Education*, Ch. III and IV; Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, Ch. VII; Rudolf Eucken, *The Problem of Human Lives*, pp. 3–128; W. Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, Pt. I and II; and F. S. Marvin, *The Living Past*, Ch. IV and V.

state, there are those who, with a success quite alarming to some of us, are omitting no effort to make it a plutocratic oligarchy; while, on the other hand, there is no little influence abroad in the world that would convert it into a proletarian socialism. Can these two tendencies be rationally compromised? The institution of private property is on the defensive; some of its ancient privileges have already been invaded by new forms of taxation and government regulation, while socialism is openly repudiating the theories upon which the institution itself has stood for centuries. The traditional relation of wage-earner to employer appears scarcely more stable than the relation between master and slave must have appeared to those who were alive a century ago. The moral code is no more static than the other institutions mentioned. Everything social is changing; the only reason we fail to perceive the magnitude of the change is because we ourselves are being swept along in the current thereof. What the outcome of all these alterations will be, scarcely anyone would venture to predict. But in the light of history, a period of flux is a time for very serious concern indeed as to the future. We cannot but wish that the story of the race contained fewer chapters on the decadence of genetic societies. And most disconcerting of all is to turn the pages back from one of those stories of disorder and disintegration, to the chapters just preceding; too often they deal with a golden age of achievement, invention, and change. If history should repeat itself — !

Population statistics throw a more definite shadow over the social landscape; for "Malthus is at par again."[1] The growth of population has been unprecedented during the past

[1] *Principles of Sociology*, by E. A. Ross, pp. 33 ff.

century. But the one thing that does not vanish before the new technique is the law of diminishing returns as applying to the food supply. It takes about two and a half acres of land to feed a human being; and to date, according to the best authorities, neither science nor invention has found any way of escaping this limitation. The law of diminishing returns is absolutely inexorable. The new applied sciences of medicine and sanitation have decreased the death-rate; so that, despite the falling birth-rates in all civilized countries, the population of the western part of the world has increased ten times as fast during the past century as during any previous period. The new transportation enables us to bring food to urbanized, congested regions from new and as yet sparsely settled regions; and the new machinofacture industry enables the overcrowded regions to pay for the food they import. Meantime the surplus population in the overcrowded areas, induced by their fatuous prosperity, is being sluiced off to the less crowded regions from which the food is being brought; thus rapidly filling them up with population, and hastening the inevitable date when they will have no food to spare. To all of which we have been stupidly blinding our eyes, blithely assuring ourselves meantime that the law of diminishing returns is but the silly superstition of a pre-scientific age. Till the day of judgment is almost at hand! The fundamental, underlying cause of the World War was the overpopulation of Europe; just as the overpopulation of the Orient menaces the peace of the Far East. The point of saturation for the United States is scarcely more than a generation ahead, according to the best authorities; and for the whole world, scarcely more than a century. The pressure of population upon the food supply

threatens to increase competition among laborers, and so lower their wage-scale and their standard of living. This in turn would, of course, accelerate the concentration of wealth, and hinder that enlightenment of the masses so indispensable to a high order of social life. It would also prevent the birth-rate from being lowered, and so accelerate the process itself. Eventually it would certainly lead to sharp class distinctions and conflicts. It would also lead to international wars, due to pressure of surplus population for outlets. Thus, on the very threshold of the new order do we confront the ghost of Malthus.

One's misgivings are not diminished when he looks into the heart of our industrial system. It suffers from an inner conflict of purpose that threatens to disrupt its personality — if one may improvise the metaphor — and render it a sort of a demoniac in the family of the institutions. Its undivided purpose should be production; but its driving motive is profits instead — aims that do not always harmonize. Its studied objective is always the welfare, therefore, of a part, instead of the whole, of the people. It would be pleasant to trust that the dinner pails are always heavy in proportion to the dividends; and faith to that effect runs current in the popular economic mythology which the system generates, despite the fact that employers, individually and collectively, always try to bargain with their help as advantageously as possible — and try insistently. The ingenious skeptic even finds himself wondering at times whether the profits system does not automatically maintain its reserve army of unemployed (normally upward of a million in the United States) to regulate its wage scale; since, if the demand for labor exceeded, or even equaled, the supply, wages would go up

till profits would disappear, and the whole industrial machine would come to a standstill with a broken mainspring. Some outcomes of the game have the appearance of being given in the deal; as, for example, the cumulative concentration of wealth on the one side, and, on the other, the extent and aggressive persistence of poverty, together with its by-products, ignorance and a high birth-rate. If these outcomes are rightly to be regarded as trends in modern life, then the causes thereof must be thought of as inimical to social harmony and cumulative welfare. Superintendents of schools, who find themselves constrained to watch their steps because of the personal surveillance of our modern impersonal materialism, should realize that they are at mortal grips with the very powers of darkness in the new régime.

And our concern for the future is only deepened when we remember that the problems of the age are all incipient conflicts. The issue between the "haves" and the "have-nots" is the irrepressible conflict of our times. It is an age-old conflict, to be sure; but in a new form. The struggle for industrial democracy is a continuation of the struggle for political democracy, and, earlier, for religious liberty, that has been going on for centuries. It has often come to blows in the past; it will surely come to blows again unless public opinion can formulate and enforce some just arbitration through legislation. It will have to be settled with bullets and blood unless we can anticipate a settlement with ballots and brains. Often in the past the poor brains of the fathers have been atoned for by the good blood of their sons; and the muddle-headed attitude of the American middle class suggests the fear that it may be so again. As for the international situation: the extensions of communication and

commerce are increasing the number of danger zones in the world, as well as the size of opposing forces; while the increasing congestion of populations renders the pressure ever more explosive. And meantime this generation appears to have missed the opportunity of the era for installing a war-preventing institution. Unless one is a blind optimist he must realize that the world is still infected with provocatives of war.

In short, there is grave danger that our uncultivated human nature and our faulty social organizations may blast the new social régime in the very bud.[1] The mastery of nature is full of promise for human welfare; but that promise is not at all likely to be realized unless we achieve a like mastery of ourselves and of our social arrangements. And the interim threatens to be troublous and long. There is real danger of middle ages ahead, during which many of the basic needs of man may be sadly thwarted.

There is little possibility of overstating the critical character of the present transition. And the new, unique, and enormous progress of the past century and a half, by which our hopes have been so inspired and our optimism so inflated, is the very central cause of the crisis which we are so blithely bequeathing to posterity. The period of five or ten centuries just ahead is an awful thing to contemplate, so momentous are its possible alternatives. Eventually, of course, the new order will get on its feet as a successfully going concern; for the innate needs of human nature predestine it. But the question is whether that consummation will eventuate promptly and peacefully, or whether long centuries of deferred hope will sicken the hearts of mankind, as so often in

[1] Cf. *Daedalus*, J. B. S. Haldane; *Outspoken Essays* and *The Idea of Progress*, W. R. Inge.

the past. Are our immediate descendants to be prosperous, peaceful, and happy; or are wars and class conflicts to overtake our grandchildren and great-grandchildren? Will they welter in blood and perish of hunger like the peoples of central Europe? And what will be the program of the centuries subsequent to them? It is not unthinkable, considering the forces, trends, and tendencies now actually operative in the world, that middle ages ahead may suffer a failure of democracy, a breakdown of industry, and a temporary reversion to quasi-barbarism. Precedents are not lacking — except that the possibilities of progress, or of its opposite, present themselves on a greater scale than ever before. Is our so-called progressive western civilization to repeat the same old story of exploitation and misery, wars and revolutions, with periods of retrogression; or can we solve the problem of permanent peace, prosperity, and progress?

The social philosopher who labors in his mind to be neither a morose pessimist nor a blind and foolish optimist, finds the present situation almost more than he can bear with stable sanity. And it is a question whether he is more disturbed by the smug indifference of those who see nothing, or by the ignorant hysteria of those whose eyes are beginning to blink. For the one sort will heed no warning; while the others insist upon worse than useless remedies. How usually the very causes of our social dangers are actually promoted as the cures! The proffered guidance of social scientists is too often contemptuously rejected; and they are sometimes even regarded as dangerous radicals. But to prophesy has always been an unwelcome function; except for false prophets who are willing to flatter class pride, pour oil on the heathen altars of racial prejudice, or offer sacri-

fices to the gods of "normalcy." The task of Jeremiah in the palmy days of Hezekiah, or of Socrates and Plato in the brilliant age of Greece, or of Cicero when Caesar was approaching his meridian, or of Erasmus during the afterglow of the Renaissance, was a thankless service indeed. Nobody is more unpopular than the man who insists upon keeping his finger on the pulse of the *Zeitgeist* and his eye on the dial of history. Nevertheless Jerusalem did fall, Greece did disintegrate, Rome did succumb to reactionary policies, and the Thirty Years War did blast the hopes of the sixteenth century. If history repeats itself — but let us hasten to make education *telic*, if we can, so that the tragic episodes of history may not repeat themselves.

Truly the prospect is bewildering. But if one craves a basis of hope and optimism let him survey the development of education during the past century. No such educational revolution has occurred before in all history. If we can only continue that development, and guide it in the right direction! Educational statesmen, of all people, must not remain bewildered. As rapidly as possible they must draft the blue-prints of such a new school system as is necessary to make the new order what it ought to be; because the new order will take form as a successful, going concern only as fast as appropriate schools are built for it. What the schools are made, that the new world will become. It is the greatest responsibility with which any small group of social leaders was ever confronted. And there are plenty of influences — those of short-sighted self-interest, and those of sheer ignorance — which will retard, and even thwart, our educational development if they are left to themselves. And upon the part of our engineers of democratic education mere

inert acquiescence to these influences, mere blind failure to clarify at once the outlines of a new education that will parallel the new supercivilization, will prove morally tantamount to the deliberate estoppage by them of social progress.

The social psychology already presented in these pages ought to make it unnecessary, by this time, to repeat that the responsibility for making society telic, if ever it is to be such, rests with the social scientists and the makers of educational policy. The social scientists must uncover the requisite facts; the educators must weave them into the public mind as fast as they become available. From which it follows that educators must be acquainted with the facts of the social sciences. The telic function of education depends absolutely upon that sort of training for the profession of teaching. It requires no statistical research to prove that there is a high correlation between neglect of the social sciences by educators and their blindness to the telic function and responsibility of their profession. If it were only the schools that they are running it might be excusable for them to study the Herbartian lesson plans, the psychology of the learning process, tests and measurements, statistical methods as applied to administrative problems, and such like subjects, with nothing much besides. But the school is the least thing they are running. They are running the world! And they ought to realize the fact. The captains and the kings, the statesmen and the diplomats, the mandarins and priests, have each had their day. The day of the educators is now at hand.

CHAPTER VII

THE OBSESSIONS OF THE *ZEITGEIST*

RELATIVE to the telic function of education, it is worth our while to consider an interesting social phenomenon presented by history. It will help us immensely in attempting to view the problems of our age objectively. And it is of the utmost importance that educators achieve a detached point of view, so that they can appraise the dominating interests and prevailing trends of their own times, somewhat as the historians of the future will be able to do. Not otherwise can they direct education with reference to its telic function. The social phenomenon referred to is the fact that each historic society has had its own unique and characteristic obsessions, or in other words its peculiar beliefs that prevailed within it so generally and so completely as to excite no skepticism whatsoever, notwithstanding the now obvious fact that they were false beliefs. Such peculiar beliefs characterize the society in which they prevail, and constitute the spirit of the age; that is to say, the *Zeitgeist* — a word, by the way, which ought to be naturalized, since the English language contains no suitable equivalent.

A few concrete examples will serve our purpose better than any other device. Take seventeenth century New England, for example. Here, certainly, the social mind was charged with a peculiar program and philosophy of life. The deity was a God of law and retribution. This life was

but a fleeting, transitory incident, the meaning of which was to be found in the everlasting hereafter. The main business of existence was to exorcise original sin. There was supposed to be a close natural alliance between wickedness and happiness; hence life was austere in the extreme. Beauty was taboo; and there was no art of any kind. It appears that even singing was discouraged. Life must have borne very heavily indeed upon the children. Play was regarded as a species of self-indulgence bordering upon the sinful. Punishment was rigorous almost beyond belief. Cases are reported of adolescents being haled into court under the charge of incorrigible disobedience, tried, convicted, and actually executed; and that upon the complaint of their own parents. And over the minds of all hung the heavy shadow of a literal hell.

Now all these beliefs prevailed by social contagion, so that everybody accepted them as a matter of course. They constituted *the* philosophy of life for all New Englanders of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Through these blue spectacles of their own unconscious creating, they looked at life and the world, and were sure that all the universe was blue. It was the obsession of their *Zeitgeist.* As we look back upon it now from our objective point of view we can see clearly enough that it was only *a* philosophy of life, and a very fractional one at that. Nevertheless, critical resistance to it by those who lived in the midst of it was a practicable impossibility, because there was no substance in the environment out of which resistance could be built. There was nothing in sight as a basis of comparison. And no student of those times can fully understand them unless he has imagination enough to immerse himself completely in

the current of those strange beliefs, and feel them as they they were felt by the men and women whose personalities were made of them.

Another good illustration is the peculiar nationalistic philosophy that prevailed in the substratum of all German thought between the Franco-Prussian War and the World War. It rationalized the German imperial ambition; and it colored the prevailing theories in theology, anthropology, economics, politics, literature, art, ethics, education, history, and what not. To us it looks like a very one-sided and exaggerated nationalism. But it passed current, and appears to have received general acceptance, especially among the ruling classes. To the Germans of that period it seemed like *the* philosophy of life, worthy to be accepted eventually by the whole world. But it was only *a* philosophy of life; and a very fractional one at that. It was an obsession of the *Zeitgeist.*

China's peculiar system was a worship of the past. To the Chinese everything good and useful seemed to have been perfected by the ancestors. Innovation was sacrilege; and invention was taboo. No one dared to doubt the soundness of the system. In fact to doubt it was almost a psychological impossibility, because there was practically nothing in the mental environment out of which doubt could have been made. To doubt it would have been quite as impossible as for five-fingered persons like ourselves to have invented an octagal system of numeration, in which a one, followed by three zeros, would indicate five hundred and twelve units. It would have been easier for the Chinese to question the advisability of wearing queues than to question the prevailing way of life. They could no more have done their thinking

through the medium of some other philosophy than they could have breathed through their ears, and for very similar reasons. Social heredity is almost as inexorable in its limitations as is biological heredity. The obsessions of the *Zeitgeist* are fixed ideas.

Another illustration may be found in the policies of ancient Rome when the Empire was at its height. Rome lived by the exploitation of her provinces. The vital organ of the system was the army. Through conquest, new provinces were added; through military power they were kept in control. From the provinces, slaves, taxes, and graft-money flowed into Rome. To keep up the supply of slaves, uprisings were ruthlessly suppressed, not to say provoked, and the frontiers were always being extended. Squeezing the provinces to the utmost was a regular business, farmed out to consuls. The limit was the province's ability to pay; and prosecutions for graft, as in the case of Verres, were the exception. By this system of exploitation Rome prospered and waxed great; and the dubious benefits of her civilization were extended from the North Sea to the upper cataracts of the Nile. By this system the great men grew rich, and to the poor was doled out corn. By this system there was always a career for adventurers and soldiers of fortune, and a ladder of fame and wealth which they could hope to climb. This system *was* Rome; and Rome could no more have doubted its glory than an iceberg could ride the sea without its invisible ballast. Yet the system was honeycombing Roman life and rotting it at the core. It was slowly but surely sapping the vitality of both exploited and exploiters. The very system that all Romans confidently believed was making Rome eternal was in reality destroying her. At

the height of her supposed glory Rome was disintegrating in the substructures of her institutions, because of the very system which Romans confidently regarded as the secret of her greatness.

These illustrations are enough to serve our purpose, although they could be multiplied indefinitely. One could present every society that ever existed in a somewhat similar light. In each, there has prevailed by social inheritance and suggestion a program and theory of social life that seemed wholly valid and indubitable; but which was only fractional and ill balanced; and which contained many items of belief that were unsound, and of practices that were pernicious. Every *Zeitgeist* has had its obsessions. And this raises the suspicion, of course, that ours is no exception. It makes us wonder what our own obsessions may be. What are those destructive aberrations that lie unsuspected in the subconscious social mind of modern occidental civilization?

The obvious explanation of such phenomena is social suggestion,[1] as explained in Chapter III. For social suggestion, in the very nature of the case, carries into our minds the false as well as the true. Whatever runs current in the social mind we naturally accept without discrimination. How could it be otherwise, indeed? And the confidence with which we believe a thing is precisely in proportion to the uncritical credulity with which we accept it. A child's assurance depends upon the tone and facial expression with which his source of information assures him — that a brass pin, for example, is more likely to poison one in removing a splinter than a steel needle is. And it is almost impossible for even an adult to be skeptical of a belief that is univer-

[1] See E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, especially Chapters II, III, and IV.

sally accepted — as, for example, that advertising increases the amount of business transacted. From which it follows that men are like sheep, and do their thinking in droves. Belief is a mass action. Normally one is swept along in the current of prevailing beliefs and ideals, whether they be sound or absurd. An individual's originality consists almost entirely in taking his choice between the somewhat divergent opinions of two or more sub-groups; and that choice usually depends upon which sub-group he happens to be herding with.

All sorts of mental epidemics are the natural result. Some of them are merely ludicrous; as, for example, the popular songs, the fads of amusement, and the freaks of fashion. Some of them are half ridiculous and half sublime; as our fervid zeal during the war to "make the world safe for democracy" — from which we have since suffered an equally irrational, but lamentably sordid, reaction. Sometimes these mental epidemics are stupidly tragic; as our popular stampedes, again and again, since the war, before insolent barrages of reactionary propaganda. Apparently there is nothing the public so much enjoys as to be collectively humbugged, propagandized, and stampeded. For always it is something! Like a flock of frightened and bewildered sheep, the human herd chases itself hither and thither across the fields of political opinion, whenever and wherever the dogs of propaganda happen to bark at it. And the spectacle is what we call democracy!

The intelligentsia are no better than the commonalty. Far from being intellectually independent, these high-browed sheep but drift in smaller droves, and pride themselves on their exclusiveness. The books that enjoy the most phenom-

enal success among them as a rule merely reiterate opinions, however fallacious, that are running current in the social minds of their exclusive groups. And the more such books flatter racial conceit, or the intellectual lust for originality or disillusionment, or the thwarted sexual desires that our social and economic maladjustments render so common, the more phenomenal their success is likely to be. Good examples, respectively, are Madison Grant's *The Passing of a Great Race*, James Harvey Robinson's *The Mind in the Making*, and Gertrude Atherton's *Black Oxen*. To catch on in the literature of his day one must echo the obsessions of the *Zeitgeist*. If, like Rousseau, one happens to make himself the mouthpiece of a movement that turns out to be really significant, he stumbles into immortality. The iron of democratic protest was getting hot in France in Rousseau's time, and he struck it; though most of what he wrote was neither original nor strictly true. But the cheapest trick by which our would-be intelligentsia flatter themselves into the illusion of originality is by following the tinkling bell of some lampooner of traditional standards still widely current. Such bell wethers run with sterile flocks. Their genius for intellectual leadership consists in adroitly following their followers, and flattering their conceited lust for disillusionment. The joke is on their clienteles, of course, for the silliest of all illusions is the cult of disillusionment. What the world needs now — and desperately! — is some acute and constructive discrimination between the old that is bad and the old that is still good; and, more than that, something positive in the place of what we must discard. Of mere destructive criticism our troubled century has had about enough, however smart.

Even the professions are not immune from discreditable mental epidemics; and it is exceedingly disconcerting that scientifically trained men are subject to these aberrations; and that, too, in the fields of their own specialties. Prestige is a very important factor in these phenomena of the professional group mind. Novelties, which, if of humble origin and left to their intrinsic merits, would scarcely be noticed at all, sweep the country because they originate at some conspicuous institution. The group mind of each profession seems to be heavily charged with professional cults. For scientists to make fads out of problems in some narrow fraction of their respective fields is certainly not to their credit as scientists. Education seems to be notoriously liable to such phenomena. This tendency is perhaps due partly to an impatience to find simple solutions for problems that really are not simple at all, partly to the envious ambitions of small men to climb into the band wagon, and partly to sheer imitation and social suggestion.

The history of educational fads is most enlightening. A century ago it was the monitorial system. Between the Civil War and the end of the century, a series of small fads succeeded one another: type solids, spiral arithmetic, vertical writing, biographical history, the analytical method, and so forth. But these were as nothing in comparison with the vogue of the Herbartian lingo between 1895 and 1910. Herbart himself would have rested uneasily in his grave could he have known that normal school students all over this country were grinding out their daily lesson plans according to the five formal steps, no matter what the subject matter was. The fad has now blown completely over. Herbartianism left its permanent deposit to be sure; but that is no com-

pensation for the faddish way its half baked theories monopolized the stage when the fad was at its height. Recently the prevailing fad has been the mental measurements; which already shows symptoms of having passed its meridian. It too will leave its modicum of permanent deposit; albeit, along with not a little wreckage and débris.

Doubtless the reader is disposed to inquire after a remedy for such unfortunate and discreditable mass movements.[1] The answer is: Remove all ignorance from the social mind. Until that comes to pass irrational epidemics will remain more or less inevitable. Periods of change are especially liable to such phenomena, due to the clash of old and new beliefs. But it does seem as if their virulence ought to be somewhat reduced. The antitoxin is, of course, enlightenment. It reverts to the principle, stated in Chapter III, that we are able to offer skeptical resistance to suggestions only as we are equipped with knowledge that contradicts them. The real remedy, which in the very nature of the case can never be more than partial, is to restock the social mind with the best knowledge available. The public cannot be blamed, naturally, for stampeding before a mass of superstition for the correction of which their age contains no extant knowledge; but it is a pity for the masses to pitch themselves headlong over some fatal precipice when sufficient light to reveal it is hidden under a bushel in the repositories of learning. Distributive scholarship is, therefore, quite as necessary as productive scholarship! And as for educated people, it is their peculiar responsibility to realize the prevalence of such epidemics, and take reasonable precautions against contracting them. Against the cults and fads of their pro-

[1] See E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, Chapters V and XVI.

fession, educators in particular may find some protection in as broad an acquaintance as possible in all the various fields of human knowledge.

But this matter of mental epidemics is incidental to our main argument, and relevant chiefly as throwing light on social suggestion, from which result the obsessions of the *Zeitgeist.* We shall therefore return now to that phase of the subject which is of practical significance to educators; namely, the mistaken beliefs that prevail in the spirit of our own times. What are some of the obsessions of our own *Zeitgeist,* which educators ought to apprehend and correct? Three examples will be discussed, not because they are of greater importance than others which might be mentioned, but rather to illustrate the principle involved, and chiefly to suggest to educational leaders their responsibility for taking an attitude of constructive skepticism even toward beliefs that enjoy general vogue and acceptance. They may be the very beliefs which most need correction by counter instruction in the schools.

First, the cult of change. Paradoxical as it may sound, a period of great and rapid change is precisely the time when philosophy and education should concern themselves most anxiously with the problem of social stability and permanence. The greatest danger of an age of change is the cult of change, to which the change itself gives rise; and which in turn tends to change the things that least need changing. For there are some changes which, far from being improvements, are instead, the disintegration of age-proved fundamentals; in which case the moth-eaten warp of the social fabric gives way, and civilization reverts to a lower type. This, as a matter of historic fact, has never

failed to happen, in some degree at least, in periods of change. The periods immediately following the Periclean age and the Renaissance are conspicuous examples.

There are two reasons for the illusion of progress in changes that are really destructive. The first is the relaxation of restraints which such changes often involve. Restraints naturally chafe the restive mettle of human nature; which has, alas, too often been compelled to wear a high check for no other reason than the whims of tyrants, the ruts of custom, or the decrees of senseless fashion. A free head accordingly gives a sense of welcome relief, and seems unquestionably a clear gain; especially to sociological illiterates, who neither discriminate between restraints, nor comprehend the essential use of useful restraints. In other words, the cult of change finds a natural ally in that excessive individualism which constitutes the second great obsession of our age, to be mentioned shortly. And this double fallacy besets the subconscious social mind everywhere in the world to-day.

The second reason for the deceit of destructive change is in the very common fallacy sometimes called the fallacy of the universal term, which seems to infect the popular mind like a fever. The fatuous logic runs somewhat as follows. The times are changing; and the changes obviously are making for progress. But here slips in the joker, to the effect that change in the abstract *is* progress. From which it follows that *all* changes are improvements; which is not true. The practical result is to urge destructive changes on the ground that the times are changing; which does no more than beg the question. The reactionary's attitude of becoming suspicious of all change, and demanding a return to "normalcy" on the ground that there is too much change, is of exactly

the same piece, so far as logic is concerned. What we really need is light on the desirability of each particular change in question.

The cult of change — with spasms of reaction — is a type of mental epidemic to which an age like ours is peculiarly liable; for into it all dynamic periods have fallen. Our own is running absolutely true to type, including the moral skepticism and sociological flippancy of the crowd, the fog in both pulpit and pedagogy, the freaks in art and literature, and the apotheosis of change in the dominant philosophies of the day. With slight adaptation of custom and local coloring, the picture of St. Paul on Mars Hill, surrounded by a flippant throng of epigones who busied themselves with nothing else but to see or hear some novel thing, would all too aptly describe the present situation. The ancient scene lends itself, however, to more suggestive meditation, inasmuch as the lapse of centuries has given the world opportunity to witness the dénouement.

Thus history suggests that the most appropriate of all times to be skeptical of the current creed of changes is precisely in those fluid periods when the creed of change is most current. The crowd's wish to go down is poor excuse for cutting the cables of the elevator. Instead, there is an ancient familiar epigram that is a good motto for the present dilemma. It is this: Prove all things; hold fast that which is good.

The second great obsession of our times is that exaggerated individualism which pervades all our theories and unscrutinized assumptions, working itself out into the patterns of all our social arrangements and behavior. It is a sort of intellectual by-product of democracy, the inevitable theory

with which the movement rationalizes itself. Incidentally it derives encouragement from the prosperity of recent decades, which furnishes the wherewithal for self-indulgence. Thus generated, it passes current by suggestion; it falls below the threshold of attention so that skeptical scrutiny of it becomes psychologically almost impossible; and there it functions as subconscious assumption, premising all our judgments. Quite naturally this intellectual defense mechanism of the democratic movement has overshot its mark; so much so that we tend to regard democracy as an organization of society in which everybody does about as he pleases, coercive restraint being regarded as an infringement of personal liberty and a reversion to barbarism; and in which everybody, regardless of intelligence or enlightenment, is encouraged to exercise his individual judgment quite independently of the accumulated racial experience.

This exaggerated individualism of the nineteenth century infests every phase of life, and has very serious practical effects. In industry, the attempt to regard each individual as a separate and independent producer, in accordance with the old economic theory, and to accord to each exactly what he is supposed to have produced, has resulted in a mal-distribution of wealth that is glaringly unjust — and which, in turn, begs the question by appealing to the individualistic theory in self-defense. Thus the theory itself retards reform. It largely accounts for the administrative inefficiency of our governments, and for the spread of crime. In religion, it obstructs the application of Jesus' ethical teachings to economic and international relations. In morality, it promotes disintegration. It is responsible for our modern soft pedagogy, to which may be charged many of the ineffi-

ciencies that our schools betray. In art it gives rise to all sorts of absurd and fruitless aberrations. It is the moth in the fabric of modern life.

There never was a more fallacious obsession of the social mind. It overlooks the commonplace facts of social and economic organization; namely, that the division of labor, the urbanization of life, and the bewildering complexity of modern relations, have enormously augmented the interdependence of mankind. From the standpoint of social psychology it is guilty of overlooking the fact that each individual's personality is made up out of the resources of the social heritage, which is a common property. Physically we have become separate; mentally we remain but slightly differentiated participants in a common social plasm. Each person acquires a mind of his own only as he participates in the social mind. "The notion of a separate and independent ego is an illusion." All of which is ignored in the prevailing individualism. The time will come, let us hope soon, when men will realize that this peculiar aberration of the nineteenth century is as destructive as it is fallacious. This is an obsession of the *Zeitgeist* which merits the especial scrutiny of educators, if our civilization is to escape it without reverting to the dictatorship of might.

A third obsession of the *Zeitgeist* toward which all thoughtful persons, including educators, may well adopt an attitude of skepticism is our popular belief in the perfection of the present economic order. That belief is, of course, a by-product of the system itself. Just as the joints of the skeleton secrete a joint water to lubricate their own friction, so any great system secretes a theory to lubricate its maladjustments and injustices. Such was the case with slavery, for exam-

ple; and such is the function of the two obsessions already discussed. Thus it comes to pass that the theories running current in the subliminal social mind of any given society are usually elaborate justifications of the institutions and processes of that society. It almost never happens that a people think out a rational plan of social action, with reasons for the same, and then proceed to conform their social program thereunto. It works quite the other way, instead. The social program evolves; whereupon the people proceed to rationalize it, especially those parts of it that work least well. Hence it follows that among the obsessions of any civilization are lines of theory that correspond to and serve to justify the prevailing social abuses. Thus it is with our industrial system. It is quite as natural that the people should believe in it, faults and all, as that they should work in it. But that is not a necessary attitude for philosophers and educators.

Classic economic[1] theory proved itself a timely contribution to this need for justification. The old domestic system that Adam Smith rationalized was, strangely enough, actually in process of passing out at the very moment when his economic theories were coming into vogue. If the old domestic system had remained, the chances are that Adam Smith would never have attracted much attention, since there would have been no important polemic purposes to which his theories could so readily have lent themselves. But the Industrial Revolution gave rise immediately to monstrous abuses; due chiefly to the operation of the *new* system under the *old* rules and arrangements. The more unjustly the old rules worked, the more urgently they needed so-called

[1] See L. H. Haney, *History of Economic Thought*, Chapters IX to XIII.

explanation; and Smith's political economy, together with the dismal fatalism of Malthus' first edition, proved a most timely defense-mechanism to the beneficiaries of those new abuses. Naturally they seized upon such plausible explanations, and gave them wide and insistent publicity. And, paradoxical as it may sound, the wont and custom of the obsolescent order rendered those theories the more acceptable to minds that had long been rutted by the wheels thereof.

Gradually some of the major tenets of the classical creed percolated down into the popular mind, where it has since come to function as a veritable economic religion. And a whole century has scarcely sufficed to check its momentum. That it should have appealed to middle class Americans is not so strange, since it both flattered and encouraged their ambition to win the prizes of the new system; and especially as the abundance of new land obscured the futility of that ambition in the great majority. But it does seem a little strange that so many of our intellectual leaders, even during the latter half of the nineteenth century, should have taken Adam Smith and the Malthusian fatalism so seriously. Smith's work was largely of the a priori type so characteristic of a prescientific age. That it should still maintain an academic standing in this age of science is puzzling, to say the least. The practical result is that in the market place, where even educators now and then foregather, men unquestioningly assume that the profits motive is the only motive power that possibly could turn the wheels of modern industry; that the rewards of the system are automatic, inevitable, and fundamentally just; and that all other human activities and interests must concede to profit getting, lest production be retarded. The Romans were never more naïvely

confident of their system of military exploitation. But our system is hardly worthy all the faith that it elicits. It has its faults. How serious they are may from time to time become apparent as our argument proceeds. Suffice to say, however, that it can hardly prove amiss for sincere and thoughtful persons, and especially educators, to scrutinize this contemporaneous obsession with critical and well-enlightened skepticism. It is the very thing whose motives and tendencies they will most need to understand if education is to perform its telic function with effect. The darkness or light of the future depends, in the long run, upon the resolution of its divergency of interests. But the educators will not rise to their function of social salvation in this mortal issue if they are too credulous of the creeds of the market place. Those creeds are among the obsessions of the *Zeitgeist.*

These three examples must suffice. Not that they are the only ones which might have been discussed; but they are sufficient to suggest the importance of appraising contemporaneous life objectively. This attitude must be achieved by educators if education is to perform its telic function in behalf of our posterity. For if even the educators also are obsessed with the obsessions of the *Zeitgeist,* they will naturally build their school programs accordingly, with the result that the schools will but add fuel to the flames of contemporaneous follies. But if educators can rise to an intelligent, objective appraisal of the aims that dominate the social mind in their own age, they can construct school programs that will check and even correct the current aberrations. They, above all others, must be free of mind; otherwise we shall all in the end be unfree.

CHAPTER VIII

EDUCATION THROUGH SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

THE social process is not only the product of the learning process; it is the educative process itself. It is by participation in the social process that the young learn, quite incidentally, the elements of that mental wherewithal by the use of which the social process is being carried on. Through social participation the individual is educated in the most fundamental sense of that word. What Professor Bobbitt calls the Great School, is after all, the real school; in it the candidate acquires the invisible nine-tenths of the mental material out of which his personality is made. Formal schooling is designed merely to furnish such information as the social process itself does not adequately teach. This principle — that the educative process is a social process — is elementary in social psychology; and is now beginning to be recognized by educators also. Its implications, when fully and clearly perceived, will clear up many dark spots in educational theory and practice. Above all, this principle reveals the educational functions of the various social institutions other than the school, with which the school must establish working alliances if education is to be telic in any large, comprehensive, and effective way. To recognize the educative functions of the Great School is to perceive that the efficiency of the school itself is, after all, in its relationships, and that the problem of educational statesman-

ship is a very much larger enterprise than school administration only.

This principle — that the real educative process is participation in the social process — was set forth in Chapter III. However, it bears elaboration. To this end consider the familiar old saying that men are known by the company they keep. To enumerate and describe the groups with which a person associates is to indicate that individual's personality and character. Indeed, there can be no more complete nor vivid delineation of character. But the old adage does not go to the bottom of the matter. The truth is that one is made by the company he keeps. The groups themselves in which one lives form the mold into which one's personality is poured. Find out the social, economic, religious, political, and recreational groups to which one belongs and his opinions and behavior can be forecast. Who would expect a member of a college fraternity to deplore the presence of intercollegiate football in American academic life; where will one find a banker promoting socialistic propaganda; to what matron dwelling in the most fashionable district of any city will the society section of the Sunday paper seem like an affront to Christian civilization; or what high church ecclesiastic will one find advocating a pantheistic metaphysic? "When the caste to which one belongs is known, all that is necessary is to press a button of his mental mechanism to release a series of opinions and of phrases already made which are all but identical in every individual of the same caste." [1]

Language does something more than merely to express one's thought; it creates one's mind; or, at least, it furnishes

[1] Quoted from Sighele, in *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, by Park and Burgess, p. 203.

the mold up to which one's mind may grow. The language of a people reflects their culture, since for every concept there is a word. Learn the language and you learn the cognitive capital of culture. But the mere smattering of a language, so common in our high schools and colleges, produces no such results, of course, because it falls quite short of that *Sprachgefühl* by which the connotations of words are appreciated. Present-day pedagogy is averse to mere verbal learning; but rightly so only in part. For there is a certain enlargement of the mind in extending one's vocabulary; since a new word often comes to one as the bearer of a new idea. By giving form and limits to a thought, the word helps to define and formulate the thought itself. Aristotle made a real contribution to science by creating a terminology; and a student makes no mean achievement when he masters the vocabulary of a new science. A large and elaborate mentality cannot unfold in the environment of a meager vocabulary; it requires a language with wide scope and fine discriminations. In the use of a developed language, therefore, one becomes heir to the accumulated intellectual achievements of the race.

Says Durkheim:[1]

> The system of concepts with which we think in everyday life is that expressed by the vocabulary of our mother tongue; for every word translates a concept. . . . And the concept is universal. . . . A concept is not my concept; I hold it in common with other men, or, in any case, can communicate it to them. It is impossible for me to make a sensation pass from my consciousness into that of another. . . . Conversation and all intellectual communication between men is an exchange of concepts. The concept is an essentially impersonal representation; it is through it that human intelligences communicate. The nature of the

[1] Quoted from Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 193 ff.

concept, thus defined, bespeaks its origin. If it is common to all, it is the work of the community. Since it bears the mark of no particular mind, it is clear that it was elaborated by a unique intelligence, where all others meet each other, and, after a fashion, *come to nourish themselves*. . . . Every time that we are in the presence of a type of thought or action that is imposed uniformly upon particular wills or intelligences, this pressure exercised over the individual betrays the intervention of the group. Also, as we have already said, the concepts with which we ordinarily think are those of our vocabulary. Now it is unquestionable that language, and consequently the system of concepts which it translates, is the product of collective elaboration. What is expressed is the manner in which society as a whole represents the facts of experience. The ideas which correspond to the diverse elements of language are thus collective representations.

The educative potency of the social process can be still further clarified by reverting to that list of the accumulated intellectual resources by the use of which the social process proceeds, and observing the extent to which each of them is learned incidentally through social participation. How obviously that is so in the case of the "folkways" and the "mores." Immigrants do not know them, except in so far as those of their native lands happen to be similar; and yet we do not set up schools to teach them. They are not acquired in that way; which is the real reason why the Americanization movement proved so short lived.

In static times it is much the same with ideals and beliefs. The prevailing ideals are normally acquired by unconscious imitation. This is why overt attempts to impart to high-school pupils ideals that do not run current in their own subgroups are very likely to result in failure. Such instruction is pretty sure to sound "preachy" to them unless it is set forth with objective, factual reasons for the new type of behavior — which cognitive aspect of moral instruction, by the way, is not sufficiently taken into account in contempo-

raneous theory and practice. Likewise, children normally get the popular beliefs from their parents and other adult associates quite incidentally in connection with their admonitions and advice, and in response to the innumerable questions which children ask. Beliefs pass current also in what Stevenson so aptly calls the smooth worn coinage of aphorisms, proverbs, epigrams, slogans, witticisms, rhymes, and fables. They are expounded from the pulpit, embodied in the national literature, and reiterated by the periodical press. So that by the time a youth arrives at his majority, he knows, with naïvely confident assurance, what is currently believed about all the problems of nature, life, and society that have ever come to his attention. If he be one of those rare geniuses who does think for himself, he is likely to be painfully rectified of his resultant heresy. Or, if he happens to live in a time when all ideals and beliefs are in flux, his mind is likely to become a jumble of bewildering contradictions. In such a time there is more occasion for formal instruction in the beliefs that should be popularized.

Some knowledge even of the sciences, and some appreciation even of the fine arts may be expected to result from mere participation in the social process, especially if the social process is already rich in its utilization of these resources. But nothing adequate! The learning of these subjects seems to require a special effort of attention, partly, perhaps, because they are so remote from the instinctive interests of the human animal. At any rate, schools are indispensable for their transmission to the rising generation. These are the resources of the collective mind which, perhaps more than any of the others, make formal education a necessity. As for the techniques of industry: in a primitive

society no formal schooling is necessary, but in a society like our own, in which the industrial technique has become specialized and intricate, with much application of science, an elaborate formal instruction is needed. The means of communication reveal, as clearly as any class of intellectual resources, the difference between primitive and advanced societies. In a primitive society the spoken language is almost the only means of communication; and that much is readily learned through social participation. The same is true of the masses of the common people in a developed society that is frankly class-stratified, and makes no effort to afford the lower classes any participation in either government or culture. But in a highly civilized society, especially if it aspires to be democratic, the use of writing and printing makes formal instruction necessary. It becomes even more necessary when a standardized usage of the mother tongue acquires conventional request, and especially when foreign languages have a real or imagined social utility. But nothing better illustrates the efficiency of informal education, so far as it goes, than the wonderful precision of detail with which we do learn the pronunciation of words, the connotations of synonyms, and the flavor of idioms, in the use of our mother tongue.

Informal education through social participation is so natural and spontaneous as to present a most striking contrast with the unnatural conditions that prevail in some of the poorest and most overcrowded schools of our greatest cities. In protest there have arisen certain doctrines and movements designed to make schooling as similar as possible in spirit and method to informal education itself. In this connection we hear much about motivation, group projects,

socialized recitations, and extra-curricular activities. There are those who prophesy that school practice is shortly to be quite revolutionized through the extension of these new socializing devices. This whole movement is epitomized in John Dewey's now famous aphorism that education *is* life, not preparation for life. And this in turn is closely related in philosophy to his implied usage of the word social as practically synonymous with voluntary.[1]

All of which contains a very considerable core of pedagogical gospel. For informal education does have a certain very conspicuous advantage: it is the *easy* way to learn. The reason for this is obvious enough. As we have seen, the social process is the natural teaching process. The materials, methods, agents, and objectives of the learning process are all social. The motivation of incidental education is ideal. Froebel was right, therefore, in his pedagogical doctrine of social participation. And so are Dewey and his followers, in urging that the learning process in school be conditioned as similarly to the social process of the Great School as possible — provided, however, that they do not overlook any important principles involved.

But certain fundamental sociological principles have, as a matter of fact, been overlooked in this whole movement, with the result that fallacies have crept into the theories, and certain unfortunate outcomes are accruing from those practices. In the first place Dr. Dewey's aphorism about life and preparation for life is a very misleading and pernicious half-truth. To take it literally — which, of course, he never could have intended — would be to revert to savagery, the very nature of which is such that preparation for life is suffi-

[1] *Democracy and Education*, pp. 28, 29 ff.

ciently derived from mere participation in the life process itself. But in civilized society we have an elaborate system of formal schooling precisely because there is so much cognitive material that absolutely must be learned *before* we try to use it — because civilized life does require so much *preparation.*

For informal education has certain very decided disadvantages; and just because of these disadvantages it has to be supplemented in civilized societies by formal schooling. The first of these disadvantages is that the information is likely to come too late. The result is that the first attempt to perform the acts in which is involved the knowledge that one gets by doing are liable to be failures. The wastes involved are therefore high. If nothing very important depends upon the success of first attempts, the wastes of informal education can be tolerated; otherwise they cannot. This disadvantage is overlooked in the most fashionable pedagogical theories and fads of our time. The wastes of informal education elude our attention — and hence are overlooked in theory — because of custom. Either we endure them as a matter of custom; or else we have customs designed to avoid them. Children learn the "mores" and the "folkways" by imitation. If, during the process, they disregard the common decencies, break out window lights, steal whatever they can get their hands on, and, in rare cases, commit murder, we make the best of it, since there is no other way. As for the prevailing beliefs, we have customary methods of seeing to it that young people learn them *before* they have to use them. But in the technical professions we do not tolerate such wastes; instead we maintain professional schools on purpose to prevent the failure of

first attempts. We train dentists and oculists in such a way that they will not spoil the first teeth and eyes they treat; we train doctors in such a way as to prevent their killing their first patients; we train engineers so that their first bridges do not collapse. In such schools there is no nonsense to the effect that education *is* life, not preparation for life. Professional schools are not "socialized" either. Instead, the information needed *as preparation* is logically organized and systematically presented; and students dig until they get it. The so-called "real" situations in such schools are actually anything but *real:* in a law school, the trials are mock trials; while in medical and dental schools, the students' practice is very carefully supervised by experienced teachers to prevent mistakes. It is highly probable that we are most liable to talk sentimental nonsense about methods in those departments of education where we are most in the dark as to *what* we ought to teach, and why we ought to teach it.

In the second place, the words voluntary and social are not synonymous terms by any means, as Dewey erroneously implies. Interrelation, with consciousness thereof, is the essential concept involved in the word social, as applied to human beings; or in other words, mental interaction. Social relationships range from complete, voluntary mutuality to absolutely coercive exploitation. Normally they compromise these two extremes. This overemphasis upon the voluntary in school practice is an inference from the individualistic obsession of the *Zeitgeist.* Moreover, it is based upon a misreading of the facts of social life, in which constraint of one sort or another always has played an important part. No sociologist would assert that the world could be run

without compulsion. Artificial incentives, however liable to abuse,[1] are indispensable in such a world as ours, where division of labor is complexly organized, where the objectives of effort are often very remote, and where the restraints imposed upon the natural instincts are often so irksome. If the learning situation in school were exactly similar to the learning situation outside the school, incentives, devices, and compulsions would still have a very considerable place in the learning process. There would be hard tasks to do; and they would be done under duress, if necessary. To omit this element makes the school *unlike* the social process, instead of like it; and therefore deprives young people of a discipline that is very important as preparation for life. A school that encourages young people to regard the hard things of life as electives is undermining the civilization which it pretends to serve.

Moreover, a school that seeks to eliminate remote objectives, artificial incentives, hard tasks, and compulsion is not only unlike the world, but it is also untrue to its own function. For it is in the very nature of formal schooling that these features can never be completely dispensed with; and teachers are entitled to the comfort of realizing that that is so — the fashionable pedagogical theories of the hour to the contrary notwithstanding. For, after all, *preparation* for life is exactly what that formal schooling is upon which civilization depends for its survival. Necessarily its objectives are more or less remote; necessarily its motivation is more or less artificial. The thing to do, therefore, is to select the material that really is relevant to life, graduating the pupils to their several stages of development as well as possible,

[1] Cf. Chapter XIX.

explaining to the older children the reasons for learning it, and sugar-coating it within reason for the younger ones. It is legitimate to humbug the children, and especially the younger ones, into imagining that the artificial situations and motivation which the teacher invents are natural; but it is poor policy for the teacher to humbug himself in these matters. For such artificial motivation can never, in the very nature of the case, be one hundred per cent successful; there almost always will remain some necessity for compelling children to learn their lessons, and in extreme cases it is quite proper to motivate them with a whip. Then we shall have a school practice that parallels the social practice as it really is, and that can be justified by a well-balanced sociological theory. Moreover, it will train efficient, law-abiding citizens; whereas it is to be feared that our soft, degenerate pedagogy does not.

These two disadvantages of informal education come out to the same principle, each from a different point of view, however. To say that the knowledge derived from informal education sometimes comes too late is tantamount to saying that informal education leaves many important items of information entirely untaught. To say that the natural motivation of informal education needs to be supplemented by the rigorous artificial motivation of the schoolroom, is to imply that otherwise much necessary information would remain unacquired by the learner. And right here we come upon the reason why formal education is so indispensable to civilized society: it provides for a *curriculum* into which can be organized the knowledge necessary to civilized living, but which would otherwise remain unlearned. The curriculum is the essential feature of the school — this is a

principle that cannot for a moment be lost sight of without sterilizing education. Method is only a means, the end of which is to impart the curriculum. In so far, therefore, as the methods of social participation succeed in imparting the contents of the curriculum, well and good; but in so far as they fall short of that, they must be supplemented by whatever artificial methods will succeed. If the social participation theory be carried so far as to make it an end in itself it may actually prevent important parts of the curricular content from being learned at all. In that case a theory that is good in its place becomes a pedagogical monstrosity and an obstacle to education.

And something of this sort has actually happened in the application of this theory to extra-curricular activities. Here again the doctrine of social participation has too often of late been given a supposedly sociological interpretation that is really inferred from a misconceived and fractional sociology. It is true that children learn fair play by learning to play fair, and all that; but it is going altogether too far when one implies that these participatory social experiences are the most important part of the school's program. They are minor, secondary, and quite incidental matters. The school exists because, in civilized societies, the social process is carried forward only through the use of a rich cognitive capital. The school's essential business is to impart that capital, and only incidentally to furnish young people with opportunities to get together socially. The other institutions can and do attend to that; but they do not, and cannot, teach the sciences, arts, techniques, and philosophies in the use of which a civilized differs from a savage society. However, since we do keep our children in school so much of the

time in order to teach them this necessary knowledge, it is of course incumbent on the school to see that they do not miss the normal sociable experiences of life; otherwise the school would be robbing Peter to pay Paul. Incidental practice in teamwork and sociability are important, therefore, in the modern school; not because that is what the school is for, but because that is what much schooling must not be allowed to prevent. However, it is a shallow sociology that ascribes to extra-curricular activities a major function in the school program, and a faddish pedagogy that overworks them in practice. The main thing is the curriculum!

So much for the disadvantages, limitations, and pitfalls of social participation. Returning now to its advantages, there is one important thing to be said for it that seems to have been overlooked almost entirely in the literature of the subject, from Froebel to Dewey. It tends to cancel the intellectual differences between dull and bright pupils, and produce a similarity of end result in all types of mentality. To a far greater degree than we are wont to realize education seeks to produce similarity of beliefs, appreciations, attitudes, and actions in all of us. We must all participate in the same institutions; and that participation (except so far as our specialized economic functions are concerned) requires similarity of behavior. We are all expected to utilize the great intellectual resources of civilization — the arts, sciences, beliefs, and so forth — in much the same way; for these are the same for all of us, in so far as they are true and valid. Hence the necessity for a very considerable homogeneity of thought, feeling, and habit. Now this mental homogeneity results largely from imitation. It involves what we have already called passive mentation. By this

type of learning, it becomes possible for dull and bright to believe the same things (the dull, in outline, and without much understanding; the bright, with a rich, detailed insight into the underlying reasons), to have similar emotional attitudes, and to practice very similar behavior. This mental homogeneity is what makes group activity possible in spite of intellectual differences. And this type of imitative learning occurs normally in groups, where all participate together in the same group projects.[1]

From such considerations as these it follows that a very desirable social result accrues from having dull and bright pupils participate together in the typical schoolroom enterprise of studying the formally organized material of the ordinary curriculum. Such group experience affects the dull in ways of which we are all too little aware. They get sketch impressions, general conclusions, emotional sets, and cues to action that are not revealed in the examinations, but that function in their subsequent behavior. As a result of such participation, the duller members of the class, even though they seem to learn but little, will tend to behave in the situations of adult society much *as if* they were bright. Their utilization of the arts, sciences, and beliefs of civilization will be similar to that of their brighter school associates. And all this may happen in spite of the fact that the pace for the class as a whole is being set by the brighter half, and the duller half seem to be getting only a part of what the class is covering. Here is a consideration from social psychology that has been fallaciously overlooked in almost all our current

[1] The social psychology and sociological theory underlying this paragraph and the next have already been introduced in Chapter III; their implications will be elaborated in subsequent chapters, especially XX to XXII. If the reader's skepticism is aroused he is invited to reserve judgment until he has read those later discussions.

pedagogical theories, and in the practices inferred from them; but it is of very great importance indeed, and will be referred to again and again throughout this book.

The subject of social participation invites us, finally, to discuss the educational functions of the various institutions. But to take up our list of eleven, *seriatim,* pointing out the educational function of each, would seem like a somewhat sophomoric slavery to a mere outline. Besides, this task has been attended to by other writers in the field of educational sociology. But it does seem worth while to say, even though it takes us just outside the field of the present work, that the function of each institution is, in part at least, to *educate* the individuals who participate in it, and that institutions need reforming if they are failing in that function. The primary groups should train individuals into the "mores," the "folkways," and the primary ideals; and if they are not doing that, attention should be given to their rehabilitation. The family exists largely for the moral and cultural nurture of the children, and whatever interferes with that function should be regarded as a social disorder. Playgrounds, theaters, and all means of recreation are such important agencies for the inculcation of ideals and attitudes that they ought really to be regarded as a part of the public educational system, and socialized accordingly. A man's or a woman's personality should be as much enriched by his work as by any other activity or relationship of his life; and one can scarcely suffer a greater misfortune than to be chained by fate to a job that has no educative interest or effect. An economic system that merely uses men, squeezing them dry and then discarding them, without concern for the education of their personalities, is a radically

immoral system. Our present industrial institution is to be judged by this criterion among others; and its sins are not to be excused. The press should educate the public, in the large and worthy meaning of that word, and not merely titillate men's minds with sensationalism or debauch their intellects with propaganda. It is worthy of respect and confidence in proportion as it does educate the public; and if it is not doing that, it ought to be socialized, first by endowments, and eventually by political administration and fiscal support, like the school. The medical profession should concern itself quite as much with the permanent education of the masses as with the temporary cure of their ailments. And so with all the institutions; together they constitute the Great School; and social reform is a sort of superpedagogy.

CHAPTER IX

SOCIAL PRINCIPLES DETERMINING THE CURRICULUM

THE fundamental principles, from which we are to proceed in solving the problem of curriculum construction, have already been established in previous chapters. In the background are the facts that personality and the social process are products of the learning process. In the foreground is the principle of parallelism. It is by reference to this principle that we are to bring order out of disorder, so far as the curriculum is concerned. Nothing less than the intellectual resources actually used in the new social process are the materials out of which the new curriculum must be made, if the school is to function vitally in the new régime. To make a school program for the new supercivilization out of antique intellectual heirlooms is like operating a hospital on the therapeutic practices of a century ago. Nor are we likely to derive much help from the curricular fads that start up from time to time. As a rule they lack orientation. Almost never do they root down into any fundamental principle. And we may expect a succession of curricular fads until we do succeed in establishing fundamental principles upon which we can all agree. To a sociologist the principle of parallelism commends itself as meeting the requirement; and hence it would seem that that principle cannot be too insistently repeated in theory nor too rigorously applied in practice. If the school is to function vitally

its program of studies must epitomize the civilization itself — omitting only such parts of it as the social process will transmit automatically through social participation — and including no extraneous material. Curriculum makers must not be satisfied with a pedantic and irrelevant lore, however fragrant with the romance of a bygone aristocracy; nor with a series of projects, however interesting, that are devoid of vital correlation with the social process. The curriculum must impart the information necessary to the operation of our institutions on an intellectual level commensurate with the new supercivilization. Nothing will so quickly dispel the fog that hangs over the curricular problem as the clear light of this principle of parallellism. Let us proceed, therefore, to the elaboration of its implications.

We advance a step toward the concrete details of this problem when we recall that a list of institutions is an analysis of the social program. To say that education must parallel the civilization is to say that it must parallel the institutions. The institutions of society are the objectives of education. The school is preparing young people to take their parts in the teamwork activities of the several institutions as they exist in contemporaneous society. The next step is to recall the principle that the institutions in their present form are operated by the use of the intellectual resources of the present age. From this it follows that the curriculum must present to the rising generation such items of contemporaneous knowledge as will prove useful in operating those institutions on the highest possible level. The curriculum maker must scrutinize each institution with a view to ascertaining what knowledge is needed to operate it.

Take the family, for example. With the highest standards

of family life in mind the curriculum maker will go through the list of intellectual resources and inquire what information under each heading is needful. He will ask such questions as the following: (1) What means of communication must the candidate command in order to conduct such a family life as the new social order requires? (2) What industrial techniques? (3) Which of the customary amusements would he be able to utilize to advantage? (4) What scientific knowledge should he be prepared to apply? (5) What use should he be trained to make of the fine arts? (6) What beliefs should he hold (in all those fields where demonstrable knowledge is not yet available)? (7) With what ideals should he be imbued? And what, if anything, should the schools take pains to impart to him relative to (8) the "folkways" and (9) the "mores" of society? These questions answered, a similar series of inquiries should be made relative to the candidate's preparation for each of the other institutions of society. The answers to such questions should be derived by a combination of (*a*) the job analysis technique, and (*b*) prophetic insight of the Grundtvig sort — of which the latter is likely to be about as fruitful of educational progress as the former. The resulting inventories of needed knowledge should then be combined, or rather organized, into a program, the order of arrangement being a task for the psychologist and practical school administrator. The sociologist's task is done when the knowledge needed for the several social processes has been invoiced.

In lieu of such a detailed analysis as here suggested, let us proceed to some general conclusions that seem more or less obvious from a sort of common sense survey of contempo-

raneous life. To this end, let us consider seriatim our nine classes of intellectual resources, but in an inverse order of our usual procedure. From such an empirical survey, in the light of principles here set forth, we may be able to make at least some little progress in the provisional balancing of the curriculum.

The "mores" and the "folkways" are, as we have so often observed, involved in all the institutions; but they are transmitted for the most part through the informal education of social participation. Doubtless attention should be paid to these matters in elementary and secondary schools; but quite incidentally, as a rule, just as in family life and community contacts. These common rules of social living do not belong in the curriculum; except, perhaps, in schools attended chiefly by the children of recent immigrants or by children of the least privileged and most uncultured classes. It might not be amiss to give the former some formal instruction in the manners and customs of their adopted country; while for the latter life might be enriched by some formal instruction in those amenities and urbanities by which a flavor of the humane and the artistic is injected into everyday life. But this does not mean that the "mores" and the "folkways" have an almost negligible claim upon the attention of the curriculum maker; for the changing character of our times imposes upon the schools the responsibility of furnishing young people with the facts by which those changes can be understood and evaluated. For example, the new status of women is introducing changes into our customs, including the prevalent code of sex behavior. The school should hardly leave the rising generation to adopt such changes by sheer blind imitation. Instead, it should

see that they understand the causes underlying them; and, so far as there are data available as evidence, which of them are for the better and which for the worse, and why. The question of moral education is attracting so much attention at present precisely because the "mores" are in flux. Realignment is not, therefore, merely a matter of habit formation, nor even of emotional motivation, but of a new enlightenment. The facts from which such enlightenment is to be derived should be furnished to the young people by means of curricular subjects dealing with human nature and human relationships, chiefly the social sciences.

Very similar remarks are to be made about the prevailing beliefs and ideals. As pointed out before, every society is equipped with a body of beliefs about human nature and all conceivable human relationships; and the forms of our institutions depend upon the prevailing beliefs. In static times these beliefs are learned quite incidentally, for the most part, through social suggestion. The rationalizing of life is done for the child and youth chiefly by the informal agencies. Parents and immediate associates are the chief sources of such instruction. However, such instruction is never entirely informal. Even in savage societies there is a sort of initiation ceremony by means of which the religious mysteries of the tribe are transmitted. In mediæval Europe the church assumed a special responsibility in the imparting of the current beliefs. In America, during the last half century, the elementary school has made its contribution. Geography gave the children an elementary framework of astronomical, cosmological, meteorological, ecological, anthropological, and sociological beliefs. History gave them beliefs about the origin and quality of their own political

institutions. Hygiene suggested their beliefs about the causes and cures of diseases. Literature furnished ethical explanations. By such formal and informal agencies the candidate, by the time he is halfway through his teens, is equipped with the prevailing beliefs and popular mythologies by which his society is operated. In static times and relatively simple societies he is thereby equipped, intellectually, for the social life.

However, our times are not simple, but complex. Neither are they static, but metamorphic and unusual to a very high degree. The result is that many of the beliefs informally derived turn out to be misguiding and illusory — popular mythologies, mostly out of date. This condition imposes an unusual responsibility upon the school. Many of the beliefs which the young people bring to high school and college have there to be unlearned. So much so, indeed, that a liberal education actually consists largely, nowadays, in clearing the mind of traditional rubbish and putting the findings and implications of modern science in the place thereof. If this task is only half done it often leaves the young soul a desert of flippant skepticism. The chaos of the social mind resulting from the fact that so many are in this lamentable predicament is enough to account for the visible confusion of our times.

This defect should be provided for in our curricula. We should organize our offerings with the definite objective of formulating the beliefs of our young people in all the aspects of their lives: cosmic and social origins, biological first principles, anthropological differences, social interactions, economic interdependencies, political institutions, moral criteria, ultimate valuations, and what not. Cur-

ricula from the primary school to the senior college must aim at rephilosophizing life in the concepts of modern science; and this is one of their most important functions at present. In times like ours the schools do not parallel the civilization if they leave the inculcation of beliefs to uncles and grandmothers, cranks and wiseacres, ignoramuses and axe-grinders, newspapers and soap-box orators. And to perform this function we must obviously depend upon the biological, mental, and social sciences.

The ideals of a people are intimately related to their beliefs. When their beliefs change, a change in their ideals is sure to follow. From individual to individual, ideals are usually passed by a sort of emotional contagion; but there is an inevitable correlation between the beliefs and the ideals that prevail socially. A change in the prevailing ideals of a society involves a change in their cognitive basis; and if that change is to be guided, deliberate attention must be given to that cognitive basis. The relevant facts are the same as those by which the prevailing beliefs are to be modified, and are accordingly derived from the same sources.

To those curricular subjects which treat of human life, its nature and relationships, it is becoming customary nowadays to apply the term "the new humanities." The new humanities include geography, biology, psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, politics, ethics, metaphysics, and history. They must be differentiated from the natural sciences because each of them contains only a core of material that is strictly scientific in its derivation and certitude; much of it is philosophical in the meaning ascribed to that word in the first Chapter of this book. Nevertheless it is from these disciplines that we are to derive the cognitive

material on the basis of which our beliefs, ideals, "folkways," and "mores," are to be modernized. The new humanities contain that larger knowledge (however incomplete as yet) before which the popular mythologies will eventually give way. This will happen as fast as the curricula render that new knowledge generally prevalent.

If this line of reasoning, relative to the "mores," "folkways," ideals, and beliefs, is sound in the main, it follows that the new humanities should occupy a large place in our curricula from the elementary school to the university. Geography is one of the most liberalizing of all studies. It roots down into all the natural sciences, and branches up into all the social sciences. Our neglect of geography, especially in our high schools, is a most unfortunate omission indeed. Biology, when well taught to college freshmen, sets up a reverent philosophy of life in their minds as no other subject seems to do. It should be moved down into the high school; some of it even into the grades — simplified, visualized, and vitalized. The elements of psychology, with a judicious admixture of elementary logic, should be taught to high school children, probably as early as the ninth grade. Its omission from our secondary school program seems like an irrational case of parallax between our education and our civilization. It is no more difficult than algebra; and would be useful to all. We rationalize mathematics on the pretext of teaching children to think. Why not introduce a course that really would teach them how we actually do think, and point out some of the logical pitfalls to be avoided? Anthropology, sociology, economics, civics, and ethics must all be simplified and given a definite place in the secondary, and even in the elementary, curricula; since the beliefs which

these subjects endeavor to scientize pertain to all our institutions. And pervading all these must be provided the perspectives of history. As for metaphysics, the significant fact is that it cannot be kept out of the individual's intellectual equipment. By informal, if not by formal, instruction he is sure to imbibe some sort of a metaphysical conception of life and the universe. Formerly the masses got it from religion. It is bound to be implicit in the instructions of teachers and textbooks. Whether metaphysics should be provided definitely, though indirectly, through the curricula for teacher training might be worth debating.

Returning now to our list of the intellectual resources of society: the natural sciences speak for themselves. They have so obvious a place in almost all the processes of modern life that they are rapidly winning for themselves a proportionate place in our curricula.

But the formal science of mathematics occupies a curricular position that seems quite out of parallel with its social position. The reasons are traditional. Mathematics developed earlier than the concrete sciences themselves. During the late mediæval and early modern period, mathematics was recognized as an indispensable tool for research. It functioned also as a sort of elementary introduction to science at a time when science had a meager offering of objective findings. For these reasons it acquired a large place in the secondary and advanced curricula of that period. The rise of the disciplinary theory in the eighteenth century fortified its position. And that position it continues to hold by sheer weight of tradition, but without reasons convincing to persons who are skeptical of its social utility. For specialists in many fields, higher mathematics is quite indispensable,

of course; but for mere participants in the social processes, the rank and file of the people have use for only the elementary forms of computation. As preparation for the industrial institution it is necessary to a minority, but not to all. As preparation for all the other institutions it is necessary to almost nobody. Higher mathematics is not a part of the common intellectual equipment of all; not even of the most intellectual twenty-five per cent. It is a technical tool of specialists. Hence it would seem to deserve a place in the technical training of such specialists as will need it; but frankly abandoned as a requirement for all. To retain it as a high school constant is to sin against the principle of parallelism; as such it is a waste of the taxpayers' money and an imposition on the patience of the average child. Nor can it longer be justified on the ground of mental discipline, as all students of psychology are now aware. Frankly, the "perfectly good reasons" given for it sound to the skeptic like the rationalization of a deeply intrenched, but inherently irrational, tradition.

The fine arts, as substance for a satisfying and successful social life under the new régime that is unfolding, are fully as important as the natural sciences; and they deserve, therefore, as large and dignified a place in the curricula. To this thesis Chapter XVII will be devoted. Our theories in this field are lamentably one-sided. Here, we in America suffer from the Puritan tradition. Our offerings are deplorably inadequate; although we have made gratifying progress during the past generation or two.

The techniques of industry, as material for the curriculum, will be discussed in Chapter XIII. Only the barest outlines of the situation need attention here. The outstanding

consideration for educators is the enormous technical development of the past century. This is the most conspicuous feature of the transition from the old civilization to the new supercivilization. One has only to consider the extent and intricacy of the new industrial technique to realize how far short our education falls of paralleling it. Our schools have scarcely more than made a beginning as yet, so far as preparation is concerned for participation in the industrial institution. In fact, our secondary schools carry a sort of unconscious tradition against it; and quite naturally so, since they are the direct descendants of European schools that were designed for the aristocratic classes only. But this is a fundamentally wrong conception of secondary education in a democracy. In a democracy secondary schools should not pamper youths into white-collared ambitions; but should teach them all to work. The lack of vocational training adequate to the demands of modern industry would seem to be the biggest gap in our educational program; and it is doubtful whether many educators sense the magnitude of that lack. Without adequate provision for the learning of its techniques the new technological régime cannot come to full fruition. This is a problem to which educators should be devoting their most earnest thought; for it is here that they will encounter the largest and most difficult problems of the coming century — and come to mortal grips with the most stubborn and powerful enemies of the humanitarian ideal. Wrong thinking here may mean defeat in the end.

Civilized societies have evolved techniques of play and recreation only less elaborate than their techniques of industry; and it may be that the former have by right a larger claim upon the curriculum maker than we are in the habit

of assuming. Play is an important part of life, for adults as well as for children; and as civilization removes the human animal farther and farther from a state of nature, there is increasing need of organizing a system of recreations according to the dictates of reason, not to say of science. As suggested in Chapter VIII, the very fact that children and adolescents are now confined in schools so much of their time is in itself sufficient reason for organizing the school program in such a way that they will, at least, not be deprived of normal opportunities for play and social intercourse. Certain historic schools — those of ancient Greece, that of Vittorino da Feltra, the Ritterakademien, and the Great Public Schools of England — used games and sports as a means of developing personality and moral character. That objective can hardly be said to have been successfully achieved in the public high schools of America, although there has been a veritable revolution during the last half century in our conceptions of play and its place in education. However, we have too much followed the drift of custom, not to say of fashion, in developing this aspect of the school program; the movement lacks as yet an adequate philosophy. Such a philosophy would doubtless include the idea of teaching games, sports, and amusements with the deliberate objective of habituating their utilization in adult life. Such a philosophy might accord to tennis and chess at least as large and dignified a place in the school program as to solid geometry and freshman rhetoric; and it would certainly establish a close alliance between games of all kinds and the fine arts as recreational facilities. Such an educational policy would probably contribute in a very important way to the enrichment of life for the common people.

We come at last to the means of communication. It is an elementary principle of social psychology that social life depends upon communication. Practically universal literacy is an indispensable requisite to a high civilization. An illiterate person is almost as badly handicapped in the complexities of modern life as a deaf-mute would be in a simple primitive life; the only way he can get along at all is by having his immediate associates tell him what they read. Due to the new technical devices for communicating at a distance human relations are far less of the kind that Cooley calls primary, and far more of the secondary sort. This change from face to face communication to impersonal communication at a distance is one of the most conspicuous aspects of the contemporaneous shift; and this is the fundamental reason why everybody, nowadays, must learn to read. Everybody must be able to participate in that sort of communication which is not face to face. A community in which all were illiterate would be virtually insulated from civilization. All its institutions would revert to barbarism. Considerable layers or areas of illiteracy hinder the joint enterprises and thwart the joint purposes of modern social life. Considering the fact that this has been more or less clearly recognized for a century, it seems strange that there should remain so high a percentage of persons who can neither read nor write.

And it goes almost without saying that the presence in any nation of large numbers of persons who do not use the national language constitutes a serious menace to the solidarity of that nation. Educators are rightly giving that problem their insistent attention.

But while literacy for all is necessary, it is debatable how

much of the taxpayers' resources and the young people's time can profitably be devoted to the achievement of grammatical accuracy and rhetorical elegance in the use of the mother tongue. It is very doubtful indeed whether our conventional school practices in this regard would bear sociological scrutiny. To leaders of public opinion such skill is almost always an asset, but even to such it is not always an absolute necessity. Successful business and professional men can usually say what they mean in such a way as not to be misunderstood, but their grammar would not always bear inspection. In certain limited groups the approved use of the mother tongue serves as a badge of conventional refinement, and therefore as a ticket of entrance, though exceptions are tolerated. The truth is, we have made the standards of these limited groups the standards of our public schools; and our objectives in English teaching cater to the purposes of these few. The probable reason is the aristocratic origins and traditions of our schools. But here too we sin against the principle of parallelism. The great majority live in groups where the art of chaste speech is not much appreciated; and so far as their foresight carries them they always will live in such groups. On the other hand, there is a widespread pride in the terse punch of popular slang which smacks of the democratic spirit. Hence school teachers encounter an impenetrable obstacle to motivation, from which there results an enormous waste of energy. The children sense the fact with a sort of elemental intuition; and hence their stark indifference. If we teach the arts and sciences in such a way as to induce intelligent appreciation, the forms of the mother tongue may surprise us by pretty much taking care of themselves. Most well-informed

and intellectually enthusiastic persons desire to speak with grammatical accuracy and some conventional elegance; and persons who really desire to speak in that way pick up the ability quite incidentally (except for a little instruction in the fundamentals of grammar), just as they do good manners or any other conventional refinement. Certainly the results achieved here do not justify the expenditure of time and energy; and it would therefore seem like a safe assumption that something is radically wrong. The principle of parallelism suggests that there is not, and in the very nature of the social life cannot be, any adequate social motivation for the artificial objectives which tradition demands that our schools try to achieve. It would be worth while to experiment with formal English as an elective only in some typical American high school. The guess is hereby ventured that better results would be achieved.

It would appear that the fundamental difficulty with the motivation of formal English really arises out of that self-contradictory conception of democracy with which our whole civilization, including our education, is obsessed. We regard democracy as a type of society in which every individual is encouraged in the expectation of rising *out of* his class, despite the expectation that there always will and must be lower classes submerged in poverty, ignorance, and unculture, and despite the further fact that the percentage of the population in those lower classes is fixed by the techniques and organization of industry. The idea of lifting the laboring class *as a class* out of poverty, ignorance, and unculture is most decidedly not a part of our current social philosophy; instead it is regarded as an absurd and pernicious dream.

Now our whole educational system is organized on this rise-out-of-your-class philosophy of society. Hence it involves an enormous waste of energy, since out of their class the great majority are *predestined* never to rise at all. The Grundtvig [1] vision of educating even the laboring class as such out of their ignorance and unculture has not entered as yet into our current philosophy of education. And of this rise-out-of-your-class philosophy the most characteristic symptom is our formal English teaching. For there is no mark of upper class membership more distinguishing than the use of conventionally proper language forms. What the taxpayers' schools are devoting their energy to, therefore, is the imparting of upper class language conventions to all children including those of the lower classes. So long, accordingly, as the youngsters in the schools have not acquired the rise-out-of-your-class ambition, and conceived it, moreover, in terms of artificial polish, they naturally feel no motive for acquiring the upper class conventionalities of language. Indeed, they have a very definite motive for not acquiring them, since such forms would be out of place in the lower class environment, and offensive to associates. Hence the enormous passive resistance, with the corresponding waste of energy.[2]

Meantime, how can teachers with exactly the same social assumptions be expected to inspire prospective ditch diggers and coal heavers *in* the laboring class with the Grundtvig vision of culture? But if the teachers did see the vision, be assured that they would direct their attention to the real substances of culture — art, science, and the other

[1] Cf. Chapter XI, p. 218 ff.

[2] This undemocratic misconception of democratic education is further exposed in Chapter XIX, pp. 373–384, and in Chapter XXI, p. 412 ff.

intellectual treasures of the race; whereupon the surface polish of formal language would pretty much take care of itself. In homes of intellectual and æsthetic appreciation — the only real culture there is — little difficulty is encountered in motivating the appropriate forms of speech. Thus the waste of energy on formal English betrays the most deep-seated, absurd, and self-contradictory aspect of unreason in our whole current conception of a good civilization. And a similar explanation may be made of the foreign language convention, especially with respect to Latin.

German and French are strongly intrenched in tradition; but their status in our school programs can scarcely be defended on sociological grounds. They were indispensable parts of the education of young English aristocrats of a century or two ago, and even yet, for that matter. But the social situation in which the typical young citizen of the United States, Canada, or Australia finds himself to-day is entirely different. This educational gift horse from a European past deserves to be looked rather critically in the teeth. To impute some mystical educational virtue to the study of a foreign language, *per se*, is but to echo the old disciplinary theory, now seriously discredited by modern psychology. The vogue during the past few years of Spanish as a substitute for German was due to our superstitious, though virtually sub-conscious belief, in some such mystical potency of language. German had struck the snag of our temporary fanaticism against everything German; so we took up Spanish. The "perfectly good reasons" with which we rationalized the fad had reference to South American trade, with the result that we taught a smattering of Spanish to perhaps a thousand times as many persons as will ever use

it. But suppose we inquire what practical use young Americans are likely to have for German or French. Will they use these languages in putting family life on a higher and more wholesome level? Or the state, or the church, or the school? How will either of these languages enrich their participation in any of the other institutions. No conceivable answer to these questions can justify them as requirements either in high school or in college. Even as requirements for graduate degrees they are of debatable utility. When will the English speaking scholars of the whole world coöperate in maintaining a bureau of abstracts and translations that will render all foreign contributions to knowledge available to them in English? That, by the way, might hasten its adoption as the universal language.

But as electives there are reasons for the foreign languages that do not seem to have occurred to many American educators. As a means of interpreting to ourselves the other great cultures of the world it might be well to have each of these great cultures represented by a few thousand persons among our own educated classes who could read and speak those languages. We Americans are really provincially minded to a mortifying degree, our national complacency to the contrary notwithstanding. All great peoples have their literature, culture, and national spirit with which it would be well for us to familiarize ourselves. Also, some appreciation of the native cultures of our immigrants might help us to assimilate them. Then there are the problems of world politics, which get unfortunately, and sometimes dangerously, distorted behind the misunderstandings of mere language. In case the jingoes should succeed in provoking a war with our friends across the Pacific, whom

could we use as interpreters? Whom, indeed, can we use to interpret to us the peace policies of the Japanese Empire? This line of argument suggests that any living language which represents a developed culture might well be eligible to a place as an elective in any school system where a reasonable number of students might wish to study it — Italian as well as French, Russian and modern Greek as well as Spanish. It was the consideration of cultural intercourse which introduced French and German into the schools of the British aristocracy two or three centuries ago. But why not think in terms of twentieth century conditions, instead of merely imitating the eighteenth century customs of another country? A dozen or more different languages might with profit be offered as electives; one here, another there, another somewhere else. Does it not seem strange how few universities there are in which even candidates for the consular service can study the languages involved in the diplomatic tangles either of the Near East or of the Far East?

What the world really needs is a universal language. The friends of Esperanto hope that it will achieve to such a status. Meantime English is actually spoken almost all over the world. At one time Japan made an effort to have English taught in all her schools, so as to make the Japanese a bilingual people. Why might it not be an excellent policy for philanthropists and business men of the United States and the British Empire to coöperate in furnishing teachers of the English language gratis in all parts of the world where their services would be accepted? Perhaps this might help the world to solve the problem of its Babel of tongues.

And, finally, a few words about Latin. That language is an almost negligible element in the mental capital on which

modern civilization operates its institutions. To be sure, it did contribute very generously to our language inheritance; and especially to our technical terminologies — as did also Greek. But the English words that were derived from Latin or Greek roots are now English words, not Latin or Greek. Should all memory of the Latin language as such be sunk without a trace there would result no perceptible hindrance to the onward movement of modern civilization. Not a single institution would even be embarrassed in its operation. It would seem to follow, therefore, from the principle of parallelism that Latin deserves no more than a minor position as an elective in our system. As a requirement, what can be its sociological justification? It did have an important social function until the seventeenth century. When its social utility declined, the disciplinary theory was invented as a defense mechanism — a familiar phenomenon in social psychology. The real reason for the persistence of Latin was the fact that it had become the badge *par excellence* of membership in the superior classes. And it still holds its position in our schools through the sheer weight of that aristocratic tradition. For Greek in high schools there is almost as much reason; but no such powerful tradition; hence it has almost no curricular position. To a sociologist Latin actually has the appearance of a negative asset of considerable magnitude, because it crowds out the really necessary subjects. It is hoped that the next chapter will make this point of view both clear and acceptable to the reader.

Excessive attention to the forms of language may be quite properly suspected as a symptom either of social degeneracy or else of a serious educational lag. Certain episodes in the

history of education would seem to indicate that when civilization is growing sterile or becoming moribund the forms of language tend to dominate the curriculum, to the detriment of actual subject matter. An outstanding example is furnished by Roman schools during the last three centuries of the Empire, when the curriculum consisted largely of grammar, rhetoric, and logic. One of the most depressing periods of history to study is the three centuries following the Renaissance. Erasmus, More, and Bacon had indulged the most exultant hopes for the immediate progress of European civilization. Science was rapidly advancing; and so was also art. Montaigne, Comenius, and others were urging the introduction of factual matter into the curricula. But the upshot was the bloody religious and political quarrels of the seventeenth century, and the postponement for three hundred years of the humanistic hopes. And meantime, in the schools, Ciceronianism and the disciplinary theory; with Comenius forgotten!

Something similar happens to the curriculum when schooling degenerates into a mere training in the conventional "mores" of an exclusive aristocracy. Such was the chief function of England's Great "Public" Schools — the most exclusive private schools in the English speaking world during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Their virtue was frankly not in the factual matter of their curricula, which consisted largely of Latin and Mathematics, but in their manly sports, their rigorous discipline, and their atmosphere of aristocratic urbanity. The copying of that curriculum into the private and even the public secondary schools of the United States and Canada would seem to have been a sin against the principle of parallelism, and suggestive of

that Scripture which declares that the body without the spirit is dead. But in periods when real additions are being made to the mental capital actually used in operating the social processes, then factual or artistic substance tends to dominate the schools; unless the schools are sadly lagging behind the civilization. In that case schools are likely to spring up on a private and commercial basis to supply the factual material that has an immediate commercial value; but meanwhile the application of the new sciences and arts to those institutions in which the people live their lives and spend their money is likely to suffer. That is to some extent the present situation; and the remedy is in the increase of factual and artistic material at the expense of formal language.

Sociologists have produced a good deal of writing during the last few years on the subject of waste in education. They, quite naturally, are acutely aware of the lack of parallelism between the academic process and the social process. If the argument in this Chapter is sound, including the principle in the premise, the waste has really been enormous. Putting together Latin, the modern-language requirements, the overworking of formal English, and the mathematics constants, it seems perfectly safe to say that from one fourth to one half of the time of all secondary school students in the United States and the British Empire is still being wasted; and perhaps almost as great a fraction of the time of college students. The same is true of all other countries where the Latin-mathematics tradition of early modern Europe has a footing. And this in spite of the fact that, as social movements go, these subjects have been rapidly losing ground during these last decades — a tendency that well deserves a little speeding up.

It has often been pointed out that, as a selective agency, the traditional curriculum operates on an undemocratic principle. Academic success is not an accurate index of success or usefulness in life. But because of its application many young people are rejected, and many turn away in disgust. These young people have rights in a democratic system of education which traditional standards ignore or even repudiate. And what is the loss of these young people is also a loss to society.

It now remains to summarize. The intellectual resources of society have been seen to equate themselves, class by class, with the recognized curricular subjects; the only complication being that we have had to treat the beliefs, ideals, "mores," and "folkways" together, and set the new humanities over against them. We have, then, the following classification of

The Curricular Materials:

1. Language
2. Vocational Subjects
3. Sports, Games, and Amusements
4. The Sciences
5. The Fine Arts
6. The New Humanities

And from consideration of the social function of each of these great classes of subject matter we come out to the conclusion that a larger place in the curriculum ought to be given to the new humanities and the fine arts, especially the former; and that correspondingly less time and energy ought to be allotted to mathematics, formal English, and the foreign languages. But this conclusion is exactly the trend of the

times, however tardy the movement in some quarters. We have accomplished nothing more, then, than to read a sociological philosophy into the current curricular trends. But that is well worth doing, since it substitutes reasoned insights for mere intuition, and removes the ground from under the feet of those who take their stand against the movement.

In conclusion it may be ventured that, pending the research by which curricular details are to be determined, the schools will probably not go far astray if they proceed to offer the subjects indicated above in the form of organization with which we are familiar. Detailed research may not do so very much more in the end than to read a statistical philosophy into that familiar logical organization of biology, economics, art appreciation, history, and the rest into which those subjects have already cast themselves. There may prove to be more correlation between that conventional organization of subject matter and the actual needs of life than we have the intuition to discern. Besides there undoubtedly are certain pitfalls in the scientific method of selecting curricular materials of which we shall do well to be forewarned. Some of them were pointed out in the latter part of Chapter I, and others will be indicated in the final chapter of the book. Meantime superintendents, principals, and others responsible for an immediately available program of studies need not feel too much disturbed if they find no other alternative, for the time being, than to offer good stiff courses in the subjects listed above, logically organized, as in the past. There is just a little danger that the project method as applied to curricular organization may prove to be the next great pedagogical fad.

CHAPTER X

TELIC EDUCATION RELATIVE TO THE FAMILY[1]

THAT great change from the handicraft to the machino-facture régime, described in Chapter V, has affected nothing more profoundly than the status of woman; and thus, indirectly, the institution of the family. For centuries woman had suffered a status of artificial inferiority. There was almost no honorable function for her outside the home, except a celibate religious service. And the family was a little monarchy, both in theory and practice. Before the law, woman was a dependent. The wife and mother was therefore a satellite in a man-ordered world.

But times have changed, and woman's world is being revolutionized. She is rapidly coming into a new freedom such as the historic order never accorded her; so much so that one of the outstanding problems of the great transition through which the world is passing is how best to utilize that new freedom for the good of all concerned. It is another case of that old dualism of independence versus inter-dependence; and it demands a new solution. Naturally we hope, with a sort of religious faith, that the new régime will produce some new adjustment by which woman's energies can be utilized to the best social advantage, and at the same time give her the fullest opportunity for self-realization.

[1] In connection with this chapter the reader will be interested in *The Education of Women*, by Willystine Goodsell. The classic work on the family is Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage*.

What that solution will be we can only conjecture, of course; except that racial experience teaches us, if it teaches anything, that wholesome family life is fundamental to social welfare. It is the ambition of the present Chapter to set forth a conjecture as to what the optimum status of woman in the new social order is likely to be; and to offer some suggestions as to how public education can help to bring such a status into common practice and appreciation.

Woman's escape from the old status of artificial inferiority appears to be due to three major causes. The first is the advent of power-driven machinery, which, by giving rise to the factory system, has removed from the home many of the industries that used to belong to it under the old domestic system. Naturally the girls have followed the industries to the factories. And as industry, including commerce and the professions, has expanded, the demand for labor, especially for cheap labor, has enormously increased the number of jobs for girls and women. This change has tended to make women economically independent. And a woman with an independent income of her own, or the easily accessible opportunity of securing one, is in a very different social position than her grandmother was without it, and especially with respect to marriage and the family. There will readily occur to the reader a half dozen ways in which family life is being modified as a result. And while there is no great gain without some small loss, if we may reverse an old familiar adage, still the fact remains that this new economic independence which the Industrial Revolution has conferred upon woman is one of the greatest boons of the ages. It puts into her hands a weapon for self-defense whereby she can liberate herself from domestic monarchy. By it she has been able to

force a revolution upon society, replacing the man-made order of things with a régime of equal rights for her own sex. Economic independence is therefore a resource which women should religiously conserve, both as individuals and collectively. However, economic independence may turn out to be of more value to them and to society if it is usually potential instead of actual; since it has economic repercussions that are too seldom taken into consideration. Here is a puzzling dilemma of which the golden mean is likely to be difficult of achievement in practice.

The rise of democracy is a second cause which has contributed toward the emancipation of women. It has promulgated the doctrine of individual rights, increased human sympathy, and mitigated the conditions of all oppressed classes, including women. Accordingly, it has endorsed her claim and sanctioned her right to liberty, equality, and self-realization. Nor is it strange that democratic theories should have produced an unwarranted overemphasis in some minds upon the doctrine of personal liberty. Women, no less than men, have become infatuated with this obsession of the *Zeitgeist*, so that they too have been at times over willing to shirk legitimate responsibilities. How to use freedom without abusing it is for all of us one of the unsolved problems of modern life.

The new medical and sanitary science is a third factor in the new status of women, and one that seems to be but seldom recognized, chiefly, no doubt, because its effects are so indirect and roundabout. It has radically reduced the death-rate, especially the rate of infant mortality. The result is that the old birth-rate is no longer the social necessity that it used to be. There could hardly be a more vital

change! And while the import of this change is not overtly recognized in the popular beliefs as yet, it has penetrated the intuitions of women in the more refined and prosperous classes, where it serves to reinforce the general desire for smaller families. As pointed out in previous chapters, the new death-rate is the central reason why a new birth-rate is absolutely necessary to the welfare of humanity. And this new birth-rate lifts an awful burden from the mothers of the race. Formerly almost the entire energy of women was devoted to reproduction, including sheer physical nurture. And at that they populated the cemeteries instead of the unoccupied regions of the earth. The pursuit of culture was thus practically precluded to the overwhelming majority of women. But all that is now rapidly changing, due, primarily, to the new birth-rate. Women may now achieve other forms of self-realization, as well as mere maternity; and may make their contribution to culture as well as to the population. And this is an enormous and unprecedented gain to civilization. To give women a new increment of time and energy, which they can devote, if they will, to higher culture means a veritable revolution in the cultural life of humanity; for social solidarity is such that no civilization can rise higher than its mothers. The new status for women will accordingly mean a new world for all of us, if only her new liberties and resources are wisely used.

As soon as we begin to inquire what that optimum use is to which women can put their new liberties and resources, we encounter the biological fact that nature has decreed to them the function of motherhood. And that leads the sociologist directly to the problem of the family. Whatever other implications the new status of women may have, the

bearing of that new status upon the family and its functions inevitably draws the spotlight of sociological attention, not to say anxiety. In order to proceed with our inquiry it is necessary, therefore, to set before our minds a clear and definite concept of the family's normal functions; and especially to inquire in what respects those functions are to be different in the new régime from what they have been in the old.

It is a characteristic inference from the individualism of our age that the happiness of the married pair is the prime objective of marriage. But it is not! That is a minor objective, however important. The major objective is the child. Not merely the production, but the nurture, of children. And not merely physical nurture alone, but moral, cultural, and intellectual nurture also. Nor can this nurture be transferred successfully to any other agency. No other motive than parental affection, particularly mother love, seems able to motivate sufficiently diligent devotion to the exacting services involved. Besides, the normal development of personality seems to demand the intimate and affectionate associations of family life, as any reader will understand who has followed to its logical implication Cooley's theory of the primary groups. It is for this reason that scientific charity is committed to the policy of conserving normal family life so far as possible; and the school should go slow when it comes to taking over any of the functions of family nuture.

The efficient performance of this function of nurture is of the utmost importance to society as a whole. On the one hand, poverty, disease, vice, and crime result from bad family life, while these in turn tend to spoil family life in the

next generation. On the other hand, homes in which high moral ideals prevail, in which thrift and mutual help are intelligently and faithfully practiced, and in which wholesome ambitions are stimulated, produce the type of citizens with whom it is absolutely necessary that a republic be plentifully supplied. The highest spiritual function of the family is to inculcate habits and ideals of sympathy, cooperation, respect for authority, obedience, reverence, thrift, industry, fidelity to trust, scrupulous adherence to principle, and abhorrence of vice. Without these virtues no society can succeed. If all families inculcated these virtues as successfully as do the best families we know, the social disorders of disease, poverty, vice, crime, exploitation, dishonesty, and graft would be very greatly reduced. If all families failed as badly as the worst families we know, society would break down in chaos. It is for this reason that the family is, and always will be, the basic institution of society.

Now the new status of women is tending to interfere somewhat with the performance of this function. Among the poor, many mothers are forced to help earn the living away from home, and among the middle class the standard of living desired often sends mothers into the gainful occupations. Almost inevitably this results in more or less neglect of their children. The new attitudes lead many women to the conviction that their own self-realization is thwarted by that close confinement to home duties which the highest type of nurture demands. Moreover, family discipline seems to have suffered from our new individualistic notions. From all of these things it would appear that the moral and spiritual nurture of children is likely to suffer as a

result of the new situation of which the woman's movement is a part. And nothing can check this trend but a new philosophy of family life.

The germ of such a new philosophy is to be found in the fact that the new régime is increasing, instead of decreasing, the demand for cultural, spiritual, and moral nurture upon the part of the family. This is one of the important aspects of the great transition, and one that seems to have escaped attention almost altogether. But it ought to be very clearly understood by all. There are several thoroughly sound reasons for taking this view of the matter. In the first place, the period of dependency is lengthening, especially among the more prosperous and cultured classes. It is lengthening even among the less prosperous classes also, to the degree in which their young people are receiving the extended schooling necessary for good citizenship and social efficiency. Young people are remaining in school longer; and are hence longer in the parental home and under the parental tutelage. In other words, the period of nurture is being lengthened instead of shortened by the trend of modern conditions; and this is precisely what is to be expected. The more complex the civilization, the longer the period that Fiske called infancy.

Not only is the period of nurture longer, but these added years of nurture are the most difficult years of all. These nearly adult young people are more subject to seductive influences from outside the home. Also, they are moving on into later adolescence, when relations between parents and children are naturally subject to greater tension. Training a child to the age of fifteen is a relatively simple matter as compared with safeguarding and guiding his moral

development between the ages of fifteen and twenty; and yet this is the typical addition to parental responsibility that the new régime is imposing. More, instead of less, the new age is demanding of fathers and mothers. More instead of less! That cannot be too often nor too emphatically repeated. It is of the utmost importance that parents prove capable of rising to this new responsibility. The obtrusive phenomena of juvenile vice and crime, of which we have heard so much of late, is closely related to parental failure at precisely this point. To meet this new increment of responsibility will absorb much of the new energy and resources that are accruing to mothers on account of the new status of women.

The dignity as well as the difficulty of this work may be inferred from the fact that the mother who does it well will have to make use of the sciences and the fine arts to a degree never dreamed of in the old régime. And this will lift home-keeping to a quasi-professional level. Just as the essential difference between a barbaric and a civilized society is in the utilization of the sciences and the fine arts, so the difference between a mere trade and a profession is in the application of science, or art, or both. Because we are entering upon a new supercivilization, many new professions are coming into existence, and many kinds of work are being raised to a professional, or, at least, a near-professional, level. Is home-keeping a calling that is to remain untouched by the new scientific order of things? Is it inherently incapable of being raised to the higher level? The question answers itself. And there is no sociological insight more important. To discern that home-keeping in the new régime must be conducted virtually on the level of a profession will carry

two results. First, it will enable the family to perform successfully its extended and more responsible functions; and, second, it will render home-keeping a more satisfying means of self-realization to the modern woman.

Consider the use that a good housekeeper has for the sciences. Suppose a young woman has been trained as a dietitian — a training that involves considerable knowledge of the various sciences. Later she finds herself the mistress of a typical family made up of individuals at various stages of life, in various occupations, and with various physical characteristics and needs. Any person who has observed the extent of malnutrition and its consequences will realize that she can make good use of her training. Or suppose that she has been educated as a nurse, and has learned the elements of the sciences that physicians apply. In the health vicissitudes of a typical family over a period of thirty or forty years will she not have many uses for such a training? Or suppose again that she has learned practical psychology and child study as part of her preparation for teaching. If later she finds herself responsible for the training of one or more children, from the prenatal stage to full adulthood — each child being a different assemblage of hereditary traits — will she have any less use for her knowledge than if she had spent her life conducting successive groups of children through some particular grade of a school? And so we might draw similar comparisons with many other professions for which young women train, and always with similar results, until one realizes clearly that the amount of science a modern, high class home-keeper can apply in her work is far beyond the utmost possibilities of a mere high school education.

But for first-rate housekeeping the fine arts are even more promising resources than the natural sciences are. It is a lamentably fractional and unworthy conception of housekeeping that overlooks the cultural and spiritual nurture of children. And it is an utterly mistaken and shortsighted notion of home training that overlooks the period of later adolescence. Here are the most intricate problems and the most glorious achievements of the modern home maker. And for nurture that is to culminate in a high type of personality at the end of this period, the fine arts are among the most promising materials now available.

To this end there is no branch of art more useful than literature. The modern mother begins with bedtime stories as soon as babies are big enough to understand them. As they pass on from infancy to childhood she reads to them. What finer picture than of a mother sitting under the glow of a lamp, with a child on her lap and one or two others beside her knee, the mother reading to them. And as for their own mental development, too few women have discovered what a rich cultural field juvenile literature has become. As her children develop into pre-adolescence the mother still reads to them. Also, she beguiles them into the reading habit on their own account. She visits the public library as regularly as she patronizes the grocery store. As her young people move on into high school, or even into college, and discover new fields of literature, they learn to their delight that mother is at home in all of them. And between fifteen and twenty-one there is much happy, unsophisticated talk at table about the good books that all have read.

Music is hardly second to literature as furnishing substance for the spiritual unity of the family and the cultural

enrichment of its members. If rightly utilized it does for the family all that is claimed for any of the arts in Chapter XVII. But it functions most effectively if one of the parents, preferably the mother, is a connoisseur of the art. From Czerny to Bach, Brahms, and Beethoven, and even Franck, it works best if mother leads the way, with tireless diligence and ever ready competence. Such home-keeping furnishes many happy hours, keeps many temptations away, refines the personalities of all concerned, and without design or affectation crowds itself into the table talk.

The domestic arts, so called in our high schools and colleges, are scarcely less important. There are homes in which, upon entering, one discerns the imprint of no presiding genius. The furniture is merely of the latest style; the decorations on the walls are but recombinations of those in a million other bourgeois houses; ten years later in the same house everything will be changed, because the fashions will have changed. But there are other homes that seem pervaded with a spirit of real culture. One realizes the moment one enters that everything signifies the tastes, ideals, and intellectual interests of the mistress. In such a home the freaks of fashion draw no meaningless conformity. If the mistress is a real artist, then this is a real home. And the less money she has to spend the more she needs artistic training. What can exert a profounder influence upon the underlying ideals and subconscious attitudes of the young people? If the parents are worshipers of the great god Mammon, are frank hedonists in their daily lives, or are dominated by the ambition to become aristocrats, these traits of character will express themselves in the domestic art of the home. If, on the other hand, the family worship at

the shrine of human brotherhood, are æsthetic in their tastes, and appreciate nature, friendships, and a real domestic life, these ideals will express themselves through the same medium. Thus is generated the very atmosphere in which the children live and grow up. Its influence is far more pervasive than precepts, just because it enters the personality by way of the unconscious. And who shall say that training in the domestic arts at school can do nothing to predetermine the ideals of the girls who are to be the mothers of the next generation?

While our brief is chiefly for the natural sciences and the fine arts it may be added incidentally that there is a large place in this new type of home-keeping for what we have already called philosophy. For at present all beliefs, all moral standards, and all valuations are in flux; and young people are not much influenced by appeals to authority and supernatural sanctions. If they are to practice austere inhibitions, make self-sacrifices in behalf of moral ideals, and conform to inconvenient conventions, they demand to know the reasons why. For them, the ideals and beliefs by which they are to live have to be reconstructed; since the old ones are not likely to be accepted without alteration, due to the spirit of the age and the conditions of the times. Hence all codes, ideals, customs, institutions, and relations have to be explained anew. With this unusual responsibility the mentors of youth are loaded only in rare periods of social upheavel, of which this is one. But in our day parents must face the challenge; and as equipment they must have at their command not only common sense but philosophy as well. Without premeditation this philosophy will find its place in the family table talk. The table talk of a family

where science, the fine arts, and the various problems of life are discussed is quite as worthy a theme for poetry as the family worship scene in "The Cotter's Saturday Night." It is sort of anvil on which are forged the philosophy and the life ideals of the young people; and from which fly the sparks of wit and humor. No high school or even college course can serve as an adequate substitute for this sort of education. There is a sense in which the family is and always must remain the most important educational institution. This fact is reflected in the old adage that it takes three generations to make a man of real culture. But this cultural education can occur only in homes where the parents are capable of setting high intellectual, cultural, and moral standards. And public education should make all this quite as possible for the poor as for the rich.

We now have before us the new type of domestic economy. Girls totally misconceive the nature of housekeeping if they think of it as consisting chiefly of physical labor, like cooking, washing dishes, sweeping, and so forth. The really significant aspect of it, in a really civilized society, is the cultural and spiritual side. It reaches up into educational work of the must exalted sort. The physical drudgery is a physical means to an end, like the essential routine in any other profession. On the other hand, there is scarcely any other profession that leads an alert mind out into a greater variety of cultural fields. It would be a very unusual career that could offer larger opportunities for self-realization, especially when the solid satisfactions of successful achievement at the end are taken into consideration. And the usefulness to society of such a career can hardly be overestimated. The demands that the new order, when it comes to full success,

will make upon the intellectual and moral mettle of the people are such that that new order can hardly hope to succeed until we get such homes in very large proportions indeed; for such education can never be transferred to the school. It is the very unusual woman who can render a larger service, therefore, in any other field.

If public education is to produce this sort of family life in the future there must be a change in the philosophy of objectives. At present this objective gets all too little recognition in high school administration. Even in the submerged philosophy of the social mind the high school is regarded rather as an institution for lifting young people *out of* the plebeian status of their parents into white-collared jobs; rather than as an institution for enriching their lives *in* that status. It is somewhat doubtful whether the second objective would be financed by the affluent, or appreciated by the masses. The growth of high schools may come to a dead standstill, therefore, when the obvious limits of the first but fatuous objective have been reached. But if it does democracy will come to a standstill also. If the objective of enriching the common life in general, and family life in particular, is to be recognized, instruction will have to be modified accordingly. In the social studies a new philosophy of family life and its functions will have to be set forth. And this is quite as important for boys as it is for girls. If society is to utilize more of its women in this service, and if women are to derive self-realization from it, it must draw sincere and adequate appreciation from all of us. Such appreciation awaits a reëducation of public opinion on the subject. This task devolves largely upon the high schools; and in the high schools the responsibility rests

largely upon the teachers of the social studies. This objective will also call for some reorganization of the content of instruction in science, literature, art, and all the other subjects. It may lead to some changes in the requirements for girls. If the objective is to be achieved to an extent at all comparable to the needs of society, as many girls as possible should get such instruction. This means longer retention in the schools of those who tend to leave too early, and perhaps special courses, or even special schools, for prospective home-makers. As a sort of social leaven, to raise the general level of family life, it would by no means be amiss for each community to have a few domestic engineers who had pursued this sort of training through a four-year college course; since there is really no limit to the higher knowledge that can be utilized in this profession. Society in the new régime will have no need more fundamental than for a very large percentage of very high-grade homes.

A democratic society can entertain no worthier nor more fundamentally consistent ideal than to lift all its families to the cultural level — even those of the unskilled laboring class! It is not manual labor that makes the laboring class the lower class, but their inaccessibility to health, leisure, art, and general culture. Nor will more income alone assure them these things in default of better education. But on the other hand the better education would work economic miracles in the long run, as will be explained in Chapters XI, XII, and XIII. That there is an inherent and inevitable connection between manual labor and cultural privation is an illusion, due to "the hypnotism of the present social reality." It would be an interesting experiment in higher

civilization for some society to put the intellectual resources of a highly cultured life into the hands of the laboring classes through public education. The nearest modern approach to such an experiment is probably the Folk High Schools of the Danish peasantry. From them a veritable revolution in community and family life has resulted in less than two generations. Educators should conceive the function of the school, not in terms of opportunity for occasional persons to escape out of the lower classes, but in terms of opportunity for the lower classes to escape *en masse* out of their cultural privations. The curriculum should therefore aim at a highly cultured family life for all classes, including unskilled laborers.

As a fitting culmination to this series of arguments a few words may quite properly be said about the later years of a woman's life. If she has been fairly fortunate in her youthful opportunities for education, and if she utilizes the intellectual resources advocated in this chapter throughout the child training period of her life, she comes to the end of that period with a ripened intellect and mellowed sympathies. Under the old régime of large families she did not come to the end of that period until she was sixty or sixty-five years of age, if she was fortunate enough to survive the strain so long as that. But now she reaches it at fifty, or thereabouts. This means that the new order is to have a new resource, namely, a considerable quota of elderly matrons with free time and rich intellectual resources at their command. There is almost unlimited scope for the reader's imagination in considering what such matrons can contribute to a high-grade civilization. Here is an undeveloped, not to say an undiscovered, El Dorado.

CHAPTER XI

TO IMPROVE AGRICULTURE AND RURAL LIFE

It goes without saying that agriculture is the economic foundation of civilization, inasmuch as agriculture is the chief source of the food supply, not to mention other commodities used for clothing and shelter. The domestication of plants and animals was a radical shift in the sources of the food supply; but the domestication of steam, electricity, bacteria, and the chemical affinities has not been, and is not likely to be. It is a shift in the sources of power; but not of food. So far as the food supply is concerned the new supercivilization will rest upon agriculture, just as did the old historic civilization.

But the demands upon agriculture will be very much greater than ever before, because of the increase in the world's total population that the new régime has made possible and encouraged. There seem to be two main reasons for the recent expansion of populations. The one is the lower death-rate due to the mastery of disease through application of the new science. Formerly a high death-rate kept the populations relatively stationary, but recently they have been growing at a tremendous rate. It has been said that European populations never before increased more than fifty per cent during a century, but that during the nineteenth century they increased six hundred per cent, spreading out, of course, into the colonies and dependencies. The

second cause for this enormous growth is the new means of communication and transportation, enabling food to be brought from distant sources to the increasingly crowded centers, and enabling surplus populations to settle up the remote and relatively unoccupied portions of the earth. This unprecedented growth in population is, therefore, distinctly a phase of the new world order described in Chapter V.

But the world is rapidly reaching the saturation point so far as population is concerned. While this filling-up process was going on men seemed to imagine that it could go on forever. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Malthus shocked the sensibilities of the western peoples with his forecast of the miseries of overpopulation, but the reaction in opinion soon set in, due to the sluicing off of surplus populations to new lands. Throughout the century political economists in America and even in Europe amused themselves by belittling Malthus and scoffing at what they were pleased to call the Malthusian bugbears. A blind intellectual leadership never deceived itself and its followers with a more stupidly shortsighted piece of optimism. But this shallow optimism is now a passing phase. Professor E. M. East [1] has apparently convinced his readers that there really are definite limits after all to the quantity of population which any given area can maintain, that the United States will reach that limit before the end of the present century, and that the world as a whole will reach it before the middle of the next.

Obviously this growth of population imposes a new and crucial responsibility upon agriculture. The hope of the

[1] See *Mankind at the Crossroads*, of which a summary may be found in *Scribner's Magazine* Vol. LXXV, p. 109.

nineteenth century was that the products of agriculture could be kept up to any possible demand by extending the area. That is now seen to be a delusion. The agricultural area of the world is strictly limited, and it will all be occupied shortly. The more recent hope has been that agricultural production can be indefinitely increased by the application of scientific methods. There is a large admixture of delusion in this hope also, but we must make the most of it, especially during the slow process of installing more fundamental remedies. For the vast problems arising out of overpopulation there is a major and a minor remedy. The major remedy will be discussed in the next chapter. The minor remedy is in the full application of modern science to the agricultural process, and that is to claim our attention now.

This great problem of agricultural productivity resolves itself into the problem of rural personnel. The slogan of the country-life movement in America has been "to make farm life permanently satisfying for representative American citizens." This is absolutely requisite to the keeping of agriculture up to the highest efficiency. The relation between the soil and its tiller is so intimate that the soil will not yield her best fruitage except to a caress that is at once affectionate and intelligent. The brain and the hand must, therefore, be in the same person. Plants and animals are so easily spoiled by stupid neglect that intelligence and a vital interest upon the part of those who care for them are absolutely necessary to the highest efficiency. The knowledge of scientific methods must be in the brain of the farmer himself, and if he has helpers they must be so few and so sympathetic that he can supervise their work in the minutest detail. For these reasons no agricultural system based upon slave,

feudal, hireling, or otherwise ignorant and irresponsible labor can ever hope to sustain the vital responsibility that will be imposed upon it by the new régime. An agriculture that is to function as it absolutely must function if the new régime is to be supported implies, therefore, a rural population that is highly intelligent, prosperous, and cultured. It is of the utmost importance that leaders in general, and educators in particular, all over the world, should grasp this principle at the earliest possible moment.

Now, the farmer's prosperity depends, in the first place, upon the quantity of his farm's production. He must make two blades of grass grow where but one had grown before; also two ears of corn and two heads of wheat. And he must convert less forage into more meat. And this is requisite not only to rural prosperity, but to general welfare also. In the long run, farmers, even collectively, are not likely to make themselves prosperous by starving the hungry multitudes. Is it not a strange and tragic anomaly that they should actually be given such advice seriously? But such are the inherent absurdities of the price system! However, on account of various conditions peculiar to the industry as it is now organized it is impracticable for farmers collectively to restrict their output. This fact is the pivot of agricultural economics. Each and every individual farmer hopes for a bumper crop so that he may be prosperous. Thus agriculture defies the profits system — fortunately for the hungry masses of mankind, but to the farmer's own discomfiture, under the price system.

But to resume: There are two possible ways of getting increased production from an acre of land. One is to increase the labor that is devoted to its cultivation; or, in other

words, to increase the number of workers per acre. The trouble with this method is that the cultivation presently passes the point of diminishing returns, so that the tillers of the soil get less than proportionate compensation for their additional labor. It means gradually decreasing returns per worker. The final outcome of such a rural policy would be a poverty-stricken agricultural class, sucking the meager sustenance of a miserable existence from a lean and weary soil. This is exactly what we never want to come to in America nor in any of the dominions of the British Empire. From this tragedy countries already overcrowded should redeem themselves as fast as possible.

The other way to get increased production per acre is to apply scientific methods. By this means the product can be very greatly augmented before the ghost of diminishing returns begins to stalk the fields at night, sowing the tares of rural poverty. But of course this is possible only as the knowledge of agricultural science is spread abroad among the farmers themselves. If all farmers carried to their work as much of what the agricultural colleges and experimental stations have to give them as physicians do of what medical research affords, the productivity of the land might be considerably increased without any appreciable addition of labor.

The hasty assumption has been somewhat prevalent that power-driven machinery can do for agriculture what it has done for manufacturing and transportation, namely, increase production indefinitely. But this is a palpable illusion. Machinery does not and cannot increase the *per acre* productivity of the land. It does very greatly increase the production per worker; but that has no bearing on the

ultimate problem of population and the food supply. It does shift population from farm to city; but it does not increase the total population that the available acres will feed — except as human mouths are substituted for animal mouths, which is a relatively minor consideration. Only to the extent that farm-fed draft animals give place to power-driven machinery on the farms can an increased population be supported by any given agricultural region or by the world as a whole. Increased production *per acre* can be secured only by scientific agriculture, not by machinery; and that depends upon increasing the scientific knowledge of farmers.

Numerous agencies are in use for getting this information to the farmers, but confessedly they are all piecemeal and makeshift. There is only one conceivable agency that could approach adequacy, and that is the new type of rural school, in which a very generous offering of agricultural science and technique is taught. Such schools must be easily accessible to the children who live on the farms, since only a negligible percentage of farmers are likely to board their children away from home in order that they may attend such schools; and presumably it is the children of farmers and villagers who will be the farmers of the next generation. Also, such schools must be secondary schools; for the science of agriculture is not an elementary school subject. It is too difficult, the children are too young to have a motive for learning it, and there are other basic needs which the elementary school must meet. To be sure, a smattering can be taught in the lower grades, but not enough to scratch the surface of this great social problem. Indeed, there ought to be a few representative farmers in each neighborhood who

are graduates from the state or provincial colleges of agriculture. When the time comes that the farmers of each generation shall have come up through such schools, then the maximum production per acre may be expected. But not until then, for there is no other way!

The prosperity of the individual farmer and, in the long run, the status of the whole rural population, depend, in the second place, upon the farmer's ability to do his marketing on a basis of equity. If he is at a disadvantage in the economic system of which he is a part, so that he must always sell relatively cheap and buy relatively dear, the inevitable result must be to mortgage his farm, and eventually to see the mortgage foreclosed. The margin of disadvantage in each item of business may be trifling in itself; but the cumulative effect in the long run is bound to be the transfer of land ownership to the financial centers, and the depression of the farmers themselves to a status of poverty, ignorance, and consequent inefficiency.

In the United States there is an unmistakable trend in this direction. The percentage of farms operated by tenants increased steadily between 1880 and 1910. The Census Bureau reports only a slight increase since 1910; but this is misleading, as has been shown by research in certain typical districts of the Middle West where land is most valuable. There the percentage is still increasing if the total land valuation of a given area be taken as the base, instead of farm units. It has also been shown that the mean age at which renters become owners is advancing. Farms in the United States were mortgaged at four times as much in 1920 as in 1910 — an increase which the shrinkage of the dollar by no means cancels. A sociable traveler can pick up gossip in

such widely separated regions as Minnesota, Missouri, Oregon, and Alberta to the effect that New York money is being placed on farm loans through channels other than the small local banks. Any person who is intimately acquainted with conditions in the Middle West knows that renters as a class are of a depreciating quality, that many retired farmers have been forced back upon their land in order to make a living, and that farm lands have become relatively unattractive as investments and securities. Little by little the ownership of the land is slipping out of the hands of the tillers of the soil. Such trends have occurred before in history, but probably never with greater rapidity than in the United States during the past forty years.

Any attempt upon the part of the farmers to rectify this situation leads them straight to their capitals. And not merely to secure franchises for coöperative buying and selling; for this enterprise of collective buying and selling upon the part of the farmers turns out to be a vastly bigger and more complicated undertaking than appears upon the surface. Organizing and managing a farmers' elevator or a coöperative creamery or a potato growers' exchange is only to dress up with no place to go, because such local enterprises have to pour their saleable goods at the terminals into the colossal hopper of the Great-Business-World-as-a-Whole. If such an enterprise were state-wide, or even if it were state-owned, it would have to encounter the old, entrenched buying and selling institutions that are organized on a national scope, and encounter them in the world wide theater of competitive warfare; not to mention their credit representatives in the farmer's own locality. However well the farmers are organized, what they finally find themselves confronted

with is our interrelated and government regulated and guaranteed railroad systems, our boards of trade and our great nation-wide corporations with their interlocking directorates and gentlemen's agreements, our modern integrating system of credit, and our great concentrated, interrelated system of financial supervision. And back of all that, the world market with its international problems of trade interference and regulation. Nothing less than all this is what the farmer confronts when he turns his thought from his plow to the marketing of his products.

Inevitably this resolves itself into a giant struggle between blocs, to employ a term that has quite naturally, under the circumstances, made its appearance in our political jargon. For the ultimate objective of that struggle is nothing less than the position of advantage in the modern economic system—on the one side to hold it, on the other to capture it. The advantage having long since passed to the industrial, commercial, and financial interests, the farmer now finds himself in the position of a so-called radical. In the very nature of the case, he is compelled to ask either that handicaps be imposed upon the vested interests for which there are no precedents, or else for fundamental changes in the very system itself. And here we come upon the crux of the difficulty: the farmer himself does not know what he ought to ask for in his own interests. If he asks for, or can be maneuvered into accepting, some superficial palliative, he gets no appreciable results in the end. If he demands something Quixotic that ignores important facts or that flies in the face of economic law, he is likely to get less than nothing in the end. That is to say, the farmer must become an expert in economics; and not merely in a narrow, so-called agri-

cultural economics, for no economics is worth anything to the farmer that does not explain the modern economic system as a whole, including the articulation of agriculture into that system. Unless the farmer knows this sort of economics he will be trying by legislative fiat to cross economic lightning bugs and honey bees, in the vain hope of getting a political insect that will work both night and day to fill the hives of rural prosperity.

The word farmer has just been used in a collective sense. In practice it is the farmers' legislative representatives who must know. It is not enough that they be able to display the conventional evidences of sympathy with the farmers' predicament; they must also know the facts and forces of our economic life. But how are the farmers to assure themselves of such enlightened representation? This is perhaps the most vital of all questions for any group in a democracy. The answer is to be found in the general enlightenment of the rank and file. And there is no other answer! In every rural community there should be a few local leaders who are really well informed; at least sufficiently well informed to realize the value of a consensus of genuinely expert opinion. The rest must know something; at least enough to realize the existence of an accredited body of knowledge covering fundamentals, and to respect the judgment of those who know more than they do. Out of such a popular enlightenment, enlightened leadership has some chance of arising. But not otherwise!

There is only one conceivable agency that can hope to accomplish this stupendous task of systematic education, and that is obviously the public school. And here again, as in the case of agricultural science, the objective calls for high

schools. Economics is not an elementary school subject. Practically universal secondary education for rural children — with a sprinkling of college graduates — is the only salvation for the farmer, so far as his economic problems are concerned.

The social and economic status of the rural population depends, in the third place, upon the level of their general culture. The different kinds of knowledge do not seem to distribute themselves to a social class in separate containers. If a group is ignorant it is usually ignorant all along the line; if it is eager in the pursuit of knowledge it will pursue all the great classes of knowledge. It seems probable that if farmers become interested in the science of agriculture and the economics of marketing, their interest will spread to science in general, to the other social disciplines, — the fine arts, philosophy, and what not. Conversely, if these other cultural interests are withheld from them there is little probability of their acquiring much interest in the special science of agriculture or in the economics of marketing. Most observers of life and students of history would probably agree that the enrichment of the cultural life tends to advance somewhat evenly along all fronts, when any large social group is considered as a whole. It must inevitably work that way with the farmers. If they study science and economics they are sure to come into contact with people who have art, literature, and philosophy. In their intellectual contests, whether in legislatures or in the forums of public discussion, they will find that they must possess all the resources of the collective intellect in order to hold their own. And as fast as they become prosperous many of them will invest part of their surplus in the facilities of mental refine-

ment. Moreover, the practical and the liberal cannot be kept separate. Every kind of knowledge ramifies into all the others. It is inevitable, therefore, that the farmers' education be broadly cultural, or nothing.

It is quite possibly putting the cart before the horse to argue that the lack of culture displayed by peasant classes in the past has been due to their economic disadvantage. There are probably currents of causality that run the other way. In the historic societies farmers have usually been remote from the centers of culture. As a result they have lived in intellectual humility, without great pride of class or personality; and as a further result they have offered weak resistance to gradual economic encroachment. In the meantime their most capable and aspiring young people have been drawn off to the centers of culture and industry, thus diluting their stock biologically. In this way the rural population has been shuffled into a status of artificial inferiority. There are indications that this process has been happening in America during the past half century. But the causes of rural isolation are now largely removed. The intellectual froth of civilization, at any rate, is now easily accessible to them. If, by a system of schools, the heavier substances of the intellectual life can be put at their disposal, the modern world is likely to see a new type of rural population. Possessed, like other groups, of the great intellectual resources of civilization, the farmers are likely to assert a stubborn pride of personality and class that no mere peasantry has ever yet displayed. People with a high standard of culture, a well developed sense of personality, and a haughty class consciousness are hard to maneuver into positions of economic disadvantage; and that would doubtless prove true of any

large rural group who prided themselves in their applications of science, their appreciation of the fine arts, and their moral superiority. Knowledge is power; and culture will give the farmers both the motive and the means to hold their own.

And here as before we come out to the necessity for secondary schools, if this cultural objective is to be achieved; and for reasons that are too obvious to need reciting. This consideration furnishes us an opportune occasion to point out the real significance of rural school consolidation. That such consolidation makes it possible to grade the elementary school, or that it congregates a larger group for pupil-activities, or that it furnishes a center for the sociability of the community, are all very minor considerations indeed. But that consolidation makes secondary education available to the farmers is a consideration of the most vital significance imaginable, both to the rural populations and to society as a whole. Unfortunately, the minor rather than the major reason runs current in the pedagogical mythology; and it seems strange how few educators have grasped the major consideration. It is almost impossible to state the major reason for consolidation with sufficient emphasis to make it displace the minor in the popular beliefs. But the matter is vital. Any class, group, or section that has access to elementary schooling only is bound to be a depressed and exploited class. Hitherto such has always been the case with farmers. But secondary education will put them on a basis of equality with the other classes in society. Nothing less fulfills the principle of parallelism, considering the strategic part that agriculture must play in the social processes of the new social order, if that order is to succeed. Accordingly, the consolidation movement is one of the most significant and

important trends in modern life. To consummate it, therefore, is requisite to the telic function of the public school.

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Among the little known great men of modern times one of the very greatest is Bishop Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig,[1] the Dane. He is not mentioned in the school histories, nor even in the histories of education, although the significance of his educational influence is almost equal to that of Pestalozzi. More than any other one man he is responsible for the prosperity and culture of rural Denmark of to-day; for it was chiefly due to his vision and inspiration that modern Denmark's system of Folk High Schools was founded; and they are unquestionably the chief cause of Denmark's agricultural superiority.

In 1825, that is, a century ago, Bishop Grundtvig was forty-two years old, but not yet at the halfway mark of his long life, although he had already been famous throughout northern Europe for nearly twenty years on account of his great work on Norse mythology, in which he sought to inspire the Danish nation with the greatness of its own past. Grundtvig lived at a time when northern Europe swarmed with intellectual giants: Fichte, Schiller, Goethe, Beethoven, Pestalozzi, and many others — and the great Bishop partook of their inspiration. His genius was many sided; he was poet, philosopher, historian, ecclesiastic, and educator; but it was as spiritual father of the Danish school system that his influence has proved most significant.

When young Grundtvig came upon the scene of early manhood he found his nation paralyzed by the effects of the

[1] See *Rural Denmark and Its Schools*, H. W. Foght.

Napoleonic wars. Like Fichte in the war-crushed Germany of the same period, he saw that education was the only available means of putting his nation on its feet again. Accordingly he conceived and preached the idea of the Folk High Schools for the peasantry. Higher education for the tillers of the soil! It was a bold idea, especially for the Europe of a century ago, where society was stratified and the peasantry were the lower layer.

But the kind of higher education which he advocated for them was even more amazing. Not the so-called practical education of a technical sort, as one might guess, and much less the old scholastic Latin which prevailed in the higher schools of the aristocracy throughout Europe. This latter he hated bitterly; such schools he called "the schools for death." Instead he wished the young Danish peasants to be taught the virile folk songs and hero ballads of their native land, the old Norse sagas, and the very best in recent Danish literature. He emphasized what he called statistics, which we should call sociology, economics, constitutional law, and political administration. And above all he believed in history. But these subjects were not to be taught in a mere bookish way; instead they were to be correlated with the vital problems of Danish life. In short, the peasants, through their Folk High Schools, were to participate in the richest thought-life of the age. Nor did Grundtvig fail to see that the spirit of the teacher — the teacher's unfeigned and eager love of learning — was to be the vital spark.

And such is the program and spirit that the visitor will actually find in the Folk High Schools scattered all over Denmark to-day. There is one exception: practical training of a technical sort is also given. But it is definitely

subordinated to the pursuit of liberal learning, and that was what Grundtvig really desired. It was liberal education to which the great Bishop pinned his faith. In these schools one hears lectures on Hegel and the other philosophers, on Goethe and the other poets, on Beethoven and the other musicians, and on all the great scientific, sociological, and international problems of the day. In the spirit of the school one feels a sincere and eager love for the higher learning. And these high schools return their students to the plow, happy and contented!

The effects upon Danish agriculture and rural life are unmistakable. Nowhere in the world is farming conducted on so thoroughly scientific a basis as in Denmark, and this fact is, of course, the foundation of Danish prosperity. These schools are the intellectual power houses for the great coöperative societies which have solved the problem of marketing, and hence of prosperity. A further result is that when one visits the Rigsdag he finds plain peasants the leaders of the debates. Also, religion, family life, and neighborhood association are wholesome and satisfying. Through her system of Folk High Schools Denmark has set the world an example of how to solve the problem of rural life and agriculture. The great Bishop Grundtvig should be adopted as the patron saint of every rural community in the modern world.

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This advocacy of an elaborate system of secondary education as the solution of the farm problem in America brings us face to face with two rather puzzling dilemmas. The first is to get the farmers themselves to see the need of it;

for that is the key to educational progress under our system of near-autonomy for local units. Better schools for rural districts are likely to come only as fast as better schools can be "sold" to the farmers themselves. And no uneducated class is likely to regard education as the only means of their own economic and social salvation as a class. In the second place, such an extension of rural education is pretty sure to look to the farmers themselves like a fiscal and financial impossibility. A decided reaction against such expansion has set in among the rural population already. In many communities taxes for the support of schools are already so high per acre that they are very perceptibly depreciating land values. At least taxation is where the shoe pinches, according to the economic logic and arithmetic of the typical farmer. Nothing seems more hopeless, at present, therefore, than exhorting farmers to tax themselves still further for a more elaborate education, the advantages of which they are hardly able to see themselves.

The solution of this dilemma is in the *economic* insight of educational leaders. If no one else sees to the heart of the farmers' economic and fiscal difficulties, those in administrative charge of rural education must. They must not confuse minor with major issues nor be diverted from the trail of adequate reform by the red herring of current economic fallacies and oversights. The central fact in the farm problem in America is that the great corporations are gradually eating the farmers up. Educators, at least, must see this very clearly. And they must also see clearly that the major remedy in the long run is adequate rural schooling *paid for by the corporations*. And they must further see with equal clarity that the Federal Government is the only

fiscal agency in sight that can collect the corporations' excess profits and turn them back to the farmers for the maintenance of schools. For it is only as educators see these things that the problem of rural life and agriculture will be solved in America.

Our economic system is out of balance, to the advantage of the industrial, commercial, and financial groups, and to the disadvantage of the farming group.[1] This bad economic balance is due chiefly to industrial combinations. Organization has been the outstanding trend of the past few decades in these other fields; but not in farming. The very nature of the farming industry, under our present system, is such as to render organization difficult, if not impossible, except to an almost negligible degree as compared with other industries. But mining, manufacturing, transportation, commerce, and banking have been transferred to the corporate basis; and corporations have grown to national proportions. Mergers, holding companies, interlocking directorates, gentlemen's agreements, and other devices have consolidated and interrelated these great corporations in the various fields to a degree that quite surpasses the popular imagination even yet. The result is that competition among them is restrained. They do not cut each other's throats when they buy from the farmer, nor when they sell to him. Hence in dealing with the corporations the farmer sells cheap and buys dear. That is to say, in the exchanges of the modern market the farmer gets less than he gives. This accounts for the present predicament of the farmer; and it means that his land is being gradually taken away from him.

[1] C. C. Taylor, *Rural Sociology*, Chapter XXII; H. C. Taylor, *Outlines of Agricultural Economics*, Chapter XXXVI.

The evidences pointing to this conclusion are, first, the consolidation movement in industry — which is so obvious on all hands that nobody with eyes can fail to see it — and, second, the enormous corporate profits and fabulous surpluses for foreign investment which authentic statistics reveal.[1] To this inordinate prosperity of corporate industry the general public (including most students of educational administration) do not seem to be awake as yet; but the statistics are none the less impressive on that account. The phenomenal consolidation, with its resultant restraint of competition, would seem to be the obvious explanation of the inordinate profits. And the farmers are the obvious victims of this trend.

Now it hardly seems probable that this trend will be checked by legislative nostrums and economic poultices that leave the corporations in possession of their present advantages. Price fixing can hardly commend itself to students of modern economic conditions; while government loans to tide the farmer over his immediate emergencies are liable to hasten rather than postpone eventual agrarian bankruptcy. Even diversified farming and coöperative marketing can prove only minor palliatives, so long as the economic balance remains as it is. Indeed, it is doubtful whether it would be socially desirable, even if it were economically possible, to check the modern drift toward combination and the resultant restraint of competition.

The alternative is to find some means of turning the economies of combination and the profits of quasi-monopoly back to the public, including the farmers. And economists

[1] These facts are set forth in some detail in Chapter XXVI, p. 526 ff, of this book, to which the reader is referred.

appear to have agreed for years [1] that this can be done, in large measure at least, by a tax on the net profits of such concerns. Moreover, excess profits and income taxes are *not* shifted to the ultimate consumer,[2] as the general public erroneously supposes. But such taxation, together with the disbursement of the funds accruing, will have to be undertaken by the Federal Government — current propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding. The reason is that the Federal Government is the only fiscal agent in the case that is competent to perform the function successfully.[3] This means Federal aid to education, supported by Federal income taxes on the corporations, against both of which there is no end of selfish propaganda. In other words, rural education in the United States must be paid for chiefly by those great corporations that are now engaged in crowding the farmers to the wall; and this must be done through the agency of the Federal Government. It is a long, slow process; but there is no quick solution for this fundamental maladjustment of our modern economic life. Upon educational leaders it is incumbent to open the eyes of all concerned to this solution of an otherwise insoluble dilemma. In short, it is for educators to lead the American farmers out of their economic predicament, and put rural life and agriculture on its feet. But prerequisite thereto is economic insight upon the part of educators themselves.

[1] See Richard T. Ely, *Monopolies and Trusts*, Chapters III and VI, especially p. 264 ff.

[2] This point will be more fully discussed in Chapter XXVI, especially p. 519 ff, of the present volume, to which the reader is referred.

[3] See again, Chapter XXVI, p. 529 ff.

CHAPTER XII

THE CHALLENGE OF THE STANDARD OF LIVING

The standard of living is defined by economists as that list of goods and services which a person, family, or class has formed the habit of regarding as necessary, and for the maintenance of which persons will expend effort, make sacrifices, and practice foresight. The standard of living may be regarded as in the nature of an institution, because of the elements of imitation and custom involved in it. Thus the standard of living of an Indian tribe in the woods, or of negro croppers in Alabama, or of farmers in west China, is as much an institution with them as is their religion or their industrial organization. As an institution it is a proper objective of education, according to our theory of educational objectives as set forth in the early chapters of this book. And not only is it an institution, but it is also a social force. Indeed, it is one of the very strongest motive forces in the social life, being one of the few that are strong enough to restrain and regulate the reproductive impulse. And just because it is such a powerful motive force it deserves most serious attention by those who aspire to render society telic, and so to make this a better world in which to live.

The standard of living, operating as a cause, produces numerous and important social effects, seven of which we shall discuss in order. First of all, it conditions physical, mental, and spiritual well-being. For a group to become

habituated to a set of acquired wants that leave some of the innate biological needs of human nature unprovided for is by no means a psychological impossibility. The result is physical misery and mental unhappiness. Whole classes of people have endured malnutrition, inadequate housing, uncleanliness, and lack of medical service, generation after generation, without conscious protest, because of having become habituated to such conditions. As a result they have suffered the pain of privation and the griefs of a high death-rate. There is a higher percentage of such persons in modern society, even in prosperous America, than most readers are likely to suppose, unless they have taken special pains to inform themselves on this point. Contrariwise modern society contains many persons who are so fixed in their habits of rivalrous luxury that they would rather die than be out of fashion. To such fastidious standards they sacrifice the legitimate needs of sex and of soul, and suffer as a result from all sorts of emotional complexes and distressful anxieties. Thus, individual, and indeed social, life may be thrown quite as badly out of balance by acquired wants that err on the side of fastidious excess as by those that err on the side of physical want.

A second effect of the standard of living is upon wages.[1] In general it may be said, with certain minor reservations, that the standard of living tends to set the wage scale. More than a century ago Ricardo wrote: "The natural price of labor is the price which is necessary to enable the laborers, one with another, to subsist and to perpetuate their race, without either increase or diminution." This sounds almost

[1] See L. H. Haney, *History of Economic Thought*, p. 212 ff; H. R. Seager, *Principles of Economics*, Chapter XV.

like saying that the wages of unskilled labor tend to gravitate to the bare subsistence level; and this not unusual interpretation of Ricardo's theory has long been called his "iron law of wages." Perhaps it would be a little nearer the truth, and to Ricardo's meaning, to say, Whatever the standard of living of the laboring class, down to that the wage scale tends to gravitate.

And the facts bear out this theory. In Asia, where the standard of living is very low, wages correspond. Wages are lower in Europe than they are in America because the standard of living is lower there. In the United States there are masses of statistical data that bear on this law in a very significant fashion. Estimates have been carefully compiled from family budgets as to the income necessary to maintain a typical family of five on a "minimum-of-physical-necessities" basis for one year. The rule is that the annual earnings of an unskilled adult laborer are usually just less than enough to furnish the average size family with the minimum of physical necessities. This means that the standard of the unmarried laborer tends to set the wage scale, the deficit for a family being provided by its other members or else by charity.

The difference between standards of living in different countries is the principal element in the problem of immigration from one country to another in the modern world. Immigrants with a standard of living lower than the natives of the country into which they are coming tend to drive the natives out of employment and thus dislocate the whole economic organization, often with serious social consequences. The obvious reason is that competition tends to force the wage scale down to the lower of the two competing

standards. This is the crux of the problem of European immigration into the eastern part of the United States; it is also the crux of the problem of Chinese and Japanese immigration into California, British Columbia, Siberia, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Thus the effect of the standard of living upon the wage scale is one of the most provocative aspects of international relations.

In considering the effect of the standard of living upon income, it is desirable to come to closer grips with the psychology of the matter. Our definition includes the effort, sacrifice, and foresight that will be practiced to maintain an habituated standard. The driving force is habit. Examples are often cited of laborers who will work a few days, and then "lay off," because their habituated needs are such as to be taken care of by intermittent earnings. This is a negative illustration. A positive illustration is found in the fact that the mothers of half-grown children not infrequently seek gainful occupation away from home, rather than permit the standard of living of the family to be lowered; especially if that family has a tradition which calls for the education of the children, and belongs to a class among whom education is customary. In labor disputes the standard of living is often shifted as the bone of contention under the spotlight of public attention; and it is this fact which gives significance to studies designed to discover exactly how much a family must have to buy the "minimum physical necessities." It has been a commonplace of American economic theory ever since the time of Francis Walker that native workers, thrown into competition with immigrants having lower standards, seek other lines of employment, restrict their birth-rate, and resort to other expe-

dients, rather than accept such wages as the immigrants are glad to get.

But the thing of real significance for social progress is what some writers call the ideal standard of living; that is, a standard somewhat higher than is actually enjoyed, but which people are determined to attain for themselves or for their children. Every reader is acquainted with such families. They restrict the size of the family, practice the most rigorous discrimination in the use of their funds, and make all sorts of sacrifices to educate their young people. This kind of ambition is among the most potent forces in modern civilization. Its effect upon the wage scale is only one of these aspects.

Ricardo himself saw, albeit somewhat vaguely, that a rising standard tends to procure the wherewithal for its own satisfaction. He wrote: "The friends of humanity cannot but wish that in all countries the laboring class should have a taste for comforts and enjoyments, and that they should be stimulated by all legal means in their exertions to procure them. There cannot be a better security against a superabundant population. In those countries where the laboring classes have the fewest wants and are contented with the cheapest food, the people are exposed to the greatest vicissitudes and miseries." [1] Accordingly, he suggested only one social policy by which the economic status of laborers could be permanently improved, and that was by building into their habits a taste and insistent desire for the comforts and conveniences of life. And from Ricardo's time to our own this insight has grown in the minds of economic thinkers, so that we can quote the following as a sort of random sample from the

[1] Quoted in Haney's *History of Economic Thought*, p. 227.

college textbooks now in use: "In the long run the rate of wages can be altered by changing the ideals of the working classes as to what is essential to a decent living." The standard of living of the laboring classes is the economic bedrock to which the whole economic system sooner or later adjusts itself; its rise in modern times is recognized as the secret of modern economic prosperity. It is the collective will for which there always is an economic way, somehow, in the long run.

The third effect of rising standards of living is to increase per capita production. This comes about in two ways. First, there is the urge to secure vocational training. Of course this tends to increase the productive capacity of those who receive it; and in proportion as vocational training becomes general the per capita production of the population must increase. The other way is by forcing the introduction of labor-saving machinery. An illustration is in the handling of coal. The *National Geographical Magazine* published a picture recently showing an endless string of coolies in the uniform of Gunga Dun, each with a basket on his shoulder, carrying coal up the gangplank of a ship at Cairo, Egypt. At the Lake Erie ports enormous steel machinery is used instead. The Cairo method could not be used on the Great Lakes because the standard of living there is prohibitive. The result is that the amount of coal handled *per man* is very much greater at Cleveland or Ashtabula than at Cairo. And this is typical; the reader has observed numerous instances. Thus it turns out that rising standards of living not only procure, but actually produce, the additional wherewithal for their own satisfaction.

Fourth, there is the closely related effect upon the markets. If both per capita production and per capita consumption

increase, merchants will sell more goods, and manufacturers will find their markets expanding. If in Mexico, Egypt, China, and all the other backward countries, the standards of living should advance, markets there would expand for the great commercial nations. But the great undeveloped market for any such nation is its own laboring class. If the laboring classes bought the things they really needed for an adequate standard of living, but which they now go without, the dreams of ambitious merchants would be realized; whereupon the manufacturers could in turn employ those ultimate consumers to make the things they would thereby be consuming. It seems a pity that the wealth used up in advertising cannot be gradually transferred to the wages fund; it would then have a real effect upon the total volume of sales. Economists are by no means blind to the fact that the prosperity of the laboring classes is the real basis of national prosperity. Says Seligman:[1]

> The second point which differentiates modern taxation from that of the past is *the emergence of the new economic substratum of society.* This new fact of fiscal importance may be summed up under the following heads: First, the increasing economic significance of the laboring class, with the corresponding *growth in the importance of popular consumption.* . . . What it is intended to emphasize is that precisely because of the growth of modern economic well-being, the great mass of the community, represented by the laborers, are acquiring an increased consuming capacity, and that *their demand is the very tap root of modern progress.* The recognition of this fact has brought about vast changes in the modern tax system.

The experience of the past century ought, therefore, to open our eyes to the principle involved, and augment social policies that are deliberately designed to increase the prosperity of the masses.

[1] E. R. A. Seligman, *Essays in Taxation*, Ninth Edition, p. 317. (Italics not in original.)

But the principles set forth above do not run current in the popular economic mythology. The industrial system secretes quite other theories to lubricate itself; and naturally it is these other theories which have worked themselves into the obsessions of the *Zeitgeist.*

That rising standards of living produce, in the long run, the wherewithal to satisfy themselves is a fact that lies outside the interest or ken of the typical business man. So does the fact, strange to say, that here lie his greatest potential markets! His desire, quite pardonable because it is a practical necessity under the competitive system, to buy labor *to-day* as cheaply as possible, blinds him to these long-run consequences of rising standards of living. And the ratiocination which the profits system generates blinds almost all the rest of us as well. But it must not blind the educators; for if it does education will not perform its telic function in the present great transition. In the social philosophy of all farseeing lovers of the democratic ideal, rising standards for the masses are absolutely pivotal. It is precisely on this issue that democracy and the blind profits system are likely to come to mortal grips. The educators must therefore see clearly; for it is upon the application of this principle that successful transition from the old civilization to the new supercivilization will depend. The new order will succeed only as it is based on something entirely new under the sun, namely, a prosperous, enlightened, cultured proletariat.

The fifth social consequence which flows from the standard of living is its effect upon the birth-rate [1]; and this is perhaps the most fundamentally important of all. The principle that birth-rates vary inversely with standards of living —

[1] See *Principles of Sociology*, by F. A. Bushee, Chapter XIX, especially p. 293 ff.

the averages of large groups being compared — has almost the validity of a social law. A low birth-rate goes with a high standard of living; and a high birth-rate, with a low standard of living. Only the extremes of wealth and poverty are exceptions to this general rule. In other words, a high, or rising, standard of living, functions as a motive (that is to say, as a real social force) to keep the birth-rate down. There has been a phenomenal and unprecedented decline of birth-rates in all the western countries during the past half century. What is the cause? It is probably safe to answer: the rising standards of living; especially if this term be interpreted to include the new liberties, opportunities, resources, and cultures that women are everywhere demanding.

This decline in the birth-rate is of the utmost importance to civilization. In the last chapter was discussed the present status of the Malthusian theory, and attention was drawn to Professor East's contention[1] that population is approaching the point of saturation so far as the food supply is concerned. In that connection it was stated that there are two remedies, a minor and a major; and the minor remedy was there discussed (p. 207). We are now ready to state the major remedy. It is to raise the standards of living of the great underlying masses of mankind, including the encouragement of their women in their demand for self-realization and culture. This will reduce the birth-rate; and nothing else will effectively and permanently solve the problem of overpopulation and the resultant poverty, ignorance, famine, class conflict, and war. Increasing the food supply is only a makeshift palliative unless at the same time the standard

[1] *Mankind at the Crossroads.* Cf. p. 206 above.

of living of the masses is raised. Professor East warns the world that mankind is at the crossroads; but he suggests no adequate solution. And in the contemporary literature of economics and sociology only an occasional writer is clear in his insight on this matter. It remains for the modern world to awaken to the fact that the solution is in social policies designed to raise the standard of living of the masses.

Sixth: it would seem that rising standards of living for the lower strata might prove a very effective check upon that mental deterioration of the population which we have heard so much about of late. It is confidently claimed — and soundly so, perhaps, — that the average mentality is declining; and women of the better class are exhorted, as a remedy, to bear more children, so as to keep up the *ratio*. How much effect such exhortation has had to date no one has ascertained statistically! But for some strange reason it never seems to have occurred to anybody that it would have the same effect upon the ratio if women of the inferior classes were to bear *fewer* children. Not exhortation, however, but raising their economic and cultural level will motivate such a change of policy upon their part.

And finally, concomitant to a decent standard of living for the masses is that fundamental requisite to the success of self-government, namely, popular enlightenment. One of the major causes for elimination from school is low economic status. Thus ignorance goes with abject poverty in spite of a public school system; while reasonable prosperity is requisite to enlightenment. And not only ignorance, but social unrest, and wild, radical schemes of redress. From this standpoint, therefore, it may safely be asserted that the

success of self-government depends upon raising the economic status of the lower third of the population.

Such are among the effects of the standard of living, operating as a social cause. Rising standards of living raise wages, increase per capita production, expand the markets, solve the problem of over population, raise the average of innate intelligence, promote general enlightenment, and increase human welfare in every way. And all this both Malthus and Ricardo at least vaguely saw more than a century ago. There is something both tragic and sublime about a great stroke of genius which fails utterly to catch the imagination or intelligence of the age which produces it; and all the more so if it falls like sparks from the anvil of the mind that conceives it — a sort of incidental by-product of his major work. Such was the case with this brilliant insight into the causal significance of the standard of living, as set forth incidentally in the writings of Malthus and Ricardo. The dismal theories of Malthus' first edition made an almost instant appeal to the English aristocracy of the time partly because the pessimism of those theories was so spectacular, but chiefly because his conclusions by implication flattered and fortified their status of privilege and salved whatever qualms of conscience their selfishness may have suffered. As for the hint, in his second edition, that improved economic and moral conditions might serve as preventive checks upon the growth of population, the idea was an afterthought with Malthus himself, and vaguely conceived by him at that. The nineteenth century scarcely noticed it at all! And it was but incidentally that Ricardo chanced to remark: "There cannot be a better security against a superabundant population." Nobody

observed that a proposition had been propounded which was absolutely revolutionary in its implications. Absolutely revolutionary! It implied a social policy in which the welfare of the masses at the bottom should be the preferred charge upon industry. Nothing could have been more antipodal to the traditional practice and theories.

For always the poverty of the laboring classes had been regarded as an inevitable necessity of the social order. That it was even conceivably possible to lift the laborers *en masse* out of poverty and ignorance nobody had ever so much as imagined. From Aristotle on, the subordination of the commonality to the status of means had been overtly justified in all economic ratiocination. During the very generation in which Malthus and Ricardo wrote, British statesmen were frankly asserting that an abundant supply of ignorant poor, to do the unskilled labor cheaply, was necessary to the prosperity of any nation. But as for the nineteenth century, the expansion of industrialism was the central plot in the drama. And what has been a more characteristic urge of industrialism throughout the century, and to this very day, than always to buy labor as cheaply as possible, so that industry (whoever that may mean) might prosper? If the economic status of labor has improved, every inch of its progress has been stubbornly contested. To the suggestion that the industrial process should aim first at the prosperity of the masses rather than of the investors, the times have been about as hospitable as the times of Cæsar would have been to the suggestion that slavery be abolished throughout the Empire. To suggest that our surplus ought to go back into the standard of living of the laboring class, rather than into foreign loans and investments

— the entangling alliances that Washington would warn us against, if he were alive now and as wise as when he wrote his Farewell Address, — to the suggestion of such a social policy the *Zeitgeist* would turn a deaf ear.

And yet if Malthus and Ricardo were at all correct, if the argument of the preceding pages approximates validity, then the historic societies, including those of the nineteenth century, have all had the cart before the horse. The very thing which has always been regarded as requisite to prosperity and progress, namely, an abundant supply of cheap labor, has always been instead the central obstacle to progress and prosperity. And it is yet, all over the world. And under the new régime which is now coming in — the new machinofacture, applied-science, democratic supercivilization — it will prove not merely an obstacle, but a destructive force. Instead, the first and most fundamental care of social policy should be to make mere skilless labor as scarce and dear as possible; and the laborers a prosperous, intelligent, and cultured class. Such a policy will make for health and happiness; the old policy will load the masses with grief, sickness, and premature death. Such a policy will obviate the concentration of wealth and power which is becoming so ominous a menace to the new régime, while the old policy will promote it. Such a policy will increase per capita production, and hence wealth and capital. In this way the new policy will furnish the means for its own achievement; whereas the traditional policy will gradually reduce per capita production. Such a policy will expand all the markets of the world, and create an increasing outlet for goods; the old policy will gradually choke the markets, and so stifle industry itself. Such a policy will set humanity on a high

hill of culture, enlightenment, and peace; the old policy will fill the world with ignorant blood of ill conceived revolutions. Such a policy will eventually solve the problem of overpopulation, and effect a reasonable balance between the birth-rate and the food supply; the old policy will eventually set the hungry mobs of humanity to butchering each other in the struggle for standing room. In short, everything that humanity holds dear, everything for which democracy dreams, depends upon raising the standards of living of the underlying masses of mankind. This vague intuition of Malthus and Ricardo promises to be as fruitful in social theory and practice as Darwin's hypothesis has been in science and philosophy. It was, in reality, one of the greatest ideas of a great intellectual century. Indeed, nothing greater has ever been conceived, unless it be by him who said, at least by implication, that the industries were made for man, not man for the industries.

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What, now, can the schools do to raise the standard of living of the poor? Three things. The first is to adopt this objective more overtly. Teaching children to be clean, suggesting balanced diets, inculcating ideals about ventilation, overcrowding, and the like, are not incidental; they are fundamental. To assume that children come to school for the sole purpose of learning spelling, the multiplication table, and the proper use of the comma betrays a fractional conception of objectives. The principle of parallelism, the idea that the institutions are objectives, the theory of the telic function, or any other sociological basis which we may adopt, points to the standard of living of the poor as

a primary concern of the classroom teacher, the principal, the superintendent, the school board, the taxpayer, the educational association, and the legislature. The first thing that Booker T. Washington, at Tuskegee, did for negro youths from the rural slums of the Black Belt was to make them provide themselves with toothbrushes. The tooth brush became to them the symbol of a more decent way of living. Our public school policy should be equally wise. It should aim to make the children of the squalid poor insistently discontented with the squalor, indecencies, and privations of their parental homes. Nor is there any valid reason, even from the coldest, business-is-business point of view, why employers should object to this sort of teaching; because any effects upon the wage scale would come so gradually, and would be more than counterbalanced by the expansion of the market; not to mention all the social benefits.

But here the school, of course, must steer carefully between Scylla and Charybdis. There are fastidious, artificial wants that correspond to no real needs of life. There is a devotion to the fashions that is wasteful and silly. There is an envious rivalry that is very harmful to character and happiness. Nor can a general economic good be conjured out of consumption that is harmful, any more than it can out of waste or destruction of goods — fallacious popular beliefs to the contrary notwithstanding. Neither is individual prosperity a valid excuse for the bad example of vulgar wastefulness and ostentation. The freakish, ludicrous attempts of adolescents among the poor to follow such examples is not always their own fault; since they are merely catching step with ideals that are current. Those who set the examples are to blame for a real social disorder. A sincere love of nature,

art, and friends is the ultimate corrective; and teachers can take the initiative in rectifying these false standards if they will. To suggest that perhaps a high school uniform, or a standardized garb, might help, is at least to clarify this objective before the reader's imagination.

The second thing the school can do toward a better standard of living for the poor is gradually to build up in the public mind more reasonable and just beliefs with respect to the extent and causes of poverty. This can be done through the presentation of certain facts in the social-science courses. It is generally believed by typical middle-class citizens in America that very little poverty really exists. When we drive about the city for pleasure we naturally select the more attractive streets, carefully avoiding the sections where the poor are crowded together. When we see a laboring man driving to his work in a Ford we very readily commit the fallacy mentioned at the beginning of this book and assume that all laborers own Fords. But the facts are quite otherwise. In 1915, W. I. King [1] published figures indicating that 65 per cent of the population are propertyless, while half the property is owned by one per cent of the people. The Bureau of Economic Research [2] announced in 1918 that 81 per cent of the recipients of income in the United States had incomes of less than $1700 — at a time when prices were approaching the peak, so that $1760 was estimated by competent authorities as the "minimum-of-comfort" budget for a typical family of five. At the same time 39 per cent were shown by the same Bureau to have had incomes of $1000 or less. Professor J. L. Gillin [3]

[1] *The Wealth and Income of the People of the United States.*
[2] *The Income in the United States.*
[3] *Poverty and Dependency.*

summarizes studies from which it is safe to infer that the wages of adult male unskilled laborers are normally less than enough to support the typical family of five; so that among the unskilled from fifteen to twenty per cent of the families encounter a deficit. He implies that 10 per cent is a conservative estimate of the proportion of the whole population usually in poverty; poverty being defined as an income too small for the maintenance of normal efficiency upon the part of the worker and independent provision for his children such as will bring them up to normal efficiency. All competent authorities agree that poverty is far more prevalent than the prosperous suppose. These are scientific facts that are worthy of a place in the high school curriculum. If they were made generally known there would be a less complacent attitude toward poverty.

It is usually believed, also, that persons are poor chiefly through their own fault or incapacity. This belief does not comport with the principles set forth in the second and third chapters of this book. Besides we should remember that its sore spots are the very parts of itself for which any system tends most insistently to find a comforting excuse, and it is safe to suspect that such is the case with the individualistic explanations of poverty that are generally current. Any educator who will take the trouble to draw, side by side, a curve indicating the distribution of intelligence and another showing the distribution of wealth (or income) [1] will experience a rude shock to his traditional economic faith. The effect is even more startling if the one curve is superimposed upon the other. A normal, bell-shaped curve the latter most decidedly is not; especially with respect to its extreme

[1] See *The Income in the United States*, by the Bureau of Economic Research, p. 128.

right, for which there is never room on the chart. Partly, to say the least, the causes of poverty are to be sought in the economic arrangements and the rules of the industrial game; as any standard economist will be found explaining. And such explanations are a legitimate part of the high school curriculum. If they were generally understood there would be a less fatalistic attitude toward poverty. For poverty *can* be reduced. A commission of twenty leading social scientists could doubtless agree upon a rather long list of measures which would be effective to this end, and effective so gradually as to obviate any shock to the economic order. But these remedies are not likely to be put into operation without a general recognition of them in public opinion. Everything depends upon passing out the expert opinions of the social scientists to the masses of the people; and the schools, particularly the high schools, are the only adequate agency available for this function.

This brings us to the third thing the schools can do to raise the living standards of the poor; namely, vocational training. The poor are likely to acquire fantastic notions about the benefits that might accrue to them through a better distribution of wealth. An absolutely equal distribution of income — as unjust and undesirable as it is impossible! — would add but a discouragingly small margin to the incomes of the poor. It is per capita production that sets limits above which the standard of living cannot rise. Improvement of the condition of the poor depends in the last analysis, therefore, upon increasing per capita production. And what the school can do toward that objective is obviously vocational education.

It requires no proof that to increase the technical training of the people will increase per capita production. But this educational measure for improving the status of the underlying masses is so important as to deserve a whole chapter by itself.

CHAPTER XIII

STRATEGIC ISSUES IN VOCATIONAL EDUCATION

In all educational statesmanship, especially of the sort that aspires to be *telic*, two goals must always be held clearly in mind, and they must always be harmonized, though sharply distinguished. They are, first, the ultimate goal of any educational policy; and, second, the step forward toward that goal which is immediately practicable next. Most teachers and school administrators are at work upon the immediate details. They face problems that call for practical wisdom, diplomacy, scientific research, and great patience — so much so that they often feel but little interest in looking a century ahead. Nevertheless it is important to do that; for if the ultimate goal of their endeavor is not clearly conceived, their work will all have to be done over, sometimes with the waste of invaluable opportunities. False starts can be avoided only by a sound philosophy of ultimate objectives. Manual training — that is, woodwork of the individual project sort — is an example. The reader has only to review any good history of education to refresh his memory of the fact that manual, mental, and moral discipline was the theory upon which it was introduced. We now know that this was the grand pedagogical illusion of the nineteenth century. The public took up manual training chiefly for vocational motives, of course, and that undoubtedly accounts for its vogue. But the public was

following a false scent, for not one tenth of the boys who studied manual training have become carpenters or cabinet makers. As vocational training, woodwork, to the neglect of other things equally important, has been ridiculously out of proportion to the world's demands. The movement was a tangent, therefore, from which we must now return. Had the ultimate goal of vocational education been clearly and wisely conceived fifty years ago, the investment of money, time, and energy that we have put into manual training might have carried us by now very much farther toward that goal. Attempting to forecast the needs of the future, even of a rather remote future, is not mere Utopian dreaming, therefore. Accordingly, it is the task to which this Chapter is devoted — together with the consideration of some perplexing issues that are likely to arise as we struggle toward the goal.

Our procedure is to break our problem up into parts. What are the outstanding features of that ideal system of vacational education which we must try to build as the century matures? First of all, it must be universal. Every citizen must be given a real opportunity, under a system of vocational guidance that recognizes the demands of industry, to secure a vocational training suited to his tastes and talents. This principle is inferred from the ideals and aims of democracy. Rightly or wrongly, the mood of our period is committed to that assumption. Democracy aims at opening to every person adequate opportunities for self-realization; and of self-realization vocational training is plainly one of the requisites. One of the fundamental needs of every human being is to find himself in "a work of love and art;" that is, in some work which he can love, and in which he can draw

appreciation for his skill and his contribution. To revert to our former terminology, satisfying participation in the economic institution is one of the basic needs of man. And, plainly, this involves the prerequisite training. Another equally fundamental need is for an adequate standard of living, which also points straight to vocational training as the necessary means thereto. Such training should obviously be adapted to innate ability; but it may not ignore personal tastes and ambitions, for to do so would be to ruthlessly subvert the inherent rights of personality. And whom, now, may democracy exclude from the privileges of such training? The poor? The residents of remote places? Such partiality would condemn the victims thereof to become an artificially handicapped, and hence an exploited, group. Privilege and democracy are incompatible ideas. Anything short of universal vocational training is, therefore, an abandonment of the ideals and objectives of democracy.

Second, vocational education must not be separated from liberal education. To furnish vocational training alone for any class or group would be to exclude them from the cultural benefits of civilization, and, besides that, to make them subsidiaries in industry itself. What was pointed out in the case of farmers is true of every other economic class; they must share in the intellectual resources on a basis of equality with other classes, or else they will become a depressed, exploited, and inferior caste. Democracy cannot exist at all except on the basis of a cultural democracy. The idea of two sets of schools, vocational for the working classes and cultural for the cultured classes, is a false lead, for in its ultimate consequences it will thwart those democratic ideals for which our forefathers have sacrificed.

Vocational and liberal education must be articulated into each other and every citizen must receive both. Such articulation involves administrative problems requiring the utmost insight and wisdom.

Third, every youth ought to have an opportunity for participation in economic activities. Of this special application of the social participation theory we ought to hear a great deal more than we do. It goes without saying — if only we stop to think about it — that participation in the world's work is an important part of a young person's education. That our modern industrial, urbanized régime deprives so many of it is one of the monstrosities of that régime. Under the old domestic system, before the Industrial Revolution, almost all kinds of work were closely articulated with family life, so that it was an easy and natural thing for adolescents to participate in industry, and even for children to observe it closely. But the Industrial Revolution has changed nothing more thoroughly than that. In manufacturing, mining, commerce, transportation, and sometimes even in agriculture, it is usually impracticable for youths to participate, except under circumstances that are objectionable. Thus the new organization of industry is depriving young people of something vital. And there is growing up a very strong, though as yet quite inarticulate, popular protest against this deficiency. Employers complain bitterly that schooling often disqualifies young people for adaptation to industry. Besides it runs in the common sense of all practical persons that young people ought to learn to work, because it helps to form their personalities and prepares them to earn their livings. For the first of these reasons every youth, rich as well as poor, ought to have this experi-

ence. No youth is properly educated for democracy until he has found out by experience how much backache there is in a dollar earned by manual toil, and how much skill is involved in good workmanship. A world in which young people do nothing but go to school until they are sixteen or eighteen is felt by practical citizens to be a world that is ridiculously out of joint. Such an arrangement looks to many like an egregious overworking of the school fetish, and designed to produce mollycoddles by wholesale. This half instinctive, popular protest came to the surface when the Child Labor Amendment to the United States Constitution was before the people in the autumn of 1924; undoubtedly it had a great deal to do with the defeat of that measure. By capitalizing the popular feeling that children should learn to work instead of devoting all their time to school, the opposition foisted on millions of American children a condition of affairs in which they will never have an opportunity to do anything but work. Indirectly, the school itself was to blame in having fostered a one-sided program against which common sense could react so violently. An educational program without vocational participation during the "'teen" age parallels no civilization.

Another reason for actual participation in industry is that adequate training cannot be given otherwise. No mere school can be devised to duplicate the so-called shop conditions and not otherwise can real workmen be adequately trained.

Fourth, training ought to be available for every kind of skilled work. As pointed out in the last chapter, this would increase per capita production in all fields; which is an ultimate necessity to those rising standards of living for the

masses upon which social well-being depends. Moreover, such training should at least anticipate, not to say guide, industrial development. And to discriminate against any process would be to discriminate against that industry, its managers, and such workers as might be employed in it. Every skilled process in industry should, in some way, be provided for in the offerings of the public educational system. Obvious as are the administrative problems involved, it must nevertheless be clearly held in mind that anything less would fail to parallel the new industrial régime into which the world is coming.

Such — to summarize — are the main features of the vocational education needed to parallel the new democratic, technological régime. There must be vocational training for every youth; every industrial process must be included in the offerings; a close articulation must be maintained between the schools and the industries themselves; but such training must supplement, and not interfere with, education for citizenship and general culture. Beginnings have already been made in spots and for the few; what is advocated here is merely to universalize what we have already begun — to carry to their logical conclusions the principles involved in what beginnings we have already made. That such an ambitious program seems Utopian in conception, and hopelessly impossible of consummation in practice, is no reason why we should flinch at it. To our ancestors of a century ago, the school system that we have to-day would have seemed impossible of realization had a sort of blue-print of it been presented then by way of forecasting what ought to be achieved by now. The amazing educational expansion of the past one hundred years is our

most encouraging basis of optimism for the future. If we can continue that development for another one hundred years we may achieve miracles that look impossible to-day. To consummate such a system of vocational education, even approximately, within a century, would be an amazing achievement, and all that we ought to expect of ourselves and our posterity. If, each year, our next practicable step forward carries us one per cent of the way toward the goal, we may congratulate ourselves. But to realize the importance of such a system — indeed, the necessity for it in the new régime—is incumbent upon educational leaders at this very moment. The offerings at present are hardly more than a beginning, and they are usually in the nature of a side issue in the local system of which they are a part. And yet one is usually conducted through a technical high school with a considerable show of local pride. Training at teachers' colleges for the administration of agricultural and especially of trade and industrial education is typically thought of as a sort of supplement to the institution; and candidates for the higher degrees in those fields are likely to be coached and examined in their own specialties by specialists in conventional pedagogics who have almost no conception of the candidate's own field; so that the candidate is likely to be held up for proficiency in their fields, instead of being properly encouraged in the exploitation and development of his own. Vocational education is, out of all comparison, the biggest unsolved problem and unfinished enterprise in modern education; and it is high time, to say the very least, that responsible educational leaders recognized it as such.

The magnitude and, indeed, the strategic importance

of this unfinished business become the more impressive as we consider some of the difficulties, issues, and conflicts that are bound to be encountered as the development proceeds. Consider, to begin with, the economic implications of universal vocational training. If the schools made skilled workers out of all, who would do the unskilled work? Immigrants? But a stream of unrestricted immigration underwashes and caves in the banks of every social, economic, and political reform upon which the success of the new régime depends. If we are to permit a procession of cheap immigrant labor to keep marching past the Statue of Liberty we may as well take the statue down; for liberty in America will never enlighten the world in that case. Morons? But there do not begin to be morons enough for the unskilled jobs. Shall we create artificial morons to order by withholding the privileges of training and education? Restricting the number of "trainees" to industry's prospective demands is to sacrifice democracy to industry — to subordinate man to the machine. But to make vocational training universal, and skilless labor scarce, would produce effects upon the wage scale that employers may be expected to resist. Yielding to that resistance would be to abandon the humanitarian ideals and aims which the new régime so ardently aspires to achieve. Indeed, it could mean nothing less in the end than a stratified society and an industrial feudalism.

Consider next the implications of an educational system by which the whole laboring class is given, along with vocational training, a liberal education. That means a new thing under the sun, namely, an enlightened, free-thinking, cultured proletariat. Such a proletariat will demand two things: a high standard of living and a collective voice in the

management of the industries that employ them. To that, stubborn resistance may of course be expected. But, as has been shown, upon the achievement, by the masses, of a high standard of living depends everything that makes civilization worth while, including the permanent prosperity of the prosperous classes themselves. It is the *sine qua non* of progress. And an effective voice in the management of industry is nothing more than the extension to industry of the representative principle upon which political democracy is based. Without industrial democracy in the new régime it is hard to see how political democracy itself can survive. It is here that the forces of light and darkness will come to mortal grips. To abandon the ideal of universal liberal education is to make the world not merely unsafe for democracy, but impossible!

Again, follow out to their final conclusions the implications of the real vocational experience so necessary both to personality and to vital vocational training. To provide such experience *in schools*, apart from industry, is an utter impossibility, and always will be, due to the sheer magnitude of the enterprise. We blind ourselves to that fact by the trifling fraction of vocational education that we are as yet undertaking. It is only necessary to imagine "*all* skilled processes," and "*all* young people," to see how hopeless it is. That experience will have to be secured *in the industries themselves*. Whereupon the question arises as to who is to control the conditions: the educators, in the interests of the young people and of society as a whole, or the entrepreneurs, in the interests of their own profits. This involves the virtual management of both education and industry. Which by the other? The third alternative is the abandonment

of any program of vocational education adequate to the success of the new régime.

We come out at the same point when we consider our fourth principle, namely, that all processes must be taught. This involves a policy of constant readjustment and expansion; which, in turn, predetermines the labor supply, not to mention the technology, of the industries concerned. Who is to decide which policies are to be adopted, and in whose ultimate interests? If educators decide such matters of policy in the interests of the prospective workers they are training, the profits of the investors are likely to suffer; but if entrepreneurs decide them in the interests of their own profits, then the future welfare of the prospective workers is likely to be sacrificed. An educational program adequate at once to the needs of democratic civilization in the new régime, and to the elaborate technology upon which the new industry must depend for its own progressive efficiency, involves the dilemma of locating economic statesmanship in the educators, or educational statesmanship in the entrepreneurs.

In this matter of industrial education and its future development the typical educator appears to use the two lobes of his brain separately. With the left lobe he thinks optimistically about the promising beginnings that we have already made in this field, confidently believing that we are nicely on our way toward that universality of vocational education which the ideals of democracy so obviously suggest. With the right lobe he takes it for granted, as do his neighbors, that to keep our industrial organization working smoothly the proportion of prospective workers to be left skilless must correspond roughly, not to the proportion of persons

capable of nothing but unskilled work, but to the industrial demand for unskilled laborers. And he letteth not his left lobe know what his right lobe thinketh. If he did his cerebral mechanism might get dangerously overheated. For what would happen to industry if the ideals of democracy should be realized with respect to vocational education? Or what would become of the objectives of democracy if the extent of vocational training should be strictly limited to the demands of industry? Will vocational education continue to grow as it has for the generation past; or will that gratifying growth come to an abrupt standstill when the shoe of industrial supply and demand begins to pinch a little? Is there, in short, a fundamental antagonism between the objectives of modern profits-system industry and the objectives of modern democratic education, which will come first to grips in the field of vocational training? Is there at issue the question of the center of gravity of the new supercivilization into which the world is coming — whether it is to be the dollar or the child? [1]

Doubtless the reader is somewhat dazed by such a dilemma. Skepticism is the easy way out, of course. But if he is disposed to take this analysis of the outlook somewhat seriously he will naturally wonder what *is* the way out. The answer is in the word *gradually*. Evolution never jolts anything; it is only earthquakes and revolutions that do that. As pointed out in a previous chapter, industry can adjust itself to almost any changes in the wage scale and the standard of living if those changes come gradually enough. It can even adjust itself to changes in its own

[1] The concepts from which the conclusions of this chapter are inferred are further elaborated in Chapters XII, XXI, and XXVI.

center of gravity. And, given time enough, evolution can effect revolutions. Let educators make their little one per cent advance each year very deliberately and advisedly, therefore. Let them inform themselves thoroughly as to the anatomy and physiology of the social, and especially of the industrial, order. Let them bring up a new generation of business men on the new humanities. And at the end of one hundred years posterity may find the skiff of vocational education successfully engineered over the riffles and placidly afloat on the deep water above, without a hole in its hull. But if that consummation is to eventuate, educators must never for one moment lose sight of, nor faith in, the ideals and objectives of democracy; especially when the supposed needs of industry conflict with them.

CHAPTER XIV

THE SOCIAL AIMS OF HISTORY TEACHING

Epistemology teaches that the elemental categories of the intellect are time, space, number, cause, and purpose. While this list is not exhaustive the vast majority of all our judgments are cast into the molds of these five Kantian categories. It is no accident, therefore, that so much of the fundamental knowledge and beliefs by which we relate ourselves to our environment is cast into the corresponding molds of history, geography, mathematics, science, and religion. These subjects of elementary instruction correspond roughly, it will be observed, with the five elemental categories of the intellect.

History answers the question, When? It clears up the chronological relations in our collective experience. It is to the social mind what memory is to the individual mind. The causal element is not absent from any of the subjects mentioned above. In fact, all the other categories of thought serve to relate causes in our intellects. And causal relations are a large part of history. But history has to do chiefly with the causality of antecedents and consequents, rather than with the causality of interaction. In other words, it clears up the temporal relations of those social causes and effects whose relations are essentially temporal. Many social causes are of the antecedent-consequent sort; and hence cannot be understood at all except as they are understood

in the historic perspective. History, therefore, uncovers all sorts of causal relations in the sequences of past events; and these revelations serve as bases for prediction when similar circumstances arise in the on-going of the social process.

Continuity is the word employed by the sociologists to indicate this causal relationship in the temporal sequence. The living generation is connected with all past generations in a vital continuity, and the worth and quality of any civilization is somewhat proportionate to its consciousness of that continuity. Says Ratzel: [1]

> We find in low stages a poverty of tradition which allows these races neither to maintain a consciousness of their earlier fortunes for any appreciable period nor to fortify and increase their stock of intelligence. . . . Here, if we are not entirely mistaken, is the basis of the deep-seated difference between races.

It is the function of history, accordingly, to conserve and vitalize this continuity with the past, by rendering it conscious, overt, and functional. This thesis is to be expounded under four headings.

First, the sense of perspective. We often hear it said that history gives a sense of perspective; but the trouble with this statement is that it is a metaphor, and its meaning has to be explained. One's visual imagination conjures up vistas, as between two parallel rows of trees, or down a long street of tall buildings. When one insists upon understanding what is meant by the vistas of history, one is really perplexed to say precisely what it does mean. To use such words in explaining the value of history is only to blur the whole situation and evade the problem altogether. But if

[1] Quoted from "The History of Mankind," I, 21–25, in *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 299, by Park and Burgess.

we do persist in analyzing the metaphor it will probably turn out to imply, among other things, the concept of social change. Society is never static but always dynamic. "Nothing ever is, but always is becoming." There are two attitudes toward the contemporaneous social structures. One attitude ignores this process of becoming; forgets that things have not always been what they now are, and resents all suggestion of change. This attitude is essentially an ignorant one; and as harmful as it is ignorant. The other attitude recognizes, indeed welcomes, the fact of change, seeks to discern its trends, and endeavors to make an intelligent adjustment, with an element of social guidance in it. This second attitude is essential to enlightened publics; and it is the study of history which imparts it.

The second concept involved in the aforesaid metaphor is that of trends. By trends we mean the direction of social change — another metaphor that means nothing until it is explained. It really has a quantitative implication, to the effect that a given kind of social activity is becoming more or less usual than formerly. For example, for over a century, there has been a trend, in the United States, toward centralization in the support and control of education; that is, the practice of local support and control is not so prevalent as formerly, whereas the practice of state and federal responsibility has increased. There has also been a trend toward the concentration of wealth, toward individual skepticism in the face of authority, toward foreign loans and investments, and toward gainful occupations for women. There is also a trend, as history becomes more scientific, to express the trends of history in quantitative terms. Trend is a word that should occur frequently in the discussions of all history

classes; because it is of the utmost importance that the citizens of a democracy perceive the trends of their own times.

This matter of trends can be visualized in a larger perspective; for social entities, like living organisms, have their life histories. They begin; they grow and come to maturity; they pass their prime and enter their period of decay; at last they die and give place to something else. Thus slavery had its beginning, as we have observed, with the domestication of plants and animals and the rise of agriculture; it reached its meridian in the ancient empires; with the advent of modern technology and humanitarianism it passed away. The life history of some social movements is very short indeed; as, for example, the vogue of popular songs or faddish games. But there is one institution, the monogamous family, which has a life history even longer than that of the species itself. *Homo sapiens* inherited it from his subhuman ancestors; and there are very good reasons for predicting that it will last as long as the human species lasts. These two examples indicate the extremes between which the life cycles of social entities range; and with these life cycles it is the duty of history to make us familiar.

It would be a superficial observer indeed who could not distinguish between youth and age. It is important to know whether a person is growing aged, and even senile, and may soon be expected to move off the stage; or whether he is young, and may confidently be expected to make further growth, and eventually to dominate the situation. And it is at least equally important to be able to make a similar discrimination between social movements that are young and those that are old. And yet the world is full of people

who are apparently unable to distinguish between youthful and aged movements; between institutions that are adolescent, and institutions that are obsolescent. The chief actors in any historic period may be classified by this test. For example, during and before the American Civil War, there were certain leaders, some of them even in the North, who could not discern that slavery and state rights were obsolescent institutions, while the principle of federalism was adolescent. And there are many conspicuous leaders of contemporary life who are as blind to present trends, for they are stubbornly fighting for principles that are long past their prime and are destined to pass out presently — unless social progress should be retarded by their arbitrary retention. Such persons are obstructionists; they do vast harm by hindering social progress. Is it not one of the deepest tragedies of life to devote the energies of one's little once to obstructing the very reforms that are on the docket during the age in which one's lot happens to be cast? And when a whole generation takes that attitude collectively, it means that progress is checked until a wiser generation comes upon the scene.

In the Metropolitan Museum of Fine Arts in New York City there is a very wonderful piece of statuary by Rodin. It is entitled "The Hand of God." The pedestal is a rough-hewn block of marble about a cubic yard in dimension. Out of the top of it there is raised a large hand, the shape of which suggests massive power rather than deftness or speed. In the upturned palm are two human figures, male and female. The posture in which they lie together, head to foot, is not that of love; it is suggestive rather of immaturity; indeed, of an even prenatal immaturity, although the figures them-

selves are quite adult. This effect is heightened by the unfinished chiseling, the forms, though finely polished, being left blended into a block of marble held in the massive hand, as if they were in process of vegetating out of it. By this remarkable technique the artist has contrived to suggest both immaturity and measureless potentiality. The figures lie unfinished in the hand of God! But the observer feels nothing quite so keenly as the joy of life to which they are obviously destined to mature. It is the purpose of history teaching to show each rising generation what are those great upward trends of human betterment that still lie unfinished in the hand of God, and in the completion of which their little span of life furnishes them opportunity to collaborate with Him.

Second: social appreciation. Another aim of history teaching is to develop an appreciation of the social heritage. As civilized persons our lives are enriched by the use of the inherited institutions and intellectual resources listed in the previous chapters. By observing the origin, development, and functions of these institutions and these resources the student comes to understand what they have cost and how they serve; and in this way his appreciation, and hence his use, of them are augmented. With one particular application of this function every elementary school teacher is familiar; for they all realize that a nation's history is taught for the purpose of inculcating patriotism. Now patriotism is nothing more than an active, emotionalized appreciation of the political institutions under which one is living. But, as will be pointed out in the next Chapter, we are training *socii*, not merely citizens; and hence history teaching should inculcate appreciation of *all* the institutions and resources of society.

If modern democracy is to be a real success, art, science, morality, religion, recreation, the family, the state, industry, must all perform their normal functions. But their normal functions they never can perform except as their worth to individuals and to society is appreciated by the social mind. Accordingly, if educators read aright the blue-prints of the structures they are building, they will teach adolescent boys and girls what joy of life there is to be derived from art in its various forms, what personal pleasure there is in the free, unprejudiced pursuit of knowledge, and what contribution such pursuit has made to social evolution; they will lead them to understand how nations have risen and fallen by reason of their devotion to, or disregard of, the fundamental moral code; how religion has functioned as a motive in life, and how its power can be geared to the best ideals of social progress; and whether it was in the growing or the decadent stages of the great civilizations that family life became unsound and unstable. There is a scripture to the effect that other men have labored and we have entered into the fruits of their labor. If the costs of our social heritage are duly understood, our appreciation of it ought to be increased. And by the development of such appreciation the utilization of all these items of the social heritage ought to be increased. The proper teaching of history to all our young people may be expected to produce this result. This is one of the ways to achieve a cultural democracy (that is, a use of all the resources of civilization by all the people); and it will eventually be discerned that a cultural democracy is necessary to the success either of an industrial or of a political democracy.

Third: social evaluation. The third function of history teaching is very closely related to the second, the only dif-

ference being that it implies a critical attitude. All peoples, especially we moderns, are confronted with the problem of human values. The various activities and interests of modern life must be appraised; and to that end criteria of value must be established. Racial experience is the source of these criteria; they have to be established by the comparative study of history. For unmasking the prevailing obsessions, and for uncovering the real values of any given period, a pragmatic criterion can be found only in what might be called the norms of history. An historic overemphasis here, as of individualism among the Greeks; or a neglect there, as of art among the Puritans; with the ripened consequences of such infatuations and shortcomings revealed in the sequels often long delayed, furnish the basis of those norms by which present trends can be appraised and criteria of value established. By this means the destructive trends of an age can be discovered before it is too late; and corrected, in part at least.

This objective adds zest and interest, as well as social utility, to the study of history. When one is overtly in quest of criteria he is continually encountering the most fascinating questions: Was the civilization of the so-called Dark Ages better than it is popularly accredited with being? Was the thirteenth really the greatest of all centuries, after all; and if so, in what respects? What were the regenerative, and what the destructive factors in Roman life? Did the frank graft and murder of their political processes put their government incomparably below ours; or may the poisoning of public opinion through the press, in behalf of modern plutocracy, prove equally pernicious in the long run? In precisely what regards were the societies of Eng-

land, France, and Germany during the eighteenth century better than the societies of Egypt, Crete, and Babylonia four or even five thousand years before? In what respects are civilized people really better off than savages? Have the amazing and multifarious inventions of the past century really enriched human life, or are our new equipments and arrangements thwarting as many of the real needs of human nature as they are satisfying? Precisely what are the assets and what the liabilities of each type of historic life?

And this sort of inquiry promises to become as useful as it is interesting; especially if it can be lifted gradually from the level of speculation to that of exact science. Doubtless it will be a long time before such a comparative study of history can render ethics strictly objective and mathematical; but the time has already arrived when its tentative conclusions are worthy of a place in the school curriculum. There can be no question, for example, that the pursuit of natural science and the application of its findings have enriched human life. The same is true of the promotion and utilization of fine arts, apparent exceptions being clearly due to the influence of other factors, such as class distinctions or materialistic ideals. Already we can plainly discern certain periods when family life, or the labor system, or national defense, or some other social institution, was conducted in such a way as to satisfy fundamental needs, and at the same time clear the way for the like satisfaction of other needs; and other periods when they were plainly conducted in such ways as to thwart these results. In short, we already have enough knowledge of the past — however many dark spots may still remain — so that various useful inferences for our future guidance can be drawn with practical certainty. And

they ought to be used more freely than they now are in molding the ideals of our young people.

Fourth: History as religion. There is a sense in which purpose is the highest of those Kantian categories of thought enumerated at the beginning of this chapter. The metaphysical question as to the objective reference and validity of these categories need not concern us here; the important consideration here is that the meaning of existence is inseparably related in our minds to the concept of purpose. If life is to be satisfying its purposes must all be organized into one major and dominating purpose that unifies them all. Otherwise, one becomes the victim of a dual personality. And the amazing thing about human nature is that that dominating purpose has to find its *raison d'être* outside the ego, in something that is infinitely larger and more significant than self. Every normal personality demands to feel its own purposes a contributory part in the larger social purposes — even, indeed, in what might be called the cosmic purposes. And this is an essentially religious experience; because that larger purpose is, in the very nature of the case, a postulate of faith, since it lies outside the limits of the known. This instinctive impulse to seek the meaning of one's existence outside one's self would not seem amazing, however, if we were not so obsessed with the irrational and unscientific individualism of the nineteenth century. Repeatedly in the course of this argument we have referred to Professor Cooley's paradox that the idea of a separate and independent ego is an illusion; and the grounds of this proposition have been explained in the terms of social psychology. We have observed that one derives his personality from the mental capital of his group; so that, as a social

entity, one's center of gravity lies just outside himself. The dualism in sociological and ethical theory arising from this fact of interdependence has also been explained. Is it, therefore, after all, so strange that our deepest spiritual intuitions should be sounder on this point than the overt popular reasoning was during the century just past? For in those intuitions we feel a more or less dumb sense of being members one of another; we vaguely discern that the valid purposes of the individual are to be found in the destinies of the species. Hence, in the depths of our souls, we are instinctively aware that he who seeketh his own life alone is bound to lose it; whereas the surest way to realize one's selfhood is to submerge it in the current of some great common enterprise. Thus the deeper intuitions of our spirits demonstrate that life does indeed lie deeper than logic, especially than the shallow individualistic logic of our sapling democracies.

Now it is precisely the function of history to lay before our eyes the blue-prints of those great collective enterprises in which each of us is to play his little part and thus find dignity and worth for his own existence. This identification of himself with the larger whole is what the ancient Israelite found in the story of his people as set forth in the so-called historical books of the Old Testament, and what the ancient Greeks found in their great classic epics. The ecclesiastic finds it in the history of his own denomination, while the educator finds it in the history of schools. The missionary, or the social worker, or the reformer, draws this reinforcement of his selfhood from the history of the movement to which he has committed himself. This impulse also accounts for the desire for family genealogies. Each modern patriot

derives this exaltation of his personality from the history of his own nation. That accounts in part for the thrill we feel when we stand to sing the national anthem, for in that ceremony each glorifies himself by confessing his submergence in the historic national whole. Thus by the aid of history we orient ourselves, and acquire that large and satisfying purpose, and sense of personal importance, which can never quite be found within our separate selves alone.

Such is the significance of those great epics which enrich the traditional folklore of every great people. And this suggests why it is that the revival of a people's national epic (as Grundtvig sought to do for the Danish people), or its presentation anew in some great artistic form (as Wagnerian opera did for the Germanic folklore), reawakens that nation to a new era of great and glorious achievement. This also suggests that we owe small gratitude indeed to those myopic realists who would strip the halos from the heads of Washington and the other Revolutionary heroes; their half blind philosophy ignores as much as it sees; which is always the case with the cult of disillusionment. And this principle also explains why pessimism, ennui, and despair became prevalent throughout society during the declining days of Rome, when the great national purposes had faded out. In such times there is nothing great in sight with which one can identify his purposes, and so be rescued from the painful insignificance of self.

For us moderns, part of our task of rebuilding a new philosophy of life is therefore to reorganize our historical interpretation of the great racial enterprise. Our denominational and nationalistic interpretations have become relatively too small to satisfy us. As furnishing a great cosmic

purpose, the creation myth and the celestial city of the old theology have lost their grip upon the modern imagination. What we need is the vision of a new racial epic, in the glorious pageantry of which each of us can feel himself a part. And how obvious it is to all who participate in the thought-life of the age that such an epic is to be found in the concept of evolution: cosmic, biological, and social. The grand social enterprise into which each of us moderns is to find his own personality articulated, and thereby glorified, is the magnificent epic of the human species gradually mastering this inhospitable planet and subduing it to the purposes of that ideal society which is to be.

In the light of the new history we are already beginning to discern the march of this great human pageant. It began with the emergence of *homo sapiens* above the level of his subhuman ancestors; it struggled slowly through the tedious morasses of prehistoric savagery; it marched with stately majesty across the historic plateau from Sargon I to the French Revolution; it is just now mounting the foothills of the new machine-age democracy; and from the first high crests of the new era its vanguard looks with shaded eyes out across the rugged panorama of the future to the distant summits of that ideal democracy to which the world has all these centuries aspired. Its destination is yonder in that ideal social order of the future, when man to man shall brother be, the world o'er, because life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall have become the achieved right of all men everywhere. And in the ranks of this great pageant we moderns are all to take up our march, therein finding for our little lives a great significance.

Thus does history furnish the postulates of the new religious faith, in the exalted joy of which the adolescents in our schools have all a right to share.

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Such are the objectives of history teaching in the public schools of a self-governing people. How obvious it is that these objectives involve a selection of historic material very different from what is offered in the traditional curriculum. Uncriticized tradition is often a poor guide, especially in times of extensive social change. It must be remembered that the schools from which we take our curricular traditions were *not* democratic in their aims and purposes. They were the exact opposite, being designed for and attended by the sons of a small, dominating social class. The European nobility desired to have their sons learn from history how monarchies had been managed and how wars had been successfully conducted. Naturally the chief interest of these classes centered upon statesmen, diplomats, and the great military geniuses of the past. Such, accordingly, were the dominating topics of historical study. To be sure, the clergy pursued the history of religion and the savants indulged in the history of philosophy. But even these were exclusive classes. However, the traditions of our schools root back to the Great Public Schools of England (which were not public at all!), to the *gymnasien* of Germany, and to the *lycées* of France, in which young aristocrats were schooled. And, without much concern as to what it was all about, we have transplanted the history teaching of those schools into the new high schools of the United States and of the British Empire, in which we are trying to educate young democrats.

Almost to date, our sons and their sisters have been studying about the same sort of history that an Emperor Napoleon and a Kaiser Wilhelm might have prescribed for the education of their heirs apparent. How obviously the old content fails to parallel the new social situation!

For what the sons and daughters of carpenters, farmers, bankers, coal-miners, and housekeepers want to know is not how to manage monarchies and achieve conquests, but how to improve the common lot. They need to learn from history what those interests, pursuits, and values are that have never failed in the past to enrich the lives of the common people, and what those trends in modern life are that need to be checked before they sweep posterity back to servitude, ignorance, and misery. Therefore, it is with all the fundamental institutions and all the great intellectual resources that history courses in the schools of the people should deal. The history of education, of art, of science, of religion, of industry, of recreation, of the family, and of the community life should each be stressed as much as the history of government. Due to its obtrusiveness in attention, on account of the exercise of force and the clatter of elections, the state has been regarded in popular belief as the all important institution. But lately, political scientists have been turning to the social psychology of public opinion. As a result they are giving more adequate recognition to the great but unobtrusive agencies of social control that lie back in the penumbra and subconscious shadows of attention. This shift corresponds to the shift in the high schools from civics to general social science. Thus, in all levels of schooling, the citizen is giving place to the *socius;* and the same broadening out of the field is needed in history as well.

Those who have been nourished entirely on the conventional type of history have really missed the most interesting episodes and the most significant currents of human experience. The history of civilization displays itself in its true scope only to those who have browsed in many fields of human interest. When one studies the history of education he gathers the impression that civilization depends upon the educators. When one pursues the history of ethics he is impressed with the idea that the ethical standards of a people are their most fundamental assets. When one surveys the evolution of religion he is inclined to feel that religion is the dominant factor in social evolution. When one studies industrial evolution he naturally gravitates to the economic theory of history. When one busies himself with the history of philosophical thought and of scientific research he tends to the assumption that wars and diplomacy may be ignored, and social progress explained entirely by the history of the intellectual class. And when one turns to the field of art and literature he is inclined to the conclusion that the geniuses in these fields are the real builders of civilization. Each of these views is, of course, fractional. The truth is in all of them combined. And if the unfolding civilization is to be nourished by a balanced ration, then a balanced appetite must be cultivated in the minds of those who are destined to operate that civilization. And the balanced teaching of history can help to do it.

To this end, the old political history is out of date. Nor does the so-called new history, with additional emphasis upon the industrial and social sides go far enough, although it is a move in the right direction. The new thing we need is a history of culture that will break out of the old ruts en-

tirely, relegate political history to a definitely minor status, and give balanced attention to all the major interests and constituents of civilization. Political and economic history should be supplemented with the history of music, literature, and architecture, with an account of the rise of the scientific method and its achievements, with a survey of moral and religious developments, with an account of changes in domestic relations; in short, with a history of all the great social ideals, institutions, and resources. These cultural interests must not be relegated to a few paragraphs of fine print at the close of the chapter, nor to occasional paragraphs sandwiched into the main text. They are at least as important strands in the fabric as the political, and each of them should be given as much consideration.

Some of our omissions from history teaching would be ludicrous if they were not so lamentable. It is somewhat safer than a mere guess to assert that not ten per cent of high-school graduates in the United States can give any coherent account of Horace Mann. They have been ground through the mill of the American public school and upon them will shortly devolve, in large measure, the responsibility of determining that institution's status in public opinion. And yet that institution almost completely ignores the history and social theory of itself in its program of instruction; so that the one man who, more than any other, typifies the educational ideal of a great nation is left almost a stranger to the citizens of that nation. It seems a pity! And then there is Beethoven, that greatest of all musical composers. Consider what he has given to mankind. The citizen of modern civilization, craving an hour of relaxation, puts a Beethoven record on his phonograph: a sonata, a string quartet, a

symphony, or some other of the many forms produced by that amazingly versatile genius. He is soothed, delighted, and perhaps even inspired. Beethoven comes to us over the radio, he greets us at the chamber-music concert or the symphony. In the quiet privacy of our own homes Beethoven ministers to us through the piano or the violin. On the Sabbath he comforts or uplifts us through some of the grandest hymns of the church. Thus every week, millions of people, all over the civilized world, turn to this same source of refined and wholesome joy. For a hundred years already this lonely soul, too deaf to hear his own compositions, has been pouring his ripe and mellow happiness into the lives of men. For centuries to come he will continue to do so. And yet our school histories count that contemporary of his, Napoleon Bonaparte, a far greater man, judging by the space which they accord to each. The thing is sadly out of balance, and out of parallel with the life of modern humanity.

History teaching in a society that really aspires to be democratic should give more attention to Amos and Ezekiel than to Cyrus, to Aristotle and Sophocles than to Alexander, to Philo and Cicero than to Cæsar, to Alcuin and Augustine than to Charlemagne, to Rembrandt and Comenius than to Cromwell, to John Wesley and Adam Smith than to William Pitt, to Goethe and Pestalozzi than to Napoleon, to Grundtvig and Wagner than to Metternich, to Morse and Horace Mann than to Andrew Jackson, to Neal Dow and Henry Barnard than to General Grant, to Pasteur and Wundt than to Kaiser Wilhelm. For the former, in each case, are the names that stand for contributions to the intellectual and spiritual resources of the race, and therefore for the enrichment of the common lot. And it is history of this

sort that we should teach if our objective is a really satisfying civilization for the masses of mankind.

The argument for the incorporation of this kind of material into the content of history teaching is necessarily an argument for prefacing modern history itself with an adequate survey of the earlier periods. For after all, these great cultural interests root back into the remote past in an even more significant way than do the political and economic interests. Art and scientific research go back to Greece, with their rootage in the earlier civilizations. Morality and religion lead us back through the mediæval period to Israel. The monogamous family is a very ancient institution indeed. On the other hand some of the movements upon which we repose such implicit faith are quite recent and untried. If it is the purpose of history to help the student locate each ideal and institution of his own time on the curve of its particular life cycle, then it is obviously insufficient to impart a knowledge of recent history only. The period is too short! The movements lack relationship. For an adequate sense of perspective the student must be given a bird's-eye view, not only of the whole range of recorded history, but of prehistoric social evolution as well.

Exclusive emphasis upon recent history is quite as obviously inadequate if our objective is to impart criteria for the appraisal of human values. If current movements are selected for almost exclusive study it is because the curriculum maker, like most of his contemporaries, is obsessed by them. The result is that the rising generation becomes similarly obsessed. Thus history teaching fails conspicuously at the very point wherein its responsibility is most

unique and necessary, namely, to rescue minds from the obsessions of the *Zeitgeist*. An exclusive diet of recent history gives the impression, for example, that almost every thing of value is new within the last few centuries; and so it tends to promote the very cult of change which leads us to ignore some of the most fundamental things in civilization just because they are old. Again, to study the struggle for political democracy during the past two centuries and a half is almost the same as to study the rise of modern individualism. Such a program would tend almost inevitably to aid and abet the excessive individualism of the times, which history teaching ought, instead, to be one of the chief means of counteracting. Furthermore, the inevitable emphasis upon recent industrial developments would have to be made with comsummate skill if it did not augment the very materialism from which the age is suffering so keenly; and also fortify the faults of our present industrial system behind an unenlightened infatuation. In short, the net result of studying recent history exclusively, or almost exclusively, might easily be to add fuel to the flame of contemporaneous obsessions; whereas it is the very function of history teaching to reveal the current aberrations of the social mind. This latter, history teaching cannot hope to do, except against the background of other periods with different interests and ideals.

Indeed, some of the most fundamental ideals, institutions, and resources of the collective life are, as a matter of fact, the very values in which the *Zeitgeist* is the least concerned. We may well have in mind such institutions as the family, the church, the legal system, and the moral code; such ideals as obedience, thoroughness, self-restraint, economy,

domestic fidelity, and reverence. These ideals and institutions are, of course, fundamental to social order; upon them the success of the new civilization depends. Their force in the modern world would be greatly augmented by a general appreciation of their long, toilsome development, of the sacrifices that have been suffered in their behalf, and of the contributions they have already made. We should be anxious, therefore, that the rising generation become familiar with the contribution of the ancient Hebrews to the ethical, social, and religious ideals upon which civilization is based. We should desire them to be familiar, likewise, with two things that originated in ancient Greece, namely, that spirit of free, fearless inquiry, upon which modern science is founded, and that artistic appreciation and creative adventure without which cultural foundation no permanent democracy can be built. We should even like to have them observe by what ideals and institutions China solved the problem of social stability — the great unsolved problem of the Occident. We should want them to know how Rome, and, before her, Egypt and Babylon, forged the substance of political orderliness out of blood and iron, and hammered it slowly into shape on the anvil of empire. They will then be much better able to appreciate the necessity, even in a democracy, for obedience, and for subordination of the individual wish to the general welfare — even under compulsion in cases of extremity. We should desire them to be familiar not only with Greece, Israel, Rome, and the more ancient empires, but also with those indefinitely long milleniums of social evolution which were prerequisite to the foundations of civilization. Only thus can they see the pageant in its true perspective. For if history teaching

is to contribute to that quasi-religious orientation of life, which has been set forth above as not the least of its objectives, it must set the student on a high vantage ground from which he can secure a large view of the whole course of social evolution.

CHAPTER XV

THE NEW HUMANITIES IN THE NEW CURRICULUM

WHAT a patternless tangle the details of history are! It is only by a bird's-eye view of the long suffering centuries that one gets the drift of things. The mills of the gods grind so exceeding slowly. A thousand years with them is as a single day; while the generations come and go in the darkness that might have been dawn. At times a fairer, better world seems almost within our grasp. But it eludes a blundering race; and the thousand-year wheel of destiny rolls round its cycle again. Meantime the light that might have come delays; and the millions live their little once, suffering privations that might have been plenty; anguish and pain that might have been joy; sickness, strife, and early death that might have been health, peace, and length of days. Is it to be so again? What a century was the nineteenth! Were ever brighter hopes indulged? These vast new lands; these great unfolding democracies; these marvelous inventions! Our fathers died with shining faces, confident that they had willed to us a world in which wars, poverty, and gross injustices were at an end. But already we have seen days of which they were never troubled in their dreams. And from the precedents of history, what may we expect as the sequel to that century of hope in which they lived? Another of equal progress, and then another and another; or a period of stormy weather, long drawn out,

and the good days just ahead, which our fathers so confidently anticipated, postponed for another thousand years? The unwelcome fact is that the sky is overcast and lowering; and the future is in grave uncertainty.

It cannot be too often nor too emphatically repeated that society is passing through the greatest transition of recorded history, by all odds and far away! The recent shift from muscle power to steam, electricity, and gasoline is producing a new order of things. A new democratic, applied-science, machinofacture, supercivilization is in the process of becoming. The magnitude of the readjustment is almost impossible to realize. And so are its problematic aspects. The welfare of mankind is at stake for a thousand years to come. If we can solve the problems of this great transition without conflict or delay, those who come after us will soon possess the promised land. But if we fail to solve them, there may be dark ages ahead; posterity may wander in the wilderness of conflict and misery, not forty years, but forty generations.

The various problems involved in the situation have already been enumerated. There is the international problem, which is liable to precipitate the world into war at almost any moment. There is the economic problem, dividing itself into various issues, but presenting itself in the large as an imminent conflict between capital and labor. There is the political problem: the question of whether real democracies can be made to operate successfully, or whether they will degenerate into plutocratic tyrannies instead. And back of all these modern problems is the imminent pressure of populations that are growing at an unprecedented rate. Meantime, the old "mores" are disintegrating as a result of the new conditions, threatening the disintegration of the

whole social fabric. Religion is in transition; the family is menaced; and the aims of life are in doubt. Thus, at the very moment when we need to lift the hardest, there is nothing to stand on!

What we obviously need is a science of society. Since the time of Comte this has been the aspiration of modern scholarship. Instead of blundering and bungling along from one crisis to the next, science might render society really telic, and reduce social phenomena to control, as it has done in the natural world. Our technical achievements have so far outrun our social adjustments that for the next few centuries at least it looks as if the world had more to hope for from social than from natural science. But the aspiration serves chiefly to throw into clear relief the meagerness of our achievements to the present date. And yet that achievement is far better than nothing. What we do know about society would go a long way toward saving us if we could only make it function. There is really a very considerable body of knowledge in the fields of the various social sciences. Much of that knowledge is rather in the nature of philosophy than of positive science, it is true; but compared with the popular mythologies still currently believed it is as dawn to midnight. Half a loaf is better than no bread.

But the problem is to make it function. To that end the sociological knowledge extant must be made a common possession of the people. If scholars had achieved a perfect and exhaustive science of society it would avail us nothing unless its findings were passed out into public opinion. The discovery of further knowledge is of no more practical importance, therefore, than the popularization of what

knowledge we already do possess. For social readjustment, distributive scholarship is quite as important as productive. If we still had monarchies it might suffice for the monarchs and a small coterie of their advisers and officials to be well informed. But we have democracies, which means that public opinion is the determinant of public policy. Responsibility has been shifted from the few to the many. According to Plato, society's problem of self-direction was to be solved by providing a small class of competent leaders. The problem of inducing the masses to acquiesce he left untouched. Since his time, the strong rather than the wise have assumed the direction of affairs, and the people have been coerced instead of acquiescing. Kings and queens, knights and bishops, have held the determining positions on the board; and the people have been but pawns in the game. Their life values were ignored, and their interests were not considered. But now the interests and policies of kings and prelates, and ultimately of entrepreneurs, are supposed to give way before the interests and policies of the common people. The will of the people is to be the determining influence in democratic societies. The democratic state, which assumes the dominating rôle among the sisterhood of institutions, is organized with the definite aim of rendering public opinion effective. The responsibility for solving all these vast new problems, and creating thereby the complex social machinery of the new era, rests, therefore, with the people. The masses of the common people have undertaken a most gigantic task indeed.

But the joker in the argument for democracy is the ignorance of the people. There runs current in the popular mind no understanding of the problems to be solved. And

so long as this state of affairs continues there is no hope for the success of democracy. An ignorant public will either blunder into a chaos of unreason, or else revert to selfish tyrannies. Thoughtful persons are at a dead standstill before this dilemma. If the people would turn over the direction of social affairs to experts, there might be ground for hope. But they are too ignorant for that. They know not, and know not that they know not. The explanation of that attitude is the prevalence of the popular mythology. Most of the problem phenomena in the fields of biology, psychology, anthropology, economics, politics, ethics, and metaphysics are problems familiar to the public. And for every problem there is an answer in the current mythologies. That has ever been the nature of the collective mind: to fabricate postulates where knowledge was not to be had. It is thus that myths arise, whether cosmic or social. Hence the popular sociological mythology: a curious mixture of shrewd intuitions and grotesque illusions, with here and there a bit of science often grossly misconceived; all mostly out of date for reasons previously explained. The confidence with which these beliefs are held is proportionate to their prevalence, or their emotionalized connection with partisan loyalties. And what the people think they know, why should they be at pains to learn, or delegate to experts whom they do not understand? With this intellectual equipment, public opinion rampages through the china shop of the present crisis.

But this ignorance of the public becomes sinister as well as menacing when it is deliberately fostered and prompted by predatory interests with an ax to grind. The secretion by institutions of a philosophy to lubricate their own friction

and justify their own injustices is a universal and most fascinating phenomenon of the race's mental history. But since the extension of the franchise in modern republics, the deliberate employment of illusion for the misguidance of public opinion has become ominous, to say the least. In former ages the people were controlled and exploited by force, but now that we have the machinery of self-government the masses can be controlled and exploited only by first capturing their intellects through propaganda and illusion. One sometimes wonders if it may not have been unfortunate, perhaps, that Lincoln should have coined his famous aphorism; for has it not served chiefly ever since as a bandage of complacent self-confidence for a gullible public to tie over their own eyes? Immediately after Lincoln's time, the process of fooling the people began to assume proportions. The internal revenue on alcoholics, for example, which had been imposed as a war measure, was not repealed, even after the war debts had been paid. It hardly seems like a mere coincidence that "The Distilling and Cattle Feeding Trust" should have been organized during that period; nor that the belief should have become current that the tax restrained the consumption of alcoholics — a palpable untruth from the standpoints both of psychology and fiscal statistics. But it was the tariff policy that gave rise to the most elaborate system of illusions; since it had to depend upon the votes of men who really did not profit by it. The economists of the period almost unanimously pointed out its fallacies; but that served rather to discredit the economists than to enlighten the public. Nor to this day have we escaped from the sinister illusion; and one of our leading economists is authority for the statement that it will

take several generations to rectify the unfortunate effects of this deception.

To specify examples of how, since the World War, the public has been misguided into the adoption of policies subversive to public welfare might fail of its purpose precisely because of the success of that misguidance. Perhaps it might be ventured to mention the Child Labor Amendment. Naturally, schoolmasters, less than any other class of citizens, were stampeded before that phenomenal barrage of propaganda, by which the public generally was so suddenly and so completely overwhelmed. It is doubtful, however, whether the magnitude and significance of the real issue involved were fully discerned by many educators, even. By way of further illustration, the arguments about the income tax which have been given widest and most insistent publicity, might possibly be mentioned; though some schoolmen, even, might profit by reading Seligman on the incidence of income taxes. But other examples. . . . The next morning after an important election a great city daily proclaimed in editorial headlines: "The People Have Spoken." To social scientists, trained to detect the illusion in editorial propaganda, the election sounded like an echo. There had been such an ominous unanimity in the persistent suggestion of the newspapers!

Here is the life-and-death struggle of democracy. This is the central issue of our times! And the only hope is in popular enlightenment. There is no motto more worthy to be the slogan of popular government than the Scripture which declares, "And the truth shall make you free!" If the people can be made to understand what those policies are that will really work in their own behalf, there is some chance

for self-government to succeed. But if they habitually adopt policies because they believe them to be for the general good, when those policies really play into the hands of concentrated wealth, then democracy is doomed. Its forms will remain; but they will become an empty shell; and an invisible plutocracy will function in reality. To control and exploit the people by first deceiving them is the enterprise to which the industrial colossus, born out of the Industrial Revolution, has now set itself. To circumvent it is the central problem of our age.

Salvation, if there be any, would seem to be with the curriculum makers. The best knowledge extant that bears on the social, economic, political, and ethical problems of the age must be passed out to the people through the agency of the public schools. There is no other agency available that can do this work systematically, and with unbiased scientific attitude. And it is really for the performance of this function that the schools, particularly the high schools and colleges, exist. They have other functions to be sure; but if they neglect this one they fail egregiously to parallel the civilization in which they are in operation. There is everywhere increasing discernment that preparation for citizenship and the other social responsibilities is the most vital objective of the schools of a democracy. Secondary students can well afford to devote at least one fourth of their time to subjects definitely aimed at this objective. In the United States, consensus of opinion among educators is rapidly adopting this position.

It is from this point of view that the disservice of the traditional curriculum is becoming most apparent. When a person has graduated from a college course consisting largely

of Latin, Greek, mathematics, and modern languages, he naturally enjoys a very gratifying confidence in the assurance that he has become an educated person. One feels a minor self-confidence of the same sort if he has graduated merely from a high school with a similar curriculum. The fact that his alma mater has really sent him forth in ignorance of the collective problems of our modern life, quite as naturally does not occur to him. On the contrary, such a graduate believes the popular mythologies with even greater confidence because of that pardonable intellectual self-confidence which naturally goes with a diploma. Precisely this has been the predicament of the supposedly educated classes, with few exceptions, for the last sixty years. During the critical period in American history following the Civil War, our statesmen, almost without exception, had had this kind of schooling, or none; and the same was true of the leaders in other fields. The unfortunate mistakes of that period were the inevitable result. The same sort of leadership seems to be too much in the ascendancy to this very day, though with a rapidly growing percentage of exceptions. In the fields of knowledge bearing on our collective problems, the enlightenment of public opinion is largely negative; while leadership is often very little better. And this ignorance is the direct result of our education. Hence there has grown up a cumulative suspicion among educators that the traditional curriculum has been offering the citizens of western republics the stones of an irrelevant and pedantic learning instead of the bread of a vital knowledge. For putting our young democracies to death without bloodletting or commotion, Latin, mathematics, rhetoric, and foreign languages would have proved the most effective brand of chloroform that

could have been devised. The younger educators are becoming convinced that the advocates of these subjects, in spite of their obviously good intentions, were leading in a wooden horse. But, fortunately, the transfer from the old so-called cultural subjects to the new humanities is coming very rapidly; and for those who love democracy and hope for its success this may be welcomed as one of the promising signs of the times.

This rapid coming of the new humanities is giving rise, indeed, to pedagogical perplexities,[1] not least of which is that of their scope. It may throw some light on this problem to seek for fundamental principles. And here the principle to which we should revert is obviously that the institutions of society are the objectives of education. All of them are! The scope of the social studies may be made clear by the rhetorical device of contrasting the two words citizen and *socius* — which is sufficient excuse for introducing this term from the technical vocabulary of sociology. A *socius* is an individual considered as a member of society. The term connotes the total group in which the individual participates. The word citizen implies the individual's relation to only *one* institution, namely, the state; but the term *socius* implies the individual's relationships to *all* the institutions. The word citizen gives a one-sided overemphasis to a single social responsibility; the term *socius* gives a balanced emphasis to all social responsibilities. Every citizen is in reality very much more than a citizen; he is a *socius*. We are training not merely citizens, but *socii*. They must therefore be grounded in sound ideals and beliefs relative to *all* the institutions of society.

[1] Cf. Edgar Dawson, *Teaching the Social Studies*.

How apparent the reason, then, why civics has been bursting the hoops of its own name during the last dozen years or so. At first we used the word civics without any qualifying adjective at all. Then we invented the term community civics, but that did not satisfy us long. Next we began talking about vocational civics, or economic civics, thus including another important institution in our objectives. But still the scope remained too narrow, and so we came at last to social civics. The adjective social blanketed the whole problem, without explaining anything; and so our next move was to abandon the noun civics all together, substituting community life problems, or some other equally indefinite nomenclature. The need we felt intuitively, and were trying to meet by the addition of all these adjectives, was the all-around training of the *socius*. If the reader will turn to the list of institutions on page 40, and invent an adjective corresponding to each and every one of them, he will see quite clearly how many different kinds of civics we would need to teach.

What we are groping our way toward in this new field is a comprehensive body of facts about all the phenomena and relationships of life, with certain lines of behavior suggested. Conversely, our objective is to give the young people a "set" toward certain types of behavior. To secure that behavior we propose to depend chiefly upon a body of information that will explain the reasons for it. We are trying to teach the children what to believe and what to do in all the typical situations of their lives. In other words we are aiming at nothing less than a philosophy of individual and social life, that will guide them safely through the maze of modern

civilization, and cause them to stabilize that civilization by their manner of living in it.

A philosophy of life! Pretentious as the term may sound, there can be no greater mistake than to suppose that a philosophy of life is only for adults. Instead, it is something that we all acquire during childhood. We of the older generation were taught it by our elders so early that for the most part the process has been forgotten. We got our beliefs from our mothers in their answers to the innumerable questions we asked them about everything that came to our attention. We got them from our Sunday school teachers and our pastors, and from our teachers and texts at school. We got them from our fathers' explanations of free silver, capital punishment, the folly of gambling, the secrets of animal breeding, and what not. We picked up beliefs from innumerable other sources. But long before we were fifteen years of age we had acquired a fairly complete philosophy of life. Some of us who have since become students have reconsidered and revised parts of it; but even the most scholarly of us are still unconsciously using, quite unrevised, large sections of that same philosophy of individual and social life that we absorbed in childhood from such plebeian intellectual sources — and sometimes vitiating our supposedly scientific conclusions with it.

But, as we have so often observed, the old beliefs must be scrutinized and revised. What the rising generation needs is a *new* philosophy of individual and social life; a *new* set of beliefs. And if this new philosophy is to equip them for *all* the relationships of modern life it must take its constituent facts from *all* the modern sciences that deal with human life: geography, biology, psychology, social psychology, anthro-

pology, sociology, economics, political science, ethics, philosophy, and history. It must derive its emotional illumination from literature, the fine arts, and social religion. We must expand civics into general social science; and the scope of that discipline must cover the whole range of the new humanities.

Doubtless it looks at first glance like a pedagogical impossibility to teach all these advanced subjects to junior and senior high school children. But the impossibility is an illusion. The traditional philosophy of life which we of the older generation learned from our elders in childhood took its materials from these very fields, however little we may be in the habit of recognizing the fact. It matters not whether one says predestination and original sin, or heredity and instincts; he is talking biology and psychology in either case. And it is hard to see why the new scientific concepts are any more difficult than the old theological concepts. What our fathers used to tell us about competition and the law of supply and demand, was economics, even if they did not label it as such. And is it any harder for a person who happens to be in boyhood now to understand why competition does not regulate railroad rates, than for one who happened to be a boy forty years ago to understand why competition did regulate the price of groceries? It is even doubtful whether the reasons why income taxes are not shifted would prove any more difficult than the reasons why revenue taxes are — provided the teacher himself were not confused. The Copernican cosmology is no more obscure than the Ptolemaic; and the story of creation in Genesis is no easier for the children to grasp than the outlines of the evolutionary theory. Indeed, there is a chance to illustrate the latter

before their very eyes! The sociological explanation of modern public education is inherently no more abstruse than the theological explanation of the mediæval church. Yet all these now antedated theories have been taught to children for centuries; and to young children, at that.

As a matter of fact, the difficulty of this basic material from the modern humanities is an illusion of the middle-aged mind; and arises from the laborious process of relearning, to which educated persons of middle age have been subjected. Not until we of the older generation had become adults did most of this new material come to our attention; and then we experienced the painful difficulty of making room for it by clearing our minds of the antiquated material which we had absorbed with so little conscious effort in childhood. To root out old beliefs and ingraft new ones; to connect the contradictory new with every functional item of the old apperceptive mass — that is the difficult thing. Not all persons have the mental vigor to so much as undertake the task; very few, if any, of us have completed it. We are apt to confuse the children whom we try to teach because we are, to tell the truth, confused ourselves. But to receive the new on the blank tablet of an inquiring young mind — that is easy! We perversely forget, however, that the minds of the children are fresh and open. The pedagogical difficulty is in our own preconceptions and confusions; not in their immaturity. Our problem is to adapt this new scientific material to their interests; and the fault is ours if we do not succeed.

And that instruction ought to be positive rather than negative; constructive rather than critical. In ought not to commit the sore thumb fallacy; that is, the fallacy of

attributing more importance to the few sore spots in society, just because they are more obtrusive in attention, than to the nine tenths of our social life that is sound. Doubtless it was unavoidable in the evolution of social science teaching that stress was placed at first upon the pathological. Our attention was given to the lamentable facts of poverty, crime, degeneracy, labor conflicts, and the like. Naturally we wanted to find the cure. But as these sciences have developed, attention has shifted from social pathology to social anatomy and social physiology, if one may extend the metaphor. And is this not fortunate, both from the standpoint of scientific work, and from the standpoint of its effects upon the minds of students? Introspection is dangerous, even the introspection of the social mind; it is liable to develop into sickly introversion. Emphasis upon the sore spots in society has a certain morbid effect upon the minds of young persons. It makes them imagine that they ought to be agitators, radicals, reformers, philanthropists, "social workers," or something of the sort. It tends to fill their heads with queer, immature, and fractional ideas, thus increasing the danger that they may fail to function normally in the staple relations and fundamental institutions of society. And that is likely to do far more harm than good. For the most important social contribution that the typical *socius* can make is not other than just to function normally in each of the social institutions. As we have seen, that is the formula for self-realization. It is also the formula for social efficiency. The aim of the social studies, therefore, is to set up beliefs and ideals that will make such behavior seem the natural thing. To that end, what we need to do is to explain all the social fun-

damentals in the light of our best modern knowledge from all the neohumanistic fields.[1]

The humanistic movement which swept over Europe at the close of the Middle Ages was motivated, as is our modern education, by the hope of a new and better social order. The mental resources that inspired that hope were the rediscovered intellectual treasures of the ancient world: the philosophy — and also the art — of Rome, Greece, and Israel. From these sources the leaders of that movement hoped to derive the beliefs and ideals that would regenerate their world. That ancient lore was then the best that was available. For it must be remembered that philosophy, to the ancients, meant the rudiments of all the sciences, both natural and social. At the beginning of the modern period the study of these ancient resources was promoted for aims very similar to the objectives urged in this chapter. The languages themselves were only the means of access to the ancient humanities. But for these objectives we now have new resources; for rudimentary the sciences no longer are. Enormous developments have been achieved since the Renaissance, and especially during the last generation. We now have available — and in English! — all the modern sciences that deal with man's individual and social life. These are the *new* humanities; and social regeneration is now to be sought through them — and the fine arts!

[1] The present writer has prepared two textbooks embodying the pedagogical principles set forth in the latter part of this chapter. One is an *Elementary Sociology* (Sanborn) for high school seniors; the other is a *General Social Science* (Macmillan) for the eighth and ninth grades.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL EDUCATION

Our quickest route to the heart of this matter is by way of a term with which we are already familiar, namely, the "mores."[1] This Latin word is used by the sociologists, as we have had frequent occasion to observe, to name the rules of approved behavior that prevail generally in any given society. The term bears down heavily on the fact of general acceptance. The social psychology of the term lies in the fact that the "mores" are a part of the common-to-all of the social mind — but of the subconscious social mind, from which fact arises the difficulty that injects itself into almost all our thinking about morality and moral education. Our conclusions are almost all vitiated by the fallacy to which reference was so often made in the earlier chapters of this work, of attributing to mental phenomena an importance among objective social realities proportionate only to their obtrusiveness in attention. For it is in the very nature of the "mores" to recede into the penumbra. The obtrusive thing in attention is the situations of life that have to be ethically evaluated; but the "mores" by reference to which we evaluate them, are quite unobtrusive. By what feels to us like intuition do we know that this is right and that is wrong; but that feeling is an illusion, as social psychology

[1] See Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, particularly Chapter IV. Part III discusses the changing "mores" of the present age.

so clearly reveals. The "mores" have been learned, item by item, bit by bit, forgotten though the learning process be, for the most part. Theories of moral education are apt to recognize almost everything else, therefore, than the necessity for teaching the "mores"; for normally that is left to an educational process so informal as to be almost unobserved.

But not in changing times like ours. For the impressive difficulties that we are now encountering in moral education are arising precisely from the fact that such informal education has failed in our generation to impart a set of "mores" that function without overt attention to them. The reason for this anomalous situation is that the "mores," like everything else, are in flux. Almost every item of the old moral code is nowadays the subject of skepticism and debate. For almost any conceivable departure from the old standards there is a group in which one can find both aid and comfort. Between conservatives who would adhere to the old "mores" and radicals who would discard them, there is an abrupt disjunction; and between the older and the younger generations a misunderstanding that is often tragic. And this is quite unusual; for in ordinary times there is a consensus that is so nearly absolute as to be almost coercive. The conspicuous absence at present of any such consensus is the reason why moral education is so problematical. For moral education has two distinct aspects: to teach the moral code, and to motivate it. In normal times the code teaches itself through social participation; and there remains only the problem of motivation. But in our times there is nothing definite to motivate; and this is where the difficulty lies. There is no adequate agreement upon the part of the com-

munity as to what ought to be regarded and obeyed. Standards of conformity and universal approval are largely absent; and hence to motivate conformity is almost hopelessly out of the question. This aspect of the problem is what most discussions of moral education ignore, due to the spotlight-penumbra fallacy. But this aspect is the vital one.

The reasons for this flux of the "mores" are not far to seek. They arise chiefly out of the great transition through which the world is passing, from the handicraft to the machinofacture order of things. All human relationships have been more or less dislocated by this change; as has been so frequently pointed out in the previous chapters. The result is that many of the old restraints have come to misfit the new situations more or less uncomfortably. This gives rise to skepticism and debate, which spreads to all restraints, however useful they may still remain. A second factor in the situation is the excessive individualism of our times; the causes of which were outlined in Chapter VII. It will be recalled that they too are a part of the great transition. And finally, there is the War. War is always more or less of a shock to all conventions; and probably never more so than on this latest occasion. A religious leader (or, more accurately, misleader) of national prominence published a magazine article during the War seriously raising the question as to whether the experiences of the soldiers were not suggesting a new weighting of all moral values. For all these reasons we are at sixes and sevens with respect to the moral code; and this is the crux of our problem in moral education. How can we teach morals to our young people when the community is full of persons, in apparently good social acceptance, who are ready to tell them, by innuendo and

example, that our instructions are the mere fulminations of blind conservatives? What an *easy* solution it would be, forsooth, to practice the young people in teamwork activities of a semi-playful sort, as so many superficial thinkers are now advocating. But the difficulty with that solution is that it is no solution at all; since it leaves the real problem right where it was before.

What we are compelled to do instead is to reëstablish the "mores." We are confronted with the task of working out the moral code *de novo;* and securing for it a new consensus of approval and acceptance. The problem turns out, therefore, to be one of very great magnitude indeed, and one that will engage the best collective thought of our intellectual leaders for a generation or two. And meantime society is bound to suffer no little moral attrition, most of which will fall upon the rising generation. In fact, that is exactly what we are now in the midst of. It would seem extremely desirable, to be sure, if there were some short and easy formula; just as a plentiful supply of free horses would be a boon to beggars. But wishes never won a great battle; and the sooner we brace our backs against the wall the better it will be for all concerned. For civilization is in for a life-and-death struggle over this issue, of which the outcome may not be apparent for a century to come. And one of the most desperate aspects of the situation is that the forces of moral reconstruction are without organization or recognized leadership. Integration will finally crystallize out of the labors of innumerable workers each doing his utmost bit in the surrounding darkness, lighted only by the flare of his own faith in the ultimate triumph of reason and right. This puts the problem up to each teacher, each parent, each pastor, each

person otherwise charged by fate and circumstance with the mentorship of a youth. He must see to it, if he can, that *that* particular young person does not lose his way. The task of the next few pages is to suggest a philosophy by which we may proceed.

For a philosophy the mentor of youth must have, because his work must always be ultimately an appeal to reason. In ordinary times it may be an appeal to authority. Our grandparents could tell their young people what was right, "thus saith the Lord," scripture and verse, and "what would people say!" For the "mores" were *not* in flux. But when we attempt to carry the case to the court of Mrs. Grundy our young people are disposed to merely smile at us as well-meaning old fogies; and right there our influence is too often at an end. If we exhort them to practice austere inhibitions in conformity to "old-fashioned morals," or to make self-sacrifices in devotion to hard ideals, they demand to know the reasons why; and ultimately we must be prepared to supply them. Nor can we make our appeal to superficial premises. We must dig beneath the surface; go to the very bottom of things, indeed, and uncover the real foundations of life before their eyes. Not otherwise can we hope to succeed, except in the case of very docile dispositions. Hence we must proceed upon an ethical philosophy that goes back to first principles.

Pursuant to this objective, our first necessity is to inquire into the meaning of the "mores." And here we must revert to that philosophy of human values set forth in Chapter IV. The "mores" root down into the innate biological needs of the human species. They represent the prevailing consensus of any given society as to the types of behavior that make

for human welfare, and the types that thwart this welfare. The "thou-shalts" and the "thou-shalt-nots" of the moral code, at any given time, indicate the collective judgment of the group, based upon its own age-long experience as to the kinds of water that surely will wet us and the kinds of fire that will certainly burn. And if an appeal is to be taken from the fluid "mores" to the court of reason, then that reason must take the *real* needs of human life as its criterion, and point out those types of behavior that really are harmful or destructive, as distinguished from those that are, as a matter of fact, relatively harmless. It is in this way that a revised code is to to be worked out. Such a code will retain whatever was fundamental in the old code; but with a new appeal to reason. And since our young people are disposed, on account of the spirit of the age, to repudiate convention and tradition, any new appraisal that we put upon the consequences of behavior, must, of necessity, be such as their soundest judgments cannot repudiate. The criterion, therefore, to which we must make our appeal is the *real needs of life,* as against its conventionally reputed needs; and we must establish those real needs convincingly before their enlightened understandings.

It would be very fortunate indeed in the present crisis if we had an objective science of ethics; but we have not, and are not likely to have in the near future. Each person charged with the guidance of youth is therefore thrown back upon the responsibility of philosophizing the ethical problems of life for his young people as best he may. And in doing so, it is well to bear in mind that ethical distinctions lie in the field of social relationships and pertain to the social consequences of behavior. Conscientiousness is equivalent

to a sense of social responsibility. The science of ethics, when it does develop, will be a social science. From which it follows that the social studies in the curriculum furnish teachers with their best source of cognitive material for moral education, and the best opportunity to render such instruction implicit, objective, and convincing. By pointing out the functions of the institutions they can make clear what kinds of conduct interfere with those functions, and hence thwart the needs of life. We must have teachers competent to trace out fearlessly, frankly, and soundly the social consequences of the various types of behavior. Facts are as necessary for the coercion of the intellect in the field of morals as in any other field; and the facts relevant to the moral life are social facts. By presenting them clearly, the ethical understandings of our young people can be gradually enlightened; and from such enlightenment there should emerge, in course of time, a new consensus. This is probably the most important objective of the social studies on the secondary level.

The obvious implication of all this is that what educators need to have clearly in mind is the collective nature of the moral life. The excessive individualism of the nineteenth century has been applied to morals, as well as to other phases of life, with the result that the notion of individual responsibility has been greatly overworked. The individual's behavior is circumscribed within the limits of the "mores" of the group to which he belongs. If those "mores" condone frank graft and bloody political rivalry, as in Cæsar's time, there will be plenty of men who will indulge in such practices. If the "mores" do not condemn drunkenness, as a century and a quarter ago in New England, then some of the clergy, even,

will drink to excess. If the "mores" approve stock jugglery and market speculation, there will be many good men on the border line of even more questionable forms of money-making. If the "mores" applaud head hunting, or the rivalries of expensive fashion, the best people will indulge in these practices, with self-congratulation proportionate to their success in them. The moral level of a society is, therefore, in the quality of the prevailing "mores"; and to that level the individual members will conform, with individual variations. The task of moral regeneration, therefore, is a collective enterprise; the problem of moral education is a problem of reëducating the *social* mind. It is not merely individual youths that educators are trying to salvage morally; their larger objective is to establish nuclei for the new consensus. The secret of faith and optimism is in this point of view. Some attrition is inevitable; due to the influence of adverse groups over whom teachers have no control. But their success in safeguarding youths as individuals will doubtless be about in proportion as they can make those youths the nuclei of the new consensus. And teachers may expect their work to be cumulative. The achievements of this generation will make larger achievements possible in the next. Each teacher, like a soldier doing his bit in a great army, may be sustained by faith in ultimate victory.

The social participation theory of moral education is therefore, very superficial. Children do learn fair play by learning to play fair; and group activities do train secondary school students in coöperation. However, this is only a very small part of moral education, as we have seen. The important question is the moral quality of the activities in which the citizen, or *socius*, engages. Ne'er-do-wells and

social parasites are often the best of good fellows. There is teamwork among grafters. Those political machines that have corrupted city governments in America to their abysmal shame display the most effective sort of group coöperation imaginable; but their objectives are bad. This group activity theory has been grossly overworked of late, and in the name of sociology, at that. Neither the multiplication table nor the moral code can be taught by merely having children play together, nor by delegating one of their number to swing a stop sign on the school crossings, nor by having them make believe that they are a city council. This is the smile-without-a-face fallacy of moral education. It ignores the cognitive reality of the "mores," and the consequent necessity for teaching them. It is inferred from a superficial sociology in which there is no adequate recognition of the unnoticed contents of the social mind. It is good only as far as it goes — which is not far.

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To this point our discussion has implied the cognitive nature of the "mores." And this has been deliberate and intentional. The moral code of any given society represents the prevailing *beliefs* as to the kinds of conduct that are helpful or hurtful in their consequences, or that are acceptable or otherwise to the powers that be in heaven and earth. True, the experiences from which those beliefs were originally inferred have for the most part been forgotten. True, also, the majority imitate passively, without much active mentation in their acceptance of the "mores." Nevertheless the "mores" do root down into cognitive experiences, and the leaders of society are always busy rationalizing them.

Hence, a disintegration of the "mores" precipitates a reconsideration of the facts involved. It is for this reason that teachers of morality must so persistently bring the facts of individual and social life to bear upon their ethical instructions. They are engaged in establishing the nuclei of a new cognitive consensus.

But moral education is, after all, not only a matter of cognitive enlightenment; it is also a matter of emotional motivation. And here we come upon a problem over which there hangs a heavy cloud of pedagogical fog. It has long been recognized that the psychology governing the teaching of ideals is obscure as yet; nevertheless there are a few sources of light. In the first place we may with profit remind ourselves of the elementary principle of psychology that cognitive experiences have an emotional coloring, and, conversely, that emotions have a cognitive basis. There cannot be a smile without a face! And the affective coloring of ideas is fundamentally relative to the bearing of those ideas upon the needs and interests of the organism concerned. We are pleased with things that promote our interests; we are angry at things that thwart our purposes; we fear things that threaten to hurt or destroy us. From this it follows that the most basic, natural, and reasonable way to generate an emotional attitude toward good or bad behavior is to create a conviction of its helpfulness or harmfulness. There is no pedagogical difficulty involved in emotionalizing the attitude of intelligent young persons toward lions, tigers, mad dogs, rattlesnakes, and vicious bulls. One simply makes known to them the facts. Similarly with respect to the germs of tuberculosis, typhoid, influenza, and syphilis. And likewise also with murder, embezzlement, stealing, drunken-

ness, adultery, and lying. If the factual consequences of these types of behavior are made clear, intelligent persons will fear them with as sincere an emotion as they fear tigers, rattlesnakes, typhoid, and syphilis.

However, we encounter two difficulties in trying to make young people fear the consequences of bad behavior. The first arises from trying to frighten them about conduct that is conventionally labeled bad, but of which the bad consequences are mostly fictitious. It is natural enough that middle-aged people should try to transmit the old "mores" *en toto*, without discrimination; but there can be no greater mistake. We must quit fussing about those old-fashioned sins of which there really are no evil consequences worthy of the fuss; otherwise we shall not be able to convince young people of the deadly nature of those old-fashioned sins that really are, and always will remain, as deadly as the old traditions regarded them. The second difficulty is that we lack the insight to trace out the actual consequences of bad behavior, and the ability to present those consequences vividly to the imaginations of those we are trying to teach. The wages of real sin really are death; and moral education will be much more adequately emotionalized when young persons understand which kinds of death follow which kinds of sin, and why. In moral education there is no pedagogical necessity more fundamental than to point out the facts.

However, it has been recognized since the time of Plato that mere enlightenment is not always enough to motivate moral behavior. One of the reasons is that the consequences of behavior so often fall upon others than the agent himself. Morality is a group phenomenon; and it is normally moti-

vated by the group-integrating feelings. For this reason the psychology involved in the pedagogy of ideals will naturally remain obscure until it is attacked from the standpoint of social, rather than of individual, psychology. For what we call the conscience turns out upon inspection to be an instinctive response to social approvals and disapprovals. It is a functioning of the herd instinct. It is as natural for human beings to feel loyalty to their group, and to show responsiveness to group ideals, as it is natural for cattle and sheep to be gregarious. Those persons who talk so much about training young people into group loyalties might as well talk about teaching fish to swim. The real question is: *Which* group is the young person going to be loyal to? To some group or other he is bound to be loyal in any case; the trouble is that he is likely to accord his loyalty to a group with destructive ideals and habits. Moral motivation turns out, therefore, to be largely a problem of enticing the young person into loyalty to this group instead of that. Especially is this the case in times like ours when there are so many ethical subgroups, due to the lack of any universal moral consensus. How can this attachment of the individual to the chosen group and its "mores" be accomplished? This is the question with which we must next concern ourselves. And the answer will be found in the psychology of intra-group attractions.

The social psychology of sheer obedience under group compulsion is a neglected field of research. It would probably turn out that submission to the coercive force of one's own group, or the authorized leaders thereof, is an elemental aspect of the herd instinct. It is an experience that is probably more often satisfying and reassuring, than provocative

of resentment. Otherwise, why is the torture that college fraternities inflict upon their pledges accepted, as a rule, with such absolute acquiescence, and why does it so effectively fuse the candidate's will into the will of the group? Why can severity upon the part of parents, teachers, superintendents, and army officers sometimes elicit a respect that is almost affectionate, if only it be coupled with justice? Subordination, within the group, is doubtless as instinctive as dominance. The current individualism has led to much superficial sentimentality about breaking a child's will, the unnatural monstrosity of an appeal to fear, the nobility of independent self-direction, and the like. The facts of life are quite to the contrary. The struggle for existence is always motivated by fear; while group integration and social control are always based on ultimate coercion of some sort. We can hardly remind ourselves too often of these facts — the *Zeitgeist* is so obsessed with their denial. Hence, respect is seven-tenths fear; and the flippant person is he who does not realize what things a sensible person is bound to be afraid of.

From which it follows that, within limits, people can be made good by law — the popular aphorism to the contrary notwithstanding. A beneficient law, rigorously enforced, creates a sentiment in its own favor. We have a splendid example of this in the attitude of the so-called Russian-Germans of the Dakotas toward public school education, as contrasted with the attitude of German immigrants from Germany itself. School attendance has long been compulsory in Germany; but not in Russia. Hence Germans from Germany are loyal patrons and ardent appreciators of our schools; while Germans whose ancestors have sojourned for

a century in Russia are quite the opposite. Thus compulsory obedience is often a most effective type of moral education — provided the code enforced is intrinsically good. Moral education needs a reinstatement of discipline.

Imitation is an even more important principle in moral education than is authoritative compulsion. Human nature is so incurably social that, after all, persons influence us quite as much as facts. Our minds are as fused on the affective side as on the cognitive. We copy each other's feelings by "sympathetic radiation" as readily as we copy each other's ideas by social suggestion. Hence, as individuals, we often take our moral behavior quite largely from the examples of our associates. Also, our moral appreciations and detestations. This principle from social psychology will unquestionably prove, upon research, to have a most important bearing on the pedagogy of ideals. And especially so as regards the duller, and hence more imitative, half of the school population.

This is the core of truth in that smile-without-a-face fallacy of moral education so severely criticized above. The social phenomenon of imitation is what makes the doctrine seem plausible that moral attitudes can be imparted without a cognitive basis. Often they can, provided the cognitive basis is in the other fellow. Given a nucleus of social influence, and moral attitudes do become contagious, by non-rational imitation. But it is only on a cognitive foundation that new nuclei of reintegration can be established. And as for that non-rational, extra-cognitive inculcation of attitudes, of which we hear so much, the whole matter loses its fuzzy haze of mystery as soon as we conceive the psychology of it in terms of imitation.

In the purely imitative technique of moral education the influence of magnetic and appealing personalities must be given adequate recognition. Probably we get very close to the heart of this problem when we consider our likes and admirations for other persons. Virtue has to be incarnated or personified to make it appealing. Great religions are built around personalities; nothing else would hold them together. Hero worship has always played an important part in social integration. Doubtless it is a modification of the principle of the conditioned reflex that makes us take our ideals from persons whom we like or admire and whose approval we therefore crave. Accordingly the educator must see to it that the ideals he wishes to impart are presented to his pupils in the guise of appealing personalities. In moral education there is an important sense in which the teachers are the curriculum. Only teachers whom the pupils like and admire can have much influence over their ideals; but a likable teacher whose character is bad, is poison to them. Careful parents are very sensitive about the examples which teachers set the young people, and rightly so. Superintendents and principals cannot be too careful, therefore, about the employment and retention of teachers who combine exemplary characters and pleasing personalities. Natural leaders among the pupils themselves are of almost equally strategic importance. Great pains should be taken to see that all school activities, curricular and otherwise, are organized around those pupils whose characters harmonize with the ideals the teachers wish to inculcate. For the inculcation of ideals, the high schools have not utilized outstanding alumni as they might have done. College fraternities have shown us how instinctive such adulation is. But high school faculties

can, if they be diplomatic and tactful, select for admiration those whom they wish to have admired. Nor do teachers make the wisest use of hero worship in the teaching of history, social science, current events, art, literature, and other subjects. They make use of it, to be sure, but the traditional list of heroes is badly in need of revision. Great generals and captains of industry might well be taken down from their pedestals and other persons put in their places. Nothing is more important than the personalities our young people are induced to admire.

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Closely related to the instinctive craving for group approval is the equally instinctive impulse to function not only *with* but *for* the group. The two are but opposite sides of the same shield. The human nervous system is carpentered with such joints and braces as to make it one of the innate needs of *homo sapiens* to help hold each other up. This subjective craving is a biological concomitant of that objective interrelation and social organization which is so impressive to those who have eyes to see it. The objective results of our altruistic impulses are not for self, but for others, for society, and for the species. That personality is stunted and decimated in which those impulses are thwarted and repressed. One cannot come to full selfhood without their exercise and satisfaction. Hence the necessity that they be given opportunity to function and develop.

Hence the social instincts have a far deeper function in moral education than is usually dreamt of in the philosophy of social participation. For it is a complete misconception to suppose that self-realization is a selfish, ego-centric philoso-

phy of life. As a matter of fact, self-forgetful, altruistic idealism is the one thing that contributes a worthful meaning to existence. Whoever has observed the phenomena of human life aright, whether as revealed in history, literature, religion, or the drab commonalties of the daily round, knows full well that an individual human unit is too short-lived and too insignificant to motivate itself. The group-preserving instincts, being among the latest biological acquisitions of human nature, are less imperious and insistent than are some of the impulses more universal in animal life; and far more liable to be smothered under the crust of subversive habits. But they are the distinctly human equipment, after all, and life always suffers a vague unrest if they are thwarted.

The spiritual history of mankind abounds in illustrations of this fact. For whenever these impulses run low in the channels of social life the mill wheels of civilization tend to slow down and stop. The world weariness that settled over Græco-Roman society at the beginning of the Christian era is the classical example. Self-weariness would better express the psychology of the situation. For centuries Greek philosophy — in striking contrast with Hebrew prophecy — had been dominated by individualistic aims and valuations; and Roman militarism had carried that philosophy to its logical consummation. As a result life no longer presented any great social causes or enterprises to which men could devote themselves with utter self-abnegation, and thus find their souls. It was dominated and inspired by no great ideal from which men could draw the meaning of their individual existences. Therefore men's lives became sordid and purposeless; and from the resultant

selfishness and sensuality of individual life came the social disintegration of the times. It was partly because Christianity offered to the world-weary, self-sick spirits of men a great purpose for which they might live, suffer, and even die, — because it offered to them an invisible ideal by faith in which they might escape from the worthless insignificance of their own visible selves, — that Christianity made such a profound appeal and received so hearty and rapid a welcome. It satisfied a part of human nature that Græco-Roman civilization had been starving for several centuries. And such is always more or less the consequence of thwarting the higher social needs of man.

What we moderns need above everything else for the salvation both of our souls and of our civilization is some Great Cause in which we can believe almost to the pitch of fanaticism and to which we can give ourselves without reserve. For the rank individualism of our brash young democracies is already beginning to bear its logical fruitage. We are sick with self-seeking, and our society is rapidly approaching that dog-eat-dog dénouement which must inevitably result. For a moment it looked as if the World War, at an awful cost, was about to teach us the ancient lesson anew. All sorts of men and women were beginning to find their souls in their sacrifices for the safer, better world that was to be. Our individualistic materialism appeared to be dying. The idealism latent in the modern soul was beginning to rise to its immeasurable power, and carry on. Innumerable lives experienced a taste of the joy to miss which is, in the final appraisal of things human, to miss all. Thus, almost without knowing it, we were on the point of finding a new world view. But then the old men at Versailles and Washington poured

blindly out upon the ground what the young men had so dearly won at Château Thierry and the Argonne Forest. Meantime we awoke to the fact that the profiteers had been fattening on our patriotism, but we did not awaken to the fact that they intended to continue it. Having been thwarted and deceived as to the objectives of our devotion, we now falsely imagine that we had been *self*-deceived and folly-martyred in it; and so the spiritual reaction has set in. Disillusioned as to our supposed illusion then, we have fallen into the even deeper illusion of our present disillusionment. Never did a more virulent mental epidemic overtake a people than this fanatical reaction from our previous collective idealism and devotion. It is not the fervor of our former devotion for which we should blush, but for that blank sordidness and sensuality into which we have since relapsed. It was in that idealism, and not in this cynicism, that our better selfhood stands revealed. The truth is that for a moment we tasted the real wine of life.

For the deepest need of our souls is to feel ourselves benefactors of mankind. Only as we identify ourselves with the most sublime interests of humanity do we find a thoroughly social, and therefore the most complete, self-realization. We function as satisfied ends only through asserting ourselves voluntarily as means. History's most constructive geniuses have been those great personalities, from Jeremiah to Lincoln, who, answering the call of God in their own souls, gave themselves for the race. And they are but conspicuous types of undistinguished millions in whose breasts the same divine fire has burned. The universal and latent force of this instinct in human nature is beyond the dreams of contemporaneous theory. What marvels might be wrought in

the plastic souls of our youths if we ourselves but had the vision of a great faith! The passing generation of psychologists expatiated on the idealism of adolescence, but our high schools have scarcely made a beginning in the art of cultivating and harnessing it to social uses. What altruistic aspirations to social service might be kindled in the souls of our youth were they never deformed by the hard, misshapen fingers of a sordid, unbelieving world. A teacher before a room full of youths is standing on holy ground, for he cannot tell at what unexpected spot the divine fire may flame forth, producing a hero, a martyr, or a prophetic genius — if only he knew how to touch their souls. Upon the generation of this social idealism the progress of society depends no less than upon scientific discovery. This is the leaven that keeps institutions from hardening into tyrannies. It is the ultimate objective of moral education.

And our age offers to its youth, if they have but eyes to see it, the Greatest Cause of all time. It is that humanitarian idealism that struggles with the dragon of wealth and privilege. It is that great human pageant marching onward toward the hills of God. It is that ideal democracy of the future which the new era is laboring to bring forth. It is that far-off, divine event toward which the whole creation moves, when self-realization shall be universal. For that new philosophy of life, to which modernism is giving rise, bids us seek the meaning of life, not in the conditions of a remote past, but in that ideal world which stands at the summit of social evolution — a world so fair and good that no art can adequately présent it to the imagination. By faith that arises out of our most noble instincts do we see that consummation afar. For ages great philosophers, great poets,

and especially great prophets, have beheld its mirage in the sky. Great works of art and great systems of philosophy and theology have vaguely symbolized it. Great political and ecclesiastical organizations have blunderingly aspired to prototype it. Present day sociology sometimes tries to sketch its outlines, but they are disappointingly vague at best. Faith, however, will not be silent. For are there not moments in life when we feel our essential human nature tragically out of harmony with this selfish, sordid world, and strangely tuned to better things! What one aspires to be and is not, comforts him; because he realizes that the instinctive aspirations of his inner nature are, as it were, blue-prints within him of that better order that is yet to be upon the earth. The unutterable cravings of the human spirit are, like Plato's "ideas," invisible patterns of the ideal world that is to be. But to Plato, ideas were more than invisible patterns; they were efficient causes of what they represented. And so is our instinctive faith in the ideal world of the future. Not only do we have instincts which, if rightly nurtured, would fit us for, and therefore do predict, an ideal world; but we have latent within us the innate forces that will gradually create such a world. These creative forces are those group-preserving instincts which lead us to altruistic service and, at times, to immeasurable loyalty to social ends and group ideals so vast and unpicturable as to be fitly called the Cause of God. For the dreams of faith are but human nature's latent potentialities instinctively projecting themselves upon the screen of fancy. They are pictures of that unpicturable reality which is to be; valid symbols of we know not what! Their social function is to motivate the predestined but inconceivable achievements of the race;

to create, in short, that better world of which our faith forever dreams.

We hear a great deal nowadays about religious education; and not a little challenge of our so-called godless schools. Do not the foregoing paragraphs point the solution of the problem? For to set this vision before the souls of our young people, and to cause it to function as a motive in their lives — this *is* religious education. It postulates a great faith, which reaches out into the unknown and the unknowable — and that is the very essence of religion. Moreover, it furnishes a program of life by which the devotee may articulate his life purposes into the telic unity of the cosmos, and feel himself fellow-laborer with the Immanent Creative Intelligence. And above all it furnishes opportunity for self-sacrificing consecration to the uttermost; for what vocation is there — or relationship of modern life — in which the idealistic youth is not challenged eventually by the demon of the profits system to choose between success and his ideals? Nevertheless, this is the new and characteristic temper of the age. It is the new religion! For in this new social hope concenter all contemporaneous thought and feeling. It is the democratic passion of the times. It is the religion of all scientists. Toward this polar star point all the great movements of the period. It is the new world view, by faith in which modern man is to save his soul. And yet it is not new at all; for what is it, indeed, but the philosophy of life expounded so long ago by him who called himself the Son of Man.

CHAPTER XVII

THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE FINE ARTS

It is in the natural sciences and the fine arts that the human intellect rises to its sublimest achievements. And in the arts not one whit less than in the sciences. In the one man is a discoverer; but in the other he is a creator. Science is a means, but art is an end in itself. The new social order into which the world is coming has quite as much to expect from the fine arts as from the sciences — which is the thesis of the present chapter. The sciences furnish us bones of contention and means of mutual destruction; but nothing of the sort is ever true of the arts. They serve only to enrich the common life. However, the world comes tardily into an appreciation of æsthetic values, especially as resources by which life can be made more wholesome and satisfying for the masses. Occasionally one encounters the most obtuse and discouraging repudiation of such values. A recognized leader in American education actually declared in print [1] not many years ago that "the world could not now put noble popular art to great uses if it had it. The world has moved past the stage where art can easily render its mightiest services." The fundamental reason given for this denial was that science has taken the place of art as a means by which men are able to control their destinies. Fortunately, however, the rank and file of educators are of quite another mind,

[1] See *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1917.

judging by the growth of art instruction in the schools during the past forty years. And this is one of the most promising trends in modern education. It seems especially desirable, therefore, that educators above all others should appreciate the social function of art and art instruction, because its services are likely to be proportionate to what they teach the public to expect of it. Accordingly it would seem a laudable enterprise to set forth the social uses of the fine arts in a democratic civilization.

Before proceeding it is necessary to arrive at an understanding as to what we mean by the fine arts. The responsibility for an exact definition will be evaded. Two concepts, however, seem to be indispensable. One is beauty. We usually expect a work of art to be beautiful; and any effort to beautify the things we use or live among we usually think of as artistic work. The other indispensable concept is the expression of feeling. Art is a means of expression; but as such it is not concerned to describe facts or to relate experiences, but rather to make known how those facts and experiences cause us to feel. It does not have to do with phenomena primarily, but with values. It sets forth the ends of life. To beautify, and to express feeling: these, then, are the two indispensable qualities of art. And if one is to name the fine arts he must include, along with literature, painting, statuary, architecture, music, and the drama, such commonplace interests as landscape gardening, even of a very humble sort, the so-called domestic arts by which the home and person are adorned and personality expressed, all modern forms of picture making, æsthetic dancing, and even choice speech and urbane manners. It will be observed that this list is decidedly democratic in its scope; and that is

quite intentional, for reasons that the reader will discover as we proceed.

The first function of art is to increase human happiness. To enjoy a good book, to sit through a fine drama, to look at a beautiful garden, or to use any other product of the artist's work, is to experience genuine enjoyment. When one stops to consider how much of the modern civilized person's entertainment comes from the use of such resources, one often wonders how people managed to enjoy themselves before civilization had come to possess these things. He who has not discovered how much sheer joy there is to be derived from the fine arts in their various forms has not yet discovered the secret of civilized living. It may well be contended that the ultimate meaning of civilization is in the growing taste and facilities for such refined pleasures. This kind of happiness is one of the intrinsic values of life; to increase it, one of the ultimate objectives of social progress.

There are three reasons why art is a means of happiness. The first is our instinctive reaction to beauty. A thing of beauty is almost invariably a source of joy to a normal human being. Beauty is an ultimate good, because it meets an elemental, innate need of human nature. Its enjoyment is, therefore, an end in itself. We hardly realize how very responsive we are to beauty, and how depressed we are by ugliness. Our awareness of beauty seems to be half unconscious; we seldom bring it above the threshold, and attend to its significance overtly. But if one will count the number of times during a single day that he uses, or hears others use, the word beauty or beautiful, or some synonym or antonym of the same, he will make a startling discovery. If he will catch himself in the act of recalling some bit of beauty that he

experienced in childhood, and then hold his attention steadily upon the memory of that childhood experience for a moment, he will realize how deeply it penetrated his emotions then. For example, a gray-haired man is taking his constitutional through the city park. A squirrel, perched on the limb of a tree, with its tail plumed over its back, suddenly attracts the man's attention by barking down at him with the most vehement impudence. Instantly the dignified gentleman is a boy again, walking through the gloriously colored autumn woods, rustling the crisp brown leaves beneath his feet, and breathing in the tang of mild, woodland odors. All the sensory imagery comes back to him with the utmost vividness. He feels a choking in his throat, and tears well up into his eyes; for it comes to him like the pangs of an old grief that the fresh young response to beauty can never be his again. By considering such experiences we discover how deeply beauty penetrated us in our youth, even though we were strangely unaware of it at the time. And conversely, ugliness sometimes sets up in us the most painful and distressing complexes. From such considerations it follows that whatever adds to the beauty of our surroundings adds to the joy of life. And that is the aim of democracy, is it not! The modern world has yet to learn that beauty, whether natural or artificial, is quite as fruitful a source of joy as liberty or wealth.

It was in the school of evolution that we were tuned to our instinctive love of beauty. For nature is a prodigious decorator; and so long as man lived in an unspoiled natural environment his sense of beauty was generously provided for. But is it not part of the irony of progress that our new economic order has produced ugliness by wholesale? It makes "industrial areas," "slum sections," "railroad dis-

tricts," "the smoke nuisance," and the "noise of traffic." What vast expanses of hideousness these phrases, all together, connote! How large a fraction they cover of the area of our cities! As for the country, there are "mining towns," "railroad towns," "mill towns," and "oil regions." Even the ordinary rural village, which might easily be made charmingly beautiful, is often hideous enough, with its unpainted, ramshackle buildings, its weed-grown fence corners, its dusty, unmown streets, its untidy yards, and its piles of compost and old machinery. And as for the farmers, how prone they are to put the house in front of the garden, the stable in front of the house, and the barnyard in front of the stable — with junk and rubbish scattered everywhere.

It seems almost as if we made a cult of ugliness, in these raw, young, western settlements of ours. Whether it is due to the incubus of Puritan asceticism, or the onus of peasant poverty, or our busy haste to exploit the resources of nature, or our materialistic ideals of life, at any rate, ugliness quite unnecessarily pervades our architecture, our dress, our household furnishings, the outdoor environment of our homes and business places, and even our speech and manner. It is not uncommon to hear expressions of plebeian contempt for beauty and the fine arts. The quotation with which this chapter begins is a humiliating example. All this is at once the heritage of ignorance and the price of industrial progress.

And all this hideousness serves but to thwart the joy of life. Our nerves are spoiled by the roar of trains and trucks, the crash and clatter of machinery, the discordant voices of the crowd. The abyss of bare brick walls, the wind-swept expanse of graveled roofs, and the ever present pall of smoke, make us prematurely old. How terribly depressing it must

be to live always, even in childhood, in an environment of rough pavements, foul smells, harsh, discordant noises, rubbish, smoke, and dust. How monstrously are personalities crippled and deformed by a rural environment made hideous by filthy shiftlessness, by the ghastly erosion of plowed and treeless hillsides, and by the complete absence of all art! In the slums of the cities the dejected old men and women whom one encounters show plainly by their dress, posture, and gait that they have long since relinquished their inherent rights in loveliness and beauty. And how pathetic are the last frantic struggles often made by the adolescent sons and daughters of the poor to rescue those natural rights from the grasping clutches of ruthless circumstance! As ignorant as they are poor — and the former, at least, through no fault of their own, as a rule — their tragedy often drives them to freaks of dress that are as ludicrous and even silly as they are desperate; for democracy has failed to teach them how beauty can be inexpensively achieved.

Has not the time arrived to develop a cult of beauty? Numerous groups and agencies might well participate in promoting it. The schools and colleges should take the lead. Indeed, there are numerous indications that a sort of renascence is beginning. Best of all is the intelligent teaching of art in the elementary schools. The high school, also, has made creditable beginnings. Even the colleges show some symptoms, here and there, of extricating themselves from the ruts of the so-called cultural subjects and of introducing subjects of real culture. For when it comes to the real culture of a democracy what is more worthful and significant than to teach the rising generation how to have beautiful clothing, beautiful furniture, beautiful yards and

gardens, beautiful villages, cities, and farms, and even how to retain their own beauty of face and figure as they grow old? To banish the hideousness that tortures the sensibilities of the people, especially the poor, and spread beauty in its place; to substitute a love for simple beauty and refined simplicity for the vulgar and expensive rivalries of the rich; to render the application of artistic principles as usual in our visible environment as scientific principles are in our industry; — would soothe the nerves of the restless multitudes, increase the sum total of human happiness, and take the rasp out of some of our most exasperating social discords.

The second reason why art is a means of happiness lies in its service in helping us to express our feelings. This is so hard to explain — and psychologically so obscure — that we shall hardly succeed in doing more than to hint at it here. The crux of the matter seems to be our constant efforts to conceal our feelings. In a civilized society, that is supposed to be the thing to do. Nobody "wears his heart on his sleeve"; it is supposed to be bad form. We seem to feel that we should only succeed in making ourselves ridiculous if we tried to express our feelings. Now it may be that one reason for this reticence lies in the inadequacy of our own individual powers of expression — in that dumb and inarticulate impotency of utterance from which we all suffer. This explanation may be inferred from the fact that we feel no shame about the feelings themselves when expressed in the borrowed and impersonal medium of art. It falls in with this theory that the trait is much less noticeable among the more artistic peoples of continental Europe. But we conceal our deepest emotions rather than to distort and

caricature them. There is in the Institute of Fine Arts in Chicago a piece of statuary entitled "The Loneliness of the Soul," which very effectively expresses this painful isolation of the individual.

And this practice of concealment reacts upon our personalities in ways that are quite impossible to describe. We bottle up our feelings and churn them into complexes that might perhaps be avoided if we could only express them. Or we stifle and kill out our finest emotions, and so fill ourselves with a tangle of inhibitions. As a result we present to our associates a front entirely different from what we would present if we could only express our real feelings. Naturally we get from them a response entirely different from what we would get if they knew us as we really are — a response that is sterile of sympathy and appreciation. From this it follows that art, if it can furnish us an adequate means of self-expression, will accordingly liberate and enrich our personalities, and so increase our happiness. And who has not observed from his own experience that this is exactly what art does do for us? There are bits of verse that we like to memorize and recite, pictures that we want to hang upon our walls, or songs that we love to sing, because by their use we feel ourselves saying: "Ah, is it not so, and how satisfying such an experience is, indeed!" And who has not, by the mutual use of art, found himself quite *en rapport* with some habitual associate, whom he had scarcely found before.

There is a third way in which the fine arts are a means of happiness, and that is by offering opportunity for the exercise of our creative impulses. In the foregoing pages we have been thinking about the utilization of art; but almost all normal persons would undertake creative work in some field

of the fine arts if they were properly encouraged. Too often there is a sort of unconscious implication in our attitude toward young people that it would be presumptuous conceit upon their part to write poetry, or compose music, or carve statuary, or plan a drama. It runs in the popular psychological mythology that such work is only for born geniuses, and we are inclined to accord either ridicule or adulation to the youth who attempts it. But there is really no more sense in taking such an attitude in the case of art than in the case of science; and we never do that. We ought, instead, to make every child feel that nothing is more natural and proper than for him to undertake creative work on his own account, without any self-consciousness as to his born genius, and with almost never any thought of publicity or a career. It is a very hopeful trend in modern education that we are doing exactly that to a very much greater degree than we did thirty years ago.

Irrespective of the terms in which the psychologist would set forth his explanation, the fact is that creative activity and achievement furnish one of the keenest and most rememberable kinds of joy that human life can experience. There are two main fields in which we can seek that joy: one is our work; the other is the fine arts. The former is seldom accessible to children — though our schools, in contrast with those of some other countries, neglect the opportunity of emphasizing the pride of workmanship in connection with the ordinary school studies. With the mechanization of industry and the intricate division of labor this type of joy is precluded to many adults. But art is open to all. And the joy is undeniable. Who does not remember with joy and pride something that he created in his youth? Who-

ever has failed to observe this joy in children has missed one of the most significant things in life. Here is a youngster who is always busying himself with the construction of something electrical. Here is one who is always inventing melodies, scribbling them down on ruled paper, harmonizing them, and playing them on the piano. Here is another who trains his dog to draw him on his sled, or breaks a team of calves to drive in a yoke. And another who, in a group of associates interested in music, discovers that he himself has a special aptitude perhaps for drawing or working with pastel. To see a youth achieve self-realization through the putting into form and action of what his own mind has conceived, is an inspiration, to say the least. And for such endeavor the field of art is always easily accessible. Moreover, the supply of this commodity is unlimited; what one enjoys subtracts nothing from what is left for all the rest. There is much lost motion, to be sure; but it is harmless. And often a significant self-discovery does occur, especially under the right sort of guidance and instruction.

At this point let us make a short detour into the theory of pedagogical method. We have heard a good deal in recent pedagogy about the encouragement of initiative and self-direction, much of which is a little puzzling to a sociologist. For there are numerous kinds of anti-social behavior to which society dare not leave children and youth to their own devices. Preparation for civilized life involves the suppression of such impulses. Whoever has read the literature of social control has lost his squeamishness about "breaking a child's will" when it comes to such behavior. There is nothing to be gained, and much to be lost, by acquiescence in the obsessions of the *Zeitgeist* on this subject. As for the

acquisition of factual knowledge, thinking for themselves often leads young people intellectually astray. For a devotee of the scientific technique of fact finding, it is hard to see what virtue there is in intellectual self-direction when it leads to nothing but misinformation. When it comes to the cold facts of nature and life, it is better to be right than to be original. There is nothing to be gained by deluding ourselves on that point either. But there always remains creative endeavor in the field of art. Here no harm can result from erratic and eccentric ventures. Limitless quantities of worthless product would of course result; but what of that? Whereas any joy that might accrue has a subjective validity that cannot be gainsaid; while under the guidance of real insight, talent, or even genius, might occasionally be uncovered. Would it not clarify our whole philosophy of self-direction and initiative if we were to recognize the fine arts as the principal fields for the exercise of those propensities?

In this connection educators may be interested in a criticism, parenthetically inserted, that one sometimes hears from artists, especially from those of the younger generation who hope to see America come to herself, so far as art is concerned, during their lifetime. They declare that America is being sterilized artistically by the soft pedagogy of the schools from which they themselves have so recently been graduated. Their contention is that it requires an almost incalculable amount of tedious practice to acquire the technique of any fine art; and that the aspiring young artist must do this practice in early youth, or he will be very unlikely to achieve proficiency later. The youth who will do the necessary work voluntarily and on his own initiative

is very rare indeed; and hence much potential artistic talent and even genius go to waste because promising children are not held rigorously to much hard practice. These critics have only the most promising children in mind; but for such children they claim that much intensive drill in adolescence is the *sine qua non* of real achievement later. Such rigorous drill, under more or less parental compulsion, is the secret, they claim, of Europe's superiority in creative artistic achievement. And these critics simply laugh at the idea that, for mere commonplace technical skill in music, or any other art, sufficient drill can be "motivated" in the ordinary child. This criticism is at least worth considering, if only because it does run so contrary to our current pedagogical cults.

The second social function of the fine arts is a derived or reflected function. It is an important aid to morals. And this in two ways: negatively and positively. Negatively, it serves as a preventive of vice by furnishing a counter attraction. This is a social application of that simple old device of furnishing children something interesting to do in order to keep them out of mischief. If a person has the taste, opportunity, and habit for good literature, good music, good drama, and the more plebeian arts, including flower gardening, his carnal and anti-social impulses are much less likely to get the upper hand of him. It works that way in family life, as many readers must have observed. If children are diligently and intelligently brought up on good reading, good music, good movies, and good flower gardens, their moral education is much less likely to develop problematical aspects. Not that these things are sufficient in themselves; but other things being equal, the use of these resources is an

immense advantage. It works with communities. The difference is easily discernible between two otherwise similar communities, in only one of which use is made of bands, orchestras, dramatics, and the like (combined with good outdoor sports) as means of recreation. If two such communities are rural the difference registers itself in the price of farm lands, due to the superior desirability of the one neighborhood as a place in which to live and rear a family.

And historically speaking the same difference is apparent in national comparisons. In this connection it might be pertinent to quote from one of our standard sociologists. Says Professor Hayes: "There is no little truth in the view of Professor Patten that man lives at first in a pain economy. That is to say, his activity is called out mainly in efforts to ward off hunger, cold, mysterious disease, hostile beasts, and more hostile men; such pleasures as he enjoys are mainly those connected with the functioning of the instincts necessary to survival. Later, having subdued nature to his uses, he enters upon a pleasure economy, in which the motive of his activity is not the avoidance of pain but the securing of pleasures. Various people have entered upon a pleasure economy for a brief period of glory, only to sink rapidly into decay. The lasting welfare and progress of a society which has entered upon a pleasure economy depends in part upon the strength of its virtues, but it depends also and perhaps still more upon the popularization of the innocent and ennobling pleasures." [1] It follows that a civilization may be gauged by the character of its popular amusements. And if this be true, the increasing popular use of the fine arts in

[1] *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, p. 656.

their best forms turns out to be one of the very most hopeful trends of our civilization.

The moral value of art is positive as well as negative. Not only may it serve to divert attention from those interests which might otherwise degrade us; it may also serve to strengthen the best impulses, aspirations, and feelings of human nature. The psychological principle is that the expression of a good impulse helps to fix it in the nervous system, and so make it an established part of the personality. That the appropriate and satisfying expression of ennobling emotions tends to make us noble seems to be a sort of inverse corollary of the James-Lange theory. Such expression is, as we have seen, the essential function of the fine arts. Those pedagogues are right, therefore, who have children memorize fine bits of literature, and who encourage youths to recite noble literary selections in the belief that these practices help to form ideals. It does make a difference what sort of pictures hang on the walls of a home; and the subtle influence of music doubtless does penetrate to the very depths of the soul for good or evil. A few well-conceived pieces of statuary or works of architecture displayed about a city may have an effect upon the ideals of the citizens which is as real as it is difficult to measure.

For fifteen hundred years, in occidental civilization, religion has been the chief reliance for the motivation of morality. Without implying that the function of religion is likely to decline, except relatively, it may be asserted that art is capable of doing as much for morality in the future as religion has done in the past. Indeed, this function of the fine arts can hardly be overestimated.

The third function of the fine arts, or rather of their utili-

zation by all the people, is to allay social friction and help to produce social harmony. It is the familiar principle of fellowship and good will through common interests. For two or more persons to enjoy the same thing together tends to unite them in a fellow feeling. This is why it is well for father and sons to play together, or for a faculty group to meet together socially from time to time. The mutual enjoyment of art seems to be more productive of this effect than almost an other mutual joy.

Ruskin [1] suggested that class distinctions would be hard to maintain in a society where art was appreciated and enjoyed alike by all classes. And this is a very great truth of which our modern democracies have scarcely caught a glimpse as yet. Of course class stratification is almost always caused, or at least perpetuated, by an economic system which distributes the products of industry unevenly; and it is absurd to suppose that such stratification could be abolished merely by a common sharing by all classes in the use of the fine arts; but it can be mitigated. Certainly such social abuses can never be abolished by economic reforms alone. Social homogeneity depends in the last analysis upon cultural homogeneity; that is, upon the common use of the arts and sciences by all members of society. The hope of democracy will remain a pier of wishes and a span of dreams until this principle of cultural homogeneity is fully realized. There can never be a real political democracy except on the basis of an economic democracy; and neither political nor economic democracy can be successful except on the basis of a cultural democracy.

The fourth function of art is in connection with the great

[1] *A Crown of Wild Olives*, Lecture II, "Traffic."

national ideals; and this is peculiarly the function of great art. Every great society has its great dominating ideals. These great ideals are among the most important possessions of any people; because they are the generally accepted ends of endeavor, and hence predetermine the collective life. To present and visualize these ideals before the imaginations of the people is the function of a nation's great art. Thus the architecture, sculpture, and mural decorations of ancient Assyria and Rome symbolized their ideals of militaristic empire. The graceful statuary of the Greeks set forth their æsthetic conceptions of human value. The great mediæval cathedrals were visible representations of that righteous authority over mundane affairs which was supposed to be exercised by the ideal and infinite but invisible world. One of the most effective ways to study history is, therefore, to study the characteristic art of historic peoples, since that introduces the student to the very inner secrets of their lives. Whoever is familiar with the great art of the great historic peoples is acquainted with the great ideals that have motivated men in the various ages of their noblest collective endeavor.

It is a fundamental philosophical blunder to regard art as a means. The difference between ends and means was a basic tenet of William James, and the distinction is as old as the history of philosophy itself. Now it is precisely the function of art to set forth the ends of life, whereas it is the function of science to furnish the means of attaining them. The ends of life contain postulates which can never be scientifically verified because of the elements of futurity and experiment involved in them. The imagination of the artist is the indispensable factor in his work; by it he pioneers the

unsurveyed fields of human potentialities. The two functions are as different as the functions of brain and hand. It is absurd, therefore, to assert that "in all the major fields of endeavor art as means is steadily to be replaced by science." The advance of science can never discount art in its function of presenting great ideals.

And in our age great art, instead of being useless, has a service to perform that is both unique and vital. It is unique because no other agency can possibly perform it; it is vital because the success of the new régime depends upon it. That service is in connection with the titanic clash of great ideals in our age. For in the crisis of the present transition a great spiritual epic is being enacted. In our modern life two great ideals are struggling for dominance: the wealth ideal and the manhood ideal. The wealth ideal exalts the economic process, subordinating all man's other innate needs thereto. Its motto is: Seek ye first the kingdom of wealth, and all things needful will be added thereunto. This motto is the grand illusion; for the wealth ideal knows no limit to its greed. It grinds up the manhood on which it feeds until it destroys the social system itself in which it dominates. It is a blind Samson, that eventually pulls down the temple of life upon itself and its associates. Its opponent in the contemporaneous Armageddon is the humanitarian ideal, which exalts the individual, and sanctions his right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The humanitarian ideal subordinates the wealth process to the level of means and exalts manhood to the level of ends. It postulates the limitless potentialities of the human spirit and the indefinite perfectibility of human society. This ideal is the core of both democracy and Christianity, struggling for

self-expression in our modern life. Ours is the first epoch in history to have espoused this great ideal; it is the unique spiritual feature of modernism. The destiny of the next ten centuries, for well-being or misery, is involved in the struggle between the wealth ideal and the humanitarian ideal.

Never, therefore, was there greater need for great art to promote a great ideal. The heart of humanity yearns unutterably for a safer world, a truer democracy, a squarer deal. But how sordidly the ideal is conceived, how vaguely its forms are discerned, how selfishly its blessings are desired, and how loutishly its ends are confused with the shameless envies and the sensual passions of the passing whim. Was there ever so splendid an enterprise as for imposing and illustrious art to clarify the incoherent vision of the present age, and mobilize our wills into effective causal relation thereto? How long must we wait for that Utopian to-morrow? That may depend largely upon how well religion and art meet their responsibilities and perform their services in the present crisis. If art of the right sort is forthcoming, the struggle of the new social order to actualize its unspeakable and glorious potentialities will not be in vain. If there be young men and women, therefore, who aspire to first-class creative work in any of the fields of art, never has an age held out to such a more opportune and challenging occasion. But first let them make sure that they really do participate in the great humanitarian aspirations of the age, and feel the epochal magnitude of the impending issues; for how can one become a great artist if the message of no great world movement speaks through him and his medium?

Such appear to be the social functions of the fine arts. If the foregoing is an approximately correct apprehension of

the facts, the reader is ready to set his imagination at work upon the question of what kind of a world this might be made by an extensive, democratic utilization of the fine arts. Ever since Crô-Magnon etched and painted the now extinct animals of his chase upon the walls of his caverns, art has been slowly, very slowly, coming to its own. Only at rare intervals has it progressed rapidly. A resource of the masses its use has almost never been; but rather a badge of exclusive privilege. But now there begins a new era. Mark its inception by the use of machines, or by the new scientific method of the intellect, or by the rise of political democracy — or mark it instead by the new access of all the people to the use of art. By the last token as surely as by either of the others is this age in which we live the beginning of a new régime.

For, so far as the utilization of the fine arts is concerned, the world is rapidly on the way to better things. And the most encouraging aspect of this movement is the growth of art instruction in our public schools. If one craves to be an optimist in spite of lowering clouds in the social sky, let him turn his attention here. In many of our cities the kindergartens and primary schools are, to paraphrase Walter Besant's figurative terms, veritable colleges of juvenile art and miniature palaces of delight. Art appears to be rapidly on its way to as large a place as the sciences in our elementary grades, high schools, and colleges; and that will be a reasonable balance. If the present trends continue music alone will soon have an even larger share of the high school pupil's time than mathematics; which is as it should be, since music is a universal language, while algebra and geometry are the technical tools of specialists. Far from being "fads and

frills," the fine arts are fundamental. A similar trend is to be detected in the colleges and universities. The Greek department is compensating itself by offering highly educative and much appreciated courses in Greek art; while the home economics department is emphasizing the domestic arts. Music is represented, though too often isolated from the other arts and tucked off in a corner of the academic college, without official appreciation of its importance. Dramatics and architecture are also recognized, though the former is usually a non-accredited activity under quasi-professorial direction, while the latter is too often submerged under technical engineering. The trend is so encouraging that the time may not be far distant when scholarships will be as available at the universities for promising young artists as they now are for promising young scientists, and when creative work in the fine arts will be as acceptable for advanced degrees as is scientific research.

Here and there one occasionally encounters a most encouraging administrative appreciation of the fine arts and their place in civilization. How exhilarating it is to sit down with a university president and hear him talk about his "autonomous college of fine arts," in which each branch is represented by the most viable artists available, and the organization is such as to shut out cold intellectualism and foster creative work in the true artistic spirit. As fast as we become truly civilized all educational leaders will share this vision and take this attitude, and precisely because they do, shall we truly civilized become.

The ground of hope is not only in these promising trends, but in the latent talent of the masses. But to date one of the most lamentable of all the wastes of our wasteful young

civilization is the potential artistic ability that is permitted to lie latent among the common people, utterly undiscovered and undeveloped. Who can for a moment suppose that Oberammergau is the only village with talent, if it were only developed, to produce great drama? The dormant resources of that little village were awakened; that is all! There is undoubtedly the same latent ability everywhere. And not only in drama, but in opera, symphony, or what not. At the most unexpected moment any teacher is likely to encounter potential creative genius in any of the graphic or the plastic arts, in music, literature, or any other branch. The teacher who develops latent talent is a useful member of his community; he who uncovers a real genius that might otherwise be lost to society, is a benefactor of the human race. If only we taught school as did the ancient Greeks!

Three centuries ago Sir Frances Bacon tried to forecast what science might be expected to contribute to the welfare of mankind. Some of his guesses were uncanny; but if even Bacon could come back to earth to-day and see what science actually has achieved he would be utterly dumbfounded. And if some prophet of the arts were to predict, as Bacon did of science, what the fine arts are capable of contributing to life he would fall as far short as Bacon did. In lieu of any more effective words, therefore, the rhetoric must be content to repeat the assertion with which we began: that the new supercivilization into which the world is struggling to arrive has at least as much to expect from the fine arts as from the sciences during the next four or five centuries.

CHAPTER XVIII

LEADERSHIP AND THE LIBERAL ARTS COLLEGE

Social leadership is, in a word, the function of the liberal arts college. To furnish society with an intellectual élite who are qualified to take the lead in the formulation of a wise public opinion on all the problems of modern life — or at least as well qualified collectively as the knowledge extant in any given generation can make them. It has always been the function of higher education to train the officers of the social army. In former ages such training was limited to the official classes of church and state; and since those classes had authority instead of mere influence, education was an exclusive privilege of theirs. Relevant to this principle, the educational developments of the Reformation period are significant. In Catholic countries the Counter Reformation led to a renascence of higher education for the ecclesiastical leaders. Protestantism, on the contrary, introduced the new principle of popular literacy, on the theory that the individual was, through access to the Bible, to become the guide of his own thought — a principle whose magnitude proved too staggering for achievement, however. As time goes on it is becoming ever more evident that there is no substitute for enlightened leadership, whether in religion or in other fields of human thought and action. The shift from authority to mere influence calls for the education of the masses, to be sure; but mass education can never do more

than provide for intelligent followership. Real intellectual leadership is even more important, now that authority is waning, than ever before. Indeed, it is the *sine qua non* of democracy, the vital organ of a free society. To furnish it is the unique and indispensable function of the liberal arts college. There is no more important unit in our educational system.

The social psychology of leadership would furnish a most interesting topic for descriptive writing. There still runs current in the popular mythology the notion of the born leader who is endowed by nature with some supernormal traits by which he throws the spell of an hypnotic magnetism over all with whom he comes in contact. He carries the waving plume of leonine pompadour; or he thrusts his hand into the bosom of his coat with a cocksure dignity beyond the unaided possibility of any mere human shrimp; or he knows every man-jack in Rome by his first name; or he can split a man "from A to izzard" with one swing of his cleaver; or he shakes hands with the locomotive engineer at the end of every railroad journey; or he is known to write a letter every day by hand to his dear old mother back in the old home town. This worship of the magnetic or imposing personality is as old as time. In the quaint folk lore of ancient Israel we find an interesting example. We read:

> Now there was a man of the tribe of Benjamin whose name was Kish; and he had a son whose name was Saul, a choice young man and goodly; and there was none among the children of Israel a comelier person than he; for from his shoulders and upward he was higher than any of the people. And Samuel sent messengers to Saul and fetched him thence; and when he stood among the people and the people saw him, that he was goodlier than any of the young men of Israel, and higher than any of the people from his shoulders and upward, then the people lifted up their

voices with a great shout. And all the people took Saul and fetched him unto Gilgal; and there they sacrificed sacrifices of peace offerings before the Lord; and there Saul and all the men of Israel rejoiced greatly, and drank new wine before the Lord in Gilgal. And Samuel said unto all the people: See ye him whom the Lord hath chosen, that there is none like him among all the people; for behold he is higher from his shoulders and upward than all the people. And all the people shouted with a great shout and long: God save the king!

It does not appear in the sequel that Saul's surplus height was due to cerebral elevation; for, as a king and statesman, he was not sufficiently successful even to organize his own dynasty, which gave way before the rise in popular acclaim of a clever young campfollower from the hills, who rang the bell of fame by potting an overgrown Philistine bully with his slingshot. And so it has ever been from ancient times till now. With the aid of the modern press the born leader and popular hero can nowadays be made to order. The merest rubber stamp of a manikin has only to have employed for him a staff of shirt stuffers versed in the practical psychology of newspaper "applesauce," and a puppet of the plutocracy becomes to the populace a veritable incarnation of the profoundest erudition, provided only that he be taciturn enough to keep his mouth shut.

In simpler times, when a small, face-to-face group had to be emotionalized to individual and collective courage, such traits doubtless had an instinctive appeal that was socially very useful. But for the exigencies of modern democracies they have a very minor, and sometimes even a negative, utility. They are likely, indeed, to divert attention away from qualities of really valuable leadership. Our problems are those of peace rather than of war. They are technical, rather than emotional, and involve the application of much

accurate knowledge. We in the United States need for leaders experts who know, rather than heroes who dare. For we now have such problems to solve as whether immigration should be restricted or unrestricted, whether income taxes should be stiffly or mildly graduated to large incomes, to what extent the sex code ought to be modified, how lenient the laws ought to be relative to divorce, in what proportion education ought to be financed and influenced by the Federal Government, whether the power of the judiciary ought to be restricted or not, whether women should be encouraged in entering the gainful occupations, whether or not syncopated rhythm ought to be regarded as a contribution to music, whether the open or closed shop parallels the lines of real democracy, and so forth. These are samples upon the correct solution of which our future welfare depends. We need leaders of the sort that can conduct us toward such correct solutions. The necessary appeal is not, therefore, to the senses and emotions of persons present in small, face-to-face groups, but to the intellects of persons distant from the leader, scattered over the areas of a great country. The very success of democracy depends upon the substitution of the new type of leadership for the old. Leadership based upon an instinctive appeal must give place to leadership based upon the appeal of the enlightened intellect. The naïve hero worship of the old instinctive sort is a relic of barbarism, and as ludicrous as it is dangerous. And so is the old superstition that somehow or other God sends his man to meet the hour. For democracy may no longer put its trust in the supernatural; its success must be won by the hard labor of the intellect — or else be forfeited! To produce this kind of leadership is the function of the aca-

demic college; and that function is of a growing importance proportionate to the growing need for such leadership in the new civilization.

The problem of providing intellectual leadership has two aspects, only one of which is to be discussed in this chapter. The other is the problem of providing followership; but that will be reserved for a later chapter.

Let us first define with somewhat more precision exactly what we mean by social leadership. The leaders of a great society are those who conceive, formulate, and direct the general policies of that society. The prevailing beliefs and ideals are what they determine. Every society has its policies, that is to say, its generally accepted programs of behavior; and those policies are the action phase of its beliefs and ideals. Moreover, each individual life program is a sort of private inference from those public policies. For example, the American nation has its official policies relative to immigration, prohibition, taxation, diplomacy, the regulation of corporations, the toleration of radical propaganda, the encouragement of agriculture, and so forth. It also has its unofficial policies relative to respect for law, the encouragement of art, the double standard in morals, parental authority, toleration of races and religions, the extent of charity, and what not. With respect to each of these policies there are persons of the sort that Professor Ross calls the radiant points of influence. They are the leaders of a democratic society. Sometimes their prestige is due to their official positions; more often it is due to other factors. The central problem of democracy is to produce persons who are capable of wise leadership in all such matters of public policy; and to set them on pedestals of prestige. The prime function of the

academic college is to see that there is a plentiful supply of persons equipped for such leadership. Whether they be looked up to and followed is the responsibility of other agencies.

What is now the intellectual equipment necessary to such leadership? Let us try to answer this question in the terminology already established in the present work. First, they must enjoy a wide familiarity with all the intellectual resources of civilization. Not only must they know what these resources are; but they must also know their uses. They must know what science is, and what it is good for. They must have an acquaintance in the fields of the fine arts that will reveal to them the benefits to be derived from the use of the arts. They must be able to distinguish, as wisely as the light of their times permits, between true and false beliefs in all fields; and between sound and unsound ideals. They must be the best judges living in their age as to what revisions the "mores" and the "folkways" need.

Second, they must know the institutions of society. They must understand, and duly appreciate, the functions of each. They must be aware of the trends of change in all of them; and, more important still, they must know whether those trends are good or bad. They must know what social movements ought to be checked, and what ones ought to be promoted. Or, at least, their judgment in all such matters must be in advance of the rank and file of their contemporaries. Only by possessing these kinds of knowledge can they advise their day and generation as to what the collective policies and programs ought to be, and set wholesome examples as to how individual lives ought to be lived.

The next step in our argument is to point out how opposite such equipment is from specialization. There is no highly

specialized expert in the whole gamut who is competent to exercise the kind of leadership described above. As well expect a smart child who has learned to recognize the king of hearts to play the game of solitaire. Nor can a commission of experts solve such a problem; any more than a dozen children, each of which has learned one card, could play the game of bridge. The expert musician will have his peculiar, one-sided notions; the expert engineer, his; the expert accountant, his; and the expert psychiatrist, his. Put them all together and you get a hodgepodge compromise, but not a rational synthesis. What the social leader needs to understand is *relationships*. He must be a synthesizer — a philosopher in the sense described in the first chapter of this book. His responsibility is to prescribe for society a *balanced* ration; and that he cannot do unless his knowledge is generalized and comprehensive. We fail to see this fact nowadays because our minds are enslaved to the specialization fetish of our times. We need specialists for innumerable functions, both public and private; but a social policy is a *coördination* of those functions; and none of the specialists involved is capable of conceiving such coördinations wisely, unless he is at the same time something more than a mere specialist.

The function of generalized knowledge, as against specialized, bears emphasis in our day, just because of the prevailing obsession. No specialist can direct all the varied interests of his own life by the expert knowledge of his own specialty, whether he be a dentist, a poultry judge, a violoncellist, a lawyer, an auctioneer, or whatever. Nor does he do it by consulting other specialists. However many specialists he might consult it remains for him to *synthesize*

their advice and services into a philosophy and program of life. And the synthesis is as important as the advice. Unless it is reasonably well done the person's behavior will suggest the suspicion of insanity. And it is the same with our collective life; it has to be synthesized; and to do that wisely requires a knowledge of all the parts and their relationships. To direct an individual, or the social life, and nourish it with a well-balanced program of interests, the directing mind must understand the *relationships* that exist among the institutions, the *relationships* that exist among the various intellectual resources, and the *relationships* between the institutions and the intellectual resources. The social leader must know what the subjective needs of *homo sapiens* are, and by what objective elements of culture those needs can be provided for. There is the same difference between such expertness and ordinary specialization as there is between the expertness of a dietitian and that of a specialized cook, say of meats or of pastries. He must be an expert in the proper balance of cultural utilization.

Let us summarize the argument to this point. Our major premise is that the unique function of the academic college is to provide society with enlightened leadership. Our minor premise is that such leadership involves as broad and extensive a knowledge as possible of all the social institutions and intellectual resources of our collective life. The obvious conclusion is that the academic college has the unique and important task of specializing students in nothing, but of generalizing their knowledge, instead, as comprehensively and yet as thoroughly as possible.

But before following this principle out to its implications we must turn aside to expostulate with the *Zeitgeist*. For our

thinking relative to the academic college and its functions is lamentably confused by the vocational demands that a materialistic age is making upon that institution. The demands themselves may be legitimate enough, for the most part, and ought to be provided for by some unit or other of our system. Perhaps, indeed, they might be taken care of in a double-purpose academic college; but in that case there should be no confusion of thought as to the radical difference between the *two* functions. However, such clarity of distinction seems to be well-nigh hopeless; for some of the inferences now being drawn from these vocational demands are certainly inimical to the larger social welfare. In crowded tenements the convenience of the bathtub as a storage receptacle is so insistent as to result in its abandonment for its own peculiar function; and there are statistical researchers who mistake the fact that that is so, for evidence quite beyond all question that so it *ought* to be. And something of the sort is happening to the liberal arts college because of its convenience as a catch-all for vocational functions not otherwise provided for. It is one thing for educational science to tabulate and chart this tendency; but to concede to its social desirability is quite another matter.

In every great university the liberal arts college is called upon to administer certain preprofessional curricula. Premedical and prelaw are conspicuous examples. Special vocational training courses are also being organized in the arts colleges: business, music, social service, teaching, journalism, and various others. Sometimes these develop into special schools in the college; sometimes into autonomous colleges. Also each department is intensely interested in the training of specialists in its own field who will make a pro-

fession of research, teaching, or some commercial service. And all of this makes a strong appeal to students who, as they approach maturity, naturally feel the vocational urge. Moreover, it raises the question in the minds of professors and deans as to whether the function of the arts college is vocational or cultural, or some compromise of both. The total result is much unclarity of thought and confusion of purpose, in which the values of higher education of the liberal sort tend to be lost sight of. Thus the facts of life destroy its values.

Right here we come upon a curious and unfortunate situation to be observed in some of our great universities. Because of the stake that the graduate school has in whatever research may be accomplished by professors in the academic college there is a tendency toward the subordination of the latter to the former. Professors are selected, encouraged, and retained in the undergraduate academic college almost entirely on the bases of their services to the graduate school. Thus the objectives of the college of liberal arts are submerged and smothered out, research is encouraged at the expense of teaching, and productive scholarship inadvertently joins the enemies of liberal education on the level that might produce competent leaders of public opinion and policy. And in all this the deans and professors of the senior academic college passively acquiesce because they are visionless as a rule to the social function of their own institution. Under such academic leadership the liberal arts college is being administered from the graduate office, men with latent capacity for great teaching are being driven out of the profession, and young people are going four years to college without getting a real education.

The solution of this tangle as to what the academic college

exists for and ought to be doing doubtless involves many problems that will have to be worked out by detailed research; but that research will give democracy a worse instead of a better system of education unless certain fundamental principles are constantly held in mind with great clarity. Education for leadership in a society like ours is radically different from specialized vocational training; and education for leadership is a most vital need of our society. The growing complexity of life calls for a lengthened training for the function of leadership, and for a growing percentage of citizens so trained. The arguments for the junior college organization of the first two college years would seem to have no bearing whatsoever on the social desirability of the leadership function of the senior college. And as for vocational demands upon the arts college, the one thing that they must not blind us to is the increasing necessity for the art college's contribution to social leadership. Let these vocational objectives be organized however they may, it remains that the outstanding, prime, and incomparable responsibility of the academic college is to qualify superior citizens for social leadership. Unless that institution comes out of the present confusion with that function greatly augmented democracy will be jeopardized and civilization hypotheticated. Because we have problems to solve.

There is not a little talk nowadays in very influential circles that the growth of liberal education on the secondary level is rendering college education less necessary. The senior college is being rendered functionless and obsolete as an institution of general culture, we are told,[1] by the

[1] See L. V. Koos, *The Junior College*, Pt. III, especially pp. 301, 305, 341, 375 and 383. Cf. "The Junior College," by George Herbert Palmer, in *The Atlantic Monthly* for April, 1927.

junior college movement, including the downward movement of the college subject matter. And what, indeed, is there so sacred, it is urged, about the number four, that we should expect young people to spend just so many years in college before they take up serious vocational studies? A college course in the days of Jefferson, Longfellow, and Horace Mann was very little if any better than a good high school course is to-day. But this kind of reasoning reveals a complete failure to grasp the larger social aspects of the situation. Between the towns of Greeley and Boulder one shifts his gears; or between Medicine Hat and Kootenay! We are in the foothills of the new machinofacture supercivilization. The sky lines wear entirely different angles; and the problems confronting the collective intellect are incomparably more complex. Preparation for social leadership must, therefore, be proportionately extended. Jefferson, Longfellow, and Horace Mann were perhaps better qualified to meet the problems of their age than are the graduates of four-year colleges to-day. It is true enough that dollar-minded young Americans do sweat with impatient haste to get into the world's work; but that does not render it wise for educational statesmen to applaud and facilitate that haste. And educational science can commit no more palpable fallacy than to assume that the trends *ought* to be in that direction because they quite evidently *are*. Any society can have and will get about what it approves and appreciates. If we show meager appreciation for liberal scholarship we will get but little of it; but the more young people of the right sort whom we can induce to stay four years in the right sort of academic colleges the better it will be for our society. Or even five years! We ought, indeed,

to have higher degrees equivalent to, and in just as eager request as, the master's and doctor's, in recognition of general scholarship as against specialization; and many persons, especially educational administrators, ought to be carrying such degrees. The trend toward vocational specialization in our system is a part of the materialistic obsession of the *Zeitgeist*. Its only defense arises out of "the hypnotism of the present reality." But a renascence of liberal culture for social leadership is an absolutely vital necessity in the present crisis.

Undeniably, there is a border area between vocational and liberal education of which one cannot say to which it belongs. It is not enough for a lawyer to know what the law is; he should also know what the law ought to become in view of the changing order to which it must apply. Without the latter he may become a well-fattened pettifogger; but he is more likely than not to be an obstacle to progress. It is not enough for a clergyman to know his Bible, his theology, and his church history; he must be able to point out the application of his religion's ideals to the social, ethical, and spiritual tangles of the age. Otherwise he will be a priest, but not a prophet. And such an application he cannot make unless he understands the age in which he lives. The social sciences are therefore of far greater importance in a divinity curriculum than Old Testament exegesis or systematic theology. One of the most crying needs of our age is for an army of recruits to the profession of journalism who are painfully conscious every day of the shortcomings of the press, and who have a clear vision of the new kind of news and editorial service that the new age demands. How can they have such a vision if they do not discern the main

outlines of the new order? If artists are to have anything worth expressing they too must see the glorious vision; otherwise art will too often be nothing more than random lunges after a vulgar and egotistical originality. The best colleges of business administration are not satisfied merely to prepare entrepreneurs and specialized experts for the present régime; they are trying to produce a new type of business man that can help to engineer our industrial system across the present crisis. And that is the greatest need of business in our day. For the old industrial organization is like a bridge that is too light for the growth of modern traffic; we need economic engineers who can not only run the trains, but who can at the same time devise and gradually install new bridges. Otherwise a collapse will be inevitable sooner or later. And so in all the other fields, but most of all in education, as will be pointed out in a later chapter. What sort of training professional people need in order to achieve a conventional success that can be measured with the calipers and balances of materialism is one thing. What kind of a training society needs to have them receive in order that they may help to negotiate the present crisis is quite another matter. In practice all this usually comes out to the question of how much and what kind of academic training candidates for the professions get before entering the professional schools; although it is not impossible to organize liberal education into the professional courses themselves. Any trend toward the elimination of a broad academic foundation in advance of professional training should therefore be deprecated as a temptation upon the part of modern civilization to sell its birthright for a mess of pottage.

So much for the puzzles arising from the fact that, in the

present transition, the academic college is cluttered with vocational functions for which no separate vocational schools have as yet evolved. Let us now return to the main line of our argument. We started with the principle that social leadership is the prime function of the academic college; and we have arrived at the conclusion that instruction toward that objective should be the exact opposite of vocational specialization. Let us now proceed to certain inferences relative to the curriculum. For our present purposes our oft repeated list of civilization's intellectual resources may be reclassified as follows: (1) vocational technique, (2) natural science, (3) the fine arts, (4) the new humanities (from which the beliefs and ideals are derived), (5) language, including (*a*) formal English and (*b*) the foreign languages. The "mores" and "folkways" may be disregarded here because they will be rationally modified as the beliefs and ideals are modified; otherwise they are not a concern of the curriculum. They are covered indirectly by the new humanities. We shall begin with the second of these, the place of vocational technique in the academic college having been sufficiently indicated already.

Science requires but little comment, except to say that the aim, at least so far as the social leadership objective is concerned, is *not* to make scientists. Courses should be organized, therefore, as for students who are *not* going to become specialists. This principle would revolutionize much college teaching, to the unspeakable advantage of students seeking a liberal education. Laboratories might not disappear before this objective; but the laboratory method would cease to be a fetish. Much attention should be given to the applications of science, and its innumerable

benefits to mankind. The history of science should be taught with a view to revealing its surpassing romance; and the technique of scientific research should be presented in such a way as to make students appreciate the wonderful patience and devotion to detail on the one hand, and the amazing flights of imaginative genius on the other, that have characterized creative work in this field. For this particular objective it is probable that history, and especially biography, might prove more effective than a master's thesis. Geography is probably the most neglected of the sciences.

The fine arts should have at least as important and dignified a position in the curriculum as the natural sciences. Our academic traditions run quite to the contrary. Typical American fathers sometimes give their daughters a choice between "studying music" (or art), and "going to college and getting an education." This antithesis is a misfortune to our civilization. The fine arts are an indispensable part of a real education. And all of the fine arts should be represented in the academic curriculum; but with methods and objectives quite different from those used in colleges of the fine arts themselves. To make artists is *not* the aim of art instruction in the academic college; but to make appreciators and utilizers of the fine arts. To be sure, students would be trained as amateur musicians (for example); but acquaintance with and appreciation of all the great works in the field of this art do not necessarily depend upon ability to play any instrument, though such ability is, of course, a help. Further, the great names in musical history should be accorded as much attention and conventional prestige as the great names in literature or science. And all the other fine arts should be treated in much the same spirit. The

history of all the fine arts should be stressed; and by teachers who can reveal the benefits that have accrued to human life through the utilization of art. The Greek department in some institutions is seizing the opportunity to teach the ancient fine arts. Dramatics should have a proportionate position. But especially should the so-called domestic arts, including landscape gardening, be taught in their practical applications to family and community life. Leaders so educated would lead society into a larger use of the fine arts as a solution to the problem of living richly and well.

Perhaps literature is the greatest of the fine arts. Some teachers have caught the true spirit of teaching it; but they are far too rare, and are sometimes held in disdain by the scientists and administrators on the campus. Such teachers ought to be more adequately appreciated as members of academic faculties. And we who speak the English tongue should remember that our language does not contain all the great literature. There are Goethe, Ovid, and Aristophanes, not to mention Ibsen, Dante, Job, and Confucius. One of the encouraging pedagogical achievements of recent decades is the teaching of foreign literatures without the languages. The Greek department has led the way, forced to it by a sort of fortunate necessity. Something is lost, to be sure; but extensive acquaintance with many great literatures is some compensation for intensive acquaintance with the linguistic beauties of one or two. Let us hope that in the real academic college of the future the great literary masterpieces of all civilizations will be made familiar to the students.

It is hard to imagine a richer experience possible to intelligent young men and women than to spend four years in an atmosphere charged with all the fine arts as a real college

ought to be. If all the colleges in America could develop such an atmosphere it might revolutionize our whole modern civilization, and redeem it from the vulgar worship of Mammon and the frantic pursuit of fashion that now curse and threaten to destroy it. One of the most encouraging signs of our times, therefore, is the trend in this direction upon the part of some of our best colleges. But many faculties and deans remain still to be awakened; for there is still a lamentable waste of time and darkening of minds through the pursuit of so-called cultural subjects that only represent a moribund tradition.

We come next to the new humanities, relative to which we need do no more than recall the argument of Chapter XV. Under this name we refer to all those quasi-sciences that deal with the nature and relationships of man: geography, biology, psychology, anthropology, economics, politics, sociology, ethics, philosophy, and history. From these fields our beliefs may be intelligently revised; and the candidate's liberal education for social leadership must carry him, therefore, into all these fields. They must be correlated and synthesized; not pursued in a pedantic, sophomoric way. And four years is all too short a period, even if the student were to devote more than half his time to these subjects. The success of our civilization during the next five or ten centuries depends very largely upon the quantity of sound information in these fields that can be worked into the mental equipment of our social leaders.

This brings us to formal English and the foreign languages. They are not, strictly speaking, knowledge, nor even indispensable tools for getting knowledge. A liberal education, that is, an education that qualifies for social leadership, can

be acquired without a foreign language; although it is highly desirable that each of the foreign languages be represented by some social leaders who can use them. Correct and elegant use of one's mother tongue is an ornament to any personality; but it is not an absolutely indispensable equipment for intellectual leadership. It is high time for us to begin to suspect that, *as requirements,* these subjects represent an uncriticized and indefensible tradition; in which case the arguments for them are no more than the current defense mechanisms that we have memorized. Does it not appear that abolishing rhetoric and foreign languages, both as entrance and curricular *requirements,* would prove a decided promotion of the academic college's real social function; inasmuch as that would save time for things of actual importance, instead of mere conventional prestige?

So much for the curriculum by which social leaders are to be trained. Its constants are the sciences, the fine arts, and the new humanities, in balanced ration; its electives are mathematics, formal English, and the foreign languages. The traditional curriculum has things exactly upside down so far as requirements and electives are concerned. And it goes almost without saying that such schooling should be a special privilege, open only to a mentally and morally superior minority. But to *all* such it should be open, without regard to the economic status of their parents.

If, to this point of the argument, our reasoning is relatively sound, two or three corollaries follow. First, majors, minors, prescribed sequences, and most prerequisites are out of place. Especially is this true of a major requirement. This custom is inferred from the notion of specialization, which is exactly what we want to get away from in the academic college.

The notion of specialization should be definitely and frankly abandoned so far as the social leadership objective is concerned; and, with it, all the requirements, prescriptions, and restrictions that are its logical derivatives. On the contrary students should be required to generalize. Their program should constitute a balanced ration from all the major fields of human knowledge. For vocational purposes students in other colleges should specialize (and in this college too, so far as it is still burdened with vocational objectives not otherwise as yet provided for); but not for the objective which the academic college exists primarily to achieve. For social leadership, knowledge should be generalized.

As to entrance requirements: the sins of the academic college constitute one of the most serious obstacles to educational progress. College professors are the tardiest of all teachers to have philosophized their own functions and relationships in the new social situation. As a matter of tradition, that college still requires for admission those very subjects which ought, in high school, to be relegated to the limbo of election: mathematics, foreign languages, and formal English. It is chiefly because of these entrance conditions, imposed upon the high schools by the colleges, that the high schools are wasting so much of their time, and sending to the colleges students who have to be given a secondary education after they get there. One of the most revealing blunders in recent college developments is the orientation course that many colleges are now offering to freshmen. This innovation illuminates for a hopeful moment the whole educational landscape, like a flash of lightning on a dark night. It reveals a brilliant intuition upon the part of college

professors as to the meaning and aim of a liberal education. But it is *placed wrong!* Orientation is something that should have happened to the modern youth *before* he comes to college. It is the very thing that ought not to need doing after he gets there. If college professors wish to conceive the function of the high school in their own terminology, let them call it orientation. But if students come to college without having been oriented, it is the college itself that is to blame. The college, under the inertia of a blind tradition, requires for entrance a mass of irrelevant and antiquated material, with which the high schools, consequently, have to waste their time, instead of orienting their students. Whereupon the college stupidly takes upon itself the task of orienting freshmen, and imagines that thereby it is initiating a brilliant educational reform. What the college ought to do is to abandon the traditional entrance requirements, and substitute instead a high school program, or other intellectual experience, that shall have oriented the student. Then the high school curriculum would become an orientation program, which is exactly what it ought to be; whereupon the college could proceed to give high school graduates a *college* education. But as things now stand this new orientation course puts the college a good deal in the position of a pyromaniac who makes a great show of helping to salvage goods out of a burning building to which he himself has set the fire.

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It only remains to say a few words about academic freedom. Academic freedom is the right of authorized and accredited scholars to pursue research, and especially to

announce their findings, in their own fields without fear of interference, and with responsibility only to their peers. The term, authorized scholars, includes persons of professorial rank employed by colleges, universities, and research foundations of accredited standing. This definition leaves open the question of teachers of lower rank and teachers in lower schools. It also leaves open the question of a professor's right to pronounce himself on subjects outside his own specialty. By his peers is meant persons of similar standing in his own institution, or in his own field elsewhere. Perhaps academic freedom ought to be more broadly defined than this; but this much, at least, is absolutely vital to democratic civilization and to social progress. Here is the very central citadel of freedom. Tyrants of the type of Mussolini, Bismarck, Metternich, and Napoleon always suppress it; and so do vested economic interests. Of religious fanatics, it is the special object of their hate and fear. In critical times these enemies may be expected to unite in destroying it. And the ignorant masses are their natural allies; for they do not understand that research is a special function which society must delegate to competent specialists. At this point democracy seems to contradict itself; for democracy is doomed if *demos* blindly interferes with research. So long as those whom society sets apart for research are free to promulgate their findings, those whom the colleges are training for popular leadership can have access to the truth; but the ultimate sources of truth are closed to them when those qualified for and consecrated to research can be silenced. Then it remains only for the blind to lead the blind.

But academic freedom, like anything else, must be *organized* if it is to be effective. But organized is just what it is

not, in modern society. Its position is utterly precarious. The organization of American colleges and universities is not such as to safeguard and guarantee academic freedom. It is fortified behind nothing more secure than a sort of conventional sentiment. And this will continue to be the case so long as ultimate authority to employ and discharge professors inheres in the board of trustees or regents. It should be transferred to the faculties at once, before academic freedom becomes a real issue in modern society, as it surely will when civilization and our economic system come to their inevitable death grapple. This is one of the most crucial defects of our whole educational system.

CHAPTER XIX

THE BLIGHT OF EXTRANEOUS MOTIVATION

"THE Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath." Never did the Great Teacher coin a more succinct epigram. However, its full significance becomes apparent only when it is generalized: The institutions were made for man, not man for the institutions. But in history and sociology there is no fact more recurrent and disconcerting than that the social means of life tend constantly to usurp the status of ends-in-themselves. When this occurs there arises the phenomenon of extraneous motivation; whereupon the fruit of human effort falls blighted from the tree of life, and men are sacrificed to institutions.

In Jesus' time the conspicuous offender was Pharisaism, a sect that had begun two centuries before as the moral and religious phase of the last great nationalistic movement under the Maccabees. The Zealots, as the sect was called in its early stages, were analogous in their aims and spirit to the Puritans of Cromwell's era. But the organization became ossified, and its officials acquired vested interests, so that by New Testament times its purposes had become thoroughly irrelevant to the spiritual and moral needs of the people. The Pharisees wasted their time debating such trivialities as the exact moment when the Sabbath began, and how many needles a tailor might wear on the lapel of his coat without breaking the Sabbath. At the same time they devised

technicalities for evading such fundamental responsibilities as the care of indigent parents. Moreover, they looked down on the common people, whose spiritual shepherds they should have been, called them "the dogs of the land," and burdened them with ecclesiastical taxes and senseless moral repressions. They were ready, indeed, to mete out martyrdom to the greatest spiritual genius of their times, if not of all time. And religious history is full of similar trends. From which fact even educators may wisely draw a moral. They will do very well indeed to remember always that the school was made for the children, and not the children for the school! The gradual accumulation of much extraneous motivation in the schools is a sure symptom that institutional ossification has set in, and that the school is by way of becoming an end in itself unless its springs are purified.

At the risk of scandalizing readers who are in the habit of accepting our economic institution at its face value, our modern price system [1] may be pointed out as another significant example of extraneous motivation. The analogy implied is surprisingly relevant. The real purpose of industry is, of course, the production of utilities to satisfy the needs of the people. But the motivation is the hope of profits. And it is really astonishing at how many points the motivation of industry actually thwarts its fundamental purposes. Goods really needed by the people are sometimes actually destroyed in order to increase the prices and hence profits. American farmers are exhorted to produce less food, even though the populations of this and other countries are less than adequately fed. In fact, of all fundamental necessities, profits depend upon the production of just less than enough.

[1] See Thorstein Veblen, *The Engineers and the Price System.*

The profits motive causes much waste. Natural resources — forests, for example — are exploited without provision for the future. Fashions are changed in order to increase sales, and hence profits, even though the ultimate result is to waste half-used articles. The profits motive requires a reserve army of unemployed to stabilize wages and discipline workers; and this reserve the system automatically maintains. Hence the profits motive functions as the insuperable obstacle to the real prosperity of the laboring class. The profits motive is the chief obstacle also to that restriction of population growth, which will shortly prove so necessary. This it does by boosting the growth of all communities, by promoting immigration for the sake of cheap labor, and by holding living standards down for the same purpose. The profits motive subordinates the policies of the press to the interests of advertisers however anti-social, it muffles the voice of the church in the presence of obvious abuses, prostitutes art to the standards of the market place, threatens the freedom of research and teaching, and invades the idealism of almost every profession and calling. Thus one of the serious indictments that can be brought against our present economic order is the blight of extraneous motivation involved in the profits incentive by which it operates. It would be a pity for education to become involved in a similar irrelevancy of artificial incentives.

Doubtless it will forever remain impossible to eliminate artificial motivation entirely from morality and religion, or from industry, or from any other phase of human activity. There are two reasons for this. The first is that individuals must often sacrifice their own wishes or even interests for the larger welfare of the group; in which case artificial pressures

must be brought to bear upon them. The other reason is that the beneficial results of effort are often so remote that the individual cannot feature them to his sluggish imagination; in which case it is to his own advantage, as well as a social necessity, that some outside influence stimulate him or some constituted authority constrain him. But this necessity for the use of outside incentives is one of the danger spots of social life and civilization, none the less. There is no bearing in the social machinery that is more likely to become overheated, and with more disastrous results. Perhaps there is no surer indication of the vitality or decadence of institutions than the immanent trends of their motivation. And this applies to education as well as to industry and the spiritual life.

On scarcely any other pedagogical subject has there been more discussion during the past generation than on the subject of motivation, including the interest-effort dilemma, of which motivation is the practical phase. But much of this discussion is dogmatic or controversial; and the resulting theories require an admixture of common sense upon the part of the classroom teacher to make them work without too much obvious damage. Now, for harmonizing the disagreements arising out of this discussion, nothing is more promising than a clear insight into the social situation that has given rise to the necessity for motivation. Such an insight is to be sought in the perspective of social evolution. We have schools precisely because we have left savagery behind, and risen to the level of civilization. Savage societies have no schools; they have no need of them. Not that schools are an incidental accessory of civilization, like white collars and door bells; they are a fundamental necessity of the

social processes of civilized life. This is because civilization differs from savagery in the use of an elaborate cognitive capital which absolutely must be learned by the candidate *before* he can participate successfully or helpfully in the civilized social process. Moreover, much of this necessary cognitive equipment is difficult to learn because it makes little or no instinctive appeal. Hence the necessity for some organized program by which society can assure itself that each successive quota of on-coming candidates shall actually have acquired this equipment by the time they are called upon to use it as adult participants. In savage societies it is true that education is life, not preparation for life; but that is true only in savage societies. And it is true there because the social process utilizes so little knowledge that a mere school-less education will impart it all. But in civilized societies preparation is exactly what formal schooling is; and no pedagogical epigram, however terse and tasty, can make anything else out of it without denaturing it. And this is apparent to common sense exactly in proportion as we invoice definitely the knowledge needed by the candidate for successful participation.

Now it is just this inherent nature of civilized education that gives rise to the interest-effort dilemma and the necessity for motivation. A curriculum that offered the child only what was naturally interesting to him would be a worthless curriculum, because it would leave him unprepared for civilized life. It is only as schooling anticipates the acquired interests of adult participation in civilized life — and prematurely, so far as the child's present interests are concerned — that it performs its function. That necessity is, and can be, avoided only in the school-less education of savage chil-

dren. It is just because civilized schooling requires us, due to its inherent and essential function, to offer its mental material to the child in advance of his *natural* interest in it that teachers, elementary teachers in particular, must be skillful in the invention of *artificial* situations that will inveigle the child into a semblance of interest. It should be clearly understood that motivation is artificial, not natural. Its trick is fortuitously to create a sort of counterfeit situation that will "condition" the child's interest to civilized interests. There is a sense in which motivation is effective just in the degree in which the teacher succeeds in humbugging the child.

But there is every reason why the teacher should not humbug herself. For education is likely to be functionless in proportion as the situations which motivation creates for the pupils actually are natural. A curriculum that does actually appeal only to the natural interests of the child will do for him only what the school-less education of a savage society does, namely, fail to prepare him for civilized life. Rousseau was very often guilty of the rankest nonsense. And, since the function of motivation is nothing less than to make the artificial seem to the child as natural as possible, it inevitably follows that motivation can never be one hundred per cent successful. Nothing is more salutary than for educational theorists and classroom teachers to see this very clearly indeed. For when the classroom teacher has done the best that the inherent nature of civilized education permits she is entitled to a night's sleep with an untroubled conscience. Besides, the whole school process is liable to become so barnacled with extraneous pedagogical accretions as to be in danger of floundering at sea, and having to keep

itself afloat only by unloading its cargo overboard at almost imperceptible degrees. The purpose of this Chapter is to create the suspicion that exactly that is the secret of many of our most perplexing pedagogical difficulties at present. As children emerge from childhood our so-called motivation ought to be reduced to the vanishing point as rapidly as possible, and the real reasons for education ought to be set up instead as functioning ideals in the students' minds.

Except as the argument has dealt in general principles it has thus far suggested only the elementary grades, and to the elementary grades it will shortly return. However, some of the most important effects of extraneous motivation are to be observed on the secondary, and even on the college, levels. The reader is invited to believe that in college one of the most serious obstacles to real education is our system of credits, with the roll calls, examinations, marks, distribution curves, honor points, espionage and other accessories that the credits system involves.

For of sincere intellectual interest this system is a negative motivation in several ways.[1] In the first place it gives rise to an elaborate technique upon the student's part for "getting by"; that is, of getting what the school asks him to want, namely, credits, with the least possible effort. It puts a premium on easy courses. It creates files of old questions, outlines, notes, and other pointers, that are passed on from upper to lower classmen. It inspires the art of flattering, cajoling, and otherwise manipulating the professors. It often causes those who get low grades to hate their teachers, which is a frame of mind quite unconducive of learning from

[1] For this insidious disease of the intellect Dean H. W. Holmes has invented the term *creditis*. See *Atlantic Monthly*, October, 1927.

them. It sets up in students a fear of showing any sign of disagreement with a teacher — one of its most stultifying effects. And it motivates all cheating. In the second place it stresses the kind of subject matter that might be called "cramable," as against the kind that is really the most educative. The students go through textbooks, library references, and lecture notes looking for memorizable items of the kind that lend themselves to examination questions, without much regard for their relative significance. And the so-called objective tests make this worse instead of better. Some of the most important results of education cannot be measured; and the measurement of results tends always to discourage the most viable teaching on that account. In the third place, the system — in connection with organized courses, sequences, and majors — tends to repress the spontaneous interests of students, and force them into prescribed grooves. If the student strikes a lead of special interest he too often must abandon it because of the pressure of prescribed assignments, to which the imminent examinations force him to give attention. Scarcely anything can be more deadening to real intellectual interest. Closely related to this is the subconscious intention that students often develop during the dry course of forgetting it all as soon as the examination is over.

This system has some tendency — perhaps more than one would think at first — to absolve professors of responsibility for making their teaching interesting and vital. Students take courses because they are required, or because they are in a sequence or major, or because they just happen to fit into a schedule. If all these motives could be eliminated, and professors had to sell their courses on their merits in

competition with their colleagues, it might make a difference in the quality of teaching. But as things now stand it is as apt as not to be a discredit to a university professor to have the reputation of being an interesting teacher. How easy it is for the professor to blame the student for not learning what is presented! But perhaps the most deadly absolvent of professorial responsibility for effective teaching is the normal distribution curve. If the percentage of failures is foreordained, why make an effort? But worst of all, the system tends to absolve the school itself of responsibility for selling knowledge to the students on its intrinsic merits. If they were not taking courses for the sake of earning credits, more need would be felt for explaining to them the real value of the subject matter, and of discarding subject matter that in reality has but little value, if any at all.

During fifteen or twenty years' experience in college teaching one will have overheard innumerable eager conversations in the corridors about examinations, marks, and the like; but it is the rarest of experiences to hear a group of students talking about subject matter itself as of intrinsic interest. It is easy for system-blinded faculty members to blame that attitude to the frivolous mindedness of students; but it is at least as reasonable to blame it to the system. The students are showing interest at exactly the spot where the system motivates their interest. A system that threw the students back upon the intrinsic merits of the subject matter itself might tend to eliminate those students who were incapable of developing any honest interest in it; and it might encourage those who did have such capacity.

The reader may follow his own lead in the elaboration of such considerations relative to the high school. Perhaps

the system does less damage in professional schools, because there the students have another motivation — it is easy for them to foresee that they will really need the information.

Returning to the elementary grades: it certainly would be an interesting experiment to operate a school over a sufficient period of years to give the experiment a fair test, without the use of daily grades, examinations, demotions, or any of the other paraphernalia of the grades-and-credits system. Such an experiment should not preclude the other types of motivation; it should involve only the disuse of grades, marks, and credits. It would involve, moreover, the promoting of the duller children — except the definitely subnormal, who could be segregated — along with others of their own age, despite the fact that they were learning but a fraction of the curriculum content. The guess is ventured that the tangible results, as revealable by the standard tests at the end, would compare more than favorably with the results of our present system, and that the intangible results would be far superior. It seems probable that the brighter pupils would come through with a far more sincere zeal for knowledge. The indifferent and blasé attitude so often complained of in high school and college students may well be accounted for, in part at least, by the deadening grind of extraneous motivation throughout the elementary grades. And as for the duller children, it seems probable that they would come out at least as well prepared for citizenship and social life.[1] There is a limit to the self-control in application of which a child is capable; and it is a serious question whether much is gained by worrying a first, third, or even fifth grader with the fear of failing to pass. And there is

[1] The social psychology underlying this hypothesis is elaborated in Chapters III and XX.

scarcely anything more provocative of righteous indignation than to see a little child crying on his way home from school because he did not pass. The damage done to personalities by such gratuitous generation of failure complexes may well be incalculable. One is suspicious that the apologies we offer for such tragedies are but defense mechanisms to which the system itself gives rise — as social abuses always do.

The efforts of educators toward improving this system and correcting its defects consist for the most part in attempts at elaborating its details and making it fit closer to the student and his work. Credits are classified as to whether the marks received were high or low, and the system is complicated by an inside system of honor points. The intervals between grade reports are shortened, and an intricate mathematical technique is evolved for computing grades. To maintain all this, an expensive staff of readers and bookkeepers has to be employed, besides burdening the teacher with mere secretarial work, in some cases almost to the breaking point. The espionage of examinations gives place to experiments with the so-called honor system, which shifts responsibility from the faculty to the honest students in the class, and so penalizes their honesty while putting a premium on cheating and hypocrisy. And the reduction to absurdity is reached when the students are required, as a penalty for cheating, to get more *knowledge, i.e.*, take extra courses.

It might be pertinent to suggest that the letter killeth but the spirit giveth life; and that the solution of the difficulties of the credits system is not in elaborating its details but in abolishing it entirely. It is an obsession to suppose that the system is a necessary part of formal schooling. We are

merely hypnotized by the present reality; for there have been school systems without it, and among them some of the very best. There are no credits in the Danish Folk High Schools (see Chapters XI and XXVII), and all the machinery of the credits system is conspicuous by its absence. And it is safe to say that nothing would more certainly kill the essential spirit of those remarkable schools than the introduction of roll calls, daily grades, examinations, marks, distribution curves, and honor points, with the red tape, espionage, and paraphernalia that they would involve. In this connection a study of the late mediæval universities might yield some pertinent suggestions.

The reader is accordingly invited to distinguish sharply between teaching and testing, and to consider the proposition that testing, *as a device for motivating the learner*, is more likely to be an obstacle than an aid to teaching. If this proposition should commend itself to the reader it would doubtless follow that the reform of our present credits system is to be found in removing testing as far from teaching as possible, preferably to some separate institution. In old China, by way of illustration, there were the schools, and there were the civil service examinations. The two institutions were entirely apart from each other; and it is to the desirability of some such arrangement that the reader's consideration is here invited.

It must be borne in mind that all tests and examinations are artificial; whereas life itself is the only real and natural test of educational results. How does the candidate function in the actual situations of the life for which the school has been trying to prepare him? That is the really important question. The artificial test is a device for forecasting

the normal test of social life; and that is its essential function. That is a social, rather than a pedagogical, function; the findings constitute a criterion by which society estimates the fitness of a candidate for a given social function. The state bar and medical examinations, for example: their purpose is to determine whether the candidate is fit to function as a lawyer or a doctor. Similarly, the granting of a certificate to teach. And similarly, also, the granting of a bachelor's degree implies that the recipient is fit to be looked up to by his neighbors and fellow citizens as an educated member of society, whose opinions are worthy of confidence, and whose philosophy of life is worthy of emulation. The examinations leading up to it are for the purpose of determining that social fitness. A certificate of matriculation in a college or university implies that the candidate is a likely prospect for membership in society's intellectual class, and a promising investment to that end for taxpayers and philanthropists. It looks forward to a social function. And the same may be said to a lesser degree of matriculation in a senior high school.

The present plea is for the organization of the examinations by which society determines the fitness of candidates for such social functions as separately as possible from the teaching by which society prepares them. The contention is that it is better for the state to conduct bar and medical examinations quite apart from the law and medical schools; that it would be a mistake for the state to delegate that function to those schools; and that it would be a still greater mistake for the state to permit those schools to go still further and substitute the credits system, examinations *in cursu*, and final graduation, for one all-inclusive certificating

examination under separate auspices. And similarly with the certification of teachers: that the testing should be done by the state department, quite apart from the normal schools and teachers' colleges; in which case the whole credits system, with all the appurtenances thereof, could be abolished in those schools. The contention includes even the baccalaureate degree: that the examinations should be organized on an entirely separate basis than the teaching in the academic colleges. Whereupon the credits system could be abolished in the academic colleges, leaving the students free to think about their education.[1] In the lower schools, as far up the grades as compulsory attendance laws apply, the problem is different; but the experiment suggested some pages back might throw unexpected light on the disutility of grades, marks, and promotions, even there.

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So much for the artificial devices of the schoolroom; we come now to the extraneous pressures from outside the school. The social motive for going to school which is most subversive of real education is the prevalent ambition to rise in the social scale. It is probably safe to assert that that is the objective which motivates ninety per cent of the registrants in American high schools and colleges. On the upper social levels advanced schooling is a conventional necessity of the class; among the middle classes, especially in the absence of heritable wealth, it is regarded as the most

[1] This is essentially the situation in European secondary and higher education, and is advanced by Learned as one reason for the superiority of the European secondary school. See W. S. Learned, "The Quality of the Educational Process in the United States and Europe." *Bulletin*, No. 20, Carnegie Foundation, 1927. — EDITOR.

easily accessible social ladder available, if not the only one. A high school or college education is thought of as a sort of social fulcrum on which one can rest the lever of personal effort; with that fulcrum one's chances of rising in life are supposed to be greatly enhanced. And by the poor, education is regarded as the only means of escaping out of their class — except by some lucky but highly improbable chance. And such education is something which the poor are still taught to believe that they can acquire by dint of personal effort if they have ability and persistent determination.

In order to present this part of the argument clearly to the reader's imagination let us distinguish three social motives for going to school: first, to acquire vocational knowledge and skill that are definitely marketable; second, to acquire the social prestige that attaches to school life and its conventional accomplishments; and, third, to acquire the intellectual resources by which life can be intrinsically enriched without regard to the economic level of one's prospective job. It may be added incidentally that the first and second of these motives are usually more or less fused in people's minds, while the third is seldom clearly apprehended. The present contention is that the third of these motives is genuine, worthy, and fruitful; that the first is as sound as any other effort to prosper through increasing one's productive efficiency; but that the second is disingenuous and subversive of the real objectives both of education and of civilization.

It all goes back to a rather fundamental misconception of what constitutes a good society. To present this prevalent misconception let us say that there are three kinds of societies: first, a caste society, second, a society of open classes, and third, a cultural democracy. Every reader

understands what is meant by caste, and cordially disapproves of such a rock-layered social order. (However, philosophers who have lived in, and therefore have been hypnotized by, such societies, have pronounced them the best possible, and necessary to social progress!) By an open class society is meant a social organization in which there is opportunity to rise from the lower to the higher classes; and in which, conversely, the unworthy members of the upper classes are always in imminent danger of falling into the lower classes. It is the kind of a society which the old aphorism is intended to describe, that there are only three generations from shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves. This is the kind of social organization that we are supposed to have in America and the Dominions of the British Empire. To it the popular faith is accordingly committed; and it the prevailing ratiocination justifies. (We are naturally as hypnotized with it as Plato was with Athenian slavery!) Nevertheless it is only a halfway station in the evolution of a good society: the cultural democracy. In the really good society of the future the lower classes will have escaped *en masse* from a status of poverty, ignorance, and cultural deprivation, into a really humanizing condition of living. Such is a society from which will have disappeared both the squalid misery of the present lower classes and the sordid luxury of the so-called upper classes; and in which all will be middle class together, sharing equitably in the cultural resources of civilization. Such a society is almost impossible for the reader to imagine, to be sure, due to "the hypnotism of the present reality" and the opiate of the prevailing economic dogmas. However, democracy will never be contented to rest short of such a society, because only in such

an order can its objectives be achieved. And education will never fulfill its really essential function until it aims deliberately to qualify the masses, one and all, for participation in such a common life.

The so-called open class society of the present is a sort of impossible compromise based upon fundamental principles that are self-contradictory. It assumes equal opportunity for all; but as a matter of fact the very class distinctions that furnish its motivation are themselves the result of artificial privileges and handicaps arising chiefly out of the organization of our economic system. Without discounting the reasons for private property and the inheritance thereof, one need be no socialist to realize that the children of the prosperous classes have opportunities for getting a start in life that the children of the poor do not have. Nor need one attribute unemployment and the perennial poverty of the unskilled to the profits system and its automatic necessity for employing just less than all of the available supply of labor, to see that the children of that class lack opportunities for getting a start in life which are enjoyed by children of the more prosperous classes. We subconsciously dread to recognize private property and the profits system as artificial social arrangements lest we be forced to abandon the sustaining illusion of equal opportunities for all. But the fact remains that *children* — who have done nothing to merit handicaps or deserve privileges — do inherit the successes and defeats of the parental generation. Our system is a class system based upon economic achievement; but a system in which one's achievements — except in exceptional cases — are predetermined only in part by innate abilities, but in part also by artificially inherited handicaps and advan-

tages. It is an open class system in which the classes are *not* really open to all alike. It contains within it the remnants of caste. It is, therefore, a compromise of inherent contradictions.

In this connection one is reminded of the old fable of the fish pond. This pond was populated mostly by minnows, who were ruled over by a small school of pike, who, in turn, fed upon the minnows. It appears that once upon a time agitators arose among the minnows who led them into a long hard struggle for liberty, equality, and fraternity. At last the struggle was settled by a compromise to the effect that hereafter the one minnow out of every ten thousand who should prove himself most worthy might himself become a pike. Thereafter the ambitions of the minnows were absorbed in the competitive struggle among themselves, and those who did not succeed in becoming pikes were constrained to regard the fault as their own. And nobody noticed that the ratio of pike to minnows was the same as always, that the minnows remained after all nothing but minnows, and that the pike continued to feed on them as before.

It would appear that a democracy, according to the popular conception, is a society in which every democrat aspires confidently to become an aristocrat. Accordingly, it is a society in which education is for the purpose of lifting overalls boys into white-collared jobs. In such a society the aristocratic classes and the newly rich send their sons and daughters to fashionable private schools and colleges, because that is a part of the "mores" of their class. Those of the middle class who have fair incomes, but little or no property, make every effort to educate their sons into some profession and their daughters into so-called good society.

Farmers, artisans, small business people, and the more ambitious laborers keep their children in high school and college as long as they possibly can in the hope that thereby they may achieve a better status in life than that of their parents. And all this competitive struggle does not modify the *percentages* of the population in the various classes; these *percentages* being determined by the techniques and organization of industry. To borrow a metaphor from the fertile pen of Professor Ross, the upper classes are like full rafts, from which, if anybody struggles on, somebody else must be pushed off — and contemporaneous civilization is obsessed with no dearer delusion than that this is not so. Our so-called open class democracy is a society that hardens its heart toward the poverty and ignorance of the laboring classes *as a whole,* anesthetizing its conscience instead with the illusion that anybody (and therefore presumably everybody !) can climb out of that class if he has individual ability.

Relative, accordingly, to the resultant objective of rising *out of* one's class, the subject matter of the high school and college curricula naturally divides itself into vocational and cultural, cultural meaning the subject matter which has no marketable value, but which does carry a conventional association with aristocracy. Hence it matters little what the so-called cultural subjects are, provided only that they are conventionally fashionable. Hence, also, it matters little whether such registrants in cultural courses really learn anything or not, so long as they keep moving along by the conventional stages toward the conventionally desired diploma. The important thing, relative to this so-called culture motive, is the prestige that high school and college careers and associations carry. Naturally, therefore,

such alleged students are keenly interested in the sports that characterize college life, furnishing a good time as they go along, and conventional subject matter for conversation. Naturally, also, they are even more keenly interested in the fraternities, sororities, and other exclusive activities through which the conventional éclat of the aristocratic classes is acquired, and connections established which they hope to capitalize later on. No wonder such a student body is not very keenly interested in knowledge for its own sake — aside from such knowledge as obviously has a marketable value. And especially when the faculty, and all society indeed, falls in with such a conception of democracy and education. The social motivation is extraneous, and constitutes a deadly blight on all sincerity of studentship.

This white-collar motive has been one of the most important factors in the growth of American education, especially above the elementary level. It probably goes a long way toward explaining the enormous increase in college and university enrollments since the World War. However, as in many other matters, the war itself was not the cause, as commonly supposed. The cause is rather in the economic trends of the times. Greeley's advice to go west and grow up with the country is no longer applicable; for there now remains no uncrowded west. Farming has become less attractive. Many lines of business are being taken over by great corporations, so that there is a declining opportunity for small enterprising entrepreneurs. Hence, the college route to the professions, the new professions, and the near professions. The growth of college enrollment simply means that things economic are closing down, and opportunities for self-made men are becoming less and less attrac-

tive. If Greeley were to come to life to-day he would probably advise young men to go to college and squeeze into the white-collared class.

But the white-collar objective of education, with its social correlate, the every-democrat-a-potential-aristocrat idea, is a grand illusion, except in a period of rapid industrial expansion. America has been a land of open classes not so much because of the inherent justice of our social and economic arrangements as because of the vast unexploited natural resources and the consequent phenomenal expansion of industry during the past century. But that expansion is a passing phase. In a settled and crowded society, such as this is rapidly becoming, widespread popular ambition to become an aristocrat does not modify the *percentage* of aristocrats in society; nor does the ambition to prepare for white-collared jobs increase the *percentage* of such jobs available. These percentages are determined by the technique of industry and the organization of industrial society. And the personnel is increasingly determined by inherited advantages. As fast as all this becomes generally apparent the white-collar incentive will tend to fade away in the minds of pupils, parents, teachers, and taxpayers, because of its futility to the overwhelming majority.

Let us cast our eyes into the future. As population increases and industry becomes relatively static, white collars will become more and more hereditary, and the college route to white-collared jobs a less and less promising adventure. Those who attempt it will tolerate less and less of the so-called cultural frills, and will insist upon concentrating more and more on the definitely vocational. "Cultural" study will become increasingly a class privilege and affecta-

tion. That this is actually happening is clearly revealed in the statistics of those educational scientists who so readily mistake *trends* for *norms*.[1] The fact is already becoming apparent that a growing percentage of the population will have to abandon higher cultural schooling as a luxury. And what is more, the employing class, as taxpayers, are likely to become less and less interested in a public education that tends to spoil the docility of their prospective employees. And with that we shall come to the end of educational expansion — unless something unexpected appears upon the social horizon!

For an "open class" society is in unstable equilibrium. It is predestined to shift its weight either to the right foot or to the left. If the privileges and handicaps inherent in the economic order are allowed to remain, the classes will become increasingly hereditary, until the illusion of open classes is finally frankly abandoned. But if those privileges and handicaps are gradually abolished, or canceled by a really adequate public education, then there is no place for stopping such reforms short of a cultural democracy, in which the overalls boys (whose percentage will of course remain relatively static) will lead white-collared lives, along with all the other economic functionaries, when they are off duty. Neither this nor any other society can stand, half privilege and half opportunity; it tends always to become either the one or the other. As wealth becomes more and more concentrated, and population more and more dense, the tendency will of course be toward privilege — unless a new vision takes possession of the souls of educators.

How obvious it is that if the cherished objectives of

[1] See L. V. Koos, *The Junior College*, Pt. III.

democracy — namely, self-realization for all — are to be achieved something new and unexpected must appear upon the social horizon. That new thing is a revised conception of the function of popular education. Its function is not to enable a few individuals to escape *out of* their class, but to enable the lower classes to escape *en masse* out of their cultural deprivation, and by that route, out of their economic helplessness also, in the end. This was what Grundtvig believed that education could do for "the man with the hoe" in Denmark: not to abolish peasantry but to revolutionize its circumstances and conditions. And that is what the Danish schools have done. And education can do the same thing for the man with the pick and the shovel: lift him, pick, shovel, overalls, and all, to a status of enlightened culture, and in the end prosperity.

This is the conception of education adhered to consistently throughout this book. It was for *all* prospective housekeepers that an education in science, art, and philosophy was advocated. It was for *all* farmers that secondary schools were demanded in which science, economics, and general culture could be acquired. It was for those whose standards of living were the lowest that an education was suggested which would elevate those standards. It was for *all* members of society, especially for those who need it most, that artistic education was urgently advised. It was for *all* citizens that history and the social sciences were prescribed. But not to lift them out of their respective economic functions. For nothing can be more clear than that the humbler economic functions are destined not only to remain, but to claim large percentages of the population. If these people are to achieve self-realization it must be *in* those humbler

functions, not by getting out of them. Somebody must remain in them; and for an honest democracy it does not so much matter who; the real question is what will be their opportunity for a satisfying life in them. The central problem of the new régime is whether the men with the hoe, the pick, and the shovel are to be brutalized or humanized. If the former, then the hope of democracy — not to say of Christianity — is a delusion and a dream; but if the latter, it will come through an education that enables them to utilize the sciences, the fine arts, and the new humanities as copiously and effectively as do any other class of society. Only thus can the so-called open class society be superseded by a real democracy; otherwise it will revert gradually to caste.

The outcome depends, as always, upon the social insight of educators. If their eyes are opened to see what knowledge can do for the masses, and hence for civilization in the new régime, they will be able to "sell" knowledge to the rising generation on its merits. In that case there can doubtless be built up a public opinion that will demand a public education which is both adequate and genuine. But if teachers fail to see, and hence fail to make their pupils and the public see, what the intrinsic advantages of knowledge are for the rank and file of *common* folks, then a reaction against schooling is likely to set in which may defeat the aims of reason and justice in the new order of things. For nothing is more certain than that without a system of public education that adequately parallels the new machinofacture, applied-science, and democratic régime, that régime cannot succeed. But white-collar education is approaching the end of its phase! And what is likely to come after it? The trend will have to be either to the right or to the left. Either there

will evolve an exclusive, "cultural" education for the prosperous few, with only elementary schooling for the masses; or else there will evolve a rich system of secondary and higher education, open freely to all capable youths of the lower as well as the upper classes — a schooling that will put into the hands of the *laboring* classes the intellectual and cultural resources for a worthful, satisfying life. Which of these trends will eventuate during the next fifty years will depend upon the social insight and intellectual zeal of the educators. But the destiny of twenty centuries depends upon it.

The teachers of the Danish Folk High Schools present science, literature, art, history, and philosophy to the sons and daughters of plain peasants in such a way as to "make them see that they are human beings," to quote the phrase of a grizzled immigrant farmer who had attended those schools in his youth. They impart an exultant faith in knowledge as a means of enriching and ennobling life *in* the peasant status. With that insight once awakened in students their motivation is not extraneous but genuine, and miracles occur. They return happy and contented to the plow, as President Foght puts it, there to enrich family life, community associations, religion, politics, and agriculture itself, with the humanizing resources of civilization. And such education can do the same for the proletariat of our modern industrialized society. The new supercivilization that is struggling to arrive has no deeper need than for teachers with vision to see that that is so. A blind and awkward midwife is liable to kill the infant.

CHAPTER XX

FOLLOWERSHIP AND THE DULLER INTELLECTS

PLATO'S scheme for locating the leadership of society in its wisest minds failed of theoretical and practical articulation with reality because it contained no provision for assuring the followership of the dull and ignorant masses. He assumed that the masses would follow as a matter of course. But that is a groundless assumption, for they never do! And to this very day political and social philosophers are committing the same oversight that Plato did. In an American commencement address a few years ago Lord Bryce was reported to have said that what America needs is great leaders. The King Saul conception of leadership seems to underlie this challenge. It appears to involve the assumption that wise minds must be able to constrain a following through some sort of personal magnetism. But this is a rare, not to say an unnatural, combination of personal traits. Men of much knowledge and profound insight are very apt to be retiring, sensitive, and self-conscious. Bryce would have been nearer the truth if he had said that intelligent followership is the great need of American civilization. As a matter of fact, there is no great dearth among us of informed and discerning intellects, but the public spurns their leadership. Professor Cooley makes the same mistake as Viscount Bryce, in declaring that the many possess the sense to discern the one man in the right, whereas that is

exactly what they do not possess. And recognition of this depressing fact is now quite prevalent in the teaching of political scientists; but what to do about it not many of them clearly see. Instead, a pessimistic, almost despairing, attitude is creeping over the intellectual classes.

Both history and psychology seem to be with the pessimists. For democracy never has worked, except temporarily. The leadership of the wise and the good has never been anything more than a beautiful wish. In practice it has almost always given place to the drivership of the strong. To date, in western society, the mobilization of the masses has never been secured except by force — or superstition. And now that we have the forms of democracy, the people do not even take the trouble to vote. And why should we be surprised? A political animal is just what the average man is not; he is absorbed instead with his own private affairs, and no more interested in the technology of governments than in any other specialized function. And now come forward the psychologists with scientific data for headlining what we all knew before, namely, that half the people have brains of just average quality or less, of whom a very considerable percentage have very poor brains indeed. How can intelligent political participation be expected of these duller intellects? Successful democracy demands the ascendency of the wise and good; that old ascendency of the strong and selfish is the very thing democracy aspires to get away from. But if leadership by the intelligent is ever to be achieved, followership by the dull and ignorant must somehow be assured. Followership, quite as much as leadership, is, therefore, the crucial problem of the present crisis. Clear discernment of this principle will greatly clarify the

atmosphere. To the educational problem of providing a following for intelligent leaders, the present chapter will accordingly direct the reader's thought.[1]

For the solution of this problem the usual formula is: Teach the people to think. Every citizen, it is urged, ought to be encouraged to the utmost to think for himself. A few years after the war, a well-known English publicist, Norman Angell, traveled over the United States telling us from the lecture platform how democracy could be salvaged. His central concern was with the barber — the barber being a sort of algebraic symbol for the average, or somewhat less than average, citizen, intellectually speaking. How to get the barber to think soundly and vote wisely — that was his problem. Angell's central complaint was that the barber is spoilt in the intellectual making by being insistently admonished that there are subjects too sacred for his skepticism. And after such systematic intellectual repression how can we expect the barber to think for himself, Angell asked. His solution was to encourage the barber, while he is growing up, to be skeptical of every sacred belief in the world. Post him, as a safeguard, against the principal pitfalls of logic; but then drunken him with flippant skepticism, and turn him loose among the sacred icons. Encourage him during his youth to doubt all religious beliefs, to scoff at all moral standards, to sneer at the Revolutionary fathers and the Constitution, to scout all laws and conventionalities, and to be his own judge of all institutionalized responsibilities — to think for himself, in short! Whereupon he will think soundly and vote wisely on all such public questions as the World Court, the tariff on butter and linseed

[1] Cf. Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*.

oil, a constitutional amendment to make amendments more difficult, municipal ownership of hydro-electric power plants, and a thousand similar technical problems. James Harvey Robinson [1] and Doctor John Dewey [2] offer practically the same solution.

But this solution will hardly bear inspection. In the first place, the barber's I.Q. is only .78, according to the army tests. I.Q.'s below .99+ are not likely to secrete cogitations of any great social fruitfulness. Quite the opposite, indeed. How strange it is that such contradictory ideas should run current at the same time. The mental-measurements movement has given prevalence to a discouragingly low estimate of the average citizen's intelligence, while the Dewey school has exalted the independent thinking of this average citizen as the means of saving democracy. And one sometimes gets the impression that both these doctrines are advocated by the very same thinkers.

The second reason for being skeptical of this solution was expounded at length in the second and third chapters of this book.[3] In those pages no little effort was put forth to make it clear that thinking, due to the pervasive phenomenon of social suggestion and passive mentation, is mostly a collective enterprise. Individual inferences of any real originality and constructive value are very rare indeed and occur only in the brightest and best informed intellects. What we mistake for original and independent thinking is the mere recognition of familiar associations between the elements of our experience — the mere matching of stereotypes which we have derived from the common stock by social

[1] *The Mind in the Making.* [2] *Democracy and Education.*

[3] The reader will do well to study the subject of imitation in the standard sociological literature of the past century, from Tarde to Cooley, Ross, Ellwood, and Faris.

suggestion, and memorized. The superiority of the human intellect is largely a collective, rather than an individual, superiority, due to the fact that each individual mind is stocked, through social suggestion, with the collective mental capital. The safety of democracy is not to be sought, therefore, in the intellectual independence of the duller masses but in their intellectual dependence. Not in what they think, but in what they think they think. For the dice of their conclusions are mostly loaded in advance by the beliefs that run current in the social mind, so that everything depends upon how the dice are loaded. The safety of democracy depends, instead, upon securing, through systematic social suggestion, the prevalence in the public memory of sound beliefs, so that when the barber parrots opinions he will parrot sound ones. Public opinion is forced up from behind by the apperceptive mass in the subconscious social mind. Accordingly the problem of democracy is one of determining the beliefs that prevail generally throughout society. There is hope for its success only as unselfish and competent leaders can succeed in restocking the social mind with a new outfit of popular beliefs that harmonize with the best modern knowledge. Obviously, this is the responsibility chiefly of educators. It is a big job; perhaps it may prove impossible of achievement in the present crisis. But there is no other way!

The truth seems to be that a mere echo is the best that can ever be expected from the duller half of the population; and the vital question is who secures them as a sounding board. In the present crisis the race is between those who would selfishly exploit the masses and those who would teach and thereby liberate them. The competing means

are education and propaganda — enlightenment and illusion. If the exploiters should win, the outward forms, even, of democracy could hardly last a century; after which there would probably evolve some sort of an industrial feudalism quite inimical to the objectives themselves of democracy. To load the dice of popular beliefs with the enlightened beliefs of enlightened leaders is the only preventive. How shall we go about it?

The psychological secret to the solution of this problem would seem to be found in the fact that rote behavior in one person, and reasoned behavior in another, may be so similar as to be indistinguishable by the observer. One person's reflexes may be conditioned to a rule, proverb, or slogan the reasons for which he fully understands; the other's reactions may be conditioned to the same stimulus without his understanding it at all. But both *behave* alike! For example, take the rule for division of fractions: "Invert the divisor and proceed as in multiplication." A pupil too dull to be taught the reason for this rule can learn to divide fractions about as efficiently as another who is capable of understanding the mathematician's explanation for the procedure. The formula for unlocking a safe, for adjusting a carburetor, or for setting an alarm clock, can be remembered and executed about as well by one who does not understand the mechanism as by one who does. A moron can call for his mail, order a vaccination, or pay his taxes about as well as a doctor of philosophy. And so on, with perhaps nine tenths of human behavior. This is why fairly bright persons cannot be distinguished from relatively dull persons except by their behavior under rather special or unusual circumstances — or else by artificial tests. Observe the people in a passenger

car, in the lobby of a theater, in a road-grading gang, at a county fair, on a playground, or in any other ordinary situation of life, and the intelligent ones will be indistinguishable from the dullards. The reason is that conditioned reflexes may or may not have bonds with rich interpretive masses of cognitive material. Very dull persons may therefore be trained to function in most of the ordinary situations of life just as if they were not dull at all. How fortunate!

Exactly the same principle applies to the larger and more abstract philosophies of social behavior, and the life programs that are inferred from them. The dull and the bright behave similarly in response to epigrams and slogans which the more intelligent are at great pains to rationalize, but which the dull accept through the most passive sort of social suggestion. Take the old saying: "There has to be a head to every institution, doesn't there?" This old saw epitomized that monarchical conception of family life which obtained till recently. In response to it, highly intelligent men and morons domineered over their families quite alike; but it is safe to say that the books, tracts, and sermons by which such practices were rationalized served not in the slightest degree to stabilize such behavior upon the part of the duller fifty per cent. With them the epigram of itself was just as effective as more. The same may be said about the reaction of bright and of dull women to the "against-nature" slogan by which a high birth-rate was maintained. The bright ones rationalized it; the dull did not; but dull and bright alike raised as large families as they could. The "full-dinner-pail" slogan probably voted more men Republican during the nineties than all the labored arguments of the politicians. Intelligent men exer-

cised their intellects over the logical connections between the premises and the conclusions. Dullards did not agitate their minds, but merely associated the full dinner pail with the Republican ticket. And both voted alike! The fact that these slogans are doubted by the reader himself has nothing to do with the argument. The social psychology of the matter would have been the same had they been as true as their devotees supposed them to be. A book could be filled with such illustrations and it would make an exceedingly interesting and instructive contribution to social psychology.

Even the most intelligent of persons who pride themselves inordinately upon the direction of their lives by reason, will be surprised upon introspection at the extent to which their own behavior is conditioned by such short-cut intellectual methods. "The second hand plays low;" "It pays to advertise;" "Feed a cold and starve a fever;" "A barn will build a house, but a house won't build a barn;" "Better let a sleeping dog lie;" "You can't keep a good man down;" "You can't make the people good by law" are samples. Persons of unquestionably high intelligence believe, along with dullards that "competition is the life of trade," that "honesty is the best policy," that "virtue is its own reward," that "first impressions are lasting," in "the superior efficiency of private enterprise," in "academic freedom," and "freedom of speech," and many others. And dull and bright behave alike. The difference between intelligent persons and dullards is not in the behavior that results from such epigrams, but in the rationalization with which their acceptance is fortified in cognition. And in turbulent periods of transition like our own, when the cult of change provokes doubt of

all conventional beliefs, even that skepticism is as likely to be flaunted flippantly by dull and ignorant persons, whose skepticism is merely imitative, as by the wise and intellectual, who have cogently considered the facts involved. For the current skepticism is itself a mental epidemic. It all comes out to the principle that our collective thought gets grooved in verbal ruts that guide the wheels of collective behavior.

This is a universal phenomenon of the social mind. Every culture system accumulates an enormous capital of catchwords, proverbs, epigrams, slogans, witticisms, rhymes, old sayings, catechisms, and the like. They are the capsules in which concentrated philosophies are swallowed. They are the token money, the credit symbols, by which intellectual exchange is carried on; and they are as indispensable to a complex social life as checks, coins, and paper money are to modern business. To abolish them would be to return to a sort of intellectual barter, under which a complex social life would break down. This clinking coinage of the collective intellect is among the most important means of social integration that any culture system can possess. No great system, whether religious, political, economic, or social, can dispense with them. They are the *sine qua non* of social integration.

To protest against the use of such terse sayings as a means of social integration is merely symptomatic of an individualistic age. The think-for-yourself dogma runs current in our popular psychological mythology, so that we see the facts of our collective mental life through the lenses of that cult. But the fact is clear enough, once those lenses are removed, that imitation is the normal method of human mentation, and

that epigrams, proverbs, slogans, and the other symbols of condensed concepts are as necessary to collective thinking as are words themselves. Without them the "great, big, blooming, buzzing Confusion" of objective reality could never be resolved, and group thinking could never rise to the conceptual level. If mass mentation is to deal in abstractions, cognitive capsules are requisite thereto. To disparage their use is to misapprehend the normal nature of the human mind.

And granted that the old sayings now current express as a rule an antiquated philosophy of life, that only means that we need a new set of sayings. It is only by the use of such shorthand symbols that the minds of *socii* can operate together; and if our old symbols no longer epitomize the philosophy by which we are living, then we need new proverbs, slogans, couplets, catechisms, epigrams, and witticisms that will express that new philosophy of life by which we are to operate the new society. As rapidly as possible we must reduce our new philosophy of epigrams, and drill them memoriter into the memories of dullards. Of course the new coinage waits upon the smelting of the new intellectual bullion; but the bullion must be minted as fast as it is produced. In the fields of the new humanities, accordingly, the phrase maker has a real function to perform. If his coins ring true, are beautiful, and of convenient size, they will soon find their way into general circulation, there to predetermine collective thought and action. We need a new Poor Richard!

And it is principally through the schools that this new coinage of the collective intellect should be paid into general circulation. It is not enough that we teach children to think,

we must actually force-feed them with the concentrated results of expert thinking. To this end there is immense occasion for memoriter training and sheer drill. Ours are the schools of a democracy, which *all* the children attend. At least half of them never had an original idea of any general nature, and never will. But they must behave as if they had *sound* ideas. Whether those ideas are original or not matters not in the least. It is better to be right than to be original. What the duller half of the population needs, therefore, is to have their reflexes conditioned into behavior that is socially suitable. And the wholesale memorizing of catchwords — provided they are sound ones — is the only practical means of establishing bonds in the duller intellects between the findings of social scientists and the corresponding social behavior of the masses. Instead of trying to teach dullards to think for themselves, the intellectual leaders must think for them, and drill the results, memoriter, into their synapses. For the dullards it is that or nothing.

To expound an argument like this without danger of misunderstanding is extremely difficult. In combating a half-truth that has been overemphasized in the current cults it becomes a forensic necessity to overstress the neglected half; which gives the impression of denying what the advocate has no intention to deny. The reader is reminded, therefore, that superior intellects are not the subject of this chapter. Teach them to think, by all means. But for the duller half of the school population, teaching them to think is a well-nigh hopeless enterprise. It is not only hopeless, it is also unnecessary, thanks to the phenomena of imitation and social suggestion. But the behavior of all, dull as well

as bright, must be conditioned alike to the stimuli of identical catchwords; while in the case of the brighter minds such catchwords should be buttressed and fortified with conceptual material, and enriched with relevant facts, in proportion to each individual's capacity for acquiring the same. Teach the *what,* memoriter, to all; but to the bright teach also the *why,* and by means of that newer technique so justly urged in recent pedagogy. Between the project method on the one hand, and the method of memoriter drill on the other, there would seem to be no conflict whatsoever. Teachers should use both methods, each for its appropriate type of mind. Between the dullest and the brightest there are all gradations. There are all gradations, therefore, in the possibility of understanding and independent thinking. But all can memorize the same catchwords, and react accordingly; while the dull can do but little more than that. For them it is enough, however; and herein lies the possibility of integrating group opinion and behavior, in spite of differing intelligences.

How, indeed, is it possible for members of a human group to behave with sufficient similarity to effect the integration of a group program? This is as real a problem as that of explaining why an apple falls down instead of up. It cannot be accounted for on the basis of instinct, as can the uniformities of animal behavior. To act together men must *think* together. But how can men of such different intelligences do that? What other explanation can there be than that offered in the preceding pages of this chapter? Dull and bright alike *remember* the epigrams by which reactions are set off, but with differing degrees of understanding. This means that, just as thinking is done for the body by certain

specialized cells, so thinking is done for the group by certain specialized persons. The notion that group thinking is done by the mass may as well be abandoned, for that is not the nature of the human mind. As well expect lungs, liver, or legs to think. The problem of democracy is which specialized sub-group is to function as cerebral cortex. That will depend upon who succeeds in drilling epigrams into the memories of the duller masses. If scientists and educators fail to do it, then selfish deceivers and exploiters will. But think for themselves the duller masses never can.

This kind of social psychology — this conception of leadership and followership — leads us again to the notion of a graduated hierarchy of intelligence and enlightenment that has been assumed throughout the chapters of this book; and overtly expressed from time to time. At the apex of such a system must be the experts, who are pushing forward research in highly specialized sectors of the front. Behind them are such men and women as the colleges should produce, who are familiar with the findings of the experts and are able to relate part with part. By these relatively independent leaders of thought, progressive change and constant readjustment will be provided for. Back of these are the high school graduates, who are somewhat familiar with the vocabulary of those above them, have some feeling of acquaintance with the various fields, and a respect for expert knowledge. Finally, there are the duller masses, who mouth the catchwords of those in front of them, imagine that they understand, and follow by imitation. The homogeneity of society, involving its capacity for unified purposive mobilization, lies in the fact that the findings of science and our best philosophy permeate the whole mass, much as Catholic

theology permeated the whole mass of west European society during the Middle Ages. Such solidarity can be secured only by practically universal instruction on the lower secondary level of the sort that drills slogans into the dullards, but at the same time selects the brightest for creative thinking on the higher levels, while doing some of both for the great average mass. By no other means can public opinion be organized around the leadership of the better intellects. The problem of leadership is at bottom, therefore, a problem of followership; and the followership of the masses can be secured only by memoriter drill on the epitomized philosophies of the leaders.

CHAPTER XXI

EDUCATIONAL VERSUS ECONOMIC DETERMINISM

EVER since the intelligence tests came into use a dozen years or so ago there has raged a hot debate concerning their propriety as instruments of pedagogical procedure. The persistence of the debate, together with the sanctions of scientific technique on the one side, and, on the other, the life histories of similar movements in the past, would suggest that there must be two sides to the question. At any rate a book in educational theory that is to appear during the third decade of the twentieth century can hardly afford to ignore this much mooted issue.[1] The word determinism is the storm center of this intellectual tempest, and may therefore serve to introduce the subject. The felt need that the intelligence tests were invented to supply, and the technique that has been employed in their construction and verification, together with the acknowledged success with which they have been used (if exceptions be ignored), leave little room to doubt the core of validity and scientific certitude that they contain. The mental tests have doubtless come to stay, whatever modification may occur in the claims that are made for them. The purpose of the present chapter is to consider what modifications a sociological appraisal may lead us to expect.

[1] See *Determinism in Education*, by W. C. Bagley; also the debate between L. M. Terman and Walter Lippmann in *The New Republic*, Vol. 33.

The fallacies that still lurk in the mental measurements movement may be classified under two categories: first, those pertaining to the *findings* themselves, and, second, those pertaining to the *applications* of those findings.

Concerning the first, little need be said here, inasmuch as they are recognized by the most careful workers themselves in that field. With possibly two exceptions. First, it is probable that the findings of the tests may be vitiated at times by the special innate interests with which the person being examined is endowed. Castle [1] lists musical, literary, artistic, mathematical, and mechanical abilities as subject to heredity. Any observer of human nature will surmise that other interests may be genetically determined. Naturally there are individual differences with respect to each of these special interests. But such differences will hardly be discovered by the ordinary mental tests. On the contrary, they are likely to affect the findings of such tests. For example, a boy who does not play football, but who plays in an orchestra, might seem to be obtuse relative to teamwork, if football were the concrete instance used in the test; whereas his orchestral experience had actually rendered him even more intelligent relative to teamwork than any football enthusiast of his group. This matter of special inborn interests would seem to be the explanation of some otherwise mysterious cases.

Second, there are the emotional pressures that play upon the pupil, especially those radiating from the teacher or examiner himself, or from the whole school group as such. The learning powers of normal pupils in school, as well as the achievement of normal adults in the world, are partly deter-

[1] *Genetics and Eugenics*, p. 273.

mined by the emotional reactions provoked in them by their teachers, employers, superiors, and even associates. Some teachers by their very temperaments provoke in certain of their pupils fears, repressions, antagonisms, and inferiority complexes that more or less block their capacity to achieve. Even a candidate for the doctor's degree may find his tongue cleaving to the roof of his mouth during his final examinations for precisely such a reason. Such traits of personality upon the part of teachers are among the most important qualifications for intellectual leadership on any level. Certain great teachers — Albion W. Small, for example — have radiated assurance and encouragement to both subordinates and students; which is five-ninths the secret of their great success. So long as educational psychologists neglect the study of such traits in teachers, their absorbing interest in the I.Q.'s of pupils throws an onus of responsibility upon mere children which often enough should be shared by teachers also — a seriously unfair, if indirect, determinism, it has to be admitted.

However, it is mostly in the *applications* of the mental tests that the sociologist discovers fallacies. And these fallacies, interesting to note, are not due to the tests themselves. The procedure of testing may be sound, and the findings valid, and yet the applications be utterly fallacious and pernicious. For the findings of the tests are never more than the minor premise in the syllogism of which the application is the conclusion. The major premise is almost invariably some popular, but often mistaken, belief, in which the investigator participates with the naïveté of the man on the street, and which he introduces quite inadvertently into his reasoning without critical scrutiny. This is the sort of

fallacy to which reference has been made repeatedly throughout this book, and of which numerous examples have already been discussed. The popular mythology is thus the bane of applied science, especially in the mental and social fields; and nowhere more so than in this matter of the mental measurements.

A forensic fever may often be due to the invisible germs of illusion in the premises; in which case the usual frequent poultices of hot argument quite fail to reach the source of the excitement. And such is the case with this debate between the anti-determinists and the mental testers. It is therefore a fruitless and interminable debate, because both sides are unconsciously agreed upon premises that are really false. The result is that one side is putting forward the scientific certitude of its findings in defense of school practices that are not inferred from those findings at all; whereas the other side is arguing at a quite unnecessary disadvantage in defense of perfectly sound intuitions, with which the validity of the findings have really nothing whatsoever to do. To escape from this predicament it is necessary to examine the false premises upon which both sides are inadvertently agreed.

The most fundamental illusion from the popular mythology to slip inadvertently into the reasoning under discussion is the belief that social organization, as well as each person's part in it, is due to individual differences and initiative. As the dean of a certain academic college puts it: "What is really important to us is the fact that individuals differ from one another in every one of those common characteristics which make us all members of the human race; and that those differences constitute the sole ground for the

organization of society and the sole means by which individuals find their places in that organization." This is amateurish and mistaken sociology. Indeed, it is nothing but the popular sociological mythology. It simply is not true. Such a statement might be partly true of industry, but of all the other institutions of society it is the exact opposite of the truth. It is a case of the iceberg fallacy mentioned in Chapter III, and an inference from the psychological fallacy specified on the first page of that chapter. The fact is, as there pointed out and explained, that social organization consists largely of the extensive *similarities* of learned thought, feeling, and behavior. Division of labor in industry is the chief exception to this rule; but the rule holds for the massive framework of all the other institutions of society. It holds true of the general framework even of the industrial institution. The exception is obtrusive in attention; the general rule is not. Hence the plausibility of the fallacy in the above quotation. It is assumed in the popular beliefs that we are educating children for *different* functions in society; whereas a sound sociology discerns that we are also, and to an even greater degree, educating them into *similarity*. This false assumption is the first and basic mistake that misguides the mental measurers in the application of their findings.

Closely related is the popular illusion as to the nature of the learning process; an illusion too often accepted by psychologists, and from which there is no escape except through the insights of *social* psychology. To a far greater degree than we are wont to recognize learning is social in the sources of its content, and passive in its method — as was explained in Chapter III. Intelligence of the self-

reliant, problem-solving sort plays a small part in much if not most of our learning. Imitation plays a very large part indeed. Now imitative learning tends to cancel the difference between dull and bright intellects, so far as the acquired mental content is concerned. And the practical social consequence is that dull and bright can learn to behave alike in those very numerous social situations which call for similar behavior. As pointed out in the last chapter, this similarity of behavior is gotten by an education in which the bright understand and exercise initiative, as well as memorizing, while the dull merely memorize and imitate without understanding. The social psychology of such education calls for *a group life in which dull and bright participate together, and study the same subject matter,* but in which the dull would be expected to learn that subject matter in a schematic, impressionistic way, while the bright would be expected to understand it. The opportunity which such group life gives for the dull to imitate the bright in behavior and feeling, and to some extent even in thought, is indispensable to that similarity of behavior by all, which is quite as real an objective of education as is specialization, and particularly on the elementary level.

Since human life is normally group life, in which dull participate with bright by imitation, instruction ought to be organized with as much similitude as possible to life itself. In so far as our objective is individual expertness and technical specialization, segregate; but in so far as our objective is group participation, segregation is more or less of a mistake, except as applied to the decidedly subnormal on the one hand, and the advanced education of the decidedly superior on the other. It is possible to teach a group of normal chil-

dren in such a way that the brighter members understand the whys and wherefores, while the duller members merely swallow the capsules and imagine that they understand. Doubtless such education would require a somewhat different technique than what is now in use, and certainly a somewhat different type of school organization; but its result should be to provide for homogeneous group behavior, while at the same time avoiding unnatural conceits, precocities, and inferiority complexes. Furthermore, it appears from experimental studies[1] that "social facilitation . . . produces a distinct increase in . . . the product of individuals"; and that "this facilitating influence is greatest for the slower and poorer workers." From this the suspicion is inferred that segregation squanders such facilitation. It appears that parents rather generally feel that there is something wrong with segregation; what is behind their intuitions may perhaps be indicated by these considerations from social psychology.

The ultimate objective of teaching is not knowledge, but behavior. Knowledge is only a means, and, in the case of the dull, not always necessary, thanks to the phenomena of rote learning and imitation. But, since it is immediate and tangible, we measure our success in terms of knowledge, and organize our schools accordingly. And the measurement movement has augmented this tendency. But *social* psychology creates the suspicion that this is fallacious in theory and pernicious in practice. If our school program were conceived and organized more with reference to the children's ultimate behavior in adult society we might revise our opinions as to the ones with whom we are succeed-

[1] See Floyd Alport's *Social Psychology*, Chapter XI.

ing. We might be more able to discover that those who only memorize summaries and general conclusions, and acquire emotional attitudes by imitation, eventually behave much the same as those who remember details and understand them. And conversely, we must seek to secure such similarity of behavior through a school program that does give the dull a chance to participate with the bright, and imitate them. And it must never be forgotten that society wants similarity of behavior in nine routine situations, to every once that it wants dissimilar behavior in problematical situations.

If this line of reasoning be sound it would seem to condemn not only the segregation of dull from bright just now so fashionably in vogue, but also the practice of promoting bright children into groups older than themselves and demoting dull children into groups younger than themselves. These practices deprive the duller children of opportunities to learn by sheer imitation, as suggested in Chapter XX. They also tend to develop conceits and precocities in bright youngsters, and inferiority and failure complexes in overgrown dullards. Perhaps a bright child would be profited as much by furnishing him opportunity to enrich the elementary curriculum with supplementary details as by crowding him forward into the higher grades. And if a dull child is to remain in school until he is sixteen, social psychology would seem to suggest that he would be better prepared for life if he went along with children of his own age through, say, the junior high school, even though he got only the outlines and general impressions of what the others got, than to make him repeat two or three grades with the idea of getting their content more thoroughly. With a rationally constituted curriculum the material of each grade

is not so prerequisite to that of the next as we are wont to imagine.[1]

From the two illusions already discussed — that individual differences are important while similarities are not, and that independent, problem solving mentality is socially significant whereas imitative, memoriter learning is not — from these two illusions there naturally follows that pessimistic attitude toward the intelligence of the average man to which the testing movement has inadvertently contributed (perhaps partly through a misunderstanding of its terminology). But such pessimism is inconsistent with the facts of history and social evolution.

It would be very bad biology to suppose, for example, that the average native intelligence of the Japanese race had suddenly increased during the last sixty or eighty years, during which time that race has so rapidly taken on occidental science and technology. Certain Philippine villages that were still in their age-old status of barbarism thirty years ago now have paved streets, good schools, and electric lights. Yet biologists would not permit us to conclude that the people have better brains now than they did then. Most of the readers of this book are sons and daughters of uneducated American farmers, with an ancestry of uncultured farmers and European peasants back of them. We intellectuals of the present generation have merely been exposed to a more elaborate culture, that is all; and the distribution curve of our success or failure in adjusting to it is about the same as that of our grandfathers, to their more simple situation. Our I.Q.'s are probably about the same as theirs were, on the average. There was something latent in those old

[1] Compare the experiment suggested in Chapter XIX, page 369.

farmer folks of two and three generations ago that the mental test would hardly have discovered. Or again, some school superintendent with vision gives some "Bloody Fifth," "across the tracks," a new school building, with a generous equipment, an improved teaching staff, and instructional facilities, and an enriched curricular and social program. Five years witness a complete transformation; there is a new outlook upon life by the patrons, a new display of ability upon the part of the pupils, and an amazingly elevated participation generally in the contemporaneous culture.

Social evolution furnishes examples on an even larger scale. If we are to take the anthropologists and biologists seriously we must believe that our Germanic ancestors of a thousand years ago — even Crô-Magnon, indeed, of thirty thousand years ago — had, on the average, just as good brains as we have, with a similar distribution of intelligence among them. If one could set back the clock of time, and transfer himself into the midst of that extinct society, so as to observe it from within as a participant, he would doubtless get the impression that some individuals were making more, and some less, intelligent adjustments to it. He would also get the impression that such a culture was about the highest that could be successfully negotiated by people of such intelligence as theirs. One would be pessimistic, in other words, about such a people ever being able to rise to a higher cultural level. And yet we now know that if infants of theirs could have been kept in cold storage of some sort until our civilization had arrived, and then brought up to it, those infants would have become able to function in it as well as our own children do. But we do not need to imagine any such cold storage miracle. Nature has kept the germ plasm in cold

storage; for, as a matter of fact, our children are born with essentially the same brain equipment as theirs had. Therefore we do have the same kind of folks as seemed then to be quite up to their depth in a very meager culture now operating a highly complex and technical culture. From such considerations it may be inferred that the limit of cultural evolution is by no means reached even yet, and that the present type of population is capable of adjusting to a much more elaborate culture than we now possess.

The explanation of this optimism is in the much neglected social psychology of passive learning and group imitation. Two things appear: first, that the best minds are capable of gradually inventing a far better civilization than we now possess; and, second, that the masses are capable of negotiating by imitation any culture system that the brightest can invent, provided they are given opportunity for memoriter learning of, and imitative participation in, all the intellectual resources of which that culture system is constituted. There is unlimited hope, therefore, for the uncultured classes of society, and for the now backward races of mankind, *provided they be not segregated.* Similarly, to select the duller children, who seem obviously predestined for the simpler economic functions only, segregate them from the brighter half, and deprive them of imitative participation in the study of the arts, the sciences, and the new humanities, is a formula for creating a caste stratified society. And the more scientifically accurate the selection the more deadly the social results. Dr. Bagley is right, therefore, in calling such a procedure an educational determinism. But the way out is not through discrediting the findings of the tests, nor in the claim that the dull can compensate for their

limitations by extra effort. The way out is rather through the insights of a *social* psychology. For social psychology reveals the fact that similar behavior can be secured in dull and bright alike by having them learn the same subject matter, but in different ways — a difference that always results normally when persons of different intelligences participate together in the same group activities.

Quite akin to the popular myth that education should cater to individual differences is the false popular assumption that education should cater almost entirely to vocational aptitudes, almost the entire school program differing for children of different aptitudes. This is an inference from the popular feeling that the vocational is the principal objective of schooling. It is a fact that most parents send their children to school, especially to advanced schools, chiefly that they may become able to earn a good living as easily as possible. Many children drop out of school because they see no vocational advantage in remaining; and children of the rich are often hard to motivate because they feel no vocational incentive. A similar assumption lies back of the remark so often made that children of low I.Q.'s ought to be given vocational training instead of academic subject matter. And this line of reasoning, together with the assumption underlying it, permeates the whole segregation tendency in contemporaneous education. It also threatens to vitiate the vocational guidance movement, in which case that movement would become extremely dangerous.

This dominance of the vocational objective is a great mistake. Throughout this book it has been contended that the institutions of society are the objectives of education — that *all* of them are. Now, for all of these institutions

(except industry) we want similar behavior. If John is obviously predestined to be a barber, but George a banker, is that a reason why they should be educated to make different utilizations of the health-preserving institution? Does society want them to behave differently when they have broken bones or infectious diseases? Does society want them to be similar or different in the matter of respect for law; to vote similarly or differently on important public questions? Does society want them to take similar or different attitudes toward the public school as an institution? And so on with all the institutions — except industry. Dissimilarity of behavior can only mean that one is socially efficient, while the other is not. For participation in all the social institutions (except industry), and for utilization of all the intellectual resources of civilization (except the techniques of industry), a sound theory of educational objectives calls for behavior, as an end result, as similar as can be secured in spite of differing I.Q.'s. Vocational training must and therefore should regard the capacities of candidates; but to assume that schooling preparatory to all the other functions in society should vary from person to person in strict accordance with their respective vocational aptitudes is an utterly indefensible educational determinism. It robs the candidate of his self-realization, and deprives society of his social efficiency. And social psychology shows that it is as unnecessary as it is pernicious, thanks to memoriter learning and imitative behavior.

So much, at present, for the determinism of the schoolroom. Let us now turn to that far more pervasive and imperious determinism of the outside world: the determinism of industry. Here we have a determinism that is almost

as merciless as war, and almost as inexorable as the climate. But most of us fail quite utterly to see it, because it is so commonplace and usual. Least of all are we capable of imagining that it might be otherwise. Hence we fail to recognize it as an artificial, fortuitous, and even wicked determinism. But let us try to escape "the hypnotism of the present reality," and feature it to our imaginations.

It presents itself in two aspects, the first of which is the determinism of the industrial technique and of the economic organization. These determine the percentage of the population assigned at any given time to each of the various occupations. The number of locomotive engineers, for example, is determined by the demands of industry. That number could not be increased or decreased either by the ambitions or efforts of youths. The same is true of school teachers, elevator operators, bookkeepers, bank cashiers, farm hands, barbers, physicians, and a thousand and one other occupations. It is true of the great classes of workers: entrepreneurs, technicians, small business men, white-collared workers, and unskilled laborers. The ambitions and capacities of persons have nothing to do (except perhaps in the very long run) with the percentages of the population assigned to each. Nor is this economic determinism any more than a partial respecter of I.Q.'s. It demands high I.Q.'s for some functions, to be sure, and is satisfied with morons for some kinds of work; but if there are not enough morons to take all the jobs that mere morons could do, it conscripts persons for those jobs of no matter how high intelligence.

The second aspect of this economic determinism is the social status that it arbitrarily assigns to the respective economic functions. For example, in our society unskilled

laborers are poor; and with their poverty goes a limited opportunity for satisfying participation in the various institutions: a meager standard of living, a straitened family and community life, a limited use of the recreational and health preserving facilities, a restricted access to education and the cultural resources generally. With the technical and clerical positions goes a somewhat more generous bill of cultural fare; while a certain limited list of economic functions carry with them comfort, luxury, and various stimulating experiences.

The point to be emphasized is that this determinism is more or less artificial, resulting from the organization of industrial society, which might be different. The wage system assigns the unskilled to poverty, ignorance, and cultural deprivation; but the slave system assigned them to a much worse condition. Perhaps there will sometime be a system that will assign them to a much better status. As systems change the social opportunities of different functionaries change. In Shakespeare's time, for example, actors were accorded but little remuneration and no social prestige; but the whim of society has changed toward them by now. In former centuries in Europe the actual tillers of the soil were a ruthlessly deprived class; at present in many parts of America the actual workers on the land are often, at the same time, gentlemen farmers with wealth, culture, and social prestige. What their status will be a century hence depends upon our solution of the present farm problem. A system of universal vocational education, especially if accompanied with restriction of immigration, would probably give unskilled laborers a richer participation in the good things of civilized life, possibly to the relative disadvantage of other classes. Radical changes in the legalized rights of

property would result in society assigning its favors to the various economic classes respectively in a quite different fashion than at present.

Now, in all this economic determinism — this artificial social favoritism — there is an element of gross injustice. We blind ourselves to it and explain it away because institutions always justify themselves insistently to the blinded minds of their contemporaneous participants. But the social injustices of other times and distant societies we can see plainly enough; and posterity will not be deceived, as we are, about the injustices of the present economic order. They are real, and far more serious than some of us like to admit. The social problem of the present age is to correct them; and it has been the central contention of this book that education can contribute toward such much-desired solutions.

Relative to the determinism of the present economic system, education can do one or the other of two things. It can accept that determinism as inevitable and therefore right, and cater to it. That it could do by determining in advance, by the use of mental and other tests, the type of economic function for which each youth is fitted, and then giving him the kind of general, as well as vocational, education that would fit him for such a sharing in the social and cultural resources of civilization as we are now accustomed to see his economic class enjoy. The obvious result would be to deepen the intrenchments and thicken the fortifications of the present economic injustices. That would be an educational determinism with a vengeance, since it would add the determinism of education to that of industry. And precisely that is what the present *applications* of the mental tests are tending to do, in so far as those applications assume that a

person's entire education should be organized around his vocational aptitudes. Those persons are neither blind reactionaries [1] nor educational fanatics, therefore, who object to such a tendency in education.

The other thing that education might do instead is to challenge the present system of economic and social determinism as unjust and unnecessary, and set itself to the task of counteracting and checkmating it. This it could do by undertaking to give the youths of all vocational aptitudes equal access to all the cultural resources of civilization (other than the technical) — by endeavoring to prepare all young people for similar participation in all the institutions of society (other than the industrial). An education which did that would eventually break the backbone of economic determinism itself, and produce a cultural democracy in which all would have equal opportunity for self-realization.[2] And this is not impossible! Such equality of access to culture, such similarity of participation, can be achieved in spite of differing I.Q.'s, to a far greater degree than is at present realized. The secret is in memoriter learning and imitative behavior. If education is to escape from its complicity in the unjust determinism of our economic system, it will be, not by repudiating the findings of the mental measurements in the minor premise, but by discarding the dollars-and-cents concept of educational objectives, and the every-fellow-for-himself notion of pedagogical methods, in the major premise — not in abandoning the science of educational psychology, but in developing a sociological philosophy of objectives, and a theory of methods derived from *social* psychology.

[1] Cf. *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1926, page 134.
[2] Cf. the last half of Chapter XIX, above.

CHAPTER XXII

SOCIAL HOMOGENEITY AS AN OBJECTIVE[1]

THE purpose of this chapter is to emphasize the responsibility of education for making us all *alike*. It runs in the dogmas of the current pedagogical cult that schooling should cater to our individual differences, and accentuate them as much as possible; but this is a dangerous half-truth. Here we encounter in another form that dualism to which reference has so often been made; the dualism that arises from two equally impressive, but apparently contradictory, facts of life, namely, independence and interdependence. It is one of the most conspicuous and insistent obsessions of the *Zeitgeist* to give independence relatively more emphasis than it deserves. Interdependence and its implications — including the responsibilities they impose upon education — are grossly slighted in the current intersuggestion and echoic jargon that we are so prone to mistake for pedagogical thinking. It is of course true that modern civilization does and must practice division of labor to an elaborate degree; and that specialization, based ultimately upon individual differences, is necessary as preparation for such diversity of function. But this is only half the truth; and the other half is at least equally important, though too much neglected in our current educational assumptions. The other half is that we must be mentally equipped to keep step together in

[1] The substance of this chapter appeared in *School and Society*, for March 23, 1918.

an ever increasing array of social activities. It is right that education should make us different; but it is at least as important that education should make us alike in our mental contents and our overt behavior. Different in some respects; alike in many others. And these two necessities must be harmonized in our thought and practice. "This ought ye to have done, and not to have left the other undone." Since specialization is at least sufficiently emphasized in our current theories, one of these chapters may quite properly be devoted to a special plea for social homogeneity as an educational objective.

The sociologists have laid no little emphasis in recent years upon the social significance of a common culture. Dewey, in his incidental capacity as a social theorist, very cleverly points out that the word community not only names the social group but also suggests that the functioning of the group as such depends upon a community of mental resources. Cooley, above all others, makes it clear that a mental capital mutually shared is the fundamental requisite of social organization and the social process. And the obvious inference is that the more elaborate the social process, the richer that common-to-all must be. This community-of-interest principle, in one form or another, is indeed the very core of all sociological theory. It is the central thought in Tarde's doctrine of imitation, in Ward's sympathy theory of society, in Giddings's "consciousness of kind," and in Simmel's philosophy of "superiority and subordination." Ross explains the social organism first by certain instincts which are common to all, such as sympathy, sociability, and justice, and, second, by a unifying control exercised upon all by all the members of society through such agencies as

public opinion, law, belief, education, religion, art, and so forth.

Ellwood summarizes his theory of social order as follows:[1]

> There must be fundamental likeness among individuals in those primitive elements of human nature — the instincts and impulses. There must also be fundamental likeness and agreement in acquired habits, especially those which children take on through early training and by imitative absorption from their environment. There must also be sympathy and mutual understanding between all the members of the group. Finally, there must be agreement with regard to the more fundamental ideals of life. All this implies, if such relative uniformity and likeness is to be achieved in the mass of individuals composing those great societies which we term civilized nations, that government and law, religion and morality, standards and education must be continually used to control and constrain the development of the individual.

Hayes expounds the same idea in slightly different terms. He says:[2]

> Association exists only when one is aware of the activity of his associate; therefore association implies communication. This tendency of human beings to be influenced by each other is the universal social fact; it is for sociology what affinity is for chemistry. The elements that enter into the life of society and of the individuals who compose society are of three kinds, namely, ideas, sentiments, and overt practices; therefore, the causal relationships that exist between the activities of associates may be of at least three main sorts: (1) those relations in which the idea of one associate becomes known to another, which we call social suggestion; (2) that in which the sentiment of one associate is felt by another, which we shall call sympathetic radiation; and (3) that in which the overt practice of one associate is practiced by another, which we shall call imitation.

Professor Ellsworth Faris, in a paper before The American Sociological Society,[3] suggests that adequate recognition of the "subjective aspects of culture" will furnish escape from

[1] *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, p. 364.
[2] *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, p. 304.
[3] *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XIX, p. 37 ff.

some of the stalemates in which psychology seems to have become deadlocked of late. What he means by the "subjective aspects of culture" may be inferred from the following quotations:

> But in all these groups there are members; and in each of these members the objective aspects of culture have a corresponding subjective side, and the subjective aspect of culture is one way in which the object-matter of social psychology might be defined. Personality is the subjective aspect of culture, and the problem is not how personality is modified by culture, but how personality results inside the process of culture.
>
> Many writers can repeat Cooley's phrase about society and the individual being different aspects of the same phenomenon without either grasping the real significance of the statement, or adding anything to their own competence in investigation. The conception of personality as subjective culture will lead to very real changes of stress and emphasis.

From which it follows that persons participating in the same culture hold large segments of their personalities in common; and, conversely, a rich culture functions socially in proportion to the percentage of the population into whose personalities that culture has been built.

But Professor Cooley is the arch exponent of this revolutionary insight; and his expressions of it are so epigrammatical as to be missed entirely by the uninitiated, while they seem like flashes of genius to those who catch his meaning and anticipate the implications of his thought:

> Self and society are twinborn, we know one as immediately as we know the other, and the notion of a separate and independent ego is an illusion.
>
> Human nature is not something existing separately in the individual, but a group-nature, or primary phase of society.
>
> Man does not have it [i.e. human nature] at birth; he cannot acquire it except through fellowship; and it decays in isolation.

This concept of Cooley's has been referred to frequently in the earlier chapters of this book, as the reader will remember.

From it we may infer that the more of the social capital one incorporates into his own mind, the larger and more nearly complete his selfhood will become. And, conversely, the less a society's individual members identify themselves with the large interests of society the fewer of such interests there will eventually be. Thus the abundance or meagerness of society and individual life are but two phases of the same phenomenon.

Let us present this principle as concretely and vividly as possible to the imagination. Imagine the following persons brought together by chance: a Chinese laundryman, an academic philosopher, a Mexican laborer, a Methodist preacher, an Italian opera singer, and a Chippewa Indian. What could they do *together* for amusement? Or to extricate themselves from some dangerous predicament? Imagine a thousand equally dissimilar persons set down in a village from which the inhabitants had moved out the day before, leaving all their equipment. What social enterprises could they organize and carry forward harmoniously? Obviously, they would have too little in common. Their minds would not be able to do teamwork, for lack of common contents. As well might a farm boy try to make a four-horse team out of a pig, a calf, a dog, and a donkey. He could bring out their individualities to the satisfaction even of an Emerson; but social homogeneity would baffle his most ingenious pedagogics. Fortunately, however, it is not so necessary as in the case of neighbors, citizens, and "socii." For neighbors who have nothing in common can carry on no social life together. A nation that has within itself a diversity of races, languages, religions, or social classes is handicapped by the friction and discord that arises. What it lacks

is community of interest and similarity of mental resources. America not only is, but must be, a melting pot; for unless we reduce to likeness the heterogeneous elements that come to us we shall hardly be able to operate our institutions successfully.

We can come to grips with this problem of social homogeneity if we inquire precisely what those mental resources are which a civilized people must have in common. The best way to answer this question is to revert to that list of mental resources first presented in Chapter II: the means of communication, the techniques of industry, the sciences and the fine arts, the popular beliefs and the accepted ideals, the "mores" and the "folkways." The means of communication must be the same for the members of a community. The techniques of industry are specialized; each person's vocational technique differs from that of most of his neighbors. This *exceptional* fact is what leads our thinking astray. We reason from the exception which is obtrusive in attention, rather than from the usual which is not obtrusive. It is in the very nature of the "mores" and the "folkways" to be practically identical for all. If a society is divided into castes, the "mores" and "folkways" will differ for the different levels; but that is just what democracy aims to abolish. Just to the degree that beliefs differ relative to economic, political, ethical, religious, and sociological phenomena, is a great people bound to suffer disharmony and difficulty of social coöperation; especially if that people is trying to determine and execute its social policies through a free crystallization of public opinion. As for the sciences and the fine arts, it has frequently been pointed out that their utilization constitutes the difference

between barbarism and a high civilization. Those collective activities in which the sciences and the fine arts are utilized depend for their success upon their common utilization by all the people.

We come out to the same conclusion with an even greater clarity of insight if we use the concept of the social structures as the premise for our thinking. As we have seen, the institutions *are* the educational objectives. It is oversight of this important principle which tricks us into unilateral conclusions relative to individual differences. Misguided by this oversight we are prone to think only of *different* objectives for children who are different. But as soon as this principle is grasped in its full import we shall be more disposed to regard individual differences as obstacles that must be overcome if possible, in order that we may achieve the *same* objectives for *all* children. The first is the point of view of the psychologist, because he is inclined to see individuals apart from institutions; the second is the point of view of the sociologist, because he sees institutions as the necessary medium outside of which the individual cannot live at all. The two points of view must be balanced and harmonized in our practice.

This is one of the dilemmas of social life that has to be solved by discrimination. Such questions as, How much? or, How little? do not help us. What we need to know is, Which? And this question answers itself as soon as we glance at our list of institutions. For one of them, namely, industry, different persons need different training, due to the modern division of labor. But for all the rest of them there is urgent need for considerable similarity of function. By way of illustration, consider the family. Housekeeping

involves similar knowledge, skills, and ideals for all good housekeepers and mothers, because the functions of all good housekeepers are similar; differences are likely to mean merely that some are incompetent. Which girls should be excused from the kind of training designed to make good housekeepers? Or what shall we do about girls whose intelligence quotients are so low that they can hardly acquire the scientific knowledge involved in good housekeeping? Let them go without it? Or try, in spite of that obstacle, to find some memoriter method of imparting it so that, as housekeepers, they will *behave* as similarly as may be to those who have learned it with the understanding? Bad home-making the schools of a democracy must not anticipate complacently on the excuse that some girls are stupid. And the same reasoning applies to boys, in so far as worthy home membership is concerned. We come to similar conclusions if we consider the state as objective. As unofficial citizens the duties of all are similar, no matter what their specialties or their individual traits: to know the laws and obey them; to know what the different agencies of the government are, and how to use them; and to contribute truth, not fallacy, to public opinion and voting — and the truth is the same for all. Having determined what are the minimum essentials for citizenship, whom shall we excuse from that training? Those who have special aptitudes for music, or mechanics, or animal husbandry? Or those who have low I.Q.'s, and can learn only by rote and memory? And our logic has the same results if we consider any other institution — except industry. And even with respect to industry, the rules of the game are the same for all, no matter what the specialty of each may be. The training necessary to the

understanding of these rules, or that is helpful in using them upon occasion, should therefore be as similar for all as innate differences will permit. Indeed, with respect to all the institutions, education should aim at similarities in *behavior* far beyond the possibilities of understanding the reasons for that behavior. It is at this point that imitation and social suggestion come to the rescue, rendering social homogeneity possible *in spite of* intellectual differences.

In the preceding paragraph we have contrasted the industrial with the other institutions as objectives. Specialization is necessary for the one, but mostly out of place for the others; and yet we are prone to give the specialization idea a blanket application. It is the spirit of the age! But is it not strange that we should have a curriculum in which training for industry is the one thing conspicuously neglected; and then try to apply to that curriculum a line of reasoning that is really applicable to nothing else. We follow the specialization idea where it is the very principle that ought to be most carefully avoided. This fallacy does considerable harm. It damages our high schools almost in the proportion that it is applied. Its application is one thing that ails our liberal-arts colleges, inasmuch as it obscures their real function, until some are seriously questioning whether the senior arts college has any function at all. Vocation is not the major objective of schooling of the arts college sort.

The thesis of this chapter may be further clarified by reasoning from the economist's distinction between consumption and production. As participants in industry we are producers; as participants in the other institutions we are for the most part consumers. Specialization, it should be

observed, is training for production. It prepares individuals to furnish the markets with the various commodities and services that make up our assorted culture. But goods are of no benefit until they are used. Civilized peoples must not only make the stock of culture, they must also use it. And to use it requires as much training as to make one's special contribution to it. Who has not encountered ignorant or provincially minded persons stranded in some eddy of the social life, who are no more a part of the twentieth century than if they had lived five hundred years ago, or are no more aware of the intellectual treasures of the age than if they resided in Mars? For ignorant or bigoted sufferers, medical or surgical science is a nonentity; their minds are not furnished to utilize it. There is an ignorance which is enough to close one's soul to the enjoyment of music and literature, to absent one utterly from the atmosphere of science, and render one a babe in the woods of modern mechanical and engineering achievements. A gift to some persons of Browning's poems or of a score of Handel's Messiah or even of a copy of the New Testament would be a joke; they could not appreciate it. There are millions of workers who tread the dusty path of drudgery with no inspiration from the art treasures of the race. In other words, members of a complex civilized society need extended education for consumption, otherwise that civilization is of no benefit to them; and that is a very different type of education from training for production. Training to produce demands specialization; education to consume, on the other hand, requires generalization; for it is evident that a very large and liberal common-to-all is essential to the social utilization of a complex objective culture.

As an abstract proposition it follows from all this that the more complex a civilization becomes the larger must be the common-to-all. When the community possesses but a meager social heritage there is little to have in common, but when a people has accumulated the elaborate mental capital of a complicated supercivilization there is a very great deal to be shared. And shared it must be if the social machinery of this new supercivilization is to run smoothly. The more culture a people possesses, the more that culture must be passed around. The distribution of culture among all the people is essential to the well-being of modern complex societies; and this is preëminently true of the new régime that is just now in process of coming into existence.

While this principle is obvious enough when stated thus abstractly, it may be worth while to furnish one or two concrete illustrations. In religious matters, for example, we are at considerable disadvantage through lack of unity. During the Middle Ages unity was sought through enforced conformity. And since religion was one of the largest and most important interests in mediæval society, religious uniformity was essential to social solidarity. The authorities that enforced it were blindly and vaguely aware of the sociological principle under discussion in this chapter. But since the Reformation, religious unity has been conspicuous by its absence; and the friction, turmoil, and bloodshed that have resulted have been tragic indeed. Modern life has found other bases for coöperation; but in the field of religion we are far less efficient than we might be. Split up into almost innumerable sects, we have neither doctrine, polity, nor program on which we can agree. There are the progressive and conservative factions; and a policy that

suits the adherents of the old theology can seldom enlist the coöperation of those who believe the new. Hence the churches exert far less influence than they might, both in specific reforms and in general idealism. But this dilemma is to be solved not in the field of religion at all, but outside it altogether, by a wide dissemination of the other elements of modern culture. As fast as all the people come to use the same language, think in terms of the same science, read the same literature, learn the same history, utilize the same fine arts, and participate in the same social ideals, just so fast religious unity and coöperation will emerge. The religious uniformity which the Inquisition so cruelly and so vainly sought to enforce will be brought to pass voluntarily in modern societies through universal participation in the dominant thought-life of the century; and this will be achieved through universal education of a liberalizing type.

The foregoing shows how one interest of modern life may be dependent upon the wide distribution of all branches of culture. Let us now submit illustrations of how all the interests of a complex society may be dependent upon the wide dissemination of one particular branch of culture. Take, for example, the science of hygiene. Upon the universal application of the principles of that science depend the success of our public schools, the rate of infant mortality in our cities, the control of epidemics, and the efficiency of our armies and our industries. In fact, the benefits of this science can be traced into every ramification of our social life. But it cannot be made effective anywhere unless the people all understand at least a modicum of its fundamental principles, for if an ignorant citizen does not believe in the existence of invisible germs he is likely to infect

the whole community with some dangerous disease. Everybody must know at least enough about bacteriology to picture the behavior of disease germs to his imagination. To this end every child ought to actually see a culture under the microscope at some time during his education. And the same line of reasoning applies to the social sciences. We have arrived at a stage in social evolution when social forces and institutions are about the most important features of our environment. As we have seen, a good deal of readjustment of that environment is needed. For the guidance of this rearrangement social scientists have accumulated considerable new knowledge, some of which is strictly scientific. But this new knowledge often fails to function in public policy because it is not in the possession of the people. Even the statesmen are ignorant in many cases. But since this is a democracy, the reforms advocated can never be put into effect until the people themselves come to know the fundamentals of social science. They must know at least enough to demand that their representatives consult the experts. Thus, upon a wide distribution of this new branch of knowledge depends the progress of civilization. Mental homogeneity is indispensable here.

From the standpoint of social control the necessity for mental homogeneity is equally impressive. Uniform and conventional behavior cannot be secured by compulsion in a democracy, as it could under monarchical and autocratic types of government. If a democratic people's conduct is to be dependable and harmonious they must think and feel alike. They must have a similar understanding of the reasons for their behavior. Popular education is to a democracy what a standing army is to an autocracy. The third

alternative is social disharmony, and that is but a step from a dictatorship.

The necessity for a generous common-culture will be made even more evident by a consideration of social caste. Caste means the separation of society into strata or classes on the basis of opportunity. When any given group in a community begin to be deprived of an equitable share of life's good things and of the opportunity to get them for themselves and for their children, then a system of caste begins to evolve. The escape of an occasional individual out of his class into a more fortunate stratum should delude no one if the vast majority, as a matter of fact, do not and cannot escape. As Pestalozzi quaintly put it, minnows are minnows and food for pike, even though the pike-made rules of the pond permit one minnow in ten thousand to become himself a pike. It seems strange how we deceive ourselves with the fallacy of the exceptional case. A vast underlying layer of humanity, submerged generation after generation in poverty and ignorance, is analogous to a caste, however we may blind ourselves to the fact. Anything that even approaches a system of caste is inimical to the ideals of democracy. Democracy implies an equality of opportunity sufficient to give every sort of talent an opportunity to reveal itself. Especially does it imply an equal opportunity to acquire the sciences and the fine arts with a view to applying them in daily life. The peasantry and the proletariat of Europe have for centuries contented themselves with the crumbs of culture that fall from the table of civilization, but in the United States and the colonies of the British Empire we want neither peasantry nor proletariat, in the continental sense of those words. Our aim is to develop a citizenry every individual

of which shall share equitably in the cultural heritage. The aim of the country-life movement, for instance, is "to make farm life permanently satisfying for representative American citizens." And nobody objects. Such a slogan is accepted as expressing the farmers' rights under a democracy. And if the farmers, why not the miners, factory hands, garment workers, and all other classes? We cannot tolerate in America the thought of a landed aristocracy and a permanently ignorant, poverty-stricken tenantry. Neither can we tolerate the thought of any other class permanently ignorant and poverty-stricken. Different economic and social functions there must always be and differences of wealth; but life in each and every function must be "permanently satisfying to representative American citizens." Otherwise this will be a democracy only in name; and the cruel farce will eventually become apparent.

Now, it is becoming ever more obvious to sociologists that the fundamental formula for liquidating caste is to provide for a wide popular distribution of all the inherited mental capital of the race. Certain groups that are in a position to provide themselves and their children with these good things, skim the cream of civilization and get themselves called the better class. The state that leaves to their own deprivation those who cannot or will not provide their children with these social goods is thereby perpetuating an hereditary lower class. A lower economic class there is always bound to be, of course; but in a real democracy that lower class will not be non-participants in the material comforts and cultural resources, neither will it be an hereditary class. Whom shall we select as appropriate victims

for a laissez faire partiality with respect to educational opportunities? The poor and the ignorant? Those children who have to leave school early to go to work? Or those whose parents are too ignorant to appreciate schooling? In a state where that can happen in any considerable percentage of cases there will never be a real democracy. As with the farmers,[1] so with all classes; they must be furnished the intellectual resources that will enable them (*a*) to maintain a class status of economic equity as against any and all other classes, and (*b*) to put their capable young people into any economic or social function for which they have capacity. If our aspiring young democracies do not do this, they will gradually revert to systems of caste as of yore, especially as the concentration of wealth and power continues to augment as recent trends suggest. Here are the alternatives that confront the new régime: either a democracy of culture and enlightenment or else a caste-stratified industrial feudalism. The recency of unappropriated land in apparently limitless quantities blinds us to the imminence of these alternatives, but the rapid polarization of industrial society in recent decades suggests that the people's business requires haste. We shall have to see to it that, as Horace Mann proposed, the wealth of the entire community is at the disposal of the state for an education of all the children commensurate with the needs of democracy. We must see to it that no localities lack educational facilities for their children because they are poor or ignorant, and that no children drop out of school earlier than their intellects suggest, just because their parents are poor or ignorant. In short, we must consummate in actual practice what

[1] Cf. Chapter XI, above.

our educational system already is in theory and in partial practice.

In the countries where a system of closed classes has prevailed since the Middle Ages the educational systems have evolved to cater to that system and so to perpetuate it. Thus, in pre-war Germany the *Volksschulen*, that is, the schools of the lower classes, taught only the elementary rudiments, with a limited vocational training at the top. The door to liberal education was closed and locked ; there was no surer way to disqualify for secondary and higher learning than to finish the common schools. They were peasant schools that mediated a peasant culture, designed to keep peasants peasant-minded, and so to perpetuate the peasant class. Such a system may have been suited to an autocracy, but not to a democracy like ours. Certain excellencies of German education have blinded American educators in the past to this objectionable trait, but continuation schools of the German type should never be allowed to get a permanent foothold in America. They cater to children who for economic reasons leave school early, and they accordingly perpetuate the class who have to leave school early. The establishment of continuation or part-time schools will prove to be a serious strategical blunder in the development of democratic education unless the educators of the country are very clear and firm in the conviction that such schools are but a temporary makeshift. As a permanent *substitute* for the adequate education of the children of the poor, they are inimical to the ideals of democracy, however useful they may be as a temporary makeshift. We must beware of administering such schools in such a way as to tend toward the erection of a double system of secondary education, the one,

vocational, for the handicapped classes, the other, cultural, so-called, for the privileged classes. Such a double system of schools would stratify our society.

One often hears the suggestion that such-and-such a subject should be introduced earlier in the grades for the sake of pupils who cannot or will not continue longer in school, for unless they get the subject early they will never get it at all. Adjustments of this sort are sometimes advocated for children who leave at the end of the fifth or sixth grade. This is one of the most plausible, and at the same time one of the most dangerous, arguments ever advanced by educators, because it means the gradual development of a system of schools that will, by catering to them, perpetuate and aggravate whatever tendencies to caste there already are incipient in our social order. Unless we are wary it will lead to class schools for a class society, similar to those of pre-war Germany. The majority of children who leave school early do so because their parents are poor, or ignorant, or both. Their leaving means that they in turn will be ignorant, and most likely poor, as a result. There is still a large proportion of our children who, because they must help to earn the family living, leave school too early for the interests of society. The result is, as Seager[1] so clearly points out in his chapter on wages, that they in turn will have to take their children out of school to help earn the family living. All of which helps to perpetuate an economic arrangement in which the family living has to be earned in part by the children. The temporary defeat of the Child Labor Amendment is helping to intrench this vicious circle in our institutions. If it is claimed that children must leave school early, the only

[1] *Principles of Economics*, p. 256 ff.

safe reply is: Indeed they must not! They must remain, even if to keep them the state must furnish, not only free tuition and free books, but also a free school uniform and a free noon lunch. The latter looks no more impossible now than the former must have looked sixty years ago. If there is to be part-time anything, it should be part-time employment, instead of part-time schooling. Nothing less is likely to furnish that social homogeneity on the higher cultural levels which will be necessary to operate the new supercivilization successfully.

For a republic that is spread out over a great area, as is the United States, sectionalism is almost as dangerous as class stratification. The misfortunes or abuses of any section are likely to spread to any or all the others. Epidemics of disease are carried from place to place with startling rapidity, so that ignorance of bacteriology anywhere becomes a menace to the whole. Radicalism of the I. W. W. sort originates in the industrial centers, but it shows up shortly in the harvest fields and the lumber camps. There is no telling how far polygamy might have spread if it had not been nipped in the bud by law. A shortage of labor in the industrial centers of the North entices labor away from the rural regions of the South, and negro dissatisfaction with school facilities in the South creates a race problem in the cities of the North. An aggressive anti-Catholic intolerance in a western state results in the establishment of a legal precedent for the whole country. A Granger, Greenback, Populist, or Non-Partisan movement in the wheat belt creates a political realignment at Washington with which every state in the Union is concerned. The educational situation for all Canada is complicated by the peculiar conditions and

unique aims of Quebec. And so on, without limit. The interdependence of sections is as real as that of classes or persons. National solidarity calls insistently for regional homogeneity.

But in the United States there is a special reason for national homogeneity arising out of the trend of economic developments in the great transition. The control of great wealth has become a national problem, demanding national action; and such national action is impossible except on the basis of a national homogeneity of thought relative thereto. Wealth is concentrating at a greater rate than perhaps ever before in history, and its organization is national in scope. Whether one sojourns in the copper cities of Montana, or the coal valleys of Colorado, or the steel ranges of Minnesota, or the wheat regions of Dakota, or the oil fields and orange groves of southern California, or the corn belt of Illinois, or the cranberry country of eastern Massachusetts, one feels it in the very atmosphere that the financial capital is in New York City. The Federal Government is the only political power that is large enough and strong enough to indulge any hope of subjecting this colossus to the reign of civil law, and thus subordinating its inordinate ambitions to the needs of the common welfare. Hence the propaganda against "centralization." The economic government at New York, just because it is itself committed to the principle of economic centralization, insistently opposes the political centralization of the visible government at Washington. With Washington impotent, New York would be sovereign! The strategy of tyrannies has always been to divide the people, and crush their opposition piecemeal. Plainly that is the purpose of the state rights propaganda which has displayed

such a surprising revival recently. This was obviously the real issue in the Child Labor dèbacle of 1925: the principle of state *versus* federal regulation. The baronage of corporate nationalism would rather be pestered by the states than regulated by the Federal Government. Their solicitude for the rights of the states is the lion's solicitude for the right of the lamb to lie down with him. As compared with this principle, child labor itself was a very incidental and minor matter; it was nothing more than an opportune occasion to clinch the major issue.

The inflexibility of our written Constitution is really a bulwark of the plutocracy. It is very likely to happen again and again that the modernization of our laws, with a view to governing great wealth, awaits an amendment of the Constitution. That was true in the case of the income tax, and it is true in the case of child labor. It will be true in many other similar issues of the future. The let-well-enough-alone agitation relative to the Constitution is of a piece, therefore, with the state rights agitation. And an amendment to the Constitution has to be defeated only in thirteen states — Any thirteen states that are ignorant enough to be beaten into the ground by a barrage of propaganda such as that by which we were stampeded in the child labor issue; that is enough!

Such gross educational inequalities among states as Professor F. H. Swift has uncovered [1] may prove fatal, therefore, to the successful evolution of American democracy. The apparent like-mindedness of the American public is superficial and deceptive. Nothing more than a homogeneity of froth-eaters is produced by the newspaper, the cheap maga-

[1] Cf. p. 516 of this book.

zine, the telegraph and telephone, the phonograph, and the radio. A popular song, a new dance, a divorce or murder scandal, sweeps across the continent almost overnight, because these things make a direct appeal to the spontaneous interests of the instincts. But when it comes to knowledge that requires a concentrated effort of the attention — as the reason why Germany never could have paid the Versailles indemnities, or why income taxes are not shifted to the ultimate consumer, or the evidences for biological evolution — these things do not spread themselves abroad automatically. Homogeneity with respect to those solid substances of the mental life by the use of which a civilized society is operated can be secured only by a system of universal secondary education, in which young people's wits are held, willy-nilly, against the grindstone of formal instruction until they take an edge.

Lest the reader rise from this chapter somewhat confused with details it may be well to repeat the thesis. Education has a responsibility to make us alike in acquired mental contents, no less than to cater to our individual tastes and capacities. As economic producers we should be specialized; but not as consumers. As utilizers of the intellectual resources of civilization (excepting industrial technique), and as participants in the institutions of society (except the economic), we should be educated for considerable similarity of behavior. We seriously underestimate the importance and magnitude of functional similarities because, being so usual, they are so unobtrusive in attention; and conversely with individual differences. Accordingly we deceive ourselves with misleading aphorisms and slogans. However, it does not pour us into a common mold for all of us to know

the fundamentals of bacteriology in relation to health preservation, or for all of us to be informed about the incidence of taxation or the economic provocatives of war. There is no dangerous dead-level ahead of a people among whom there is a widespread appreciation of Beethoven's music or the best English fiction, or the applicability of art to home and community life. On the other hand, intellectual and cultural homogeneity, as contrasted with both class differences and sectional antagonisms, is absolutely essential to the success of the kind of a civilization that modern republics are trying to achieve. And the public school seems to be the only agency that can produce such homogeneity. The psychological possibility of achieving that homogeneity lies in the fact of initiative learning of the fiscal possibility, in state and federal aid to education based upon the newer types of taxes.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE UNSOLVED PROBLEM OF SOCIAL STABILITY[1]

SINCE the War we Occidentals, formerly so self-congratulatory and optimistic, have been brought to a standstill by a new and shocking question. The question is this: Shall we be able to solve the problem of social stability and permanence — a problem that has hitherto baffled western civilization; or is our modern world foredoomed to another of those recurrent periods of disintegration, disorder, and retrogression which puzzle and dismay the student of history? Are we building up this wonderful civilization only that posterity may see it swept away again in a few centuries? The more we study the polarization of wealth, together with the imminent industrial conflict that it is generating, and the portentous encroachments of growing populations upon the food supply, not to mention the ominous flux of all ideals and institutions, the more insistently this question forces itself upon our anxious consideration. And, however appalling it may be, the question will not down.

In what striking contrast with the intermittent rise and fall of nations has been the steady, not to say the stolid, permanence of ideals and institutions in China. We Westerners pride ourselves in progress. We take turns at the game! First Babylonia and Egypt; later Greece and Rome; then,

[1] The substance of this chapter and the next appeared in *The Educational Review* for February, 1918, and is reproduced by courtesy of Doubleday, Page and Company.

after a breathing spell, Spain, France, and Germany; and now the British Empire and the United States. But hoary China, reminiscent of her youthful contemporary, the Babylonian Empire, dandles these young western republics on her knee, somewhat skeptical of their experiment. China's static stolidity is not to be admired without qualification, of course; but neither is the intermittent evanescence of the Occident. Is there no golden mean? In quest of the solution we might do worse than to consider seriously the educational program of old China. It conserved, we must concede! For stability is essentially a challenge to the educators. What are those contents of the social mind which make for social stability; and what sort of an educational system will produce them? This is about the last problem to which the *Zeitgeist* turns pedagogical inquiry, and that is precisely the reason why it is of such paramount importance in the present crisis. This is the sociological problem to which the reader's attention will be invited in this chapter and the next.

A study of social evolution, history, and social organization leads to the conclusion that three conditions are necessary to social stability and uninterrupted social progress. The first is social orderliness, that is, the dependable on-going of the social process, so that life, property, and happiness are relatively safe. The second is social conservation, that is, the continued maintenance and use of those social structures and spiritual resources which make life satisfying. The third is social justice, the absence of which is provocative of that active protest from which destructive conflicts arise. And to secure these there must be social control. These four topics will furnish the outline for the present discussion.

First, then, social orderliness.

The problem of change and identity has puzzled the minds of metaphysicians from the earliest days of Greek thought. How can anything change and yet remain the same? This problem has been verbally solved, sometimes by denying the reality of change and reducing it to mere seeming, sometimes by a similar denial of identity. Now metaphysical problems parallel and reflect the practical problems of life, and therein lies, no doubt, their unfailing interest. Thus the problem of change and identity is one of the deepest problems of actual life. Its biological aspect is: How can nature prepare an organism to adapt itself to an environment that may either change or remain the same? This is the perennial problem of living organisms, whether in a physical or a social environment, and the fallacy of ignoring either contingency is very liable to be the accepted solution. It is the purpose of this chapter to show that such is the outstanding error of the *Zeitgeist*, and that the dominant philosophy, and especially the dominant pedagogical theory, of the times makes little or no effort to correct the error.

For a stable changeless environment nature's device is an automatism. The adjustment is reflex, and all goes well so long as external conditions remain just as they were. And the reflex is a real biological entity without which life would be impossible. It sounds like the demonstration of an axiom to emphasize this fact. That our hearts are beating continuously, that the sunrise brings the day, that air pressure on the surface of the body keeps the blood vessels from bursting, are none the less fundamental phenomena because they attract so little attention. Likewise the fact that adjustment depends upon reflexes.

But when the environment changes, an organism equipped with reflexes only is lost. Nature's problem then is to prepare for a changing environment. One of nature's solutions to this problem is biological variations. Variations remake the species into another that can meet the changed environment. But this does not provide for adjustment during a single lifetime to a changing environment. Nature's solution to this problem is conscious intelligence. Consciousness, and in its higher ranges creative intelligence, enables the individual to react in ways different from those provided in his reflexes. Thus a problematical situation is solved and the living organism successfully adjusted. But the successful adjustment once achieved, it tends upon repetition to harden into a new automatism. Thus intelligence veneers the innate reflexes over with a more or less plastic mass of habits. The human organism, accordingly, adjusts itself to a stable environment through habit and to a changing and problematical environment through intelligence: a principle so elementary that it hardly needs to be stated here except to launch the argument.

The utility of habit in individual life is evident to every student of psychology, though it is precisely the psychologists who often seem most prone to overlook its function in social organization. Habit insures efficiency. It can guarantee a perfectly accurate response instead of an awkward, blundering one. This is true in work. The thousand and one skills of the daily round are due to habit. This advantage is expressed in numerous homely proverbs, such as: practice makes perfect, order is heaven's first law, a place for everything and everything in its place, and so forth. Without the efficiency derived from thoroughly habituated

skills no person nor people succeeds. The wonderful German efficiency is the standing object lesson of what system, order, technique — *die deutsche Gruendlichkeit* — can accomplish.

Habit is as essential in morals as it is in work. It is the moral capital on the income of which one can live a right life without effort. Even in our thought processes habit makes significant contributions — increasingly recognized in recent psychology. The proportion of our activites that are under the control of habit is large, indeed, quite amazing: rising from bed, dressing, eating, walking, speaking, reading; the housekeeper's work in kitchen and chamber, the farmer's work in barn and field, the specialized piece work of mine or factory, driving the automobile, plying the pen, or manipulating the typewriter; the arts of oratory, music, surgery; the managerial problems already familiar to the administrator: all these things habit controls. In what an overwhelming percentage of one's daily round one would be helpless without habit is hardly ever sufficiently recognized. This is because the habits themselves are not noticed, being below the threshold of consciousness. But the more adequately we recognize the importance of habit the more sound will be our educational and social philosophy.

It follows then that a second function of habit is to free the attention so that it may devote itself to the problematical aspects of situations. For instance, only as a musician has thoroughly automatized his technique can he devote thought to the interpretation of his selection. The more completely one has the routine details of life reduced to habit the more effectively he can apply himself to the real problems that arise. The efficient administrator is not the one who attends

to trifling details himself, but the one who turns them over to an office force which he can depend upon. He is then free to push forward the apex of his policy. His subordinates are, so to speak, the habits of his office force, without them he wastes his energies upon details.

The function of intelligence is to adjust one to the changes of the environment. When an entirely new situation arises habit leaves one helpless. It is only as one can analyze the situation, solve the problem involved, and formulate a new procedure adapted to the new conditions, that one can meet the crisis. But the solution of new situations that arise of their own accord is by no means the entire function of intelligence. The "will to live" sends us out in actual search after changes, which if we do not find we proceed to make. "We do things not only because we have a sensation, but also in order to make a sensation." In this way we tend to create that variety so essential to self-realization. Without discrimination, initiative, creative intelligence, individual life would be narrow and monotonous and social progress out of the question.

It needs to be remembered, however, that the guidance of the intellect is not always safe. Out of many variations but few prove an aid to survival. The world has to produce a hundred freaks in order to get one genius. Change is not necessarily progress by any means; it may be mere caprice. Only a few plans work, the rest turn out to be dreams. Organizations may multiply with no result but duplication, conflict, and confusion. Much thinking proves to be but random lunges of the imagination. Yet adjustment is possible only through thought, and social evolution only through change and experimentation.

That there should be a struggle, in both life and theory, between habit and inventive intelligence is, therefore, as inevitable as the metaphysical debate about change and identity. For habit also is not always a safe guide. It often seizes upon wrong responses, casts them into permanent form, and makes us their victims. It often resists change when change is necessary or desirable. Thus habit often narrows, stagnates, and enslaves life. Whereupon some Heraclitic rises up to deny the utility of habit altogether; and life, its centripetal tether broken, flies off on the tangent of license, caprice, laziness, and inefficiency. On the other hand inventive intelligence has its dangers also. For thought itself is really an abbreviation of the "trial and error" method of adjustment; and the element of error is large enough in the best of thinking. It conceives absurd ventures, it forgets the lessons of experience, and singes its wings again and again in the same fires; or is silenced by desire, and so deserts us when most we need it. Then some Eleatic comes to the front and denies its trustworthiness altogether; whereupon life winds itself up tight to the post of habit. Obviously the practical problem of life is to discover a just balance between habit and deliberative choice — a solution which most persons and most societies miss, unfortunately, on one side or on the other.

For society, like the individual, presents the two aspects of fixity and change. All such uniformities as customs, institutions, laws, morals, manners, and conventionalities represent the habit side of the social life. In fact, these are but the social projections, so to speak, of individual habits. These social uniformities exist precisely because all the individual members of society have the same habits; otherwise

they could not exist at all. On the other hand the intellectual aspects of the individual life are paralleled by the adaptive activities of the social life, for just as habits are changed by discriminative attention, so customs, laws, institutions, and the like are changed by discussion, debate, and conflict. Sometimes such changes occur without serious friction and sometimes they are accompanied with the most tragic violence. A static society which the habitual and customary predominate, is naturally institutional, inasmuch as the established customs and institutions dominate the individual, pressing him into conformity to their demands. On the contrary a dynamic society, in which change predominates, is inherently individualistic, since the opinions and wishes of individuals figure conspicuously in the discussions, debates, and conflicts which cause the changes.

Seldom does civilization, any more than individuals, secure a normal balance of these two tendencies; the pendulum is always swinging to one extreme or the other. The whole history of western civilization is a struggle between individualism and institutionalism; first one and then the other in excess. The durable empires of the ancient east, and the long periods of the Roman Empire and the Roman Church, were eras of relatively static institutionalism. There have been but three conspicuously dynamic periods in the western world's recorded history: the Periclean age of ancient Greece, the epoch of the Renaissance and Humanism, and the period in which we ourselves are living. Just as the Renaissance inherited the spirit of ancient Greece, so the modern period has inherited and augmented the Renaissance spirit. From the fourteenth to the twentieth centuries the movement away from institutional control

has been cumulative, the outstanding stages of the progress being the Renaissance and Humanism; the Protestant Revolt and the Enlightenment; the rise of democracy in England, America, France, and thence eastward; the Industrial Revolution and the scientific movement of the nineteenth century; the World War; and finally the reconstruction period through which we are now passing. Never have such fundamental and extensive changes occurred as during the past three or four generations.

The advantages of such social change are obvious. Without it progress would be impossible. Had society always been static mankind would never have advanced beyond the most primitive type of social life. The great dynamic periods have been the germinal seasons of civilization. The galaxy of Greek geniuses that the age of Pericles produced made a contribution to mankind which was unique and outstanding. The modern institutions which most benefit mankind are, many of them, the lengthened shadows of such viable geniuses as Petrarch, Luther, Bacon, Locke, Voltaire, Rousseau, Darwin, and many others, all typical of the dynamic epochs that could generate such mobile minds. Without such periods and such persons human life would stagnate and burdensome institutions would cramp and deform the souls of men for centuries. The spirit of discussion and social reconstruction is the indispensable leaven of civilization. Its absolute value cannot be overestimated.

But the relative value of social change most certainly can be overestimated. As a matter of fact the hazards and risks inherent therein are readily overlooked, especially in the age of change itself. An individual or a society is seldom aware of his or its own obsessions. Thus in an age like ours change

and progress tend to become synonymous, the new is its own warrant, and excessive individualism seems axiomatic. The reason is obvious. The intellectual processes of the individual, and the problematic, changeful aspects of the social process, attract the spotlight of attention; whereas individual habits and social customs are the objects of an almost negligible degree of awareness. Whereupon we fallaciously ascribe a value in theory to habit and custom proportionate to the amount of attention which they attract in practice. As often pointed out, social institutions are really like icebergs, nine tenths of their bulk being out of sight below the surface of the sea. To overlook this fact produces all sorts of aberrations. Thus the natural optimism of a period of change may itself be the very most significant symptom of a hectic social distemper. Therefore, in an ocean current where everything is flowing along with the ship it is well to consult the fixed stars. And it will help us to find our bearings if we consider the function of the social fixities.

It should be borne in mind that social change is from and to. The object of social change is not merely to be changing, but to arrive at a relatively stable institution that is better than the old. Social habit is, after all, the essential thing in social organization; without it there would be nothing but a chaos of human atoms. Without order, system, and organization, an army becomes a mob, utterly incapable of concerted action. What military order is to an army, so custom, law, technique, creeds, and standards are to the social enterprises of peace.

The inevitable dependence upon the customary is shown by the way new institutions are built out of the material of

old, as in the case of our Federal Constitution; or by the reaction that often sets in after a too radical change, as the return to the empire after the French Revolution. The reason is that institutions, customs, conventions, laws, morals, beliefs, and traditions represent the result of the race's experience crystallized into habit. To throw them away is, first, to venture upon a complicated social program without rehearsal; second, to undertake the labor of establishing new habits, which takes time; and, third, to run the risk of rushing in again where race experience has proved it unsafe to tread.

Bagehot says: "The first thing to acquire is, if I may so express it, the legal fiber; a polity first—what sort of a polity is immaterial; a law first — what kind of a law is secondary; a person or set of persons to pay deference to — though who he is, or they are, by comparison scarcely signifies." That is to say, a social habit, or set of habits, is so important that it matters relatively little what their quality is. They are absolutely necessary to coöperation; and coöperation is the vital factor in social life. The North American Indians lacked this ability. They could not restrain their young braves from going on expeditions of private adventure; they could not hold themselves together in dependable and permanent coalitions. Had they been able to do so it is doubtful whether the whites could ever have taken this continent.

But all this is only the superficial and concrete expression of a fundamental sociological principle, namely, that social habit *is* social organization. Ellwood says:[1] "This coördination or co-adaptation of individuals in activity is, of

[1] *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, p. 144.

course, what makes group action possible. It creates the unity of the group, and the coördinations that persist — become habitual — form the substance of permanent social organization. We are justified in concluding, therefore, that the important and practically the most fundamental fact for the psychological sociologist is this coördination or co-adaptation of individuals in activity — the social coördination." This social coördination, though modified from time to time by "intelligent adaptation," is, Ellwood makes clear, largely a matter of instinct and habit.

> In all the social species, the instincts of individuals are made so that they fit into each other, as it were, and provide certain social coördinations to start with. But it is also true that in man social habits are largely acquired. These original coördinations have become overlaid with a vast mass of acquired social habits that are even more important for the distinctive character of human society than the instinctive coördinations. In brief, all the tangible uniformities of social life are social habits. They are known in the larger human groups as folkways, customs, manners, morals, law, institutions, and the like. Hence, the need in human society of some definite form of interaction whereby every member may acquire the habits of the group.[1]

Chapters discussing the phenomena of social fixity and change are found close to the logical center of all sociologies and quotations like the above might be collected without limit. Cooley,[2] for instance, has this:

> Of course, the institutional element is equally essential with the personal. The mechanical working of tradition and convention pours into the mind the tried wisdom of the race, a system of thought every part of which has survived because it was, in some sense, the fittest because it approved itself to the human spirit. In this way the individual gets language, sentiments, moral standards, and all kinds of knowledge, gets them with an exertion of the will trifling compared with what these things

[1] *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, p. 152.
[2] *Social Organization*, p. 320 f.

originally cost. Once the focus of attention and effort, they have now receded into the dimness of the matter of course, leaving energy free for new conquests. On this involuntary foundation we build, and it needs no argument to show that we could accomplish nothing without it. Thus all innovation is based on conformity, all heterodoxy on orthodoxy, all individuality on solidarity. . . . Thus choice, which represents the relatively free action of human nature in building up life, is like the coral insect, always working on a mountain made up of the crystallized remains of dead predecessors.

And Hayes:[1]

Social activities may go on with quite as much power when most unchanging. In a static situation the activities of a people are regular and constant. They consist of firm beliefs, generally accepted judgments, inviolate customs, and established institutions; and the tide of a people's life may flow on with quite as much power as in an era of transition which would be described as dynamic. Indeed, as in physics a static situation may become dynamic by weakening a support, so a dynamic era may be introduced in society by the weakening and undermining of settled beliefs, the breakdown of established customs, and the wavering of public sentiments; and the life of the people may not regain its full power until the changes have been for the most part accomplished and society is ready to enter again upon an established order. For welfare order may be as important as progress.

These considerations ought to make clear the importance of social fixity. We undervalue it precisely because, as Cooley says, it tends like habit "to recede into the dimness of the matter of course." But the bones of the body are no less important because we cannot see them. Custom is as important a consideration in sociology as habit is in psychology. Whoever places a low appreciation upon the routine element in life betrays his sociological illiteracy.

This explains why pessimism sometimes reduces itself to absurdity. As one looks about him in modern society

[1] *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, p. 414.

he finds something out of joint at every turn. Every institution, relationship, activity, and ideal has rotten spots in it, until finally one wonders that the machinery runs at all. It would seem that in all reason the social machinery ought to gratify the pessimist by going to smash since there is hardly anything about it that is not all wrong. But go to smash is precisely what it does not do. Instead, it runs along fairly smoothly from day to day and from year to year, almost as if there were nothing much the matter with it. Finally, out of the depths of his despairing mood, the pessimist is impelled to ask himself *why* things fail to go to smash. What is it that keeps the machinery going in spite of all the repairs it needs. At last the answer dawns upon the doubter. It is this: Most of the people, most of the time, are attending regularly to the routine affairs of life, and making little or no fuss about it even if the harness does gall them in a few spots. In other words, the fundamental institutions of society are performing their normal functions in an orderly, dependable way, in spite of minor frictions here and there. The massive habits of the common life, in short, constitute the main current of the social process; and this main current sweeps along, in spite of bubbles, eddies, by-pools, and driftwood. With this great fact clearly in mind the doubter takes heart again. Thus does pessimism tend to undermine itself by a sort of reduction to absurdity.

It follows, therefore, that the really serious disease from which a changing society is liable to suffer is that of fundamental disorderliness. Let family life become quite generally tentative and hectic; let laborers notoriously soldier on the job, and managers become wasteful; let disregard for the law become usual; let corruption and bribery become

common in government; let the moral code fall into debate and behavior become erratic; let religion lose its grip upon the souls of the people; and you have a society that is not so liable to disappoint the pessimist. And if such a society has great readjustments to make in any case, as our society has, then the danger that such readjustments may explode into blood and fire is increased. Never is the necessity for fundamental orderliness so great as in periods of change like our own, and never is its importance so liable to be overlooked in theory and practice. If we moderns can maintain order and routine while we are making our readjustments, we shall be able to solve our problems.

We come now to the subject of social conservation.

In our previous discussion of social evolution an effort was made to enlighten the reader's imagination as to our dependence upon the past. Nothing was said but what is perfectly obvious, to be sure, and the purpose was merely to throw the spotlight of social theory upon certain phases of the social life which the untutored attention habitually overlooks. As we have seen,[1] attention is normally monopolized by whatever new thing happens to be in process of invention at the moment; and the consequence is that the inherited resources of civilization are monstrously undervalued in the popular sociological mythology. In spite of the fact that perhaps ninety-nine per cent of all educational energy is devoted to social reproduction, yet it almost never occurs to educators to recognize in theory the reproductive function of education, or to suspect that any vital element of civilization might possibly be lost to subsequent generations through their oversight. But that indeed is not impossible. Cer-

[1] Chapter III.

tain items of technique, like carding and spinning wool by hand, have been learned by so few young persons that they are practically lost; certain processes in use in ancient Egypt are a complete mystery to us now — not that these particular techniques are any longer valuable, but the cases illustrate a point. It is possible, indeed, for a civilization to lose large parts of its cultural inheritance, and so to revert to a lower level of life. Not infrequently in the past whole civilizations have disappeared and given place to barbarity; pathetic examples of this are the ancient civilizations of the Tigris and Euphrates valley, and the extinct civilizations of Central and South America. Our own European history has had its dark age, during which the brilliant culture of ancient Greece and Rome failed of transmission so that for more than a thousand years men were looking back to a glorious past that was no more. And the same disaster is conceivable again, especially to one who regards the collapse of ancient culture as caused fundamentally by failure to transmit the *ideals* upon which those civilizations were founded.

Perhaps our present deceitful cult of change menaces least such cognitive elements of civilization as the concrete facts of common knowledge and the ascertained contents of the natural sciences. The same is probably true of the techniques of communication, industry, art, and science. These things are perceptually discerned and their utility is a matter of common experience. But this is not true of the great ethical ideals, such as æsthetic appreciation, religious reverence, group loyalty, ethical fidelity, self-control, good will, and craft spirit, nor of the basic institutions, such as the family, the church, the state, property, and the moral

code. A public that lacks utterly the perspective of social evolution and is already flippant with the soft creeds of a fluid age, can hardly be expected to appreciate the value of ideals and insitutions, since their social function is conceptually discerned. It is our fundamental institutions and ideals, therefore, which we are in greatest danger of failure to conserve — a fact which suggests a very vital function of twentieth century education.

The appraisal of ideals and institutions must be made in the light of world history and social evolution. There are some things which only a shallow ignorance will try to evaluate by an appeal to individual experience. Individual experience is too short and fragmentary to render a verdict; besides a verdict may already have been rendered by race experience. The ages must be called to testify. It is the long run that counts. This is the kernel of truth at the core of pragmatism which the pragmatists themselves have been too prone to miss for lack of perspective. The scientific student of history and social evolution is the true pragmatist.

Social evolution seems to have given rise to two sorts of ideals: those which function as the ends of life, such as the materialistic, the hedonistic, the æsthetic, the martial, the pietistic, the ascetic, etc.; and those which function as means: *e.g.*, self-restraint, honesty, frugality, thoroughness, loyalty, chastity, obedience, reverence, etc.

The prevailing ideals of the first sort, those which function as ultimate ends, determine whether life in a given community is worth living or not, and hence whether that society will permanently satisfy its members, or disintegrate through failure to satisfy. Hence Professor Hayes writes:[1]

[1] *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, p. 367.

In nothing do different societies show more characteristic contrasts than in their standards of success. One society acclaims the member who can drink the most beer, another the member who can write the best poetry, one the member who can boot a pigskin with the greatest force and accuracy, another the member who can devise the most brilliant mathematical demonstration. Nations differ widely in the relative value which they attach to the various forms of success. A nation may measure success in skulls, like the head-hunting Malays, in scalps, like the Indians, in flocks, like the pastoral nomads, or in dollars, like the more vulgar Americans. A great society as well as a little one may be on the wrong track as to what constitutes the aim of life. Possibly no other basis of comparison between different peoples is so significant of their character and stage of advancement as a comparison of their standards of success and approval; and no other reform so fundamental as the shifting of the emphasis placed upon the different standards of success in the regard of the people.

A great people's current concepts of the ultimate ends of life are absolutely their most significant possession. The holy fire was brought from the hills of God; if it goes out on the altar of a people's heart, that people's doom is sealed. The present age is in danger of precisely that catastrophe. We scorn the Puritan ideals of our ancestors and pride ourselves that we are of more liberal minds than they. That is to say, we are making little or no effort to keep those ideals alive in our children. But we are discarding them more at the dictates of the *Zeitgeist* than upon the maturely deliberated judgments of reason. And the sequel may show that we have thrown overboard the only cargo that is really worth bringing into port.

The dominating purposes of life are vital, whether in the case of an individual or of a whole society. A youth does not find himself, as we say, until he conceives and adopts some dominating purpose in life; if a person is uncoupled, by some shock or accident, from the driving purpose of his

life, his existence loses the feel of reality and worth to him; and the individual whose personality is cleft in twain by conflicting and irreconcilable purposes, is in imminent danger of insanity. Moreover, the pursuit of fatuous and illusive purposes that correspond to no real needs of life produces a restlessness that the victim does not understand and a vague sense of futility. And something similar is true of societies and civilizations. A culture system is hypotheticated when it contains an excessive number of persons who feel that their lives are not worth the living. When such a condition prevails generally, a period of stagnation and degeneracy may be expected, because such a society is, to use Professor Hayes's metaphor, like a mill on the bank of a stream that has run dry; there is no motive power to turn the wheels. And such a situation arises from a prevailing confusion and uncertainty as to what to believe in and what is really worth doing; a confusion, that is, with respect to fundamental ideals.

Modern civilization is in somewhat such a predicament. So much improvement has been accomplished in recent times that we have become obsessed with the new and feel scant reverence for anything from which the varnish is worn off. How often we hear or read the absurd assertion that the race has achieved more in the last hundred and fifty years than in all its previous history. It does look that way on the surface of things, but the fundamental ideals of the moral life and the essential laws of social organization do not lie on the surface of things. Their functions cannot, therefore, be perceived, like the steam engine, the telegraph, and the billion dollar corporation; they must be conceived instead. The most obvious characteristic of these eternal verities is

their age; hence they readily become the objects of flippant contempt. Thus the old loses its value in our estimation. Under such circumstances persons fail to get satisfaction out of the primary social relations, such as the family and neighborly intercourse. They are little in their homes, being drawn away by the multiple distractions of life; disintegrated standards break down conjugal fidelity; the changing times cleave asunder the older and the younger generations. Neighborly relations likewise disintegrate, and even nature loses its charm. And finally the old symbols of life's limitless latent resources cease to motivate and nothing takes their place. Innumerable souls are lost, therefore, in the littleness of the tangible self, so that no worthy and satisfying purposes ennoble life.

Meantime new interests and activities, some of them beneficial, many of them otherwise, claim our participation faster than we can appraise them. Thus much of our energy is devoted to activities that in the very nature of the case are bound to disappoint us. Furthermore, the multiplicity of stimuli and solicitations to action produce hurry and confusion. This alone is enough to spoil many lives and has been much commented upon by social psychologists. The conflict of unappraised interests gives rise to an inner conflict of purposes, an extremely unhygienic, not to say unhappy, state of mind. Next there arises a conflict with social sanctions; for the traditional standards remain sufficiently intact to keep those who defy them constantly in hot water. The most acute form of this disorder occurs when the burdens of life that none can explain bear heavily upon our backs. In static times, as Professor Cooley points out,[1] one scarcely

[1] *Social Organization*, p. 353.

questions why one must be poor while others are rich, why one must do work that one does not like, why one should be honest while others are unscrupulous, why one should be worn out bearing and rearing children, why one should be faithful to husband or wife when happiness is gone and another would please better, or why one should live when death is preferred. In static times people bear such burdens as a part of the day's work, just as the soldier, the seaman, the fireman, the brakeman and the doctor face perils; but in times of flux mental distraction complicates the situation, and people suffer more from the distraction than from the burden itself.

But the disease goes much deeper than this. When time-worn sanctions break down and the rein of social control lies loose on the neck of the instincts, the carnal, selfish wish and the capricious whim find nothing in the devastated soul to restrain them; and conduct which race experience has demonstrated to be destructive is rushed into as heedlessly as the moth flies into the fire. Whereupon the sensual vices get in their deadly work, the virtues that industrial competency depends upon desert their posts, while private dishonesty and public infidelity infest business and political life. The result is that young men grow up to make their mothers regret the day when they were born, and innocent children suffer with the guilty. Under such social circumstances innumerable lives live their little once to no avail, and the fundamental institutions begin to rattle like a piece of old machinery.

These characteristics of the present age are not without instructive precedent. In the dynamic period of Greece the spirit of skepticism and rash moral adventure was represented

by the Sophists with their apotheosis of personal opinion, which meant a complete repudiation of all consensus of judgment based on race experience. It was in quest of solid ground above the shifting waves of personal opinion that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle explored the uncharted sea of philosophy. But nothing corrected the obsessions nor checked the tendencies of those times until the disintegrating causes had run their complete course. Historians speak of the *Weltschmerz* and *ennui* that characterized life in the declining days of Græco-Roman civilization. The Epicureans and Stoics, the Cyreneans and the Cynics had enfranchised the individual wish, but the Hebrew law and the Christian gospel had not yet offered the world their kingdom of invisible and immeasurable ends. There was nothing to live for except to exploit the colonies and to waste the substance thereof in riotous living. And so the world was growing old! The fundamental ideals of life were being lost.

Ideals of the second type function as means. They render achievement possible. Most of them are necessary to successful work of any kind; some of them are necessary to successful human relations. Self-control is prerequisite to all the others. These ideals have emerged out of the age-long experience of the race; their social importance is too great for the grasp of the ordinary intellect; to make them function they must be emotionalized as well as rationalized. A nation might better return to the oxcart, the hand-loom, and the stagecoach than to lose these ideals; for to lose them would be to lose the power either to preserve or to reproduce all the other elements of civilization.

With respect to these ideals we may well take serious account of stock, for there are numerous indications that we

are failing to pass on to our young people the basic ideals of the moral life. A great deal is being said and written about the moral debacle of the younger generation; and it is a most favorite strut of young intellectuals to affect this new moral liberality, so-called. The high schools are often criticized for the flippant attitude that prevails in them, and the colleges and universities are not given credit for perfection in this respect. If there is increasing moral degeneracy among our young people, it is as much the fault of the older generation as of the younger; it means that we have failed to transmit to them the fundamental ideals of our moral heritage. No educational failure could be worse. This is the danger of the soft pedagogy that now prevails so generally, for it tends to inculcate a soft creed of life; and that points directly to the disintegration of the social fabric.

A strong and dependable anchorage is all the more necessary in time of storm. When numerous new and difficult social problems are to be solved is just the time when disintegration of the moral ideals is most dangerous, especially if the social problems are charged with possible conflict. Take our present labor-capital controversy, for example. The industrial changes of the past century and a quarter have produced new forms of social injustice; and, whether or not the conditions of the laboring classes are more or less hard than in former times, certain it is that the prevalence of democratic ideals makes the masses less willing than ever before to tolerate hard conditions. The enormous growth of per capita wealth during the period has naturally contributed to the same attitude upon their part. To secure a more equitable distribution of wealth and opportunity is absolutely necessary, therefore, to the stability of our new

civilization; for unless the masses come into their just share of the benefits of our new industrial order they will sooner or later precipitate a revolution.

But the flux of moral standards and the loosening of customary moral restraints seriously interfere with any quiet evolution of social justice. The more profoundly one studies economic theory the more clearly he sees that morality is one of the two ultimate determinants of the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth. The other is intelligence. Labor must produce abundantly if labor's share in the product is to be satisfying. But a laboring man or a laboring class can never be very productive without certain old-fashioned virtues. The support of public opinion is absolutely necessary, also, to the success of labor's cause; and that they forfeit by immorality. The I. W. W.'s, for example, have advocated theories and indulged in practices subversive of the moral standards that the race has been centuries in establishing; and their loss of public sympathy has been a serious setback to the cause of labor as a whole. Finally, if laborers do succeed in getting a larger share of the world's wealth, it is largely their morals that will determine whether their increased wages will be a benefit or a damage to them. On the side of capital, the resistance that capitalists offer to needed reforms will depend largely upon the ethical and social ideals of their class. Further, in the struggle for social justice, courts and other agencies of government must be trusted — which cannot happen without honest officials. From all such considerations it follows, therefore, that reverence for the time-tested standards of conduct and social relations is necessary if we are to solve our economic problems by peaceful evolution instead of violent revolution.

But in such an age of change as ours none too much of such reverence remains. There are those who fear that a storm of civil strife among social classes is brewing in this and other western countries. The surest way to protect our children and grandchildren against such a tragedy is to instill into the rising generation of all social classes the good, old-fashioned ideals of self-denial, honesty, frugality, thoroughness, loyalty, chastity, obedience, and reverence. If these old-fashioned virtues are accompanied with a decent appreciation of humanitarian idealism upon the part of the ruling classes, we may make the rapids without spilling either the passengers or the cargo.

But perhaps the most intricate problem confronting education is how to conserve the fundamental institutions of society; for here we are confronted with a puzzling dilemma, namely, the necessity of changing all these institutions to meet the new conditions, and yet keeping them stable at the same time. It is a matter of keeping the trains running while a new bridge is being put in. For nothing is more evident than that all of them — the family, the church, the state, private property, and the moral code — are actually changing. Indeed, they are in need of change. Nevertheless, it is equally obvious, at least to all thoughtful persons, that they must all stand firm, for they are the bulwarks of the social order.

The conservation of institutions in a period of change is first of all a problem of discrimination, for it will be discovered that each of these institutions is a mixture of good and bad elements, and that the bad elements must be sorted out and corrected with the greatest care not to change the good elements; just as a man might rebuild a wing of his house,

while his family continued to live in the upright; in which case it would be all the more desirable to keep the carpenters out of the living rooms entirely. Here again the solution is in escaping from the deceit of general terms and descending to concrete scientific analysis.

Suppose we subject the family, for instance, to such an analysis; since the desirability of modifying it is one of the acute questions of the times. Press, stage, platform, and even pulpit are noisy with ignorant, sentimental, and often sensual jargon on the subject; and innumerable moths are singeing their wings in the candle of experiment. Other civilizations have played with the same kind of fire and contributed thereby to their own destruction. But if we analyze the problem we find that it resolves itself into at least four problems: the monogamous *versus* other types of family organization; the stable and permanent *versus* the easily terminated relation between husband and wife; the monarchical *versus* the democratic conduct of family life; and the problem of whether women are to devote their new leisure and resources to "society" and the "gainful occupations," or to the putting of family life on a higher cultural level. Turning now to history and social evolution, we find that racial experience has settled the first two of these problems, practically every form of sex relation having been tried out, and everything but the stable, monogamous family having been demonstrated subversive of human welfare in the long run. It is plainly suicidal to experiment with these two adjectives. But it remains for this generation to change from the monarchical to the democratic type of family. That change we are confident is worth trying, and there are no precedents against it. As for the use that women are to make of their

new status, we can doubtless find guidance in racial experience if we look for it diligently enough.

What has been said about the family has been said by way of illustration. Every fundamental institution requires the same kind of discriminating analysis. And the important point in this connection is the absolute necessity of conserving whatever is good. It would be worse than useless, for example, to make the family democratic if at the same time marriage became unstable and sexual life corrupt. A superstructure cannot be built except upon a foundation! Besides, we have real problems enough to solve, without creating problems by pouring the emery dust of self-indulgence into the bearings of our fundamental institutions. If we prove able to understand, appreciate and hold fast that which is good in our established institutions we shall probably succeed in solving what problems we have that are really new. But if we revert to barbarism it will be because our posterity becomes flippantly "liberal" toward the age-tried fundamentals. As explained in a previous chapter, it is one of the obsessions of the *Zeitgeist* to hold anything old in more or less contempt; so any who venture to plead for the old-fashioned verities — and some of the old fundamentals are as fundamental as ever they were — are withered with the finest scorn by those who bleat in the flock of the intelligentsia. We must find a way to dispel this obsession. We must invent means of creating in the minds of our young people a reverent respect for the old that is good. Here is a problem of prime importance for educators.

If society is to discriminate effectively between the good and the bad in our old institutions, and so avert social chaos by conserving what is good, it is important to inquire who is

to do this intellectual work of discriminating. Our brash young democracy is notoriously intolerant of experts and has ludicrously little appreciation of competence. And our intelligentsia are not above this same mistake. Much of what they say and write seems to imply that one person is as competent as another to winnow the chaff of the social heritage from the wheat thereof. Professor Robinson, it appears, would encourage everybody to be skeptical of "all the sacred notions in the world." It cannot be too often repeated nor too vigorously emphasized that the vast majority who respond to such an invitation will make negative contributions. How to limit discussion to competent persons only is a problem that society may never solve. But why should we make a special point of encouraging every ass to regard it as his solemn duty to bray in public? The right of free speech is a great thing but the duty of sensible speech is an even greater thing. As for playing with fire, it is better to be right than to be original. Any fool can break the most artistic statuary, but only a few rare geniuses can create anything worth cherishing. There is an old bit of doggerel that used to be taught us as a "memory gem" when we were children in school that might stand some revision as follows: "Seek out the facts! One sound idea, but known to be the truth, is better than a thousand culled from the whims and freaks of youth." There is really considerable that might, with profit, be said in favor of reverent, obedient conformity to social standards especially upon the part of children, morons, ignoramuses, and knaves. The stability of the social order depends upon it. We must find some effective way of inducing our young people to recognize the function of

expert service in social evaluations, to inquire as to the source of radical ideas, and to look for the trade-mark of competence on those which they accept. And educators need to recognize their own duty to qualify as experts, or at least as disciples of the experts.

For the educators must make the curriculum. And into it they must put a great deal of instruction about social values. The functions of our fundamental institutions must be explained to our young people, and the value of our chief social resources must be made clear to them. This objective devolves chiefly upon the courses in the social sciences and history. But the problem of emotionalizing and idealizing these appraisals is a deeper matter; we have scarcely given it a thought, so superficial has been our pedagogical thinking.

But the pedagogy of transmitting the fundamental institutions as going, functional concerns to the next generation is not merely a matter of imparting explanations as to why they are fundamental. It is not even primarily so, important as such explanation is in the development of intelligent young people. The transmission of fundamental institutions is primarily a matter of habituation, and that before children arrive at the age of reasoning. The habituation upon which the permanence of institutions depends precedes thinking and deliberated choice upon the part of the younger generation to whom the institutions are being transmitted. The social processes to be transmitted should be selected after much deliberation and choice, as has just been pointed out, but deliberation and choice upon the part of the child's elders, not upon his own part. It is as silly to expect the child to select the social processes which he is to inherit as to expect him to build for himself the city into which he is to be

born. Conservative education fears the shallow democracy of current educational theory because its overemphasis upon individual choice throws the responsibility for social selection and conservation too much upon the children. To be sure, we have no right to impose institutions and the habits of which they are constituted upon our children, except such as racial experience makes it reasonably certain that they will thank us for when they do arrive at the age of discernment. Precisely what those habits and institutions are it is our bounden duty, therefore, to know; and for the performance of that duty they will hold us responsible. Nor can we shirk that responsibility by giving them, instead, a "problem-solving attitude." For if we give them only attitudes instead of the sound solutions which they have a right to expect from our generation, they will be swamped with the problems of their own day plus those of our day that we have left unsolved for them; for there are problems that cannot be postponed without growing like a rolling snowball. In which case the "problem-solving attitude," of which we prattle so glibly, will not excite their gratitude, when once they get their eyes open to the predicament that our folly has gotten them into. But having once decided what institutions and social processes are to be transmitted, the first process in the pedagogy of that transmission is habituation. Children must first be habituated to what racial experience has demonstrated to be good; later the habits should be rationalized for them. Meantime the children may be encouraged to experiment with matters that have not been settled by racial experience. That will be conducive to progress without being destructive to conservation.

CHAPTER XXIV

SOCIAL CONTROL IN RELATION TO STABILITY

The considerations of the last chapter bring us to the subject of social control. Social orderliness depends upon the prevalence of certain beliefs, ideals, and habits of the social mind. So does social conservation. If social stability is to be achieved, those contents of the social mind simply must be imparted, and transmitted from generation to generation. The question of whether the children learn them by rote or by reason is not important from the standpoint of this objective. Indeed, our overemphasis upon individual initiative and independence is the natural concomitant of our progress cult and our misconception of democracy. Our neglect of, and contempt for memoriter methods and drill are but part and parcel of our failure to conserve. For progress we must have initiative and invention — after the Athenian model — at least upon the part of the capable few, and in the fields where they are expert. But for orderliness and conservation we must have memorizing and drill, especially for that vast mass who, as even the psychologists admit, are hardly capable of much contributory thinking. For the sake of the objective now under consideration there may even be occasion for regimentation under duress, the obsessions of the *Zeitgeist* to the contrary notwithstanding. Whether the young democrats approve or enjoy the process is a matter of very minor importance

indeed. In fact, a certain amount of resistance is the very thing normally to be expected, due to the natural conflict between social necessities and youthful instincts. But social stability depends upon that resistance being overcome. The protest of the *Zeitgeist* would be far wiser if it were aimed against *undiscriminating* compulsion, instead of against compulsion *as such;* for the real question of democracy is *who* controls, and *for whose benefit.* To control *per se* the alternative is not freedom, but social chaos. Being soft and indulgent with our children is no substitute for discriminative thinking relative to the control that ought to be imposed upon them in their own interests.

The importance of social stability, and the social control necessary thereto, may be appreciated by taking stock of the marvelous technique that society has developed for securing the individual's conformity to the social routine. To one who has not considered the matter it is really amazing how society causes the individual to think what it prefers him to think, to want what it wants him to want, and to do what it desires him to do. The means of social control vary from the most unconscious influences of social participation to the most overt and radical compulsion.

John Dewey has devoted several of the earlier chapters of his book, *Democracy and Education,* to a discussion of the more implicit forms of social influence. He points out that the social life itself is a mental give-and-take with the environment, much of which consists of other persons, and that the social stimulus is essential, therefore, to mental development. Social participation, accordingly, gives rise to manifold suggestions and to spontaneous imitation; so that the social environment is built, so to speak, into the very

structure of the individual mind. In other words, the human unit is molded to reflect in its aims and purposes the aims and purposes of the social order. The will is thus shaped in childhood and youth by being poured into the social mold.

But Dewey errs in deprecating, or at least discounting, the importance of the more overt means of control which society exerts upon its members. Any educator who would really feel the magnitude and importance of social stability as an educational objective should read and ponder well Professor Ross's monumental work on *Social Control.* This book is regarded by competent judges as among the two or three really important contributions to sociology that appeared in English during the past generation. His chapters on law, public opinion, belief, suggestion, education, religion, ceremony, art, illusion, and enlightenment, are almost classic. He shows how, in response to these stimuli, the individual conforms as a rule without much conscious resistance; indeed, our wills are largely pre-formed for us by the social will, without our being aware of it; and that, for the most part, while we are still too young to offer any conscious resistance.

But not always! And only practical disaster can result from overlooking in educational theory and practice the fact that society often crosses the purposes of its members and breaks their wills. Indeed, compulsion has everywhere and always been an outstanding phenomenon in social organization and evolution. Society has never displayed the pale squeamishness about killing an individual wish that some contemporary theorists profess themselves to feel. The routine element in social life has always been too important to tolerate such trifling.

Public opinion is an effective, very insistent, and often merciless means of compulsion. "Coldness and avoidance, the cut direct, the open snub, the patent slight, the glancing witticism; the catcalls of the street, the taunts of the corner loafer, the hoots of the mob, the groans of the regiment, the hiss of the audience; the pulpit, the press, the caricature, the topical song, the poster, the lampoon, the resolutions of societies and public bodies." [1] What a suggestive inventory! The importance of this monitor and the extent of its operation are very great. The mere appeal to public opinion is often sufficient to check a flagrant evil. Patent-medicine venders, for instance, have suffered at its hands the painful rectification of their nefarious proceedings, in part at least. Ever and anon it trips up, temporarily at least, the corruption of little politicians at the hands of big business interests. Public opinion "is the jet of compressed air that clears out corners and crevices that the clumsy broom of the law will never reach." It is difficult for staid, middle-aged people in the dignified walks and relationships of life to realize how effectively they are hooped about by what folks would say. There are few of us but must admit to our most secret selves that were it not for this restraint some "Freudian wish" might seduce us into surprising by-paths at times.

When necessary for its end, society makes use of physical force and even violence. It is particularly in the earlier stages of social evolution, to be sure, that one sees compulsion most ruthlessly exercised. When biological evolution first produced individuals with augmented social instincts there must have been a fierce struggle for existence between the new type and the old. But the survival of the fittest

[1] Ross, *Social Control*, p. 91.

did its work and those who lacked the social instincts were rooted out as mercilessly as weeds. For the free expression of their personalities they were unceremoniously pushed off into the dark. We are descended from those with whom social compulsion was well pleased.

We look back upon the political and ecclesiastical autocracies of the past with a sort of self-superior contempt. But our disapproval is at least two-fifths mistaken. Those autocracies all abused their power, it is true, and progress demands that they now be superseded. Nevertheless they made a contribution to the evolution of civilization that could have been achieved in no other way. The Roman empire, despite its faults, brought law and order, for large aggregations of mankind, to a stage of dependability for which all posterity owes it a debt of gratitude. The earlier empires of Babylonia and Egypt must have built similar materials into the forgotten subfoundations of orderly government. The mediæval church subdued the barbarians and prepared them for civilization. The modern kingdoms and empires have carried forward the same function. The cost in personal liberty was doubtless unnecessarily high at times; but the alternative would then have been, not freedom and democracy, but social chaos. A very useful sociological sermon could be preached from St. Paul's concession, "The law is a schoolmaster to bring us to Christ." It remains to be seen whether the western world has had the discipline of compulsion long enough to be ready for the voluntary maintenance of social orderliness. Sometimes it looks as if the experiment might yet result in social chaos.

In fact, the whole career of man has been one long series of struggles through which individuals, tribes, and nations

have been given their sweet choice between Allah and the sword. In primitive societies no mercy was ever shown toward those who defied the "folkways," the "mores," and the taboos. The method of Mohammed, Charlemagne, and the Inquisition has been the rule rather than the exception. No theory of the state is conceivable without the idea of coercive force. Conceivable, perhaps, for anarchy is precisely such an absurd theory; but the mere mention of the term clinches the argument. Everywhere and always the club of social compulsion has fallen on the heads of the unwilling, forcing them into line with the established order. We flatter ourselves that such a steam-roller process is revolting to our superior sensibilities, but it is for us, nevertheless, that the road has been smoothed.

Through all this popular protest of our day against coercion there runs one persistent thread of oversight. However well behaved the majority may be, one thing can always be depended upon with absolute certainty, namely, that a small percentage of individuals will surely run amuck. Most automobile drivers, for example, can be depended upon to observe the rules of the road, but not all, as every driver knows to his sorrow. Not a very high percentage of men are burglars; but who looks for the time when there will be none? Most high school and college students can be depended upon to do the right thing voluntarily; but one hundred per cent is absolutely out of the question. Even the few trouble makers behave well a good share of the time; while on the other hand who is so good that he never, never steps aside? Almost everybody can be induced through the milder means of social control to observe approved decorum; but it is absolutely certain that a few will always

remain to whom these milder means make little or no appeal. It always has been so; it always will be so, as long as the brute inheritance remains in man.

And whoever has observed the facts of human nature, and perused the episodes of human history aright will realize what an immense amount of trouble can be started by this small but recalcitrant minority. One or two careless or irresponsible hunters can get all the farmers in the countryside so exasperated at hunters in general that the sport is spoiled for all honest and careful sportsmen. A few students who persist in cheating break down the honor system for a whole university. One insane brute who amuses himself by clubbing women to death can terrorize a city of a quarter million and bring suspicion upon many. A few greedy planters, probably not over five per cent of the total population of the United States at the time, were primarily responsible for the Civil War. And a small group of German Junkers or Russian reactionaries were similarly responsible for touching the button in 1914. Now, for this very small percentage who can be depended upon to break up the social game there is only one argument that avails, and that is a club. Force, and the appeal to fear, ought to be reduced to the minimum, to be sure; but the fallacy that it can be dispensed with entirely will wreck any institution in the world. And this fallacy prevails generally in modern society. It is one of the obsessions of the *Zeitgeist.* In our zeal for democracy we yearn to get rid of the very last symbols of the old autocracy. We are half disposed to abolish capital punishment and we have abolished corporal punishment in most schools. We confidently assure each other at parlor societies or in highbrow magazines that it is brutal to whip

children and an abject confession of intellectual failure. And anyone who attempts to present the other side of the matter on the basis of sociological principles is listened to with contemptuous impatience.

It is blindness at precisely this spot which constitutes our central aversion to the League of Nations. We imagine that we can get peace by creating a public opinion against war. But there has been a strong public opinion against war ever since the days of Isaiah. Public opinion against war, like public opinion against murder or any other crime, will never be one hundred per cent. War is always started by some one recalcitrant member among the family of nations. Even though all the other nations in the world, and all the religious bodies in the universe, are for peace, that one nation — indeed, a very small percentage of that one nation's people — can set the world on fire; and it is the sheerest stupidity to overlook that fact. Peace will be assured only when there exists an international government with authority and available force to club such exceptional aggressors to their knees at the very start. When would-be aggressors among the nations of the world know in advance that they will be met with that kind of authority and force, war among the nations will be as impossible as war among the states of our Union, and for the same reason. But not until then! Any peace propaganda that slurs over this principle does more harm than good, because it blinds us to the only possible means of getting and assuring world peace. Our popular objection to the League was based upon that oversight and upon our consequent unwillingness to contribute our share to that joint responsibility and force — an indispensable share, by the way.

Aversion to the use of force in social control seems to arise from a curious tendency to identify coercion with tyranny. An interesting and suggestive parallel may be drawn between the attitude of public opinion toward monopolies and toward social compulsion. Monopolies grew originally, two or three centuries ago, out of special privileges granted by autocrats to their favorites. Gradually there grew up such an irrepressible prejudice against monopolies that they came to be forbidden in the old English common law. But since the Industrial Revolution the necessity for large fixed investments has rendered some businesses natural monopolies, and the welfare of society demands that they be operated as such. But the old prejudice against monopolies is such that we have persisted in applying the old common law long after it has ceased to fit the situation. The fact is that certain natural monopolies must be encouraged — though regulated and controlled in behalf of the public welfare. Similarly, compulsion was formerly exercised by the privileged class — the knights and bishops who could move in more directions on the board than could the pawns. Consequently there grew up such a violent popular prejudice against compulsion that to this day it suggests nothing to certain writers but the ruling class in a stratified society. A third alternative is an amazingly difficult intellectual achievement! The fact is that the democratic revolution has completely transferred the aim of social control from the selfish whims of kings and lords to the general good of all the people. Control, like natural monopolies, is not to be done away with, but directed and regulated in behalf of the common weal. The problem of democracy, therefore, is not to abolish control, but to create guarantees that it will be exercised only

in behalf of the public welfare rather than in behalf of some privileged class. Control must be removed from the classes of privilege, and vested in the classes of knowledge and good will. With them in the ascendancy compulsion will be reduced to the necessary residuum of use in the restraint of anti-social adults and in the training of children into those conventions which race experience has approved and which they themselves will approve upon arrival at maturity. But compulsion will by no means be abolished.

It is from the sociological principles set forth in this chapter and the last that Dewey's *Democracy and Education* is to be appraised. It is based upon and presupposes the sort of philosophy that has just been criticized. Every chapter of Dewey's book expounds the sort of pedagogical theory to which critical reference has just been made. From a dozen points of view he overemphasizes the deliberative, conscious aspect of individual and social life, and in as many ways slurs over the value of habit, drill, and compulsion. The inevitable result is to discount the importance of the social heritage and to pour oil on the already dangerous fire of contemporaneous individualism. While it is true that the citizens of a democracy need to be taught to think — those of them who have good brains, at least — it is quite as important, especially in the present crisis, that they be taught to revere and to obey. It is true that *Democracy and Education* contains some positively constructive theory of very great value, especially the author's exposition of industrial education, which Dewey's followers seem, strangely enough, to have overlooked for the most part. It also contains a valuable half-truth, namely, his emphasis upon constructive thinking. Nevertheless, if the argument of the

preceding pages is valid, then it follows that that part of Dewey's theory which has gained the most faddish vogue is dangerous, since its emphasis is in the wrong place. At a critical time its influence has increased, rather than checked, the obsessions of the *Zeitgeist,* and the resulting disorders by which the stability of our modern civilization is most deeply and subtly menaced. It is encouraging that many educational leaders have been outspoken in their opposition to it, which goes to show that the tide of public opinion is beginning to turn against the excessive individualism of the nineteenth century which has so seriously threatened the life of modern democracy in its infancy. And as for the pedagogical inferences from all this, they were succinctly set forth by G. Stanley Hall, when he said that children of the preadolescent, and even of the adolescent, period will profit by more regimen and drill than are dreamt of in the soft philosophy of our modern degenerate pedagogy. And he might have added that the permanence of civilization depends upon it.

The argument of the last few pages will, perhaps, be misinterpreted by some. However, it is not intended, by any means, as a plea for the abolition of initiative, self-direction, motivation, interest, social participation, and so forth, in the modern schools. These good things cannot be overdone, *except relatively.* This argument is, instead, a protest against the abolition of rigorous discipline where rigorous discipline is needed. We should use the former wherever practicable; but we cannot dispense with the latter. If attendance at secondary and continuation schools is to become well-nigh universal — and it must, if democracy is to succeed — such attendance will have to be made compulsory by law. Then, if we continue our present theories and methods of discipline

we shall find ourselves in the ludicrous predicament of having no ultimate recourse in discipline but expulsion. That will do for the schools of the future what it would have done for the armies of the past, with similar ultimate effects upon social order, because schools instead of armies are to become the safeguards of social order in the democracies of the future. Our high schools are already in more or less of a predicament almost everywhere as a result of our soft pedagogy. Teachers are expected to achieve results that can be tabulated on a normal distribution curve; but to get these results they may have recourse only to the various sugar-coated devices of our so-called motivation. The inevitable consequence is the lowering of our standards, a nonchalant contempt upon the part of the pupils for properly constituted authority, and, in extreme cases, the prevalence of disgraceful morals. The only remedy is the very thing the *Zeitgeist* most abhors, namely, a system of school discipline as inflexible and final as that which obtains in the army. It should be kept out of sight for the most part, to be sure. On the surface of things the school should present the appearance of voluntary self-government by the students themselves, under the supervision of the finest social idealism. But the student body should understand perfectly that absolutely irresistible compulsion is closeted with the faculty and the board, to be used to the uttermost if necessary. And it should be brought to bear upon the lessons as well as upon school decorum and ordinary morals. Without such discipline it is hard to see how the schools of a democracy can conserve the necessary orderliness and the fundamental institutions of civilization.

This will impose a most solemn responsibility upon teachers; for they will need to discriminate between necessary

and arbitrary orderliness, and between the fundamental and the outgrown institutions. And they will have to be more, not less, skillful in motivation, lest they abuse their authority and kill the real spirit of democracy. This is a difficult dilemma; but neither horn is a solution. The success of modern democracy, and the permanence of civilization depend upon achieving the golden mean in theory and in practice.

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Doubtless the doctrine of control, as set forth in this chapter, and especially the final appeal to coercion, will engender more resistance, not to say resentment, than almost any other part of this book. By many very creditable and influential intellects it will doubtless be regarded as a philosophical abandonment of democracy, and a reversion to those very tenets upon which ecclesiastical and political autocracy has always been based. Such objectors may well bethink themselves, however, of the phenomena of social suggestion and the obsessions of the *Zeitgeist.* Even the brightest minds are notoriously subject to the "hypnotism of the present reality." We are all normally swept along in the current of the contemporaneous contagions, and what we think we think often turns out upon inspection to be nothing more than the substance of our mental absorption by social suggestion without any thinking at all. And not infrequently the confidence with which we hold our views is proportionate to the element of social suggestion in their derivation. The first impulse of modern democracy has been greatly to exaggerate the concept of individual independence, as we have seen; and the brainiest men of the age have adopted the

obsession, in conformity with the laws of social suggestion. And there is scarcely any topic on which one's opinion is more likely to be accounted for in this way. Accordingly the reader is invited to assume an attitude of skepticism toward what he regards as his own beliefs on the subject of control and its function in society and education.

If such self-disciplinary skepticism is really to give itself a fair chance of proving effective the concept of social organization must first be adequately conceived. And that is an exceedingly difficult achievement, for the psychological reason suggested on the first page of Chapter III. For social organization, in its very nature, lies in the penumbra of attention where it is seldom noticed. Being unobtrusive, it is imputed small importance. Hence, further, it is conceived, even, with difficulty. And therein lies the whole strength of the reader's usual attitude, toward which he is just now deliberately holding himself in an attitude of skepticism. Draw social organization, as such, once under the spotlight of attention, and that skepticism suddenly becomes surprisingly easy. Professor Cooley commits a serious pedagogical blunder when he says, "It would be useless . . . to attempt a more elaborate definition. We have only to open our eyes and *see* organization; and if we cannot do that no definition will help us." He should have devoted at least a chapter to the awakening of his readers' imaginations, so that they *could* see organization. Because he has omitted to do that his teachings traverse the intellectual digestive tract of many, perhaps most, of his readers without assimilation. For social organization is sometimes the most difficult thing in the world to see — as difficult as the submerged nine tenths of the iceberg.

Social organization consists of those customary uniformities of behavior which make it possible to carry on programs of social activity, since they enable each of us to know what to do next and what to expect of our associates. For example, the family, as an institution, is a program of social activities. In family life each of us knows, in most situations, what to do next and what to expect of his housemates. This is because of certain customary uniformities of behavior; and these customary uniformities of behavior constitute the institution. The same is true of every other institution. It is also true of every phase of social life. All human activity is permeated with such customary uniformities of behavior: morals and etiquette, law and business procedure, work and recreation, and the ordinary details of life, such as sending a letter, procuring groceries, eating a meal, and a million and one other such like items. No serious objective of human activity can be achieved without social organization. Absolutely none! War, business, art, science, health protection, and even reproduction; a picnic, a tennis match, a roll call, a hair cut, a smoke, or even a game of solitaire. All human activity is social activity; and therefore involves social organization — as the reader will recall from Chapters II and III. Whenever a program of behavior is executed by the use of learned mental content possessed in common by two or more interacting persons, we have social organization. It is as universal, therefore, as mental mutuality. Social organization is the very medium in which we live and collaborate, as necessary to human activities as water is to the fish.

Social organization is to human life what social instincts are to gregarious animals: it provides the programs for

collective behavior. Without social organization human behavior of a normal kind would be absolutely impossible. Nothing is more necessary. But since nothing is more elusive of attention there is scarcely any important aspect of life whose importance is more persistently overlooked; and it is precisely that oversight which makes the liberty and self-direction dogma of modern democracy seem so plausible. The danger of carbon monoxide is that one can neither see nor smell it. One assumes, therefore, that it is not there — until it has done its deadly business! It is much the same with our current ways of thinking about social organization and the control that holds it together.

For the crux of this whole matter lies in the fact that no social organization can be made to operate without social control. The collaborators must not only learn their parts, but do them; and both require motivation. Usually that motivation is of the mild and therefore unobtrusive sorts; but almost always the more drastic forms of social pressure have to be drawn upon, as we have seen, if the objectives are to be achieved. If schools are to be maintained some taxpayers must be coerced into paying their taxes, and some parents must be compelled to send their children. If the state is to repress crime in times of peace, and maintain defense in times of war, coercion of the most ruthless sort will have to be resorted to in extreme cases. And so with all the other institutions. And likewise with all the other worth while objectives of social behavior. If the objectives are unimportant, compulsion may be dispensed with; but if the objectives are vital, it will have to be used in extreme cases. It is sheer sociological and historical illiteracy to ignore the element of compulsion necessary to social organi-

zation. But it is also one of the most prevalent and virulent obsessions of the *Zeitgeist.*

The world will never be able to dispense with control. Social disorganization is the alternative. The vital question is *who* the controllers are to be, and *in whose interests* they are to exercise control. Democracy is not an abolition of control, but its relocation. It substitutes new agents and objectives. Under the old social and political systems, against which democracy is a protest, control was located in a privileged minority, who exercised it selfishly for the maintenance of their own privileges. The new order has aspired to locate control with the people collectively, to be exercised in behalf of the collective welfare. That has given rise to some perplexing problems as to how collective control can be effectively focused. The whole philosophy of this book looks toward the solution of that problem in a hierarchy of education, which will, through a process of enlightenment, locate social control in an intellectual and moral aristocracy. It advocates the transference of control, in other words, from captains, kings, and plutocrats to the fraternities of scholarship and teaching. But if these groups should shirk the responsibility of control, due to the prevalence among them of the theory that control is undemocratic and undesirable *per se,* then control will revert to the captains, kings, or plutocrats; for control can no more disappear from human society than bones from the human anatomy. In that case the objectives of democracy will miscarry as a result, and the masses of mankind will revert to their age-old miseries of exploitation.

Due, therefore, to the importance of social order, and the consequent necessity for social control, the argument ven-

tures to lay down the following principle, namely, that *the burden of proof is on the innovator and the disobedient.* And at this principle we arrive not only from the facts of social organization and social control, but also from the phenomena of random motion, as involved in any new coördination. It is safe to assume that ninety per cent of disobedience and innovation is but random motion; and if random motions had the right of way in social life social order would be impossible. Tacitly encouraging every disgruntled ruffian to climb porches and slug pedestrians, every lazy lout to shirk his job, every indolent youngster to shoot paper wads instead of getting his lessons, every libertine to disregard the ties of family, and every hedonist to get drunk ad libitum, most decidedly would not be conducive to human welfare. Nor could the philosophy of any misconceived democracy devise to make it so. It is only from the rarely exceptional recalcitrant that moral progress may result. Recalcitrance is always the object of suspicion, therefore; and rightly so. Only posterity can tell whether Joan of Arc is a criminal or a martyr; the representatives of the established order can wisely do no other than to assume that her freakish recalcitrance is criminal. We conclude, therefore, that until, with respect to any particular rule of conduct, there develops a new consensus of social opinion, the agents of social control are obligated to maintain the existing order.

How, then, is the moral progress to arrive? In the past it has perhaps most often come through the blood of the martyrs. The agents of social control have sat on the lid, as a rule, until it has been blown off by the violent and bloody protest of revolution. That is to say, they have selfishly and foolishly disregarded the integration of a new consensus

long past the point where it merited serious consideration. It would be a great gain to humanity if discussion could be substituted for conflict as a method of social change. And that is one of the advantages to be hoped for in transferring control to a hierarchy of scientists and educators. But such a transference would mean that the discussions of the competent few, rather than the freakish disobedience of the recalcitrant many, should determine what types of disobedience were to go unpunished. However, until the competent few become omniscient and perfectly unselfish it may continue to require an occasional martyr to vindicate a worthy innovation. If one deeply believes that it is in the interests of a worthy cause that he is about to be disobedient to the established order, he should be willing to expect the agents of control to do their duty and make a martyr of him; and he may hope that his own martyrdom may incite discussion out of which a new consensus will emerge. For social order is so very important that, even for the sake of progress, it may not be jeopardized except upon the most convincing reasons.

However, the subject of control is one upon which discussion can never hope to terminate debate, because we are confronting here a really insoluble dilemma. We are dealing with that perennial dualism of independence *versus* interdependence to which reference has so often been made before in this work. Moreover, we are concerned with the problem of pioneering the untried future. To substitute the innovations that individuals desire for the established social order is always, therefore, an experiment, as to the outcome of which no one can be certain in advance. Hence, whenever the question arises, whether in principle, as here, or in con-

nection with concrete cases, a debate is inevitable, with no possible decision in sight until after the experiment has been worked out to its conclusion. The contention of this chapter is that the *Zeitgeist* has been obsessed with an excessive individualism in which the importance of control and discipline has been grievously underestimated; and that it is high time for educators, at least, to shift to a more median position. There is far more call for authority and control in society and education than has been recognized in the current cults of recent decades.

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In a book like this it will assuredly be expected that something be said about education as a means of preventing war; and there is perhaps no less illogical place than this for a few paragraphs on that well-nigh hopeless subject. This is the most baffling topic in the whole field of educational sociology, partly because of the immeasurable magnitude of the problem, and partly because anything worth saying has so little chance of a respectful hearing by the American *Zeitgeist* in the mood of its present obsessions. If the sociologist were willing to advocate the promotion of international acquaintances and good fellowship, and the passing of sonorous resolutions against war, he might get not only a hearing but a hearty popular applause. But he knows that all such *fol-de-rol* is worse than useless, because, in addition to accomplishing nothing, it diverts attention from the only measures that might possibly prove somewhat helpful. Whereas such ideas as might make for international peace, if they could become sufficiently prevalent, are violently repugnant to the popular political and economic mythology that now prevails.

In the first place it needs to be recognized that modern capitalism (as was true of Roman capitalism in the bitter tragedies of Corinth and of Carthage) is the most culpable provocateur of modern war. Foreign investments are almost certain to become bones of contention. It is an axiom of modern diplomacy that the property of nationals must be protected by their home governments; from which it follows that the foreign policies of governments are in substance the policies of the nation's great foreign investors. Foreign loans and investments represent a national surplus accumulated by pinching the standard of living of the laboring and consuming classes at home; and abroad they constitute worse than "entangling alliances." They ought in general, therefore, to be frowned upon and discouraged, rather than approved and boasted of.[1] If education could make this principle clear to each rising generation it might help some.

But foreign investment is only the cutting edge of a massive social wedge, namely, the pressure of surplus populations. And for this colossal problem there is only one solution, namely, to raise the living standards and increase "social capillarity"[2] the world over. This means that every great modern nation should adopt two policies: first, that of paying higher wages and giving better education to its own laboring classes; and, second, that of contributing *gratis* to the education of backward peoples everywhere. In so far as education can help to spread these ideals abroad will it help to remove the causes of international war.

But to such ideals and policies the capitalistic profits system is inimical. That system has a motive for holding

[1] Note the facts and figures relative to foreign loans and investments presented in Chapter XXVI, page 351.

[2] See F. A. Bushee, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 293 ff.

wages down, for opposing taxation for further education, and for seeking foreign investments; but it has no motive for raising the standards of living and the cultural levels of the laboring classes, not even at home, much less abroad. If education can open the eyes of at least our intellectual leaders to the fundamental immorality of the profits system, and help to prepare the way eventually for something better, it may contribute something toward the eventual beating of swords into plowshares and spears into pruning hooks. For capitalism will bring peace to the world when lions lie down with lambs.

But even with capital superseded by a less provocative system, and population growth the world over reduced to the control of reason, there would still be need of something further to insure world peace. That something further is *international organization.* For world peace will have to be organized before it can ever be achieved. If the reader feels vaguely mystified by this word let him read, and re-read, Professor Cooley's *Social Organization* until a new point of view begins to take possession of his imagination. "Experience shows, I think," says Cooley, "that until a higher sentiment, like brotherly kindness, attains some *definite organization* and *programme,*[1] so that men are held up to it, it is remarkably ineffective in checking selfish activites."[2] "Modern democracy aims to *organize* justice, and in so far as it succeeds it creates a medium in which truth tends to survive and falsehood to perish,"[3] and, likewise, justice and injustice, he might have added. "The failure to realize these [humanitarian] impulses in practice is, of course, due in part to moral weakness of a personal character. . . . But going beyond

[1] Italics not in the original. [2] Page 194. [3] Page 184.

this . . . the cause of failure is seen to be in the *difficulty of organization.*" [1] "The creation of a moral *order* on an ever growing scale is the great historic task of mankind; and the magnitude of it explains all shortcomings." [2] "We are constantly being caught and ground in our own neglected *mechanisms.*" [3] We have no world *organization* corresponding to our craving for world peace, and by which the selfish activities of aggressor nations can be restrained. Until we get it we shall continue to dream in vain of peace, just as the world has always dreamed, since history began.

And here again we come upon the principle of social control. Whoever has mastered the philosophy of Professor Ross's book on that subject must realize that nothing important involving irksome coöperation can ever be accomplished in this world on a wholly voluntary basis. There have to be available the various means of control, including coercion by force in cases of extremity. Civil order and justice have been achieved by nothing less; nor could they ever have been. Peace among the States of the American Union is organized on an ultimate basis of force, as it was necessary for our Civil War to demonstrate. It must inevitably be so with world peace. The world must be so organized as to repress *by force* any nation that may presume to break the peace. In other words, to the force of a world organization the sovereignty of nations must be subordinated, contrary as that may run to the prevailing beliefs, loyalties, and fears. Those psychoses of the social mind are, therefore, the chief obstacles to this desideratum, and it is the essential responsibility of education to dissipate them, especially in America. For until we Americans discern this fundamental principle,

[1] Pages 52, 53. [2] Page 53. [3] Page 118.

and are willing to contribute our share (which happens, under the circumstances, to be the vital share), it is hard to imagine how there can be any assurance of world peace. To make these principles clear to the rising generation of Americans is probably the greatest contribution that education anywhere in the world can make toward international confidence, tranquillity, and order. And it is safe to assume that these are necessary to the stability of civilization in the new régime.

CHAPTER XXV

EDUCATION AS A FACTOR IN SOCIAL PROGRESS[1]

THE purpose of this chapter is to show the function of education as a factor in social progress, and especially to point out the extent to which progress depends, so far as education is concerned, upon a wide popular distribution of knowledge. Hitherto society has depended chiefly upon advanced education for the few; not even yet has distributive scholarship attracted the attention which it deserves. Hitherto — so far as concerns progress as objective — the chief effort seems to have been to secure contributions to the sum total of human knowledge through offering facilities for the finished specialization of those few who present themselves, as if by foreordination, at the apex of the educational pyramid. And now that the education of the masses is being considered as having a bearing on this objective the prevailing philosophy contents itself, for the most part, with advocating that one-sided, lift-yourself-by-your-bootstraps solution known as the problem-solving method. This philosophy, good so far as it goes, of course, ignores that principle of social psychology suggested by Professor Ogburn's list of simultaneous inventions and discoveries,[2] namely, that mental creation is in large measure a mass product, after all, welling up through creative individuals

[1] The substance of this chapter was published in *The Educational Review*, for June, 1919, and is reprinted by courtesy of Doubleday Page and Company.

[2] See *Social Change*, pp. 90–102.

out of the apperceptive social reservoir. From this principle it follows that inventions and discoveries must be somewhat proportionate to the popular diffusion of the prerequisite knowledge. As to the effect of popular enlightenment upon the nurture of creative genius which would otherwise go to waste, there seems to have been no adequate appreciation. Moreover, it has been too easily assumed, especially among productive scholars, that knowledge, culture, inventions, discoveries, and the like are self-distributive. This assumption is really a phase of the laissez faire fallacy that has so disastrously dominated democratic thought and policy for a century or more. As a matter of fact, social inertia tends to resist the distribution of knowledge. Only the froth of culture distributes itself automatically; whatever requires an effort of attention has to be taught under organized duress, sometimes mild, but sometimes otherwise. Democratic societies, therefore, if they are to progress — and progress they must if they are to survive — must take overt and active measures to provide a popular distribution of culture very much more extensive than we have even yet.

It is no doubt logical to begin with a definition of progress; and such an exercise carries no little academic interest, especially to students of social theory. The trouble is, however, that a sympathetic reading of the chapter is likely to be forfeited on account of the reader's disagreement with the definition. As a matter of common sense we all know what we mean when we talk about social progress; but a formal definition seems to be one of the hardest things in the realm of social theory upon which to secure agreement. Accordingly, there would be no good reason for the reader

to close the book even if he should find himself unable to endorse our formal definition. However, that definition was at least implied in the theory of social values set forth in Chapter III, since the criterion of human values is at the same time the criterion of social progress. Progress is change from lower to higher values. The criterion of progress is therefore those innate biological needs of *homo sapiens* which have been constant as long as have the unit characters of his germ plasm; that is, since the last ice age, at least. Man's effort to satisfy these needs has been the lifting force in social evolution; and progress consists in increasing the intellectual resources and readjusting the social structures, so as to assure a more nearly complete satisfaction of those innate needs as time goes on.

The difficulty arises when we attempt to specify definitely which social changes are for the better and which are for the worse, and especially when we try to compute an algebraic sum of the benefits of all changes, and so decide whether, on the whole, society really is progressing. Here we have to fall back upon the fact that in the long run *homo sapiens* tends to quit the behavior that hurts him, if he can, but keeps on with that from which he benefits. Thus he quits a lower for a higher standard of living every time he has a chance. He holds on to the monogamous family, in spite of all temporary experiments with other sorts. He always reverts to forms of government that give him order and security; but he is forever trying to decrease the elements of unnecessary repression in the same. Steadily, throughout the centuries, he has outlawed conflict and private vengeance; on an ever larger scale he has organized the arbitration of disputes. In general, and in the long run,

he abandons those institutional forms that interfere with the functioning of sister institutions, so that harmony among the institutions may be regarded as the objective sign and ultimate pragmatic test of social welfare. Social harmony, with a high standard of living and culture, appears to be the goal of social progress. But toward this goal we occidentals never seem able to progress with an even front. At present the lags are in our overconservative attitude toward old industrial injustices and in our unconservative attitude toward the old moral fundamentals. We are conservative where we ought to be radical, and radical where we ought to be conservative. Hence the scientific and technical progress we have made is being jeopardized by our negative progress in social organization; and social change has no better than a fighting chance to eventuate promptly in social progress. This brings us back to our common sense notions of what we mean by progress, on the common basis of which we may proceed with our discussion.

Social progress [1] is of two main sorts, each of which may be subdivided. The first depends upon the availability of the social heritage, and is due, primarily, to conservation, and secondarily, to utilization. The second depends upon the increase of the social heritage, and occurs, first, through invention, and second, through selection. This analysis has the merit, at least, of furnishing an outline for the chapter. Our four topics will accordingly be: (1) conservation, (2) utilization, (3) invention, and (4) selection. The first topic can be omitted, since the last two or three chapters have been devoted to nothing else. It should be obvious

[1] See *Theories of Social Progress*, by A. J. Todd, an important contribution to educational theory.

enough by now that the conservation of the social heritage is prerequisite to social progress. We may proceed, therefore, to the second.

Utilization

There are a great many people who have little or no opportunity to share in the good things that the race possesses. To them the world's culture is a closed book; they do not participate in it. Their lives, as a result, are tragically meager. The more the mental and moral heritage which the race collectively possesses can be participated in by the individual members of the race the greater will be the sum total of human well-being. This, which we may call progress by utilization, is axiomatic, to be sure; but we are so accustomed to regarding the tragic meagerness of the deprived millions as a matter of course that it may not be amiss to vivify this sort of social progress before the imagination.

For instance, we have heard a good deal lately about the defective health conditions prevailing among school children, candidates for conscription, and others. This condition exists not because the scientists know so little about hygiene, but because the public knows so little. When the black death swept over Europe during the fourteenth century the people were helpless because there was no medical science, but we could protect ourselves from most of the contagious diseases if the people all understood them as well as the doctors do, or even if they understood them only well enough to realize how well the doctors do understand most of them. As yet there are too many persons who take no stock in these "new-fangled" theories about germs, or who

at least cannot visualize germs, and hence it is almost impossible to secure thorough regulation by officials and effective coöperation by the public. "The chief reason for this discrepancy between the ideal and the real," says President Butler, "is simple ignorance."

The war emphasized our shortage of technicians and skilled workmen of all sorts. The difficulty was not primarily in the undeveloped state of the industrial sciences and arts but principally in the fact that too few men knew them. Similarly, the great hindrance to scientific agriculture is the ignorance of the farmers. If they all knew all that the scientists know about how to farm, the productivity of the land would immediately be increased considerably. Indeed, this is true of all our sciences. If the people only knew enough science to utilize the services of the scientists, comfort, health, happiness, and the productivity of industry would lurch forward unbelievably.

The fine arts, literature, music, dramatics, pictures, dress, architecture, home decoration, are sources of immeasurable satisfaction to those who know how to use them. But how few do! Any reader can enumerate a long list of acquaintances whose lives would have been very greatly brightened, not to say uplifted, if they had learned to use and enjoy good reading, music, and the other arts. An educational policy designed to effect a distribution of the fine arts and their utilization by all the people would add greatly to the general happiness — as we have seen.

What has been said of science, art, and technique, is also true of ideals. It is hardly possible at our stage of social evolution to conceive of any better social and spiritual ideals than those of the Hebrew-Christian tradition. For two

thousand years and more the evolution of social organization has consisted largely in a gradually better application of this humanitarian idealism, and the end is by no means yet. While, as Cooley points out, the problem of Christianizing the social order is partly one of inventing new forms of social organization, it is also, as he admits, one of pressing the ideal home to the hearts and wills of all the people. If greatly increased numbers of our people could be induced to adopt ardently the social ideal of life as set forth by the great Hebrew prophets, this would presently become a far different kind of a world to live in.

And the same with the social beliefs. The whole American public was slow to discern the real causes and central issues of the World War, and they are in the dark even yet, now that it is over. But students of history and world politics were not surprised when the storm broke. If the general public, both in Europe and America, had understood the trends of events for twenty years, it might possibly have been avoided. Certainly we shall never have an organized substitute for the explosive old diplomacy until the public generally does understand the faults of the old and the principles upon which a new must be constructed — understand at least well enough to follow, instead of rejecting, leaders who do understand.

Frequent reference has been made in these pages to the imminent conflict between capital and labor. A metropolitan newspaper, commenting in 1919 upon the labor situation the world over, remarked editorially, "The man with the hoe has broken the silence of centuries." Since then the forces of reaction have been in the saddle, but the pendulum always swings. Eventually there must be a settlement,

for there never was a more irrepressible issue. Let us hope that it can be achieved through brains and ballots. The obstacle to such a solution is the ignorance of the public. The capitalists know how to operate industry under the present régime, but as school boys almost none of them were ever given any suspicions of its imperfections, and hence they cannot conceive of the question having any other side than their own. Labor, if it grows angry enough, can easily destroy the system, and all our culture with it; but how to reorganize they do not know, nor do they even know what ought to be conserved. The great middle class knows nothing, for the most part, and cares less, if only it be let alone to pay the installments on its latest rugs and automobiles, and roll its offspring before it like the tumble bug in Cabell's allegory. Thus ignorant, we drift along toward the day of fate. The welfare and progress of the next century or two depend upon the application of the social sciences; but such application is a synonym for the popular utilization of those bodies of scientized beliefs.

Lester F. Ward wrote:

> The failure to assimilate achievement is due to the enormous inequalities of society. It is due to the exploitation of the unintelligent class by the intelligent class. . . . For knowledge is power, and sympathy, altruism, benevolence, and philanthropy are utterly unreliable principles, and can not in the least be depended upon to secure any sort of equality in society. . . . The only hope of an equitable distribution of the fruits of achievement lies in putting exactly the same arms into the hand of one member of society as of another. . . . If the rest of the world is to remain as it is and more of these prodigies hunted out and set to work in it, the present confusion will be worse confounded. . . . It will only increase the social inequalities which are the cause of all the trouble.

Invention

New elements of culture are the products of creative intelligence. The sociologist uses the word invention in the broadest possible sense; and social progress depends ultimately, of course, upon invention. On the basis of this theory of progress the educational system has long provided for original research. More recently elementary and secondary teachers have been urged to develop in their pupils the problem-solving attitude of mind. This movement has an important core of validity; but it has been at least sufficiently emphasized by other writers of late. There is usually little call for developing the eating attitude of mind; what the starving millions need is food. And somewhat analogously, human beings have the problem-solving attitude innate; and in a dynamic period like this there is little danger of its being stifled by ancestor worship. A problematical situation like the present reveals no dearth of the problem-solving attitude. From the soap box to the Senate, there is plenty. The dire necessity of the present crisis is information. Information! Without it the innumerable problem solvers bid fair to eat each other up!

The flaw in much of the pedagogical literature about teaching children to think, and producing in them the creative attitude of mind, is an insufficient emphasis upon the use of the racial inheritance as a basis for thinking. Ruskin went so far as to assert that "originality is never to be sought for its own sake, otherwise it will be a mere aberration." How frequently one meets some middle-aged or elderly person of the finest natural endowment whose self-reliant thinking, for want of the guidance of knowledge, has rendered him a

crank. Such intellectual aberration is a distinct social loss. Unless thinking is based upon abundant factual knowledge it is mere formal logomachy. Scholasticism is the historic example; the current emphasis upon problem solving to the neglect of information getting, is a sort of modern scholasticism. Sound within limits, it is easily misconceived and overworked. It falls on the horns of that ubiquitous dualism of self and society. It must never for a moment be forgotten that every advance the race has made was based on the accumulated knowledge of the past. The doctor's degree is granted in all reputable universities only to those who have first mastered what others have done in the candidates' chosen fields, because that is prerequisite to their own "little peppercorn" of contribution. The same prerequisite should be demanded with equal rigor of children in the grades. Cogent thinking is rare enough at best; for the rank and file of common folk, *the expert hunting attitude* might prove a more profitable aim of democratic education.

There is another means, however, of developing a supply of creative intelligence, namely, the popular distribution of knowledge. If the biologists are to be taken seriously, creative intelligence is not so much a matter of developing as of discovering and stimulating. This means has been too little realized.

A few great periods have fairly swarmed with geniuses, for whose massed appearance no adequate explanation has ever yet been given. That of the hereditarians merely begs the question, while that of the environmentalists never answers it, except in part. Some historians try to account for the intellectual activity of these periods by the stimulus of new ideas brought in by migration, commerce, and war. Let it

be noted, however, that the important thing is the new ideas, not migrations, war, or commerce. The new ideas might conceivably be furnished in some other way — by an educational system, for example, if it were vital and effective, rather than merely formal and custom bound. Qualify millions of otherwise destitute minds to share *vitally* in those parts of the social heritage in which they do not now participate, and there might appear a new Periclean Age or Renaissance. Never was there a more appropriate occasion to try the experiment.

Neither has a satisfactory explanation been offered as to why certain viable periods in history have been followed by periods of relative stagnation and decline. Perhaps it was for lack of popular support. Genius has to be appreciated and its products patronized to keep it producing. Social solidarity is such that discovery cannot very far outrun application; while the application of knowledge is the most fruitful incentive to further discovery. Natural science advanced but slowly for three centuries until it began to be applied practically about the beginning of the nineteenth century, since when it has advanced beyond all previous precedent. In whatever realm a genius may produce, he must appear in the fullness of time or he will waste his sweetness on the desert air. Christopher Dock, the Pestalozzi of Colonial Pennsylvania, is a good example. Aspiring young artists in the fields of literature and music complain bitterly that there is no demand in America for first-class work. Musical composers have to resort to jazz to earn a living, while literary people have to cater to what the cheap magazines will buy, unless they are willing to starve for their art. If the vast mass of the people persisted ignorantly in the use

of incantations and old women's remedies, medical science would soon come to a standstill. Perhaps this explains it. The great progress periods were followed by periods of decadence and deferred hope largely because of the dense ignorance and the moral stupidity of the masses—together with the absorption of attention by the ambitious wars of ambitious kings. The public was incapable of patronizing its geniuses, and so of keeping them at their production.

Wrote Lester F. Ward:

> In the past and present state of the world not only literary but all other achievement has been irregular, sporadic, and spasmodic. The world of thought may be compared with a vast mountainous region, with great peaks and domes, chains and sierras, rising with utmost irregularity. . . . This is all due to these artificial causes, to influences repressing most of the geniuses of mankind. . . . If the movement had been natural and normal the whole mass would have risen together. . . .
>
> It is impossible for us, accustomed to the old stagecoach methods, to form any adequate conception of the teeming, seething world of thought and action that the acceptance by society of the logic of opportunity in its full measure would create.

Perhaps we strike closest to the heart of this matter when we consider how much latent talent probably lies undeveloped in the population. Making whatever allowances the reader may think necessary for gradations of mentality, is there any good biological reason for supposing that creative intelligence, or even genius, is as rare as it appears to be in most societies? Every type of civilization predetermines the type of talent it is to stifle. And, as we have seen, the school epitomizes the civilization. Athens taught art, but we teach commercial arithmetic. We run a magnet over our school room, and if iron adheres to it, all well and good; the residue we discard. In this way we waste silver, gold,

diamonds, and who knows what rare and untried metals. Society must learn to assay its human ore more systematically. We should, so far as possible, expose all young people to all phases of culture. If one is immune to music he may take to plant breeding, while if another does not respond to literature, he may invent a new type of motor, or inspire the world with a new religious ideal. Talent, even genius, breaks out at the most unexpected spots. The most unpromising boy may suddenly present the world with the last sort of achievement parents or teachers had ever thought of asking him to show promise of. But the youth whom God has tuned to a given note will never vibrate to it unless something in his social environment gives forth that tone. Hence the necessity of sounding all the various notes of culture in the hearing of every youth. The greatest tragedy of life is the blank silence of souls whom fate has never struck and made to ring —the mute inglorious Miltons, the undistinguished Hampdens, the cold, pulseless hearts potential of celestial fire:

> But knowledge to their eyes her ample page,
> Rich with the spoils of time, did ne'er unroll.

This principle, that society has vast, latent resources that might be uncovered by universal education of a vital sort, is the keynote of Ward's philosophy. The name of Lester F. Ward is anathema, to be sure, in the hereditarian cult of educational psychology, just now so universally in vogue among the pedagogues. But the pendulum will swing, of course. The fundamental fallacy of that cult is in ignoring that part of the environment — the major part, indeed — which is alike for dull and bright, and to which they react with similar behavior.[1] The iceberg fallacy! To add a

[1] Cf. Chapters III and XX above.

rich intellectual increment to that *common* environment will naturally increase the percentage of those who display intellectual behavior. When this fallacy becomes more popularly apparent there may be a revival of the Ward sociology among educators. They may then be more interested in his conclusion that there is at least six hundred times as much talent and genius in society as has ever been developed. Let us grant that he exaggerated. But suppose it be sixty, instead of six hundred; or even only six! What kind of a society might this become if we uncovered and matured six times as much creative intellect in the fields of science, art, and philosophy as we succeed in doing. One needs only to grasp the biological idea, insisted upon by anthropologists, that among the Crô-Magnons was as high a percentage of native ability as among ourselves, to realize that even among us an enormous amount of it is still allowed to go to waste.

Said Ward:

> The number of Newtons who may really be said never to have had an opportunity to watch an apple fall to the ground, may be great; for the sons of toil and want and circumscribed existence, reflection even is forbidden. It is just this initial circumstance, this vision of the promised land, that education is specially adapted to furnish to those naturally bright minds whom fortune has restricted to dark and narrow regions.
>
> The most important of all educational schemes . . . is to spread a net . . . that will catch all the "big fish" in the social sea. There is only one kind of a net that will do this, and that is the kind that extends absolutely equal opportunities to all members of society. The "small fry" would slip through such a net, even as they do through the bungling apparatus that exists now, but all that are worth having would be caught and utilized, and not allowed for the most part to get away as has thus far always been the case.

Selection

We come now to progress by social selection. Survival of the fittest has sometimes been juggled by careless thinkers into an altogether sufficient formula to account for biological progress. They forget that mutation — the *arrival* of the fit — is the crux of the matter. With equal one-sidedness the emphasis has too often been reversed by educational theorists, as if productive scholarship, creative genius, and the problem-solving attitude were all that required consideration. Social selection is almost as vital a factor in social evolution as is invention itself. As a matter of fact, there is going on constantly a struggle for existence between rival social entities out of which only the fit eventually survive; but the speed of social evolution depends upon the promptness with which the unfit is rejected. To this principle and its implications the engineers of democratic education should give thoughtful consideration.

The fitness of institutions, beliefs, customs, ideals, and social valuations is relative to the innate needs of *homo sapiens*. Race experience furnishes the pragmatic test of truth and value and also the ultimate ground of all authority. In the long run, that will survive which best serves the needs of life. Religious faith and social philosophy unite in the confidence that truth and right are eternal and that evil and error must gradually give way before them. The *rate* of progress is the only question. Will the new machinofacture, democratic régime mature successfully after a century or so, or will its consummation be postponed for a thousand years of social chaos and misery? There is nothing miraculous or supernatural about progress at all; it is simply the choices

of sentient, purposive minds, accumulating like a coral — promptly, or with deferred hopes. Eventually the dreams of poets and the inspired hopes of the prophets must come true, since human need requires them. Thus, out of social evolution the new social religion draws both faith and inspiration.

On the surface of things it looks as if war were a very important social sieve. In the primæval climb from the brute to the truly human level, fighting must have figured very largely, eliminating the sub-human types least fit for survival. In the growth of civilization, however, its influence upon resources and institutions may have been less than appears, except as a hindrance to the work of the intellect. Innumerable wars have involved nothing more significant than who should rob and who should be robbed. But when social values are at stake we confront the following dilemma. The group that fights for right and justice must have decided beforehand what right and justice were. If they win, the decision had really been reached by the thinking that preceded the fighting. But if they lose, their cause will not stay lost. The victims presently become conscious of their pain, whereupon they think and discuss. Eventually they will demand and secure a reconsideration. Nothing is ever settled until it is settled right. Or, to put a similar matter in a less syllogistic form, it has often happened that the conquerors have absorbed the culture of the conquered. Which means that in the long run mind rather than muscle has been the agency of social selection to a far greater degree than appears on the surface of history.

Informed thinking is the essential agent of social selection. By the conscious appraisals of individuals, followed by com-

munication and general discussion, a social decision is finally reached. If there appear to be other agencies of social selection, they are less influential than they seem to be. Certain institutions may be said to inhere in human nature, such as the primary groups: the family, the neighborhood group, and the play group of children. But even so, they have all been subject to endless experimentation; and if, as Hayes suggests, they tend to conform eventually to a marked resemblance to their original forms, it is because conscious racial experience has demonstrated the soundness of those forms. As we survey the age-long past it looks as if much social selection were the chance result of blind trial and error. But the process of trial and error usually turns out upon close inspection of its details to consist of a long series of infinitesimal choices, all now quite forgotten.

Conversely, the ignorance of the masses has always been the most effective clog to rational social selection, and that ignorance has always been highly prized and carefully cultivated by the classes of power and privilege. It is a crime to teach slaves to read. Your aristocratic governor of a stratified society — Virginia of the seventeenth century — boasts that there are no free schools in his community, and he hopes there will be none for a hundred years to come. Only about a century ago in England statesmen declared that the prosperity of their nation (*i.e.*, of their class) depended upon an abundant supply of ignorant poor to do the labor cheaply. To this day, even in America, there are those who look with selfish suspicion upon the education of their "wops" and "hunyocks." In an undemocratic society the political ratiocination develops the theory that it is the business of the poor to work and not to think. And if they try to think,

vested interests see to it that their thinking goes astray. Junkerism used the German schools to that end for generations; and especially after the Franco-Prussian War did the imperial party make the most of them in preparing the people to bleed for the régime that was preparing to bleed them. Nor are the political tyrants the only ones who are adept in the art of fooling the people. American history since the Civil War is rife with examples. Tax and tariff systems were selected by the misguided classes who were their chief victims. And since the World War the business of organized propaganda to stampede the people has assumed colossal proportions, and, to date, has always been successful. The inside ring of wealth and special privilege get together and decide what they want the people to select, proceed to fill the air with an impenetrable newspaper din, and then the next morning after election it always appears that the people have selected what had been suggested. Of such results, the only preventive is popular enlightenment.

Thus ignorance is a halter by which the masses are led not by tyrants alone, but by which the masses entangle and fasten themselves to damaging illusions. There have been crises in history — and the post-war period was one of them — when the earthquake of events has thrown open iron doors, shaken sword and scepter from the hands of kings, and cast up tyrants like driftwood. In such moments of awful opportunity, the amorphous masses too often know neither what to do nor how to do it. Frenzied with the rage of irrational revenge, blinded with the tears of a desperate hope, crazed with a medley of impossible schemes, they have reveled in an orgy of misery and folly or even of fire and blood, only

to lapse into the hands of dictators masked or red handed, as cruel and tyrannical as those of old.

Time out of mind the people have groped their way blindfolded through the maze of life. Century after century they have deceived themselves and suffered themselves to be deceived. Prejudice, superstition, tradition, custom, have caused them to vex themselves with an endless variety of imaginary ills. These have caused men to inhabit the invisible world with innumerable specters of their own morbid fancy — ghosts, goblins, demons, vengeful gods, and the angered spirits of the dead — until life has become to them a nightmare of fear. Not content with filling the present existence with gratuitous fears, they have laid upon themselves an eternity of torments which no constitution could endure. To the sufferings of disease they have added the tortures of medicine men, sorcerers, quacks, and frauds. As if that were not enough, they have punished themselves with whips, knives, cold, hunger, nakedness, and all sorts of ingenious and horrible instruments for purposes of religious penance, or warlike rivalry and show. For superstitious reasons they have refused to kill venomous reptiles, man-eating beasts, disease bacteria, and commercialized vices. Criminals have been tortured in unbelievable ways, to read about which makes the blood run cold; and all to no avail. Women have been induced almost everywhere and always to submit without protest to intolerable sufferings, indignities, humiliations, deprivations, and slavery to "nature." As a rule society stupidly fails to recognize either its benefactors or its destroyers. Military conquerors, high financiers, whisky magnates, political bosses, it often highly honors and richly rewards. Its prophets and emancipators, its

saints and saviors, it often poisons, burns, or crucifies. Caste-laden, custom-harnessed, and vice-lamed, the masses plod the weary road of their little once, with the ring of ignorance in their nose and the goad of poverty at their flank. For all of which interference with rational social selection, universal enlightenment is the only cure.

Sociologists regard communication and discussion as the chief means of social selection. Communication presents new material to public attention; discussion winnows it. The more systematically new material is presented, and the more intelligently it is discussed, the more effective the process will be. But the high schools and colleges are the most available means for securing this enlightenment and discussion. In the course of public discussion, the truth, Professor Cooley says, is first suggested by the few, and then recognized as such by the many. He assumes that the masses possess "the general capacity for recognition" of the "one mind in the right." He takes it for granted that "the many have the sense to adopt . . . the finer judgments of the few." But here our Homer nods, alas, for it is not possible to make this assumption too complacently. In reality the masses are commonly too ignorant to recognize the truth when the few present it to them. They first have to be taught by the few, under circumstances that can render the teaching both systematic, extensive, and effective. As yet the eyes of democracy see that principle only "as trees walking"; they still need another anointing.

* * * * * * *

Modern democracy is giving birth to an absolutely new idea under the sun, namely, that progress can be achieved

by the liberal education of the masses. No modern invention was more foreign to the ancient mind. Egypt, Babylonia, and Rome reposed their faith in vast organized force; the Hebrews in a religious type of righteousness; Greece, in the contributions of geniuses to the intellectual and æsthetic treasures of the race. We moderns put our trust in material achievement. Each of these ideas has made its contribution, but neither of them alone is sufficient; nor yet all of them together. One thing more is needful, namely, universal participation in the whole social heritage. For a little over a century society has felt the premonitory pains of this new idea. Only a century, but the vital ordeal is yet to come! Let us prepare for this child of the twentieth century!

CHAPTER XXVI

FINANCING EDUCATION IN THE NEW RÉGIME

If the schools are to reform the republic the republic must first reform the taxes. The expansion of education which the new régime is to require will necessitate an expenditure of funds quite impossible to the old tax system. For many communities the limits have been reached already. But the old tax system is a hang-over from the old industrial régime that has passed away. It fails utterly to tap the resources of modern, corporate, machinofacture industry, which are abundantly ample to all the needs of the new education if we only had fiscal means of getting at them. There is no phase of educational planning to which educational leaders, and, indeed, teachers in general, should now be giving more acute and critical attention, therefore, than to the problem of taxation, especially in view of the fact that that new public opinion upon which the new tax system waits will depend largely upon the work of educators themselves. The social science courses of the high school are the entering wedges of the readjustment. To the elaboration of these considerations a chapter may well be devoted.

If the argument of the previous chapters is sound in the main, it follows that unprecedented, indeed revolutionary, extensions of education will prove necessary if the schools are to parallel the new technological, machinofacture, democratic régime into which social evolution is so rapidly

carrying us. Compulsory school attendance will have to be advanced to the later 'teens, which will mean a secondary schooling very different from that of the traditional sort. Plants and equipments will have to be greatly enlarged and very decidedly differentiated. Moreover, if almost all adolescents are to be kept in school many of them will have to be furnished not only with free textbooks, but also with a noon meal and a school uniform at public expense. If we are to conscript recruits for the army of intellectual defense, we shall have to equip them like conscripts. Such extension of educational facilities will fail unless we can produce a teaching staff trained and salaried to a very much higher level of efficiency and dignity then we are now accustomed to. Vocational training will have to be universalized and elaborated to parallel all the vocational processes. Numerous new professions will acquire technical schools in connection with the universities. Scholarships and fellowships will have to be made available if higher education is to be open to capable persons irrespective of their economic status. And these educational advantages will have to be made accessible to all without regard to the class from which they come or the section in which they reside. The expenditure this will require can seem no more impossible to us now than our present expenditures would have seemed to our forbears of a century ago.

It needs to be clearly discerned by all concerned that this can never be accomplished, nor even approximated, without a fundamental reconstruction of our entire fiscal philosophy and a complete reorganization of our tax system. The old system cannot equalize educational opportunities for different localities; it cannot furnish sufficient offerings; it

cannot even try seriously to do so without serious injustices to certain classes of taxpayers; it cannot even distribute the tax burden with equity.

The gross and amazing inequality of educational offerings, to which the old system of school support has given rise in the United States, has recently been set forth by Professor F. H. Swift with a most prodigious array of data. A few brief quotations from his voluminous writings must suffice to convey the impression. He specifies [1] one southern state in which, in 1918, the maximum annual average county expenditure per white pupil in attendance was $48.06, while the minimum was $15.92. The maximum average annual county expenditure per negro pupil in attendance in that state was $12.75; while the minimum was $1.36. In a Rocky Mountain state in 1915 the annual expenditure per child enrolled varied from $77 in one of the counties to $21 in another. In the year 1918 the school term in two counties of a north central state averaged nine months, while in another county of the same state it averaged only six and six tenths months. The average annual salaries of all teachers varied from $1340 in the first of these counties to $308 in the last mentioned. One county of the same state spent an annual average of $36.45 per pupil enrolled in one-room schools, while another county of the same state spent $6.50. In that state the average annual expenditure per high school pupil varied from $282.42 to $20.24. These are samples of the inequalities to be found within states themselves. As between states the average annual expenditure per child ranged from $13.13 to $96.44. From such figures the gross inequalities of educational facilities in the United

[1] *School Board Journal*, May, 1920. The original specifies names of states and counties.

States are evident. Social homogeneity can never be achieved under such conditions!

Now the significant fact in connection with such figures is that where the tax rate is the highest there the schools are often the most inadequate. In many communities and states the general property tax locally administered is incapable of producing adequate revenue. In many farming regions rural school consolidation has become a real burden to the farmers because the tax rate is seriously depreciating land values. This can mean nothing else than that local support will have to be much more generously supplemented by state aid if educational opportunities are to be equalized within any given state. And the inequalities among states arising from similar causes will similarly have to be equalized through Federal aid. Horace Mann's principle that the wealth of the whole community must be put at the disposal of the community as a whole, for the adequate education of all the members of the community, must now be pushed to its logical conclusions in practice. The wealth of the entire Nation will have to be put at the disposal of the Nation for the support of equal educational advantages for all the people throughout the Nation.

Not only does the old general property tax fail of educational equality, but it also fails of fiscal equity under the conditions of the new economic régime. In no phase of life has the great shift from handicraft to machinofacture industry had profounder effects than upon our tax system. The reason is in the change that it has caused in industrial organization. The shift has been from production for use or barter to production chiefly for the markets. Our modern system is a system of exchange out of all comparison with

the old system. The reasons for this shift are to be found in that division of labor to which the new technique has given rise, and in the modern methods of transportation and communication. And the fruitage of exchange is the modern profits system, which is incomparably more pervasive and potent than it was a century ago. Nowadays the business man's remuneration is in what profits his accountant can discover, and the value of property depends ultimately upon the profits it will produce. The result is that there may be no very close correlation between the construction or replacement cost of a corporation's property and the market value of its stocks and bonds. All of which means that profits rather than visible property are, increasingly, the juster basis of assessments, especially in the case of the corporations.

And this principle is clearly recognized in the trend of modern taxation. Income and excess-profits taxes are coming into general use and appreciation in all civilized countries, and that with the approval of economists and tax experts. Commenting on steeply graduated income taxes Professor Seligman [1] has this to say:

> The American scale is an eloquent testimony to the fact not only that large fortunes are far more numerous here than abroad, but also that there is a greater appreciation of the democratic principles of fiscal justice. For the overwhelming trend of modern opinion is clearly in the direction of applying to excessive fortunes the principle of faculty or ability to pay.

Propaganda against graduated income and excess-profits taxes is one of the surest indications of their effectiveness. The public is sedulously indoctrinated with the misconception that income and profits taxes, like indirect taxes, are shifted to the ultimate consumer — which is not the case

[1] *Essays in Taxation*, 1921, p. 695.

to any appreciable degree. That deceptive doctrine is readily believed because it has long been recognized that the old fashioned types of indirect taxes were so shifted. The public has not yet learned to discriminate. Income and profits taxes are *different* from internal revenue and tariff taxes in that they are *not* shifted to any important degree — as any one may learn by reading after the tax experts,[1] or as any one can see at a glance. A man's (or a corporation's) income for this year is not affected by the fact that part of his last year's income is taken away from him by an automobile accident, a wedding in the family, or the tax collector; since his competitor will not, on any account, allow him to add the expense to the prices of his goods and services. In the case of monopolies the consumer is protected by the law of monopoly price.[2] The public is told that such taxes are shifted because shifted is precisely what they are not.

Along with graduated income and excess-profits taxes the new estate and inheritance taxes are a promising fiscal instrument of modern democracy. Inheritance rights are made and maintained by the government, without which there could be no such thing as inheritance. Clearly, then, government may modify inheritance rights in the interest of all the people. And changing social conditions may conceivably change the function of inheritance quite radically. If the state guarantees one's children and grandchildren medical care, education, vocational preparation, recreational facilities, fair rules for the industrial race of life, and old-age insurance, one may depart this life in peace. If democ-

[1] See "Tax Reduction and Tax Exemption," by E. R. A. Seligman, in *The North American Review* for April, 1924.

[2] See *Monopolies and Trusts*, R. T. Ely.

racy has transferred responsibility for education from family to state, why not also the responsibility for further guaranteeing the new generation a good start and a fair chance in life? So much as this, democracy is under bonds to guarantee *to all* alike, but at present it does not do this, just because inheritance tends, under changing conditions, to degenerate into a system of special privilege for the endowment of luxury, idleness, and waste on the part of the few. If opportunity for all youths is to be socially guaranteed, private privilege for a few becomes glaringly inconsistent, especially now that some few fortunes are so irrationally large. Private inheritance of much property seems to be more in harmony with the ideals of the old stratified societies than with the ideals of democracy. Inheritance taxation may well be vastly extended, therefore, and the proceeds invested in a rational program of education, for the endowment of universal opportunity. This is a principle to which Andrew Carnegie [1] unequivocally committed himself.

A second aspect of the great shift which has affected everything, including taxes, is the transition from small, local, individually owned shops, to great, colossal concerns of nation-wide scope. Numerous industries which will occur to the reader's mind are organized in this way. No matter where a farmer resides he can buy implements from the International Harvester Company; Mr. Ford's services are available everywhere at the hands of his own organization; and the national consolidation of the baking industry has recently been of headline interest in the newspapers. This trend toward consolidation has been carried to lengths of which the typical citizen is hardly aware. The facts are

[1] "Gospel of Wealth," and *North American Review*, Vol. 148, p. 695.

trade secrets that the public will not know until it sets up legal means of finding out. A dozen years ago there was a good deal of popular talk about "the money trust." The talk was mostly pooh-poohed out of countenance, so that the public does not generally know that a commission was appointed by Congress to investigate, nor that that commission's findings were afterwards summarized by Justice Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court in a little book entitled *Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It.* The concentration revealed in that book is amazing. It showed that numerous banking, railroad, and industrial corporations were focused in two related New York banks. The members of one great financial concern held seventy-two directorates in 471 of the largest corporations in the country. That was a dozen years or more ago, and any observant person must realize that such concentration has been growing ever since, and especially during the past four or five years — despite the "water" that has been manufactured for distribution to employees and the middle-class public. Unquestionably modern industry is a centralized empire, dominated by a small oligarchy. And if this industrial feudalism toward which the present trends are carrying us is to be headed off, taxation must be used to do it. The new types of Federal taxation are moves in that direction; and the propaganda against them arises from the fact that they are effective and successful. A sheep before her shearers may be dumb — but not a pig! Persistent loud squealing suggest that things are not to his liking. Educators should see to it that the rising generation is not deceived thereby.

Authorities like H. C. Adams[1] and W. M. Daniels[2] frankly

[1] *Public Debts*, p. 8.

[2] *Public Finance*, p. 11.

assert that the security of public debts, and constitutionalism itself, "originated and consist in the political power of the propertied classes." This explains the kinds of taxation that were chiefly employed by the Federal Government from the Civil War until quite recently. These were levied chiefly upon the poor and operated indirectly to the advantage of the rich. At the time this was not generally understood by the public; nor is it to this very day. Obviously, the internal revenue on alcoholic beverages and tobacco was paid by the ultimate consumer. Since the great bulk of tobacco and alcohol was consumed by the relatively poor, obviously again it was the poor man who paid this tax. More accurately, it was the poor man's family, especially in the case of alcohol. It literally took shoes from the feet and bread from the mouths of helpless children. The tax was tolerated on the myth that it discouraged the use of alcohol. The facts were the exact opposite. Historic statistics show that consumption did not fall with the rise of the tax, nor rise with its fall. Common sense might have foreseen as much, since the appetite is a depraved habit. The tax fattened the liquor interests, gave them a profit on the tax as well as on their stock, and it fortified their business against popular execration. Besides the revenue collector was a convenient exterminator of competition, the "whisky trust" having been organized as early as 1887.

It is easy for anybody to see that a protective tariff on the necessities of life puts the burden on the consumers, the great mass of whom, of course, are relatively poor. But how the protective tariff helped at the same time to cause a serious concentration of wealth, very few citizens seem to understand. The tariff on steel may serve as an example.

British steel imported here had to pay the tax. But American steel, because protected from foreign competition, sold for an extra profit above the cost of production. In other words, the consumer paid a virtual tax on American steel, but the tax went to the treasury of the steel manufacturer. The tariff enabled the steel industry as well as the government actually to tax the consumer. This privilege held out to the steel manufacturers prospects of fabulous profits if only competition among themselves could be eliminated; which was one of the incentives which led to the organization in 1901 of the United States Steel Corporation.[1] It is in this sense that the tariff was the mother of trusts. But of this tax the consumer was not conscious, since it was so indirect. He paid it when he bought commodities that had come in steel cars over steel rails and steel bridges.

Moreover, the profits that accrued to the steel trust in this way were in themselves the least serious phase of the whole matter. Their effect on the creation and sale of capital stock was the important feature. The United States Steel Corporation was organized in 1901 with a capitalization of more than a billion and a quarter. Approximately half of this was "water," and had no value at all. An important part of its prospect of becoming valuable was based on the hope of quasi-monopolistic profits. The tariff helped to make such profits possible. And the hope was realized. The profits gave the stock value, and little by little the "water," that is the common stock, rose to par. In this way fully half a billion dollars' worth of property was generated. Privilege thus became property! And Professor Ely [2]

[1] See Meade's *Trust Finance* (1903), pp. 126, 349.
[2] *Monopolies and Trusts*, p. 254.

wrote in 1899: "A very brief period, beginning with the Civil War, — a period probably not exceeding twenty-five years, — is very largely responsible for the excessive centralization of wealth in this country, and for many evils which it will take more than one generation to overcome." And in a footnote he explains that he "has in mind among other things the character of taxation." From these considerations it is safe to say, thirty years later, that such taxes are rightly being abandoned, and the newer forms substituted in their stead — gradually, and with temporary setbacks in reactionary administrations.

This trend indicates not merely an attempt "to make the legal facts conform with the economic facts," but, more than that, it indicates a shift in the underlying philosophy of taxation. It still further indicates a shift in the control of taxation from the "propertied classes" to the rank and file of the common people; and, therefore, a shift in the control of government and the conditions of life. This is one of the most fundamental necessities in that great economic and social readjustment to which reference has so often been made. Taxation is one of the chief means by which the most crucial problems of that transition can be solved. By taxation, the centralization of wealth and power can be rectified, in part at least; and equitable opportunities kept open to the people. In the past taxation has ostensibly had one function only, namely, to keep the government in necessary funds. Actually, it has been an important factor in the concentration of wealth. Now, if taxation can function to concentrate wealth, it can be deliberately employed to redistribute wealth. Taxation should be used to lop the tops off from tall fortunes, thus getting lumber to build lad-

ders of democratic opportunity for the poor and ignorant. Democratic taxation will not be frightened about killing the the goose that lays the golden eggs. Instead, it will cook the eggs that hatch the gilded geese; and out of them serve up an omelette of opportunity to the children of poverty and ignorance. Not otherwise will there ever be any real democracy. Such a fiscal policy has never undermined a nation, as we are so often frightened into believing, while letting the poor man pay the taxes often has.

There are no facts of more vital relevance to fiscal policy in a democracy than the statistics of incomes. If the tallest fortunes are only a little taller than the common run, then they should not attract the woodman's ax; but if they are inordinately tall, the case is different! If corporate earnings run usually around the conventional six per cent, there is no occasion for a hue and cry; but if they run up to fifteen or twenty per cent on the average, they have less claim on public clemency. Certain facts are relevant, therefore, to the present argument.

On page 128, in *The Income of the United States,* by the Bureau of Economic Research (copyrighted, 1921), is a chart on the distribution of income. Incomes up to $4000 are shown on the base line, about a quarter of an inch being alloted to each $200 interval, ascending from left to right. The curve humps conspicuously to the left, the maximum elevation being for the three million persons who received incomes between $900 and $1000. This means (as stated in Table 26, page 134) that 38.74 per cent of income getters had incomes of $1000 or less; and that at a time when $1386 was estimated as the minimum-of-subsistence level for a family of five. For lack of space on the page at the

right the chart does not show incomes above $4000; but if it did, its five-inch base line would have to be extended over four hundred feet to the right to provide for the largest incomes, as shown in the accompanying table. Table 26 indicates that over one fifth of the national income is *not* shown on the chart, since over one fifth of the national income goes to persons receiving over $4000 — who are only 3.39 per cent of all income getters, however. It appears from another table that 7442 persons had incomes of over $100,000, their incomes totaling $1,779,000,000. One hundred and fifty-two persons had incomes averaging about two millions each. This is a book with which every school administrator should be familiar, as it contains facts bearing on the formulation of just educational policies.

The United States Treasury Department publishes an annual report entitled *Statistics of Incomes*, which ought also to be in the library of every school administrator. For the years 1919, 1920, and 1921, these volumes contained tables showing not only the net income of corporations reporting income, but also the percentage which that net income was of the invested capital of those corporations. According to those tables the manufacturing corporations reporting income earned 19.89 per cent net on their invested capital in 1919, 14.56 per cent in 1920, and 13.04 per cent in 1921. Of manufacturing corporations the following industries showed the following percentages for the same years respectively: food products, 24.24, 12.89, 16.31; textiles, 27.87, 17.77, 17.51; leather and leather products, 30.28, 14.74, 16.84; lumber and wood products, 16.95, 17.94, 13.48; printing and publishing, 19.76, 22.11, 20.78; and so on. For corporations engaged in trade the corresponding per-

centages were 19.85, 15.72, and 15.80. For construction they were 25.59, 17.85, and 16.14. For steam railroads they were only 4.78, 4.87, and 6.08. For banks of various kinds they ranged: 6.72 to 13.93, 7.14 to 11.64 and 8.74 to 10.52. For all corporations reporting income the net income was 14.07 per cent of their invested capital in 1919, 11.28 per cent in 1920, and 11.14 per cent in 1921. The reports subsequent to 1921 contain no such tables, total dividend payments being substituted for percentages on investment. At the present writing (1927) the data available do not show such high percentages; but that is due, not to decreased profits, but to increased capitalization. And this increased capitalization is often misleading at that, since it very often represents, not increased investments, but stock dividends that have been issued for the very purpose of evading the income tax. As a result it is now possible for a business concern to conceal large returns on its actual investments behind a capitalization that has been artificially inflated by its recent profits.

The total income of corporations reporting incomes has been as follows: for 1916: $8,766,000,000; for 1917: $10,730,000,000; for 1918: $8,361,000,000; for 1919: $9,411,000,000; for 1920: $7,902,000,000; for 1921: $4,336,000,000; for 1922: $6,963,000,000; for 1923: $8,321,000,000; for 1924: $7,586,000,000; and for 1925: $9,500,000,000 (estimated). Figures for subsequent dates are not available at the present writing, but it will be observed that 1920 and 1921, especially the latter, were depression years. Times have been growing steadily better ever since. According to a current newspaper item[1] the

[1] *Minneapolis Journal*, March 16, 1926, editorial.

net operating income of railroads, for example, has increased from $58,000,000 in 1920 to $1,135,000,000 in 1925.

It must have been such data as these which Professor Seligman [1] had in mind when he wrote:

> While it is true that the educational budget has increased more rapidly than the population, it is not true that it has increased more rapidly than the wealth of the community. On the contrary, it may be affirmed with little fear of contradiction that, from the economist's point of view, the growth of prosperity in the United States as a whole has been so enormous as to make the proportion of educational expenditures to the real wealth of the community actually smaller than it was in past decades.

Now the meaning of all this for taxation is that the old-fashioned, visible property tax, locally assessed and administered, is as much out of date as top buggies and ox-carts.[2] It is essentially ineffective and unjust. The great, nation-wide corporations do business everywhere; but they assemble their incomes only at the financial centers. For purposes of income getting they reach into every crossroads and country lane in every state; but for the objectives of the taxgatherer their incomes are accessible only at the great financial centers. Every rural township in the country in which automobiles are driven contributes to the profits of the gasoline companies; every township that raises wheat pays tribute to the railroads, even though their tracks do not cross its territory; every village and farmhouse that is lighted with electricity drops nickels into the slots of the great power companies; every remote village that uses aluminum utensils deserves a contribution to its schools from the aluminum manufacturers; and every township in which credit is used

[1] Quoted by F. H. Swift in United States Bureau of Education, Bulletin, 1923, No. 47, p. 32.

[2] Cf. Professor Seligman's address before the National Education Association at Boston in 1922, *Addresses and Proceedings of the National Education Association*, p. 1386 ff.

pays its interest through the local credit agencies to the great Wall Street banks. But the township assessor has no means of levying taxes on such great business organizations.

Corporations that are national in their scope and organization can therefore be successfully taxed on the basis of their net profits at their central offices only. It is for this reason that the Federal Government is obviously the only effective fiscal agency when it comes to the great corporations. How can any state effectively tax a corporation's profits if its offices are in New York City? Not even New York State can do it, because if New York is too drastic the offices will move across to New Jersey. Only Washington can do it. It would violate the principles of equity for the income tax of a citizen like Mr. Ford to go solely to the state of Michigan because his factory, offices, and residence happen to be in that state. His profits come from everywhere! Says Professor Seligman:[1]

> So far as the corporation tax and the income tax are concerned, the almost insuperable obstacles to overcoming the difficulties of interstate conflicts of tax jurisdiction may be removed by a national supervision of the taxes imposed by the states, or by some scheme whereby the taxes in question will become national, so far as the methods of assessment are concerned, even though the proceeds may be apportioned in whole or in part to the separate commonwealths. In some way or other *the legal facts must be made to conform to the economic facts.*

Propaganda against such taxation at the hands of the Federal Government may well be accounted for by the very facts which it is intended to conceal. We hear a great deal nowadays about "centralization," as if it were a very bad thing. Such talk too often presents the sinister appearance of having been set going as defense propaganda

[1] *Essays in Taxation*, p. 345.

upon the part of centralized industry. "Centralization" of government is opposed by industry precisely because industry *is* centralized. The great corporations desire to escape such taxation and regulation as the real interests and safe future of democracy require. Since the Federal Government is the only agency that is really competent to tax and regulate them, they are naturally loud in their demand to be taxed and regulated by the states instead. But if state rights means the right of the state to make a failure of taxing and regulating the great corporations, then it turns out that the states' real right is the right to delegate that function to the Federal Government. It cannot be too often repeated that Washington impotent means Wall Street sovereign. And with Wall Street sovereign our schools will be in jeopardy, since the only source of their adequate support is the unresponsive corporations, and the only competent fiscal agency in the case is the Federal Government. And from all these statistics and economic and political principles it seems to follow obviously that the support of education in the United States must come in very much larger proportions from Federal aid. By this means alone can educational opportunities be rendered adequate.

But the matter lies very much deeper than a mere educational policy. For here, as everywhere, the educational policy is the guiding policy of civilization. Education is the telic factor in democratic society, as this book has so often insisted; and the schoolmasters are running not merely the school, but the world. And in this matter of taxation we are where the roads fork, leading to a successful democracy on the one hand, but to an industrial feudalism and dark ages ahead, if we take the other way. For the ultimate des-

tiny of a great machinofacture civilization depends upon what use it makes of its surplus. And in this connection it should be noted that the possibility of the expansion of industry is limited, depending upon the ability of the markets to absorb the products. Surplus that cannot be reinvested in the expansion of industry itself must go either into the standard of living (including the education) of the masses, or else into something else. At present our surplus seems to be going into foreign loans and investments at the rate of about a billion and three-quarters annually.[1] In 1926 American investors were estimated[2] to have about twelve billions abroad, in addition to an approximately equal amount of government loans. As long ago as 1911 Americans were estimated[3] to own nearly one third of all the property in Mexico. They probably owned from one fourth to one half of the property in Cuba in 1926.[4] In every part of the world American investors are represented.[5]

These foreign loans and investments represent our surplus production over and above consumption — goods produced here, but consumed elsewhere. Had the laboring class and the farming class received larger shares of the total incomes, the surplus for foreign investment would have been less. Nor can these investments ever come home again — even the dividends on them — except as the purchasing power of these two classes increases. Foreign investments boil down, therefore, not to sources of income to be consumed at home by the people, but to *power* abroad — to the economic and political power abroad of our great American financiers.

[1] See the report of the Secretary of Commerce (Mr. Herbert Hoover) for the fiscal year ending July 1, 1926.

[2] See *American Foreign Investments* (1926) by Robert W. Dunn.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 90. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 119 ff. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 57 ff.

That means "entangling alliances" for our government. It means propaganda for military interference, as in the case of Mexico. Eventually, it means war. It would be infinitely better for the future of our civilization to invest our surplus — part of it, at least — in the education of our citizenry, in raising the standards of living of our laboring classes, and in putting agriculture on a basis of equitable prosperity. Our industrial system is out of balance, to the pecuniary advantage of the industrial, commercial, and financial investors — a relatively small oligarchy. That bad balance means three things eventually: the depression of agriculture, a low standard of living for the masses, and provocatives of war abroad. The three together mean, if indefinitely continued, the ultimate collapse of civilization.

There may be several devices by which this bad balance of economic society can be rectified, but the newer forms of Federal taxation are certainly among the most promising. And in so far as the advantages of the industrial class are based upon natural monopoly — a question that cannot be answered without opening the books of the corporations to the public — taxation is the only remedy. Richard T. Ely made that clear a generation ago, in his book on *Monopolies and Trusts*. To the extent that the corporations are quasi-monopolistic are they the natural tax collectors of modern society, it remaining only for the public to see that their collections are "covered into the treasury." And from the treasury they can be returned to the people in the form of public improvements and in the form of social services, such as health conservation, recreational facilities, necessary charities, and above all education, including vocational training. By these means taxation can salvage civilization.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION OF EDUCATORS

One of the most disconcerting aspects of life and history is the fact that when persons or groups are most zealously confident of making contributions to human welfare, it often turns out afterwards that they have done at least as much harm as good. How history does abound in illustrations; and who, past middle age, can look back over his own life without finding painful examples? And, due to the social psychology of crowds and publics, the most foolish and even destructive fads may pass current for a whole generation as the very means of social salvation. As we have seen, the profession and practice of education have not been immune from such contagious aberrations of the collective intellect. And it is just possible that the recent movement for the scientizing of education deserves less confidence than it is now enjoying among educators. It may develop that there are things in earth or heaven that are being overlooked in the philosophy of this movement. These remarks may serve to introduce the unpleasant task of this chapter, namely, to point out the fly in the ointment. No one can doubt, of course, that it is a highly creditable aspiration to reduce educational procedure to a science. Nevertheless the professional education of educators, as it has developed in the United States during the past twenty-five years, is based upon a false analogy. The movement is, therefore, uni-

lateral; and, in spite of its good points, is likely to produce some highly unfavorable consequences. Indeed, the ultimate outcome toward which this movement would lead, if carried far enough, is nothing less than the catastrophe of H. G. Wells's famous epigram.

Before the reader can be expected, however, to respond to any such lugubrious alarm he must be convinced, of course, that there really is a false analogy underlying the present trends in the professional education of educators. To the ungrateful task, therefore, of trying to show that our idol's feet are after all but gilded clay the argument must now direct itself.

As usual the fallacy is in the major premise; which, as so often happens, has been derived without critical scrutiny from the popular mythologies. It is the now prevalent fetish of specialization. The proposition of the major premise is this: If education is to establish itself as a profession on a par with the other professions, it must, like the other professions, build up a body of exact scientific knowledge in its own special field. The minor premise is that, corresponding to medicine's special field of materia medica, anatomy, and physiology, and to the law's specialty of law, precedents, and court procedure, and to engineering's special application of the physical sciences, is the educator's special technology of teaching, classroom management, and school administration in its various phases. The conclusion is that education must scientize that specialty and build up a body of exact knowledge comparable with the scientific stock-in-trade of the other professions. Than which nothing could seem more obvious! That this conclusion is in reality as fallacious as it seems obvious, it is our present task to show.

Prerequisite to all scientific work is an accurate and adequate analysis of the concepts involved. Unless this analysis is well and sufficiently done the thinker is in danger of false analogies and misleading associations, due to treating unlike entities as if they were alike. And this is exactly what has happened in the present instance. The major premise is a misleading half truth because of this fallacy. The concept that requires analysis in this case is that of *the special field* by which each profession is characterized. Upon such analysis it turns out that each profession has a major *and a minor* specialty. Its major specialty is that body of scientific knowledge which it is the business of the profession to apply; its minor specialty is the scientized technique of applying that knowledge. The major specialty of the medical profession, for example, includes anatomy, physiology, and materia medica; its minor specialty, the technique of conducting diagnoses, managing clinics, and administering hospitals. The major specialty of the legal profession includes the law and court precedents; its minor specialty, the technique of legal procedure. The major specialty of engineering includes the sciences applied in the profession; its minor specialty, the technique of applying them. Similarly, the major specialty of the educator's profession is — but what it is we shall try to make clear shortly; its minor specialty is the technique of managing schools and administering systems. What the educators have done is to equate the *minor* specialty of their own profession with the *total* specialty of the other professions. They have mistaken a part for the whole, and a minor part at that; with the result that the major part they have overlooked entirely — except as their common sense is saner than their theory.

Let it be admitted at once that this charge is not leveled against the training of classroom teachers. They are taught a major specialty, namely, the subject matter they are to teach, and a minor specialty, namely, the technique of instruction and classroom management. But against the prevalent training for school administration it is leveled. To be sure, the training even of school administrators is never quite monopolized by the science of technique. They are supposed to have had subject matter courses on the lower levels; also, they are supposed to do some general reading; and occasionally they are permitted even a graduate minor in some non-technical subject matter. But, in spite of these qualifications, the tendency is to emphasize technique. On the undergraduate level the candidate is usually expected to major in school administration and minor in, say, educational psychology. On the graduate levels pressure is very definitely and avowedly brought to bear by the policy itself of the teachers' colleges to specialize in the science of education, quite exclusive of subject matter courses of a mere cultural value, so called. And this tendency is reacting upon the training even of classroom teachers themselves. There is increasing emphasis on so-called professional courses and specialized curricula, to the relative neglect of general subject matter.

The preceding paragraph has already implied, albeit somewhat inadvertently, what the school administrator's major specialty should be. It should be a general familiarity in all the principal fields of human knowledge. In short, the educator's specialty is not a specialized field at all, but as general as the whole range of human knowledge. And that is precisely why educators have overlooked it as their spe-

cialty. They have gone astray on the fetish of specialization, which is a dogma from the popular mythology of our day; whereas education is the one profession to which the dogma does not apply — except in minor part. The educator's profession is not like other professions, but different! Whereas each of the others does have for its major stock-in-trade a body of specialized knowledge in a special field, his profession has for its major stock-in-trade a body of knowledge as general as it can possibly be made. Where others specialize he must sedulously avoid specialization. This is our thesis.

Before we proceed to the philosophy underlying this unorthodox position let us pause to forestall a difficulty that must already have obtruded itself upon the reader's mind. The demand seems impossible, and hence preposterous. But it is not so impossible as it seems; because the educator's outline acquaintance with encyclopedic knowledge is of a very different sort than the specialist's knowledge in each respective field. For there are two very different kinds of knowledge; and they need to be sharply distinguished in this plea for comprehensive general enlightenment upon the part of educators. The one is such knowledge of a thing as will enable one to *make* it; the other is such knowledge of a thing as will enable one to *use* it. Knowledge for production and knowledge for consumption, to use the terminology of economics. One can use an automobile without being able to make, or even to repair, one. One can enjoy good music without being able to play a single instrument or compose a single aria. To be an accountant is a very different thing than to know enough about accountancy to know when and how to employ one. The educator needs

the kind of knowledge in all fields that will enable him to know what knowledge the people need to use in order to live well, individually and socially; for he must organize a curriculum that will equip them with that knowledge. The educator will therefore study the natural sciences, the fine arts, and the new humanities in a very different way than will the prospective specialists in these several fields. He will study them as they should be taught in academic colleges, rather than as they should be taught in professional schools. It is a large order, but it is not impossible.

But of all things, educators must not shy away from such a professional equipment because it is difficult. The quest for something easy has done education quite enough harm already; for almost all the professional fads of the past fifty years have arisen chiefly out of the desire to find simple solutions for problems that were not simple at all; some quick and easy way of doing things that were really very complicated and difficult. There is no better illustration of this than the Herbartian lesson plan that was so universally and insistently in vogue until a decade ago. It imposed the same simple rule upon all kinds of lessons without regard to what the subject matter was. Other similar illustrations nearer to date might easily be found. The quest must be abandoned; for there is no easy way. Similarly, for educational administration, there is no substitute for a general education so liberal and extended as to seem almost impossible. Perhaps a partial solution can be found in the differentiation of certain specialized technical functions, to be performed by experts whom the school board might retain more or less permanently. But for the general administrative responsibility a liberal general education is the last

thing to be slighted by a prospective superintendent. No undergraduate curriculum of general cultural subjects is likely to provide more than a foundation. Programs of graduate study in education should, therefore, provide liberally for subject matter courses — except, perhaps, in the training of highly specialized technicians who never expect to become principals, superintendents, or other general administrators. But educational administration will never become thoroughly professionalized until it involves a training at least as long and difficult as that of medicine, however different it may be from the standpoint of specialization.

But let us return to the main line of the argument, namely, to the philosophy underlying our thesis. We may begin by pointing out that the school administrator's work may be roughly analyzed into two major parts: executive details, and the formulation of policy. The first is mere school shopkeeping; the second is educational statesmanship. The first includes supervision of instruction and discipline, school accounting both instructional and financial, selection of teachers, budget making, publicity, and the like. The second involves deciding what is to be taught, to whom, and by what equipments and arrangements. It involves, in other words, the progressive reorganization of the curriculum and of the facilities for presenting the same. In his first capacity as school shopkeeper the educational administrator is operating the school *as it now is;* in his second capacity as educational statesman he is making the school over into *what it ought to become.* In the one function he is merely running the *school* of to-day; in the other he is running the *world* of to-morrow. The second, as this book has tried to show, is by far the most important function of edu-

cation in the present great transition, and one for which the common run of educators seem to have a very vague, schematic sense of their responsibility. To perform the first function the educator needs the minor specialty of his profession — the science of school administration. But to perform the second function he requires that major specialty of his profession which turns out to be, not special at all, but the broadest and most liberal enlightenment possible. For this second function any narrow specialization in mere technology is more likely than not to prove a disqualification in the end.

But let us consider somewhat more in detail what it is which constitutes the function of educational statesmanship, and for which educational administrators ought to be prepared by their professional training. What is involved in the formulation of those larger policies of education by which the school is to perform its telic function in such an age as ours? In answering this question we may revert to the principle of parallelism set forth in an early chapter of this book. The school program must parallel the civilization in which it is to function. The telic function of education implies that the school program must anticipate the civilization as it ought to be becoming. That is, the curriculum must furnish the rising generation with the knowledge they are actually going to need in operating the social life of the future, and operating it on a higher and better level than the social life of the present. The educator's task is analogous to that of a doctor: the social life is his patient; the curriculum is his prescription. From which it follows that the educator must know the social life, its parts and their relationships, its trends, and its unitary totality. He must also know the

materials out of which a school program may be made. Just to the degree that the modern educator lacks this general knowledge of the world itself and of all available curricular materials is he unfit for the responsibilities imposed upon him.

The scope of the educational administrator's responsibility may be made somewhat clearer yet by reverting to certain other principles set forth earlier in the book. It was asserted that the institutions of society are the objectives of education. Our list will be recalled: the family, the local community, the state, the industries, the church, the school, the press, the standard of living, the customary recreations, the health-preserving institutions, and miscellaneous others. Now it is the function of the schools to prepare young people for satisfactory participation in each and every one of these. From this it follows that the educator must know the institutions of society. He must be familiar with their history and structure, discern their functions, understand their present shortcomings together with the reasons for the same, and know wherein the behavior of individuals ought to be modified in order that those functions may be more effectively performed. If he does not possess this comprehensive knowledge of the institutions, for which his school program is to prepare the young, he is no more fit for his responsibilities than is a doctor who, through ignorance of anatomy, physiology, and pathology, is unprepared to diagnose his cases and prescribe for them. And there is no slide rule technique in either case that will serve as a substitute for adequate information. No training in educational shopkeeping, however scientific or detailed, can take the place of this comprehensive knowledge of the social institutions.

Or, again, we may recall that the curriculum is composed out of those great intellectual resources which social evolution has accumulated, and by the use of which the social life and institutions are operated. The list was: language, vocational techniques, recreational techniques, the natural sciences, the fine arts, and the new humanities, including all the biological, mental, and social sciences. All this vast body of knowledge is to be epitomized in a balanced curriculum. From this it follows that the modern educational administrator must be acquainted with all these fields of knowledge, and especially with their practical application to individual and social life. These are his materia medica; out of them he must organize a prescription that will enable the oncoming generation not only to participate successfully in the civilization of the future, but also to make it increasingly successful by the kind of participation which the curriculum prepares them to accord. If educators are not prepared to do that the civilization of the future is not likely to be successful at all.

For this responsibility it is not necessary that educational administrators be experts in all these fields of knowledge. They must be competent not as makers of any special product, but as users of all products. And not for themselves, but for society. The school program they make must epitomize, parallel, and anticipate a balanced life program for the people collectively, and thus cause such a life program to materialize. Their responsibility is to synthesize the contributions of specialists into a balanced utilization thereof. This is a task that cannot be well done by any specialized producer in any field; nor will such a synthesis result from the misjointed compromises of experts in the several fields. This

synthesis is an expert function, to be sure; but it calls for a very unusual expertness based upon a generalized knowledge for utilization, as distinguished from any specialized knowledge for production. In a sense it is a specialty in itself, except that it is unique among the professions in being a special function that is based not on specialized knowledge, but the exact opposite. The "major specialty" of the educational administrator's profession is paradoxical in being, not special at all, but as general as it can possibly be made. To specialize this profession (except for the minor specialty of technique) is, therefore, to *dis*qualify it. And posterity will be the victims.

The designing of a great educational program is analogous to the designing of a great cathedral. Neither a stonemason, a carpenter, a glazier, a painter, or any other artisan could build a cathedral. Nor could any committee of them all. To build a cathedral, an architect is required. The architect need not be competent himself to do the work of any of the specialists involved. But he must know what each can be expected to contribute; and he must be able to articulate their contributions together into a finished work of art. And there is a very real analogy between a cathedral and an educational program; for of each the significance is in its integral totality. Of an educational program the significance is that it makes possible an organized and balanced social life for a great population. And an educational program is like a cathedral in another respect also; for no cathedral ever duplicated any other exactly; and so, in an evolving society, each decade must see a new educational program that never was before. Now, as has been so often pointed out in these pages, such educational pioneering

always involves the intuitions of creative insight. It always must adventure beyond the bounds of any scientific technique whatsoever. Nothing is more important in educational thinking than to recognize that experiment goes beyond science. It may furnish data for later science; but there is no science that can prophesy in advance the outcome of a genuinely new adventure. And the point of our present contention is that such extra-scientific adventuring is always safest in the hands of those who have the broadest possible knowledge of life and society, of institutions and the intellectual resources by which they may be operated. On the other hand, those adventurous experiments by which education pioneers the future and exercises leadership are most likely to prove erratic freaks when conceived by narrow specialists and hobby riders, even if their hobby be the specialized technique of scientific method. There is no guarantee, of course, that educational innovations will prove sound; but the best available protection is not in a misconception of what science can do, but in an intellectual breadth and liberality of knowledge on the part of educational leaders. Educational pioneering is most likely to prove both safe and fruitful when conceived by philosophic minded men and women of broad and balanced enlightenment. A broadly informed and liberally educated professional personnel is, therefore, society's only safeguard; especially in such a period as ours when so much educational pioneering is inevitable.

Let us next observe what is likely to happen when the attempt is made to substitute a supposedly scientific technique for such a broad general knowledge. Take the problem, for example, of organizing a program in the social

studies. A much advocated technique has been to tabulate the topics found in current literature. For taking a cross section of what the public, however ignorant, happens to have been interested in during recent years, this technique may be scientific enough; but for ascertaining what an enlightened public ought to be informed about during the next decade or so, it is utterly worthless. We should smile if we were to read of a committee of twentieth century physicians trying to ascertain what their profession should prescribe for smallpox or diphtheria by making a statistical tabulation of remedies in popular use in the past. The inevitable result of making a program of social studies by this item counting method is that instruction is always in danger of arriving just too late. For instance, two closely related problems that have been of vital importance during the past few years, say since 1920, are federal regulation of child labor, and the state rights versus centralization issue. But of these items almost no mention would have been found in the public press between 1900 and 1920; the great corporations had not yet experienced their sudden awakening to the bonanza there is for them in the futilities of state regulation and taxation. Hence a curriculum based on the item counting technique would have left our present citizenry in ignorant defenselessness against the recent sudden barrage of propaganda. But if, during the last two decades, there had been in use a teaching program inferred from a comprehensive knowledge of economics, political science, and history *as taught by scholars in those fields*, public opinion would probably have been fortified against the recent drive. For such teaching would almost certainly have inoculated the public mind with certain principles, well known to

scholars, from which the deceit and menace of the decentralization propaganda could be quite easily inferred. What the public needs from the schools is advance information against the time when any topic in the field of the social sciences may suddenly become a conspicuous and highly emotionalized issue in the public attention. For anticipating such contingencies there cannot, in the nature of the case, be any air-tight scientific technique; but the most hopeful guidance is likely to come from men and women of broad and comprehensive scholarship in the fields of social science. For making a program of social studies there is no substitute for knowledge in those fields — the current cults and fads to the contrary notwithstanding.

Again: consider the problem of improving the offerings of a teachers' college. The investigator, to be scientific in such a case, tabulates the felt needs of recent graduates. They are asked to evaluate each of the topics in the basic courses, (*a*) as to its applicability to the problems they find themselves confronting, and (*b*) as to its contribution to such educational thinking as the college has just finished teaching them to think. Whereupon the offerings of the college are revised accordingly. But this technique ignores such an institution's responsibility to provide society with educational leadership for a generation to come. Not a high percentage of its undergraduate trainees, to be sure, will rise to such a function eventually; but their importance will be as that of a general to the privates in the ranks. If this technique were taken seriously, and given universal application (even to graduate training), society would eventually find itself supplied, for educational leadership, with gray-haired, blindered gradgrinds,

schooled to nothing but the thumb-nail tricks of the novice's trade, taught to regard the history of education as "bunk," and without sociological vantage ground for educational vision. Such a technique is science gone to seed; nothing could more completely emasculate educational statesmanship in the long run than a system of teacher training derived in this way. And society's only escape from such a tragedy is through administrators who are liberally cultured instead of merely cultish — or else through the fortunate pressures of common sense.

So much for the professional education of school administrators. It goes almost without saying that such training can by no means be confined to the general staff of the army of education. It must be participated in by the commissioned, and even by the non-commissioned, officers as well. There are at least three reasons for this. First, the generals come up from the ranks; second, the policies of educational leaders must have the intelligent support of subordinates; and, third, school policies are, and should be, coöperatively, rather than autocratically, formulated. From this it follows that all teachers who are ever to participate in the formulation of school policies should have a broad, liberal education. They should have it for classroom teaching also. Scientific evidence[1] is accumulating to suggest that supernormal children suffer from the lack of teachers who are adequately gifted and equipped. High school and even college specialists are often so ignorant of other subjects, and so narrow and uncultured, that they are disgusting to their most promising students. The bane of formal schooling is igno-

[1] The basis of this statement is in certain as yet unpublished studies by Professor M. J. Van Wagenen, of the University of Minnesota.

rant teachers devoid of sincere intellectual zeal. Society must find some means of providing its young people, especially its brighter ones, with more intelligent and highly cultured teachers; for knowledge and sheer joy in the intellectual life are the *sine qua non* of viable teaching. For this, technique, however sharp or scientific, is a crusty substitute indeed. To this vital aspect of good teaching we shall return shortly.

There is no occasion for misunderstanding the contentions of the present chapter. It is not intended to discount the importance of technique and the science of education. Nor does it overlook the fact that courses in education are sometimes so vitally related to life and culture as to render them more genuinely liberalizing than many courses in the academic colleges. Least of all does this imply that liberal culture is to be sought in the so-called cultural subjects of the traditional curriculum. The gist of the present contention is that the professional education of educators is becoming ill-balanced. Relatively too much attention is being given to the science of educational technique, and relatively too little to liberal education. And this unfortunate tendency is not only accelerating, but it is developing into a cult, with all the emotionalized mental attitudes thereof. Technique ought to be studied by prospective educators, to be sure; but not to the relative neglect of general culture. General culture the candidates are getting; but not enough of it relatively. If the candidate comes up through a normal school and a college of education, and then does graduate work in education, it is really surprising how narrowly he may be educated, in extreme cases. And nowadays there is a definite insistence in certain centers that

the graduate work of prospective educational administrators ought to be specialized and technical altogether. It seems a pity, especially in view of the fact that their maturity would render liberal cultural study so much more fruitful than it can possibly be on the undergraduate level.

At this point a paragraph might well be inserted on the causal relation between this tendency in contemporaneous education, and the vested interests to which such a movement quite naturally gives rise. But that can most effectively be left, perhaps, to the observation and intuition of the reader.

If society were static, and education had no *telic* function, the current emphasis in the professional education of educators would matter less. Oversight of the telic function of education is, in fact, exactly what the current emphasis does indicate. But let it once be keenly felt by educators that they are charged with telic responsibility in this great and critical period of social readjustment, and candidates for the profession will be given a very differently balanced ration of training than they are now being offered. Let them once see themselves as the educational statesmen which the age challenges them to become, and they will demand the meat of statesmen. If it is the world of the future which they are preparing themselves to predetermine, they should generalize in those sciences and near-sciences which treat of human nature, human institutions, and social evolution. The chief subdivisions of the major pedagogy are, therefore, biology, geography, anthropology, psychology, social psychology, economics, political science, sociology, ethics, history, and philosophy, not to mention the natural sciences and the fine arts. A profession well grounded in such a pedagogy as this will make the world safe for the new civilization; but the

present unilateral movement would tend to thwart that function of social leadership with which the age challenges the schools. It would tend to reduce educators to the status of pale parasites eating out of the hands of their economic masters, and turn the leadership of modern civilization over to an oligarchy of industrial imperialists. Nothing in modern civilization is more strategic, therefore, than the professional education of educators; and the present trends are in the wrong direction. Nothing could be more dangerous to posterity than a body of essentially ignorant educators, however sharpened they may be in a scientized technique for administering the schools as they now are.

* * * * * * *

There is a very close connection between general enlightenment as equipment for the educator, and the vital spark of all good teaching — to which the argument just promised shortly to return. For teaching is an art as well as a science, and as such it is, above all else, an emotionalized appreciation of knowledge and the cultural resources. A good teacher will be a somewhat better teacher, to be sure, if he is master of a good technique; but technique will not make a really good teacher out of one who lacks the artist's inspiration. In the technique of those school processes of which the results are tangible enough to be measured we are unquestionably improving; but in that less tangible, but, for the most viable minds, by far the more important aspect of teaching, which characterizes the really great teacher, the case is not so clear. The latter is something that cannot be listed in the offerings of normal schools and teachers' colleges, but without it their function is largely a failure.

Every reader of this book, in looking back over his high school and college career, can doubtless recall a few teachers, perhaps only one or two, who stand out in his memory as having really inspired him. History records in almost every age some school or system of schools that was conspicuous by reason of this sacred fire. There was Clark University during the presidency of G. Stanley Hall, there were some of the English Great Public Schools during the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, there was the school of Vittorino da Feltra at Padua, and there were the schools of ancient Athens. In the conduct of such schools there is seldom much self-conscious technology; but there is always something far more significant, namely, a magic touch by which the teacher is able to strike his pupils and make them ring, as an old German adage puts it.

What, now, is the secret of such a teacher's magic touch? Nothing mysterious; merely a contagious enthusiasm of the intellect. Such a teacher feels, in the first place, a sheer delight in knowledge as an end in itself. From it he derives a joy that is not second to the joy of eager play, or of personal success, or even of romantic love. In the second place, such a teacher displays a quasi-religious faith in knowledge as a means of enriching life. He sustains a fervid belief that knowledge of the right sort will bring to persons, to families, to communities, and to the nation as a whole, not merely wealth, but health, harmonious living, increased capacity for achievement, and every other kind of human welfare. He knows that art is a joyous common interest for the communion of housemates and neighbors; that science alone can solve such personal problems as health, prosperity, and even love; and that only in popular knowledge is there any escape

from the tangles of crime and poverty, class conflict and international war. And he teaches art, science, and philosophy accordingly. Now, such delight in learning, such zealous faith in knowledge, is contagious; it is one of those appreciations that we absorb from each other by unconscious imitation. And this is the secret of great teaching. It always has been, and it always will be.

During the half century just past the schools upon whose sacred altars this fire seems to have burned more brightly than perhaps anywhere else in the world are the Folk High Schools of Denmark. Visitors write of them with the utmost admiration; and immigrants who have attended them hold their memory as something almost sacred. The secret seems to be partly in the spirit of Bishop Grundtvig, which lives on in his disciples, the teachers, and partly in the spirit of the times and nation. Grundtvig conceived his great idea during the period of depression following the Napoleonic wars: it was essentially a faith in a new knowledge as a means of national rehabilitation. But it was not until after the disastrous war of 1864, when Denmark was crushed, humiliated, and helpless, that Grundtvig's idea took root in the minds of his disciples and of the Danish people generally. But then it was accepted as a great national faith; and that faith seems to have grown ever since, as it has demonstrated its validity. Hence the Danish youth go to schools in which the teachers are of idealistic temperament and consecration, and are imbued with a zealous faith in knowledge as the means of individual, social, and national salvation. And the schools bring forth their fruit accordingly. As related in Chapter XI they have transformed the Danish peasantry into the most successful, cultured, and contented agricul-

tural people in the world, and have made that little nation truly great.

The deepest necessity of American education is not a scientized technique, worthy and important as that is in its place, but something analogous to the spirit of Grundtvig and the Danish Folk High Schools. Our schools require a renewed faith in knowledge as the only means of a really satisfying life and permanently progressive society. Prerequisite to any such renascence is a deep, urgent, and very contrite sense of need. And there is plenty of occasion for such a feeling if only we had spiritual and social insight enough to realize it. For, individually, which of us is happy — with the breakdown of religious beliefs and moral standards, with the disintegration of family and community life, with the rivalries of fashionable and fastidious living, and with the excitements of jazz and the bright midnight lights? And as for our social outlook, it is only a smug, blind ignorance which can fail to see that, collectively, we are entering upon the most problematical period in recorded history, to say the least. What will the end of the twentieth century bring forth, with the world populated to the saturation point, with wealth concentrated as the present trends suggest, and with the resultant class and international conflicts rampant? If a sense of need is requisite to a national craving for a new knowledge there is indeed plenty of occasion. The time is fully ripe, therefore, for a second Grundtvig, or for a whole school of minor prophets, who can open our eyes to the fact that only in the popular distribution of knowledge is there dignity and worth of individual life, and a hopeful future for humanity. If the schools for the training of teachers do not kindle such a contagious intellectual enthusi-

asm in the minds of their students, to whom shall we turn instead? And, of this desideratum, an ill-balanced zeal for the scientizing of technique may become the active obstacle, unless it is conceived in proportionate relations. From this standpoint the false analogy, which it is the purpose of this chapter to expose, does not hold forth a promising outlook. For, of a half blind educational leadership, the sequel for civilization is the ditch.

The saving efficacy of knowledge, and the telic function of education, may, with the utmost propriety, be religiously conceived. For there is no service — absolutely none! — to which a religiously tempered idealist may consecrate himself with a more eager and exalted zeal. And such has been the attitude of the great educational leaders of all time. Whoever is familiar, side by side, with the heroes of religion and the heroes of education for the past twenty-five centuries must realize that in altruistic devotion and idealistic zeal the latter have never been inferior to the former. Plato's yearning for Greece at the inception of her decadence was no less solicitous nor religious than that of Jeremiah for Judea. Quintilian and Alcuin labored for humanity with as lofty purposes as Chrysostom did, or even Augustine. The zealots of the so-called Reformation period, Erasmus, Xavier, Melanchthon, Loyola, Luther, the Jesuits, and the Puritans, figure as conspicuously in the history of education as they do in the history of religion; and their motives were identical, in whichever story one encounters them. There is a tragedy, a pathos, and a spiritual grandeur in the life of Comenius that is surpassed in that of none of the saints. Those four great contemporaries of the early nineteenth century: Pestalozzi, Grundtvig, Herbart, and Froe-

bel, were all of them fundamentally religious in their attitudes and motivation. Grundtvig was a churchman — though more religious than the official church of his period; and his educational gospel for the salvation of modern Denmark was an integral part of his life work. Froebel's theories and practices of education were shot through and through with a metaphysical mysticism that was essentially spiritual. Herbart made morality the objective of education, but he conceived it with a broad spiritual significance; and the Herbartian movement that swept over American education a generation ago carried the flavor of a religious reawakening. Some of those who lived through it say that that was its most vital aspect. Pestalozzi was almost a fanatic, and certainly as religious in his mental processes as he was intellectual. His letter to his prospective bride, in which he sets above everything else, even above her, his consecration to his country and humanity, especially when considered in connection with the trials of his subsequent life by which he demonstrated his sincerity, has as sublime a tone as anything in the literature of religious experience. It is inspiring to follow Bishop Francis Asbury in his laborious travels on horseback from Maine to Georgia, and across the mountains into Kentucky and Ohio. But it is not one whit less inspiring to follow the biography of Horace Mann, struggling to school himself at Brown, sacrificing a promising legal and political career just as it was about to bear the ripened fruit of conspicuous success, tramping about Massachusetts in the snow, and kindling his own fires in little schoolhouses to preach the gospel of a better education, fighting a lifelong battle with disease, enduring the contemptuous effrontery of the fossil-minded Boston schoolmasters, and putting in the

last years of his life in the forlorn hope of a little western college. And what shall we say of Barnard, Harris, Sheldon, Colonel Parker, Stanley Hall, William James, and others of the generation just removed? Nor need one stop short of the living leaders; for among them are names that will rank, for quiet zeal and cantless devotion, with any of their contemporaries of the church.

In every normal school and college of education, may this fire burn continuously, day and night, upon the sacred altars. Without cant and ostentation, to be sure; but with a deep spiritual fervor all the more pervasive and imperious because it passes from soul to soul through an occasional meaningful glance of the eye or incidental utterance. If modern democracy is to be saved through the inspiration and guidance of education, the colleges of education must become the effectual power houses of our new spiritual life. For in the new religion of social progress the keystone is faith in art, science, and the new humanities.

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